SOMALIA: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND STABILITY

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BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
MARCH 16, 1994

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SOMALIA: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND STABILITY

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 16, 1994

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:02 p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Harry Johnston (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. JOHNSTON. We can call this meeting to order.

We have the luxury today of having one panel and one witness. I would like to welcome you to the Subcommittee on Africa's hearing on Somalia: Prospects for Peace and Stability.

The objective of this hearing is to assess current condition in Somalia and to explore prospects for peace and stability after the pull-out of U.S. troops.

I called this hearing to look toward the future and to explore ways in which we can constructively help the people of Somalia and not to dwell on past mistakes and point fingers. Certainly there are lessons we can learn from our mistakes and we will find an appropriate forum for such a discussion.

Prospects for peace and stability in Somalia remain elusive in the face of continued skirmishes and growing banditry in the countryside. In Kismayu, the security situation has deteriorated significantly over the past several months. Meanwhile, the security situation in Mogadishu seems uncertain.

Unfortunately, after billions of dollars and several thousands of casualties, Somalia is far from recovering. The humanitarian situation could deteriorate in the coming months unless a political settlement is achieved soon. According to some relief officials, pockets of famine have begun to reappear in some parts of Somalia.

Recent peace efforts by Somalis and Somalia's neighbors have been promising. The Aideed-led peace initiative in Nairobi seems hopeful. Most importantly, the Imam-led initiative in Mogadishu has brought the warring Hawiyee clans together. We are encouraged by this new development.

Meanwhile, another new initiative has been launched this week. President Mubarak of Egypt, the current chairman of OAU, held talks this week with the Group of Twelve, General Aideed's rivals, in Cairo. I am not optimistic about this initiative and it may be counterproductive since it could potentially undermine the two ongoing peace efforts.

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While the international community continues to focus on southern and central Somalia, the northwest section known as Somaliland has largely been neglected by the international community. Since the declaration of independence in May of 1991, assistance to Somaliland has been limited. I hope the Clinton administration will become more engaged in that part of Somalia as well.

This afternoon, we will hear from Ambassador David Shinn, Director of the East African Bureau and a former Somalia coordinator. We are pleased to have you here this afternoon, Ambassador Shinn.

We had also requested the Defense Department to send a representative to appear before this subcommittee. Unfortunately, our request was rejected.

Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your effort to keep the focus on Somalia during this critical period as the United States withdraws from the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Somalia.

In order to discuss today's topic, prospects for peace and stability, it may be helpful to our past actions in historical perspective.

When President Bush committed U.S. troops in December 1992 to help the starving people of Somalia, there were several flaws in this policy. By the very nature, Operation Restore Hope was always more than a simple humanitarian operation.

As Walter Clark, former charge at the U.S. liaison office in Somalia and now professor of international relations at the United States War College stated in "Parameters", the War College quarterly, the introduction of a substantial international force directly affected the internal lines of communication and balance of political forces of local leaders who had been at war with another for nearly 2 years.

It as only a matter of time before a violent response developed to this intervention unless, of course, the warlords could satisfy their political ambitions by working with the foreign forces.

Clark further goes on to point out that the UNITAF mission would be judged not by how many people it helped to feed but by the political situation it left behind. Further, that contrary to the assertions of certain Bush administration officials indicating disbelief in the existence of legitimate political forces in Somalia, U.S. diplomats in Mogadishu continued to receive pleas for action against the warlords.

Because of my own knowledge of the existence of these political forces, I was one who support U.N. General Secretary Boutris Boutris-Ghali's plea that the U.S. forces disarm the warring factions in early December 1992. Several defense experts I discussed the matter with said that coming off the victorious Gulf War we had the psychological and military advantage to do this with a minimum of casualties.

I was interested to hear General Shali, as President Clinton calls him, on Ted Koppel's show last night. In answering Ted's question about what went wrong in Somalia, he agreed we need to better articulate our policy. General Shali said I think I have said repeatedly that we need to do a much better job in articulating why it is important for the United States not to stand idly by when it
comes time to help implement a peace plan but also what the risks would be involved in our involvement in such an operation.

In looking back on our own congressional process, we could also have done a better job of informing the American people that such operations could mean casualties as we should be prepared to make the sacrifice if we allow ourselves to become involved in that it will not be an operation that can be done absent casualties.

Later in the program, General Shali agreed that if the United States commits ground troops in Bosnia, we should be prepared for the possibility of casualties. That is what it is all about. It is unfortunate but it is reality and it is truth and if we are going to be true to the American people and true to ourselves, there will be casualties.

I like General Shali’s closing comments. Americans have understood perhaps better than most that freedom is not free and that to gain the sort of world that we all hunger for for our children, we sometimes have to make that sacrifice.

Possibly if we had prepared the American people better, there would have been the political will to stay the course for a more orderly withdrawal in Somalia. I was one who also opposed a date certain for withdrawal long before the incidents occurred.

Recent reports of violence again between Indian troops under the U.N. and warring factions, as well as uncoordinated peace talks that are unable to achieve consensus, do not bode well for the future in Somalia.

I hope Mr. Shinn can give us some encouraging words and I am disappointed that the Defense Department saw fit to cancel the appearance of Mr. Slocum here today.

Mr. Chairman, because of the significance of Mr. Clark’s article and the transcript of Mr. Koppel’s interview with General Shali last night, I would appreciate the opportunity to submit both documents as part of the record of this meeting.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Donald Payne and information referred to appear in the appendix.]

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you very much. Do you have a copy of the transcript from last night?

Mr. PAYNE. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSTON. How in the world did you get that?

Mr. PAYNE. High Tech.

Mr. JOHNSTON. If I could get a copy of it, too, I would appreciate it.

And I adopt everything you say, Congressman Payne. The American public does not realized that in the 13 months that we were in Somalia we lost 30 troops, all of whom volunteered. It is not like Vietnam where they were drafted. All of whom volunteered again to be in the Rangers, which is a combat operation, and we saved 400,000 Somalis from starving to death.

We lost just as many in 5 days in Panama and 9 days in Grenada but the American public has not the slightest idea of that content.

After all that pontification on my part, Ambassador, we appreciate your coming today. Our next vote is at 7 o’clock, so you have 4 hours and 50 minutes.
Mr. Shinn. Mr. Chairman, I have a 2-minute statement and I will take questions for 3 hours and 58 minutes.

STATEMENT OF DAVID SHINN, DIRECTOR, EAST AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Shinn. Mr. Chairman, Congressmen, I want to thank you for this opportunity to discuss Somalia today. Your continued interest in this difficult problem is very welcome to us and I say that sincerely. It is always a pleasure to meet with the Foreign Affairs Committee and particularly the Subcommittee on Africa.

We are quickly approaching another threshold in American involvement in Somalia. In the post-March 31 period in which we will no longer be militarily involved, in reaching this new stage, we have taken stock of what has gone before and we find that we have every reason to be proud of what the United States has done in Somalia.

Our involvement was prompted by a human disaster of massive proportions, largely the result of an enormously destructive civil war. There is no longer widespread starvation. In mid-1992, before we became involved, anywhere from 1000 to 3000 people were dying daily from starvation. There are now only isolated cases of starvation-related deaths. Through food distribution programs, 167,000 people receive food daily. Before our involvement and that of the United Nations, 80 percent of the relief food for Somalis was stolen. Now, well over 80 percent reaches the intended population.

Before our intervention, agricultural production had completely ceased. Now crops are grown and harvested throughout much of the country. In mid-1992, less than five hospitals were functioning and there were no maternal and child health care centers. There are now 32 hospitals and 81 maternal child health care centers in operation. In mid-1992, no schools were operating; 234 are operating now.

The March 31 withdrawal of American combat troops from Somalia was announced by President Clinton in a statement last October 7. That was nearly 6 months ago, during which President Clinton said Somalis would be given a reasonable chance to rebuild their country but the outcome would be determined by Somalis themselves. “It is not our job to rebuild Somalia’s society,” he said, “or even to create a political process that can allow Somalia’s clans to live and work in peace. The Somalis must do that for themselves. The United Nations and many African states are more than willing to help but we—we in the United States—must decide whether we will give them enough time to have a reasonable chance.”

We have since been working on the things the President said we would do to help Somalis make use of that time in order to gain control of their destiny. Recognizing that a continued U.N. military role would be essential in protecting humanitarian assistance, we have encouraged others to do their part in providing forces to UNOSOM, the United Nations Organization in Somalia.

We have provided equipment to support UNOSOM military contingents and to help prepare them for carrying on work our forces have done. After March 31, the UNOSOM force is expected to have about 18,000 non-American troops which will be largely engaged in
protecting major seaport and airports and keeping routes open for the delivery of relief supplies.

We have continued our humanitarian assistance. The humanitarian conference convened by the United Nations in Addis Ababa late last November brought together nearly all the Somali factions and the international aid donors. The donors were able to describe to the Somalis what assistance would be lost if violence continued unchecked. The donors collectively agreed that the future of Somalia is in the hands of Somalis themselves, a position which has since been repeatedly emphasized.

Following agreements reached at this conference, the donors have organized under U.N. leadership a more effective mechanism for coordinating assistance.

We have actively encouraged political reconciliation among Somalis, both through our own efforts and support for those of the United Nations. Talks underway in Nairobi have the potential for significant progress.

There have been other talks, most particularly in Addis Ababa last March and again in December, which have laid a reasonable foundation for establishing an interim central government. But the necessary political concessions have not yet been made. Somali leaders seem too preoccupied with pursuing narrow agendas and insufficiently dedicated to the cause of rebuilding their country.

The immediate focus of the talks in Nairobi is an initiative to obtain a peace agreement for Kismayu. At the urging of Ambassador Lansana Kouyate, the U.N. Secretary General's acting Special Representative in Somalia, the leaders of the factions concerned in the strife in Kismayu are meeting in Nairobi this week. A settlement on Kismayu could lead to broader discussions on national peace objectives. A proposal for an interim government has been tabled by the Group of Twelve headed by Ali Mahdi. We anticipate that Somali National Alliance leader General Aideed will issue his own proposal in Nairobi.

These talks are complimented by discussions in Mogadishu under the aegis of the Iman of Herab, whose traditional position of influence spans the Hawiyye sub-clans to which both Ali Mahdi and Aideed belong. The Imam's initiative has constructively added the voices of highly respected religious leaders and elders to those of many other Somalis weary of strife and who now want to get on with the rebuilding of their country.

While March 31 brings an end to our military role, it by no means brings an end to our involvement in Somalia. We intend to stay engaged for as long as security conditions permit. We will maintain a diplomatic and AID presence in Mogadishu. We will provide a base for maintaining contact with Somalis and for continuing to encourage political reconciliation.

We are increasing the number of AID personnel working on Somalia programs, particularly to take advantage of reconstruction and development opportunities in suitable areas away from Mogadishu, and including Mogadishu if necessary. We have made available approximately $65 million this year for food aid and other forms of humanitarian and economic assistance. Up to $45 million is committed to help U.N. efforts to rebuild Somalia's police force. Along with other countries, we are providing personnel to help
train the police. We are also meeting the U.N.’s request to provide personnel to help UNOSOM with contracting and logistics.

As President Clinton said, it is up to Somalis to seize this opportunity. Both positive and negative factors are at work. There is still considerable violence and lawlessness. Large parts of Somalia are generally peaceful but there is a disturbing trend in the increasing number of armed attacks on the nongovernmental organizations through which international assistance is distributed, including that provided by the United States. This is most noticeable in the southern and central parts of Somalia where employees of nongovernmental organizations are sporadically attacked, sometimes with loss of life, forcing in some cases at least temporary suspension of operations.

We are impressing on Somali leaders that the departure of these organizations would end the means by which humanitarian assistance is distributed.

The southern port city of Kismayu has been the site of recent fighting. That has abated, although the factions concerned appear prepared for further combat if the current peace initiative fails.

Nothing in Somalia, however, compares with Mogadishu where the stakes are greatest and the threat of strife is constant. Last week, inter-clan fighting resulted in the brief closing of the airport. Positions held by UNOSOM military contingents have been under increasing fire. The trend toward greater violence adds urgency to the reconciliation efforts, a point we have repeatedly stressed.

We are proud of our record in Somalia. We intend to remain engaged there and will continue to demonstrate our interests in Somalia’s political and economic reconstruction.

In economic terms, our emphasis along with other donors will be on helping those Somalis who are willing to provide the necessary security and cooperation for assistance programs to work.

In political terms, we are making it clear to Somalis that the fate of their country is in their hands. The United States and other countries cannot decide their future for them.

Mr. Chairman, with those remarks, I would be happy to answer any questions that you have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shinn appears in the appendix.]

Mr. JOHNSTON. We are very pleased to have the ranking member of the full committee with us today, Congressman Gilman.

Do you have an opening statement?

Mr. GILMAN. I welcome the Ambassador to our committee and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for arranging this at an appropriate time as our troops get ready to leave Somalia. I think it is extremely important that we take a look at what the future holds for Somalia and what the options are for our own nation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Let me, if I may, just kind of go through your testimony.

We are still feeding 167,000 people daily?

Mr. SHINN. Yes. That is an estimate, of course, and the figure is going to vary a little bit from day to day. And most of that is going on outside of Mogadishu. A lot of this, there is a fair amount of pipeline food that is either in Somalia or is perhaps still trickling in although I suspect most of it is in warehouses on the ground.
That number is far smaller than what it used to be. I cannot give you the old figure but it is a much diminished number.

Mr. JOHNSTON. What are the prospects of weaning them off that? Last year, they said they had one of the best crops after the drought was over.

Mr. SHINN. Well, unfortunately—you are right. Last year was a good crop year but unfortunately this year is turning out to be a near disastrous year throughout the greater Horn of Africa area. In fact, it is one of the issues that we are now talking about in the Department of State for doing some heads-up briefing on the Hill because the picture is just starting to become clearer to us.

The situation in Somalia, quite frankly, is not as bad as it is in some of the neighboring countries. And I know we are not here to talk about those areas today but the fact remains that spotty, drought-related rain lacking areas of Somalia are resulting in a poorer crop this year. Some areas are not too bad but some areas are rather poor.

The biggest problem, however, is going to be the security issue. Even in those areas where the crops are growing, if the farmers cannot safely move that crop from the area where it has been grown to areas where it can be sold and profitably used by people, you have basically the same problem. It will be wasted grain on the ground if there are transportation problems.

There are not serious problems in this regard yet but this could create another difficulty.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Well, it appears to be starting on a serious vein when there is a 20 percent attrition rate of the food from the time it hits the country before it is distributed.

Mr. SHINN. You are right. It is a problem. The only thing I can say is that it is a far less problem than it was at the beginning of this operation where an enormous percentage, roughly 80 percent of the food, was simply not getting to the people to whom it really should be getting.

Somebody was obviously eating the food. It is not as though it were being totally wasted. But it was not getting to the people who needed it most.

There still is a fallout factor in the food that is going in and I think in any massive program of this kind, in an area where you still have considerable instability, a 20 percent rate is probably within the realm of the acceptable.

Mr. JOHNSTON. When we leave in 2 weeks, there will still be 18,000 troops in Somalia from other countries. What will be the attrition rate of these troops? How many Indians, how many Egyptians, how many Pakistanis will stay?

Do we have any long-term commitment from the other countries?

Mr. SHINN. Well, it depends how you define long-term. If you are talking mid-summer as long-term, and I suspect you are not, there are very few commitments that go beyond mid-summer. That is, the July, August, September timeframe. In fact, there may be only one or two commitments that go that far ahead. But this is not unusual. None of these countries is willing to commit way out ahead. And even if they did, it would not be a terribly realistic commitment. If things were to go very sour in the country, they would clearly pull their troops out whether they had committed or not.
What I can say, though, is that the figure of 18,000 is a figure which is a virtual certain figure for up until the end of April. Now, out of that 18,000, it is likely that the Moroccans who constitute 1375 may not remain much beyond the end of April. That is a fairly significant drop at the end of April.

On the other hand, offsetting that, we think, will be new deployments from Indonesia some time between now and into April from Indonesia of 250, Pakistan an additional 1500 and Zimbabwe 1000. These are not necessarily hard and fast and there could be some fallout on these increments but as far as we know they are still on track. So that would take the figure actually above 18,000 again if they all showed up.

There are no other major countries among the current troop contributors whom we are aware of that plan to leave in the May-June timeframe. The other major contributors are Pakistan, India, Malaysia and Zimbabwe and as far as we know they are firm into the summer in any event.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Let me talk to you about spending $45 million and committing help to rebuild a police force in a country as unstable and has no governmental infrastructure as Somalia does. You are handing guns to people who belong to some clan, probably all to the same clan in a particular geographic area. What is the wisdom of this policy?

Mr. SHINN. If I could spell out just very briefly what our program consists of then and I will answer your question directly.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Please.

Mr. SHINN. The total American commitment to rehabilitating the police force in Somalia is approximately $45 million figure and it breaks down into $25 million worth of DOD equipment and the transportation of that equipment, mainly vehicles, but as you pointed out including weapons and including ammunition for those weapons.

It includes a $6 million grant to the United Nations to set up the justice system. When we say police program, we are really talking about three different components of it: police, penal and the justice system. We are not doing anything on the penal side but we are in both justice and police.

It includes $2 million that has already been given to the United Nations to pay for police salaries and it includes a $12 million package out of the peacekeeping fund which is a training program and a rehabilitation of police stations program which is being done by ICITAP out of the Department of Justice. This makes a grand total of $45 million.

Now, the wisdom of reestablishing the police in Somalia? First off, I take your point that it is in effect a calculated risk. As you point out, this is not something that is going to happen without difficulties. There will be problems along the way. We are starting to see some of them already.

The fact remains, though, that with the drawdown of the UNOSOM force, with the departure particularly of the Americans, it was realized a long time ago, in fact, way back in the beginning when Robert Oakley was on the ground under UNITAF, one of the first things we had to do was to get a Somali component to the security apparatus in Somalia.
When Oakley was there, they actually reconstituted some of the formerly existing police and managed to get a few uniforms from the Italians and a handful of weapons that had been confiscated from some of the warring clans and handed out a few of these weapons to the policemen. So the police have in effect been in existence in Somalia throughout the period from December 9, 1992 when we sent our troops in but they have not been particularly effective and they have been usually unarmed.

Enormous efforts have been made ever since the early months of UNITAF to try to create a professional police force and to increase their numbers. Their numbers got up to about 5,000 on this voluntary basis or by being paid with a little food and a little money.

As I understand it, the numbers today are around 7,000. The idea is to get them up to around 10,000. And eventually to turn over to them the vehicles, the weapons. These have not been turned over yet because the administrative apparatus is not adequate yet to ensure that the program has a reasonable chance of working.

But I would be the first to admit that even when we think that it is at the point of working, there are going to be some occasional missteps here. You are going to have the occasional member of the police force who misuses his weapon or decides to pass the weapon on to someone else. You are probably going to have a few vehicles lost in this process with bandits or someone attacking the police.

This is inevitable that this happen a few times. The goal is to keep it to an absolute minimum but in the meantime recreate a viable police force for which Somalia has a good history. The national police force in Somalia was one of the better institutions in the country but it is going to mean retraining. It is going to mean getting a better mix of people into the police force. It is going to mean weeding out some of those that are there now. Some of them are too old to be effective; some of them are perhaps too linked to factional politics to be effective. There has to be a weeding process and this is what is supposed to be going on from this point forward. But it is a calculated risk.

The alternatives are not very good. It means no local Somali security apparatus and we think that would be a mistake.

Mr. JOHNSTON. You know, my questioning is going to be on a vein of cynicism and I am sorry but I see a jeep and a gun in Somalia, I see a technical and that is just history.

If I were a police officer in Bidaa or Kismayu, who would be my superior? What is the chain of command? What is the criminal justice system in these two towns?

I have ignored Mogadishu because that is kind of an aberration of lawlessness.

Mr. SHINN. What you have in Somalia now is a system where there are some enormous variations and the ability of the police to function reasonably well or not to function much at all. You also have something of a variation in terms of the authority structure. The initial idea under the police program was to turn over authority to the district councils which would have been set up throughout much but not all of the country.

After working on that premise for some months, it was decided that that was probably not the best way to go, that in some cases
the district councils did not adequately represent local authority. In some cases, they simply were not appropriate. They were not up to the job. And therefore people started looking around for a new way to deal with the creation and the standing up of the police.

What they have decided to do initially, as a stop-gap measure, is to have the police work much more closely with the UNOSOM forces in the field, to do joint patrols with them, to do some joint training with the UNOSOM troops, to work hand in glove with them. Only at some later date the police will be turned over to local Somalia political authority because they are just not at a position to do that yet.

The UNOSOM headquarters operation has a justice division which will oversee the administrative aspects of the program. That is, getting the money out to the field and making sure the police get paid. But the real hard part during the short term, perhaps even going into the medium term is going to be working very closely with UNOSOM troops in the field.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Congressman Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Yes. Thank you.

The situation in Somaliland, what is functioning there and are things still as normal as they have been all along?

And then, actually, finally, I guess, what is the future, in your opinion of the so-called Somaliland?

Mr. SHINN. The situation has not significantly changed in recent months. I would say it is essentially the same. Somaliland, also referred to as Northwest Somalia, has been generally more peaceful than the southernmost part of Somalia. I would not say that it has been any more peaceful than the northeastern part of Somalia but if you compare it with the area south of the road that goes from Belet Weyne to Mogadishu it has been more peaceful. But it has not been free of difficulty. All you have to do is go into the airport and have money extorted by local militia there before you can go on into Hargeysa to realize that the airport at Hargeysa, which is the capital of Somaliland, is not totally under the authority of the political rulers in Hargeysa.

There also are occasional problems involving kidnapping of expatriate personnel in Somaliland or extortion of funds from the demining operation because people are unhappy with the salaries they pay. But all in all, it has been a generally containable situation as compared to what has been happening much further south.

Mr. Egal, who is the leader in Northwest Somalia at the request of the local congress, local assembly that was held there some time ago, has made very clear his view of the future of Somaliland. He would like it to secede from the rest of Somalia and to become independent. He is arguing very strongly for that position, not only with other Somalis, but with foreigners.

Our position on this is very clear. We think this is not the time to be talking about the independence of any piece of Somalia until such time as one has a government or at least a semblance of a Somali Government organized in the South. It seems that it would be inappropriate to make an irrevocable decision upon what happens to a former part of the country in the Northwest.

So our position from the very beginning on the northwest part of Somalia has been that we prefer to take no position which would
prejudice the future outcome of Northwest Somalia. In other words, we will not do anything that implies independence on the one hand nor will we do anything which indicates that it must become part of Somalia on the other.

As far as my own view as to where it is likely to go in the future, I think that it is perfectly reasonable at some point to have a nationwide plebiscite on Somaliland. What the result of that would be, I have no idea. But I think that if the vote were held on a nationwide basis as opposed to just the people of Northwest Somalia voting, there probably would be considerable opposition to independence.

Mr. PAYNE. OK. Thank you.

Mr. JOHNSTON. The Congressman has graciously yielded to the ranking member.

Mr. GILMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding and since I have to attend another meeting I did want to get a couple of questions in.

I want to welcome Ambassador Shinn before us.

To date, how many peacekeepers have been killed in Somalia, our forces and other forces?

Mr. SHINN. I will ask one of my colleagues if he has that figure. In combat, 30 Americans have been killed and I think I remember a figure of—my recollection is, and I saw that figure not long ago, 120 sticks in my mind but I would have to get back to you, Congressman, to be absolutely precise. But that is close.

Mr. GILMAN. All right. If you could just notify the committee and,

Mr. Chairman, I would like to include an accurate figure.

Has anti-American sentiment grown or declined in recent months in Somalia?

Mr. SHINN. I would say there has been essentially no change in recent months. Certainly there has been an improvement since mid October in terms of our relationship with General Aideed and the SNA. The anti-Americanism that was very clear and very loud leading up to that period has disappeared.

I do not see any indications of anti-Americanism per se in the country. There is occasionally what you might call an antiforeign attitude by some Somalis and I am sure there are some Somalis who have lost loved ones in the fighting since the arrival of UNITAF and UNOSOM who harbor grudges. But beyond that, I think it would be inaccurate to say that there is any significant outpouring of anti-Americanism today.

Mr. GILMAN. Will our U.S. mission remain open after our troops leave, Ambassador?

Mr. SHINN. Yes, It will remain open, obviously security conditions permitting. But we are operating on the assumption that it will be open, that security conditions will permit. We are anticipating that the American Government presence in Somalia after March 31 will be approximately 100 and let me break that down for you.

Half of that number would be a security contingent to protect the AID and the diplomatic presence that remains there. It is the same group that is there right now, what we call the FAST Marines and they now number 50. That group would stay on for 3 months, at least 3 months, beyond March 31. The other 50 persons would con-
sist of the AID and the diplomatic presence plus the ICITAP police training presence, although they consist of TDYers coming and going. Because one is always replacing another, they for all practical purposes are there in a permanent capacity. And the last remaining group, probably about a dozen, would be people assigned on the UNOSOM staff in an expert capacity, totally noncombat but there would be probably about a dozen of them. The grand total being just about 100 official Americans left, both military and civilian.

Mr. Gilman. We have an arrangement to build a Somali police force and rebuild their justice department, do we not?

Mr. Shinn. That is correct.

Mr. Gilman. Will that be ongoing and will that continue after our troops leave?

Mr. Shinn. Absolutely. In fact, it is really only now just getting underway. There have been an awful lot of delays in this program and we have been very disappointed with the slowness in getting it set up but it is very much ongoing.

Mr. Gilman. Mr. Ambassador, how much is the United States providing to support the police force program?

Mr. Shinn. We are providing $45 million.

Mr. Gilman. How many people are we training?

Mr. Shinn. I cannot tell you how many we, the United States, are training because a lot of other countries are involved in the training. There will be a grand total of about 10,000 police, it is anticipated, when they all are trained over a 2-year period of time. Because ours is the biggest program, we will train clearly the biggest chunk of that 10,000 but I cannot break it down. But countries like Italy, Germany, the U.K., Botswana, even Ghana, Egypt, Nigeria, Zambia——

Mr. Gilman. They are all involved in training?

Mr. Shinn. Are all involved in training with small numbers of people. Two, three, four, five persons each.

Mr. Gilman. Who is administering the training with all of those countries involved?

Mr. Shinn. The overall administration is being done by the UNOSOM justice division.

Mr. Gilman. I see. Are we contributing to the support of the new justice program for the government?

Mr. Shinn. We contributed $6 million for creating the justice program in Somalia. That has been turned over to the United Nations and that program has been very slow to get off the mark.

Mr. Gilman. Do these programs have the support of the Somali leaders, whoever they may be?

Mr. Shinn. I can say yes to that in a generic way. All of the Somali leaders, Aideed, Ali Mahdi, Morgan, all of the others have emphasized to us the absolute essentiality of recreating the Somali police force. That is one of the relatively few things that I have seen Somalis agree on in Somalia.

Now, they may have different ways of going about it. Aideed has his own proposal for standing up the police and I suspect the others have a slightly different idea and I do not want to suggest that there is total agreement on how you go about it. But on the general concept of recreating the police, I think there is unanimity.
Mr. Gilman. There has been some criticism about supporting a police force without a government in place. How do you feel about that?

Mr. Shinn. Congressman, all I can say is I am not sure there is any better alternative. It is not an ideal arrangement, clearly. Just as though it is not ideal to recreate a penal and a judicial system before you have legitimized political authority. But is the old chicken and the egg question. One has to get started and security is just so critical to getting on with anything in the country. We think that the police will make a major contribution to reestablishing security; we see no alternative to it. In the ideal world, one would not do this but we simply do not have the ideal world here.

Mr. Gilman. Some observers have suggested that the recruitment process for the new police force is largely focused on the former Somali police. Do you share that view?

Mr. Shinn. That is an accurate statement and it is one of the things that to some extent has to change. There are too many of the former Somali policemen who are too old, who are not really up to the task any more. They must be carefully vetted. Some of them removed. And this is part of the ongoing process that is just getting underway now.

Mr. Gilman. What would be the dangers to our personnel in our embassy once our troops are gone? Will there be a major threat to them?

Mr. Shinn. We do not think so. The biggest threat at the moment is a more general breakdown of law and order unrelated to any interfacational fighting. But if the sort of atmosphere develops that the only way to make a living is to go out and steal something and use your weapon to do it, then there will be serious problems. We are working on the assumption that most Somalis do not, in fact, the vast majority of Somalis, do not accept that as a way of life and they will help to reestablishing the police and, with the UNOSOM forces, to prevent that kind of a breakdown. But that is the biggest threat we face today.

Mr. Gilman. One last question. I thank the chairman for allowing me.

According to the press reports, and you indicated also Egyptian President Mubarak has launched a new Somali peace initiative. Can you tell us if there is any substance to that initiative and have we endorsed that initiative? Do we encourage President Mubarak to move ahead in that manner? And what are the prospects for his success?

Mr. Shinn. I am not sure I would characterize what happened in Cairo as a new peace initiative. What he did was to invite ultimately all representatives of all 15 of the factions that signed the Addis Ababa agreement in March to come to Cairo and to sit down and talk.

Now, in the final analysis, only the Group of Twelve, the group that is opposed to General Aideed, sent representatives and interestingly they sent precisely the same 12 representatives who signed the Addis Ababa document in March of 1993. The signatures are identical.

The other four groups who are aligned with General Aideed did not show up. Actually, one representative of one group showed up
but he was in Cairo, he was not in the meetings. Therefore, what came out of Cairo was a position paper by the Group of Twelve and as a position paper I think it is fine. It represents the position of that group. But it is not a document from which General Aidedd is willing to work. He will present, we assume, his own position paper. You will have the two on the table and then someone has got to try to narrow the gaps in the positions. And that is what you have there.

We were not party to the meeting that took place in Cairo. When we learned about it, we had some serious reservations about it. It went ahead anyway. And I think that the outcome still conceivably could be positive if it is treated as nothing more than a G–12 position.

Mr. Gilman. Are we willing to be a catalyst in that area?

Mr. Shinn. Well, we not only are willing to be a catalyst but we continue to try to be. The last visit made by Ambassador Oakley was, I guess, 4 weeks ago now or maybe 5. Ambassador Dobbins led a small group out to the area accompanying General Shalikashvili this past weekend. He was in Nairobi earlier this week meeting with all of the Somali factional leaders together with Ambassador Bogosian from our USLO operation. I will be going out to the region later this week and will be in Somalia just after March 31. I will also be in and out of Nairobi a number of times and hope to meet with factional leaders in Nairobi. So we very much are willing to play the role of the catalyst but it is at the point where in our view the key is for Somalis to sort this out themselves. There is only so much that outsiders can do at this juncture and I think we have to be careful about mucking around too much in their business. We want to know what is going on, we want to monitor the situation, we want to nudge a little bit where we can be helpful but we have to be careful about how deeply involved we are at this juncture.

Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Johnston. Thank you, Mr. Gilman.

We appear to have a lot of students in the audience today. Just to tell you what we are doing, we are the Subcommittee on Africa of the Foreign Affairs Committee. We are having a hearing today on Somalia and what happens to Somalia after the end of this month when the American troops withdraw. Our witness today is Ambassador Shinn, who is the Under Secretary of State for Eastern Africa who has, what, 12 countries under your jurisdiction?

Mr. Shinn. I have 12 countries but you just promoted me enormously. My title is Director of East African Affairs. I will be happy to accept the promotion any day.

Mr. Johnston. Congratulations, Ambassador. I am trying to puff you up for the students out here. We will have you Warren Christopher before the day is over.

Mr. Shinn. That is fine, too.

Mr. Johnston. Congressman Payne.

Mr. Payne. Thank you.

Just in regard to the meeting that Representative Gilman was talking about, who coordinated the meeting?

Who asked for it? Who called for it?
Was it under U.N. jurisdiction that Mr. Mubarak as a member of the OAU called it or OAU meeting, U.N. also then since it is sort of a sub-body?

Could you enlighten us about that?

Mr. SHINN. I will enlighten you to the extent that I am knowledgeable about it. To the best of my knowledge, the U.N. had no role in that meeting. Now, it is conceivable something happened that I am unaware of in which they were involved but I do not believe so.

This was a meeting that was discussed between the Egyptians on the one hand and one or more of the members of the G–12 on the other, probably not all of them but certainly several of them, and the agreement was to have the meeting in Cairo. We got involved in the act rather late when we heard that it was taking place. We emphasized to the Egyptians and emphasized to all the Somali parties that any future Government of Somalia must be all-inclusive, that it really does not make any sense to pursue a government which excludes a critical element of the body politic and it looked to us at the beginning that that meeting might be headed in that direction.

It is our understanding that the Government of Egypt did invite all of the factions, all 15 factions, although as I say only the 12 showed up and participated in the deliberations.

Mr. PAYNE. Would not it be kind of difficult, I guess, for—although Egypt being the largest and probably one of the strongest Middle East countries or Islamic countries that would relate to Somalia, because of the previous relationship between Egypt and the former dictator and the manner in which Boutris Boutris-Ghali seemed to be despised in Somalia, it would seem that the person fighting against the former dictator that both the United States supported and Egypt because I guess—since we were helping them out financially, I suppose their role was to support the U.S. position. Does that make it difficult for Egypt to really broker Aideed who was the major opponent of the former government?

Mr. SHINN. Well, certainly in the eyes of some Somalis and including those who I think are supporters of General Aideed. Yes, it does make matters very difficult. It makes it very hard for the Egyptians to play a neutral role.

Clearly the G–12 factions have no problem with this. I mean, they willingly went to Cairo and participated in the talks there. But, yes, you are absolutely right, it does pose a difficulty for Aideed and probably some others, too.

Mr. PAYNE. Just one and I will let the chairman have the time back. About how many refugees? We visited refugees down in the Mombasa area and all through northern Kenya. Do you know the number of refugees still out of Somalia, either in Kenya or in Yemen and all around, Djibouti and Kenya?

Mr. SHINN. I may be able to if I can read quickly here and identify a number.

OK. There are currently over 545,000 Somali refugees. In Kenya, out of that number, are 300,000, Ethiopia 140,000, Yemen 55,000 and Djibouti, 50,000. Now, I hope that math adds up because I have not checked this before giving you those numbers, but that should be 545,000.
Now, these numbers are month or two old. I doubt if they have changed very much since then. We are not aware of any significant refugee movements.

Mr. PAYNE. OK. That was going to be my other question. Do you know whether at one point there was a movement back? But I assume that is slowed down?

Mr. SHINN. It is not significant. There is a slow filtering back, particularly from Kenya, but those numbers have not been terribly significant.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. JOHNSTON. The refugees we interviewed in Mombasa almost to a person said that they would not return to Somalia until Aideed had been neutralized, to coin a term.

We are still debating what we learned from our intervention in Vietnam. What did we learn from Somalia?

Mr. SHINN. It is interesting you should ask that. I spent all of yesterday afternoon at a lessons learned session that was organized by OFDA of AID looking specifically at the humanitarian side. But we went far beyond the humanitarian side and we did not get anywhere close to exhausting in just the half-day that I was there, it was an all-day session, the lessons learned. They are numerous, some of them are major, some of them are not so major.

The major ones would include such things as—and I ask this as a legitimate rhetorical question, I do not know the answer to it and I am not suggesting a response one way or the other, can the United Nations take on a Chapter VII operation of this magnitude, is it really feasible, and should we ever expect the U.N. to do this kind of thing again?

I would like to think we could answer that in the affirmative but someone has to ask a very real question as to whether it can be done.

Now, I would argue that the Somali experience in many ways is unique. Not in all ways but in many ways is unique and perhaps is more difficult than the vast majority of any foreseeable Chapter VII operation. It is a very big question, particularly when the U.N. was trying to do 17 peacekeeping operations at the same time. It was clearly overextended and we left them an enormous burden when we left after the end of UNITAF.

Another major lesson learned out of all of this is the command and control issue. If the U.N. is going to do it, there has to be a far better understanding among all the troop contributing countries as to what the command and control rules are and an agreement to follow them. Every country had a somewhat different understanding about command and control. In some cases, it was clear cut and clearly understood from the beginning, as in the case of the United States. In other countries it was neither understood from the beginning nor was any U.N. policy really followed once they arrived.

One of the lessons learned is better consultation with the Hill. There have been periods where we should have—where even though the Hill was not necessarily asking us to come up, in retrospect, we should have been more proactive. We should have come up here and collared people and said, hey, you have got to hear
what is going on whether you really want to hear it or not. And I think we should have done more of that.

I think on some elements of this Somalia exercise there has been very good consultation with the Hill and generally a pretty solid understanding on both sides. But there have been other periods where it has not been very good, when things sort of broke down from our optic over an apparent lack of interest.

Now, maybe it was, maybe it was not, that does not excuse us from the fact that we could have come up and asked for hearings or asked for briefings.

Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Chairman, would you yield?

Mr. JOHNSTON. Certainly.

Mr. PAYNE. On the question that you mentioned at the early part on the troops and the command, we saw that when we were there on a couple of occasions, that a command would be given to the Italian unit and they wanted to call Rome and get the legislators to discuss it and get back to the headquarters in Rome and then back about a command. Do you think that there is a possibility or whether it would be wise to have a different kind of an operation of sort of a really volunteer volunteer U.N. force that would be under the command of the U.N. and not under the command of 28 different capitals around the world? I do not know, sort of like—I guess a bad example but the old French Foreign Legion. You know, if you just got there, that was it. You were there. Has there ever been any notion to that so that you would simply have a commander that would command and not be second-guessed?

Mr. SHINN. We are getting a little bit beyond my area of expertise. I am really focused on Somalia and one can draw some lessons from Somalia. I can say that the option that you just laid out has been discussed. It is one of many options that is being looked at by a group that I am not involved in. It is looking at peacekeeping generally based on experiences around the world, not just Somalia. And since I have not been party to those discussions, I am a little reluctant to say very much about it.

My impression is that people were less enthusiastic about that particular option than some of the other options under consideration. For example, I think another option is to have designated units where they do not join the U.N., they are not part of the U.N., but they are preidentified and there might be some training by these units and if there were a problem conceivably they could be drawn upon. But this is really an area that goes well beyond my expertise, I am afraid.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.

Mr. JOHNSTON. You have stated that Somalia is a unique situation. Is that because there was no governmental structure there when we arrived?

Mr. SHINN. That is the most obvious reason for it being unique but I think it is unique in another way, Mr. Chairman. That is this whole question of the importance of the structure of clans. I do not know of any other country in the world that has quite that kind of ethnic structure which is so complex and so important to the society and so difficult for an outsider to understand. I do not think that any of us ever, and certainly not today, will fully appreciate the importance of the clan structure and what it means for every-
day decisions. I have spent my entire career working on Africa so the terms ethnicity and tribalism I understand fairly well. To me the situation in Somalia is infinitely more complex and difficult than those ethnic structures that I know reasonably well in other African countries. I doubt if there are very many academics who have spent much of their life studying Somalia who really thoroughly understand the clan structure nationwide. If they are anthropologists, they might know one element of it quite well but not necessarily another. And I think the combination of the clan structure on the one hand, the fact there was no government there on the other, puts Somalia in what may be virtually a unique category.

Mr. Johnston. When I first took over this committee, I had the Congressional Research Service come over to brief me and they had this chart showing the clans and the sub-clans. It looked like the Department of Energy organizational chart. I have never seen anything as complex in my life.

Let me name eight African countries that have problems right now: Algeria, Liberia, Burundi, Angola, Mozambique, Western Sahara, Zaire, Sudan. Do you see us committing American troops in any of these countries?

Mr. Shinn. Again, Mr. Chairman, you are getting a long way away from my area of expertise.

Mr. Johnston. As an African specialist.

Mr. Shinn. It seems to me that the Somalia experience will cause one to look long and hard before we make that kind of commitment. Of the countries you named, the only one that I personally deal with now is Sudan and I know that situation quite well. I know some of the others as a result of having traveled there or having lived next to them in any event. In the case of Sudan, it is an even more difficult issue than Somalia. And if we have as much difficulty as we did in Somalia, the concept of putting troops in a place like Sudan really staggers the imagination.

Mr. Johnston. In December of 1992, when President Bush committed our country there and said originally that we would be out by Christmas. He then said we would be out by Inauguration Day, January 20, 1993. On Inauguration Day there were 28,000 American troops there. I have elevated you now to the President of the United States. In hindsight, what should have been our policy for the next 6 months?

Mr. Shinn. On Inauguration Day?

Mr. Johnston. Yes, sir. When you inherit 28,000 troops in Somalia, what should have been the foreign policy of the United States when you took office? And the procedure for the next 6 months.

Mr. Shinn. Well, I think where the difficulties came were not so much the decisions that were made just before, on or immediately after Inauguration Day. I think they came a little bit further down the line and I will get into that in just a second.

Things were starting to look like they might work out reasonably well by Inauguration Day. There were still a lot of question marks but we had a fairly good feel for the way the trend was going. And by the time we got to early March and then through March and April, it was really fairly quiet indeed. This was also a period of time when there was very little discussion up here. It was a time
when people were not coming to us and we were not going to any-
one else to talk about Somalia because everyone thought that it
was going to work out quite well.

And put in that context, the decision to draw down our troops
come May 4 to about 5,000, they were actually closer to 6,000 on
May 4 rather than 5,000, but that was certainly a reasonable de-
sision. And even with the benefit of hindsight, I am not sure I would
disagree with that.

One can ask some questions about our policy on disarmament,
and that was one of the major things we were second guessing yes-
terday. There was indeed something of a debate whether under
UNITAF more should have been done to disarm and the decision
was made, no. That was seen as mission creep. We did not want
to get into that and, in fact, we really did not get into that in any
significant way.

And I am not even sure in retrospect that I would change that
decision because the kind of disarmament we were talking about
at the time was heavy weapons, artillery pieces, technicals. And
they were not the problem, really, later on. The problems were
caused by the hand-carried weapons, by the shoulder-carried weap-
ons. And I think we have learned clearly since the early part of last
year that there is no way a foreign force is going to identify, pick
up and get rid of most of those arms that can be carried by one
person and hidden or buried or whatever. That was wishful think-
ing if anyone ever really thought that could happen.

So until about May 4, I think essentially the decisions that were
being made were not far off the mark at all. Where the problem
really came was once there had been the attack on the Pakistani
peacekeepers on June 5 with 24 of them being killed and with the
enormous concern about the precedent this would create for Chap-
ter VII peacekeeping anywhere in the world in the future. There
was also very strong feeling in this country and the United Nations
and in Pakistan that something had to be done and, as you recall,
it was only 24 hours before there was a Security Council resolution
introduced by Pakistan to catch the perpetrators of that act. That
was followed up a week or two later by an arrest warrant issued by
UNOSOM in Mogadishu aimed at General Aideed and his fol-

Mr. JOHNSTON. Let me stop you right there. In other words, you
do not fault the arrest warrant for Aideed?

Mr. SHINN. Not per se. No. There were some elements of it, I
mean, the reward and this kind of thing that one could perhaps be
critical of but the arrest warrant per se, if you put it all back in
the context of what happened at the time, it made sense. And even
if you look at it totally in hindsight and forget what the atmos-
phere was at the time, I could still make the argument.

But where we went terribly wrong was in persisting for so long
to try to arrest Aideed and unsuccessfully, obviously. We should
have realized that this policy was getting us nowhere and for just
plain practical reasons it was imperative to come up with some
other alternative much sooner than we did. And, of course, as you
know, we paid a heavy price for that on October 3. That is where things went badly awry.

Mr. JOHNSTON. The former ambassador once, Frank Krigler, sat in your chair and defended Aideed and said that the attack on the radio station by the Pakistanis or trying to close down the radio station was an aggressive act and his forces were warranted in shooting the Pakistanis.

Mr. SHINN. Well, I know Mr. Krigler very well and I respect his judgment but I am not sure he has his facts entirely correct there. What actually happened on the day of the attack on the Pakistanis is that the Pakistanis went to the radio station in search of arms. They found none. They were leaving the radio station, in fact, had left the radio station when the attacks began to take place. They were leaving at that point.

Now, it is true the radio station was issuing vituperative anti-UNOSOM and anti-U.S. propaganda at the time and it clearly was under the control of General Aideed. We were all concerned about that. But on that particular day, there was no attempt to shut it down and no attempt to destroy it. It was an attempt to search for arms; that is when everything went awry.

Now, Aideed may not have known that. He may have thought that something else was happening. His interpretation of it may have been rather different. But I think that is the fact of the matter.

Mr. JOHNSTON. OK. He could never explain the fact that Aideed would put women and children in front of his forces when he was firing on the Pakistanis.

Mr. SHINN. There are a lot of things to answer to in Somalia.

Mr. JOHNSTON. That is right. Let me go back to Somaliland just briefly. Here is a large area of the country that has an intellectual past, a peaceful past, was bombed terribly by the previous government, has no infrastructure, no running water and no electricity.

Can we devote some aid to this area of the country? When you think how much has gone into southern Mogadishu versus Somaliland, there is just nothing going into this part of the area. An area which I think is salvageable and can be a viable community. I am not saying support Somaliland's independence but I am saying that they have been ignored because no one is starving there.

Mr. SHINN. I think the answer to your question is, yes, one can do some relief in Somaliland and indeed one should do some. I am not sure I can put my finger immediately upon what we have done there so far. We have done a little up there. It has not been very significant, I would be the first to agree.

Part of the problem has been that being focused in Mogadishu for so long and only fairly recently moving outside of Mogadishu and with Hargeysa being as far away as it is, just logistically there is something of a problem.

There also is this difficulty, this practical problem of getting in and out of the airport there and going through this extortion business which is a nuisance. It is not necessarily much more than that.

But, as I say, we have provided some minimal assistance in that area and I think the goal is to provide more in the future. It is one
of the areas that we see where one can focus more assistance and we fully intend to do that, security conditions permitting.

Mr. Payne. Just getting back to the June 5 attack on the Pakistanis after they left the radio station, it would appear to me, and I was there, we left maybe around June 1 or 2 from Mogadishu, my third trip there, it would appear to me that one of the problems that Aideed saw at the time was that Bidaa was really almost normal as compared to 6 months prior to that when we were there when hundreds of people were dying daily at that city. And the little local merchants were back out, there was a lot of normalcy. The technicals were off the street, some of the little preschool classes were going on. And it appeared that things were moving back to a normal situation, no chaos, very little confusion.

Do you think that that was one of the driving forces, using the radio station as an excuse but that Aideed flourishes best when there is chaos and killing and war-like situations rather than people returning to normalcy?

What is your opinion on that?

Mr. Shinn. My own analysis of the situation, and I think it is shared fairly widely among those of us who have been working the question but it is certainly not unanimous is that General Aideed was beginning to realize what U.S. and U.N. policy was doing during the months of March, April and May. And that was in large part an effort to permit wide elements of Somali society to take part in creating their own government, to bring in, as it were, elements of society that had traditionally been a part of that government.

To do that, you had to reduce the power of the factional groups, the people with the guns. And of all the groups with guns, certainly in Mogadishu, Aideed was the most powerful. He is a smart man. He realized what was going on. We refer to it as marginalizing the political factions, if you will. He saw that slowly, day by day, his power might be marginalized, might be reduced. And my own hypothesis is that he finally reached the point where that was just unacceptable, where there might be too little power left, not only for him but for other factional leaders who for whatever reason were not willing to go as far as he was willing to go. I think he took action in response to this policy.

Now, that is one hypothesis, one analysis. You will find other people who will have different analyses but I am not sure I have heard a better one.

Mr. Payne. Well, that basically, I guess, is more or less even what I was saying. I did not use the marginalization but we used to talk about a normalization. Maybe that was too general a term. But that there was another rule other than the rule of the gun, that normalcy, people came out, people were in the streets, people were going to school, people were dealing in commerce. And therefore they were empowered. Women were really becoming organized, the women's movement, and that might have been somewhat new although the Somali women have always been strong. But during that period they became very vocal. I mean, they were actually the only ones that used to violate the green line anyway but they were organizing and really as they would say up in Newark, they were bad mouthing the old warlords, you know, the factional leaders and
they were saying we do not need any of them. And so it seemed that this marginalization, I concur wholeheartedly with that analysis. That is basically the way I saw it.

Just getting back to disarmament and the fact that if you were President, I conclude from your comments that you are feeling that disarmament would not have been very successful because you are only talking about the large heavy armament but I think that initially when the troops went in, I do not necessarily call a jeep with a machine gun mounted on the back as something that is a negative or should be considered in the small arms. And I think initially when we went in there was no attempt actually to deal with that, to ask them to dislodge the guns or at least to even keep those jeeps or trucks quarantined but it was just after, I guess, 3 or 4 weeks we asked them to take the tanks and heavy Bradley-type trucks outside the city limits.

It would appear to me that when we went in initially if even the technicals, even if you keep your truck but take the gun off, and if we had in my opinion made it clear that it was not the accepted practice to walk around with weapons on your arm, that if there had been a strict enforcement of law and order, I still feel that we would have had much more positive results than we had by looking the other way.

Mr. SHINN. Congressman, as you may recall, initially when we went in, we were not quite sure what to expect. Quite honestly, we all thought there would be far more American casualties in those first couple of days than there were and we were very pleasantly surprised with the outcome in the first week or so.

A number of technicals were taken out in that first week, in large part as a result of the efforts on the ground by Ambassador Oakley and his team which preceded the arrival of the military by several days, in talking with people like Aideed and Ali Mahdi and telling them not to engage us, let us come in, we are trying to come here to deliver food.

He was largely successful in those efforts but not with everyone. There were still some renegade elements that were running around town taking potshots at troops or doing nasty deeds. And when our military, when UNITAF encountered those kinds of elements, they took them out. I do not know what the number is, I have forgotten, but a not insignificant number were removed.

It is true that it was weeks later when we started what we called cantoning the technicals, the artillery pieces, a few tanks, armored cars, that kind of thing, under the control of both Aideed and Ali Mahdi and perhaps for a few other of the factions. They were cantoned primarily in the greater Mogadishu area. Again, memory fails me as to what the numbers were in these cantonments but they were not insignificant. One of the lessons learned out of all of this was that these cantonments were often done on the honor system. In other words, we cantoned these pieces of equipment out in the desert somewhere in a graveyard and left them. Then when things went sour again, come June 5, militia members collected as many of them as they could. A fair number of them were actually destroyed before they could be moved, but some were not. Some were put back into use again by the militias. And that is a lesson
learned. You should not have voluntary cantonment sites on the honor system in a situation like this.

Mr. Payne. Without development assistance after the United States withdraws and some of the other countries withdraw, it appears to me that what you are saying is that there will eventually be—in your opinion, will there be—say come September, how many U.N. peacekeeping troops do you think will be in Somalia?

Mr. Shinn. Come September, I would estimate there will be between 16,000 and 18,000. And that is an estimate. We are doing a certain amount of guesswork going that far out.

Mr. Payne. Do you expect things to be normal or do you think that if the warring factions get back to warring again, will the troops stay?

Mr. Shinn. If there ever were a situation where relative comes into play, it is referring to Somalia as being normal. I think there is a good chance that the situation in Somalia come September will be sufficiently stable and secure that one can go on with one's work. And if that is normal, then I guess the answer to your question is affirmative.

But that does not mean it is going to be anywhere near trouble free and that there are not going to be bandits still lurking about and causing trouble. Occasional inter-clan conflicts I suspect will be going on. And this is probably a best case scenario, not a worst case. In a worst case scenario, I can give you some pretty horrible options. We do not think that will happen but one cannot rule it out.

But I think a figure of 16,000 to 18,000 troops is reasonable to predict at this point.

Mr. Payne. And you do expect there will be this 10,000, you said 10,000-person police force?

Mr. Shinn. Yes, but in all honesty, come September, that police unit is not going to be in a position where it can do what it really should be doing. This is a 2-year program and it is really only now getting underway.

Come September, it will be more useful than it is today. It will not be a 10,000-person unit. It will be a functioning police unit in certain locations. And it already is, actually, in certain locations. There have been a couple of interesting cases lately where people were robbed by bandits with automatic weapons and where the police intervened, caught the robbers and returned the money and in one case, substantial amounts of money. There are not very many of these cases but it is an interesting development. We are starting to hear this for the first time now.

There is going to be more and more of that with the police. But come September, it will still be a long way from being completed.

Mr. Payne. They have had a previous history of having a substantial police department. I mean, this is traditional. It is nothing new to Somalia, right?

Mr. Shinn. And a very good one and one that at least at the leadership level was not based on clan lines.

Mr. Payne. Just kind of winding down, who will these policemen work for? Who do they report to? The U.N.?

Mr. Shinn. Well, the ad hoc arrangement at the moment is that their training will be done by a variety of different countries, in-
cluding us, working very closely with UNOSOM troops in the field but taking administrative advice and administrative management from the UNOSOM justice division in Mogadishu. It is a bit of a Rube Goldberg operation, but then that is nothing new to Somalia either.

Mr. Payne. Well, probably the place that you might be able to compare it to, Somalia about what is normal and what is not normal, is that in Haiti they have a police department in one city only, though, in Port-au-Prince and the chief of police is a fellow named Michel Francois, who is also the drug smuggling baron but he is a police chief and he is also, though, in the army but he is under General Cedras who runs the army but Michel Francois, who has a brother who is even worse, is stronger than the general under whom he serves. You are talking about we are dealing with some complicated situations, that is one that really boggles the mind, this police versus military in Haiti and they actually had two different groups, the army that was going to retrain the military and the Canadian Mounties that were going to work with Francois. That was under the so-called Governor's Island accord.

But just concluding, I just hope that were some lessons learned. I think that finally the real tragedy of all of this is that for 30 years we had one goal in mind, or 40, maybe, since World War II and that was to defeat the Communists. And as long as you were not a Communist, you were all right with us and we just took bums and murderers and thieves and crooks as our allies, like Mobuto in Zaire and Doe that we looked the other way in Liberia when he took over by killing the President and his family and Liberia received more funds during that 10 years than they had ever gotten before. And the support of Barre after he even bombed his own country when I was first here in the Congress early 1989, 1990. And for us to build one of the largest embassies that we have anywhere in Africa was this dictator was fighting communism and therefore our policy is simply look the other way, I think that is the real tragedy because what we did was to drive people to continue to do what they wanted to do.

I mean, when Ethiopia decided to go the other way, we needed someone to fight communism so we elected Barre in Somalia and they fought the bad Communists that were the new bad guys in Ethiopia. And so hopefully as we move into this new world order, and that is not such a good term either. You know, that is what they called it in 1930's, Hitler called it—I do not know if people real-ize it but that is what he called it, the new world order, so I do not use that. I hope that we move into a more sound foreign policy where we have more than one basic goal and I guess we did, we beat the Communists so we are the victors, I guess. But in the process we really messed up a lot of places.

Mr. Johnston. Ambassador, there are 50 Quick Marines that will be—

Mr. Shinn. FAST Marines.

Mr. Johnston. FAST.

Mr. Shinn. All the same.

Mr. Johnston. Excuse me. I could come out with a rather salacious joke about this but I shall not. I am sure they would be flattered to be described as that, too.
Mr. Shinn. I am sure they are quick, too.

Mr. Johnston. When he was in Somalia recently, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that several Marines would remain offshore. I think about 1,500. Do you know what the criteria would be to commit them back to the mainland?

Mr. Shinn. Well, the amount of time they are going to be offshore is not yet determined. It is my understanding it will certainly be through April and probably a little beyond. After April you start doing a lot of guesswork.

They would be available if there were a breakdown of law and order where Americans are present, which is essentially in Mogadishu, to be able to conduct their safe evacuation from the country. That would be the primary purpose of their being there.

Mr. Johnston. OK. We have American NGO's there that are starting to be victims of burglary. We have technicals that are coming back, seeing more and more of them. You are having crops that are being ravaged and you have also had a bad season. I see everything down the future, for the next 6 months to a year, very much like the condition right before we went in there.

Mr. Shinn. Well, with one major exception. You do not have the starvation today that we had when we went in initially. In other words, in December of 1992, huge numbers of people were dying every day and that is simply not happening today.

Mr. Johnston. But they were dying because we could not get the wheat from point A to point B because in the port they were extorting everybody just to unload a mere ship of food to feed their own people there. Everybody was on the take in this country. There was no rule of law. And, as I said, in 6 months from now, I feel that we are back where we were in 1991.

Mr. Shinn. Well, that is certainly a scenario. I would place it in the worst case scenario. One cannot rule out that something along these lines might happen. I mean, when we look at the various options that might be facing us, it is one of them that we look at.

We tend to think, and perhaps we are by nature optimists, that it will not follow that scenario, that it will be something considerably less destructive and harmful than that. It is not going to be an easy future under the best of circumstances. There are just too many problems to overcome. But we really do think there is a reasonable chance that if enough Somalis realize that this is not a very good way to live, there are better alternatives than a return to that kind of a situation, and I think the vast majority of Somalis do believe that. Unfortunately it is a minority that chooses the other path. That huge majority of Somalis is going to have to neutralize somehow that minority. We tend to think that is a doable thing.

Mr. Johnston. For my own edification, could you name the 12 countries that you have jurisdiction over?

Mr. Shinn. Yes. Starting in Sudan in the North, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Seychelles, Madagascar, Mauritius, Comoros. We have British Indian Ocean Territory, which is not really a country.

Mr. Johnston. You have Comoros, you say?

Mr. Shinn. Comoros, yes.

Mr. Johnston. You have all the islands, then.
Mr. SHINN. Except for the Maldives. Maldives belongs to South Asia. And Somalia. I forgot Somalia.
Mr. JOHNSTON. A Freudian slip.
Mr. SHINN. Sometimes I would like to forget Somalia.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Does the State Department have a clan chart for the State Department?
Mr. SHINN. No, but we need one.
Mr. JOHNSTON. You do not have something that I could pick up and look at?
Mr. SHINN. Oh, you mean a breakdown of——
Mr. JOHNSTON. Yes, sir.
Mr. SHINN. Oh, yes. Sure. Of course.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Could you——
Mr. SHINN. You mean the breakdown by country as to who is responsible for what?
Mr. JOHNSTON. Yes.
Mr. SHINN. Oh, sure. Yes.
Mr. JOHNSTON. All right. If I could have one of those.
Mr. SHINN. By all means.
Mr. JOHNSTON. So I do not make too many more mistakes.
Mr. PAYNE. Do you have Eritrea?
Mr. SHINN. I am sorry. Eritrea, too. Yes, I do.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you very much. You have been very helpful and on a very, very tough subject and you are very kind to come today.
Mr. SHINN. I devote a lot of energy to it.
[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
I would like to welcome you to the Subcommittee on Africa's hearing on "Somalia: Prospects for Peace and Stability." The objective of this hearing is to assess current conditions in Somalia and to explore prospects for peace and stability after the pullout of U.S. troops. I called this hearing to look toward the future and to explore
ways in which we can constructively help the people of Somalia and not to dwell on past mistakes and point fingers. Certainly, there are lessons we can learn from our mistakes and we will find an appropriate forum for such a discussion.

Prospects for peace and stability in Somalia remain illusive in the face of continued skirmishes and growing banditry in the countryside. In Kismayu, the security situation has deteriorated
significantly over the past several months. Meanwhile, the security situation in Mogadishu seems uncertain.

Unfortunately, after billions of dollars and several thousands of casualties, Somalia is far from recovering. The humanitarian situation could deteriorate in the coming months, unless a political settlement is achieved soon. According to some relief officials, pockets of famine have begun to reappear in some parts of Somalia.
Recent peace efforts by Somalis and Somalia’s neighbors have been promising. The Aideed-led peace initiative in Nairobi seems hopeful. Most importantly, the Imam-led initiative in Mogadishu has brought the warring Hawiyee clans together. We are encouraged by this new development.

Meanwhile, another new initiative has been launched this week. President Husni Mubarak of Egypt, the current chairman of the OAU, held talks this
week with the group of 12, General Aideed's rivals, in Cairo. I am not optimistic about this initiative and it may be counterproductive, since it could potentially undermine the two ongoing peace efforts.

While the international community continues to focus on southern and central Somalia, the north-west section, known as Somaliland, has largely been neglected by the international community. Since the declaration of
independence in May 1991, assistance to Somaliland has been limited. I hope the Clinton Administration will become more engaged in that part of Somalia as well.

This afternoon, we will hear from Ambassador David Shinn, Director of the East Africa Bureau and a former Somalia Coordinator. We are pleased to have you here this afternoon. We had also requested the Defense Department to send a representative last week to
appear before this Subcommittee.

Unfortunately, our request was rejected.
OPENING STATEMENT

CONGRESSMAN DONALD M. PAYNE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA HEARING

SOMALIA: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

MARCH 16, 1994

Thank you Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your efforts to keep the focus on Somalia during this critical period as the United States withdraws from the UN Peace Keeping Mission in Somalia.

In order to discuss today’s topic, "Prospects for Peace and Stability" it may be helpful to put our past actions in historical perspective.

When President Bush committed US Troops in December 1992 to help the starving people of Somalia there were several flaws in this policy.
By its very nature, Operation Restore Hope was always more than a simple humanitarian operation.

As Walter Clarke, former Charge' d' Affairs, at the US Liaison Office in Somalia and now Professor of International Relations at the US Army War College stated in Parameters, the War College Quarterly, "the introduction of a substantial international force directly affected the internal lines of communication and balance of political forces of local leaders who had been at war with one another for nearly two years.

It was only a matter of time before a violent response developed to the intervention.
Unless, of course, the warlords could satisfy their political ambitions by working with the foreign forces."

Clark further goes on to point out that the UNITAF mission would be judged not by how many people it helped to feed, but by the political situation it left behind. Further, that contrary to the assertions of certain Bush Administration officials indicating disbelief in the existence of legitimate political forces in Somalia, US diplomats in Mogadishu continued to receive pleas for action against the warlords.
Because of my own knowledge of the existence of these political forces I was one who supported UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s plea that the US Forces disarm the warring factions in early December 92. Several Defense experts I discussed the matter with said that coming off the victorious Gulf War we had the psychological and military advantage to do this with a minimum of casualties.

I was interested to hear General Shalikashvili (Gen. Shalli, as President Clinton calls him) on Ted Koppel’s show last night. In answering Ted’s questions about what went wrong in Somalia he agreed we need to better articulate our policy.
Gen. Shalli said "I think I have said repeatedly that we need to do a much better job in articulation why it is important for the United States not to stand idly by when it comes time to help implement the peace plan, but also what the risks would be involved in our involvement is such an operation."

In looking back on our own congressional process we also could of done a better job of informing the American people that such operations could mean casualties, and we should be prepared to make the sacrifice, if we allow ourselves to become involved.
Later in the program Gen. Shalli agreed that if the US commits ground troops in Bosnia, we should be prepared for the possibility of casualties. I liked Gen. Shalli’s closing comments "Americans have understood, perhaps better than most, that freedom isn’t free and that to gain the sort of world that we all hunger for for our children we sometimes have to make that sacrifice."

Possibly, if we had prepared the American people better, there would have been the political will to stay the course for a more orderly withdraw in Somalia.
Recent reports of violence again between Indian Troops under the UN and warring factions, as well as uncoordinated peace talks that are unable to achieve consensus do not bold well for the future in Somalia. I hope Mr. Shinn can give us some encouraging words, and I am disappointed the Defense Dept. saw fit to cancel the appearance of Mr. Solcombe today.

Mr. Chairman because of the significance of Mr. Clark’s article and the transcript of Mr. Koppel’s interview with General Shalli last night I would appreciate this opportunity to submit both documents as part of the record of this meeting.

Thank you Mr. Chairman
Mr. Chairman, Members of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa:

I want to thank you for this opportunity to discuss Somalia today. Your continued interest in this difficult problem is very welcome to us. It is always a pleasure to meet with the Foreign Affairs Committee.

We are quickly approaching another threshold of American involvement in Somalia, the post-March 31 period in which we will no longer be militarily involved. In reaching this new stage we have taken stock of what has gone before, and we find that we have every reason to be proud of what the United States has done in Somalia. Our involvement was prompted by a human disaster of massive proportions, largely the result of an enormously destructive civil war. There is no longer widespread starvation. In mid-1992, before we became involved, anywhere from 1000 to 3000 people were dying daily from starvation. There are now only isolated cases of starvation-related deaths. 167,000 people receive food daily through food distribution programs. Before our involvement and that of the United Nations, 80% of the relief food for Somalia was stolen. Now well over 80% reaches the intended population.

Before our intervention, agricultural production had completely ceased. Now crops are grown and harvested throughout. In mid-1992, less than 5 hospitals were functioning, and there were no maternal and child health care centers. There are now 32 hospitals and 81 MCH centers in operation. In mid-1992, no schools were operating. 234 are operating now.

The March 31 withdrawal of American combat troops from Somalia was announced by President Clinton in a statement last October 7. That was nearly six months ago, during which, President Clinton said, Somalis would be given a reasonable chance to rebuild their country. But the outcome would be determined by Somalis themselves. "It is not our job to rebuild Somalia's society," he said, "or even to create a political process that can allow Somalia's clans to live and work in peace. The Somalis must do that for themselves. The United Nations and many African states are more than willing to help. But we - we in the United States - must decide whether we will give them enough time to have a reasonable chance."
We have since been working on the things the President said we would do to help Somalis make use of that time in order to gain control of their destiny. Recognizing that a continued UN military role would be essential in protecting humanitarian assistance, we have encouraged others to do their part in providing forces to UNOSOM - the United Nations Organization in Somalia. We have provided equipment to support UNOSOM military contingents and to help prepare them for carrying on work our forces have done. After March 31, the UNOSOM force is expected to have about 18,000 troops which will be largely engaged in protecting major sea ports and airports and keeping routes open for the delivery of relief supplies.

We have continued our humanitarian assistance. The humanitarian conference convened by the United Nations in Addis Ababa late last November brought together nearly all the Somali factions and the international aid donors. The donors were able to describe to the Somalis what assistance would be lost if violence continued unchecked. The donors collectively agreed that the future of Somalia is in the hands of Somalis themselves, a position which has since been repeatedly emphasized. Following agreements reached at this conference, the donors have organized under UN leadership a more effective mechanism for coordinating assistance.

We have actively encouraged political reconciliation among Somalis, both through our own efforts and support for those of the UN. Talks underway in Nairobi have the potential for significant progress. There have been other talks - most particularly in Addis Ababa last March and again in December - which have laid a reasonable foundation for establishing an interim central government, but the necessary political concessions have not yet been made. Somali leaders seem too preoccupied with pursuing narrow agendas and insufficiently dedicated to the cause of rebuilding their country.

The immediate focus of the talks in Nairobi is an initiative to obtain a peace agreement for Kismayo. At the urging of Ambassador Lansana Kouyate, the UN Secretary General's acting Special Representative in Somalia, the leaders of the factions concerned in the strife in Kismayo are meeting in Nairobi this week. A settlement on Kismayo could lead to broader discussions on national peace objectives. A proposal for an interim government has been tabled by the Group of Twelve, headed by Ali Mahdi. We anticipate that Somali National Alliance (SNA) leader General Aideed will issue his own proposal in Nairobi.
These talks are complemented by discussions in Mogadishu under the aegis of the Imam of Herab, whose traditional position of influence spans the Hawiye sub-clans to which both Ali Mahdi and Aidid belong. The Imam's initiative has constructively added the voices of highly-respected religious leaders and elders to those of many other Somalis weary of strife and who want to get on with the rebuilding of their country.

While March 31 brings an end to our military role, it by no means brings an end to our involvement in Somalia. We intend to stay engaged for as long as security conditions permit. We will maintain a diplomatic and AID presence in Mogadishu. It will provide a base for maintaining contact with Somalis and for continuing to encourage political reconciliation.

We are increasing the number of AID personnel working on Somalia programs, particularly to take advantage of reconstruction and development opportunities in suitable areas away from Mogadishu. We have made available approximately $65 million this year for food aid and other forms of humanitarian and economic assistance. Up to $45 million, is committed to help UN efforts to rebuild Somalia's police force. Along with other countries we are providing personnel to help train the police. We are also meeting the UN's request to provide personnel to help UNOSOM with contracting and logistics.

As President Clinton said, it is up to Somalia to seize this opportunity. Both positive and negative factors are at work. There is still considerable violence and lawlessness. Large parts of Somalia are generally peaceful, but there is a disturbing trend in the increasing number of armed attacks on the non-governmental organizations through which international assistance is distributed, including that provided by the United States. This is most noticeable in the southern and central parts of Somalia, where employees of non-governmental organizations are sporadically attacked, sometimes with loss of life, forcing in some cases at least temporary suspension of operations. We are impressing on Somali leaders that the departure of these organizations would end the means by which humanitarian assistance is distributed.

The southern port city of Kismayo has been the site of recent fighting. That has abated, although the factions concerned appear prepared for further combat if the current peace initiative fails. Nothing in Somalia, however, compares with Mogadishu - where the stakes are greatest and the threat
of strife is constant. Last week inter-clan fighting resulted in the brief closing of the airport. Positions held by UNOSOM military contingents have been under increasing fire. The trend towards greater violence adds urgency to the reconciliation efforts, a point we have repeatedly stressed.

We are proud of our record in Somalia. We intend to remain engaged there and will continue to demonstrate our interest in Somalia’s political and economic reconstruction. In economic terms, our emphasis — along with other donors — will be on helping those Somalis who are willing to provide the necessary security and cooperation for assistance programs to work. In political terms, we are making it clear to Somalis that the fate of their country is in their hands. The US and other countries cannot decide their future for them.
Testing the World’s Resolve in Somalia

WALTER S. CLARKE

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In mid-1993 the American public wrestled with the spectacle of its forces engaged in seemingly continuous hostilities against insurgents in the southern part of the city of Mogadishu in Somalia. As Americans were killed and wounded, strong pressures developed in Congress and the public to withdraw from Operation Restore Hope. One of the arguments made by critics was that somehow the original humanitarian focus of the intervention had been diverted to “nation-building.” Complaints about a change in the mission are unjustified. By its very nature, Operation Restore Hope was always more than a simple humanitarian operation.

The introduction of a substantial international force into Mogadishu and southern Somalia in December 1992 directly affected the internal lines of communication and balance of political forces of local leaders who had been at war with one another for nearly two years. It was only a matter of time before a violent response developed to the intervention, unless, of course, the warlords could satisfy their political ambitions by working with the foreign forces. It is as true now as it was then that the only way to ensure Somalia does not revert to massive starvation is to find a means to divert the country’s war chiefs of their pretensions to political legitimacy. From the outset, it was clear that the success of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) would be judged not by how many people it helped to feed, but by the political situation it left behind.

Contrary to the assertions of certain Bush Administration officials indicating disbelief in the existence of legitimate political forces in Somalia, US diplomats in Mogadishu continue to receive pleas for action against the warlords. UNITAF’s seeming neutrality on issues of “Somali-on-Somali” violence, and prudence in the use of its substantial force, was a serious disappointment to those Somalis who wanted nothing more than a return to law and order and an opportunity to rebuild their lives after years of war.

Chronology of the United Nations Intervention in Somalia

As the consequences of the Somali civil war became inescapable, the United Nations decided early in 1992 to intervene on behalf of the Somali people. That intervention, identified as the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), was authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 751, dated 27 April 1992. UNOSOM (subsequently named UNOSOM I) represented UN authority in Somalia from that date until 4 May 1993, at which time its missions were taken over by UNOSOM II.

It was soon evident that UNOSOM I forces would not be able to establish the secure environment that the humanitarian relief organizations needed in order to provide food and medical assistance in Somalia. After a series of debates on the problem, the UN issued Security Council Resolution 794 on 3 December 1992. This resolution, developed as a number of nations decided to launch a powerful military intervention in Somalia to support humanitarian relief activities, was authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The coalition that was created to carry out the intervention, led by the United States, included the forces of 18 other nations. UNITAF coexisted with, but was independent of and equal to, UNOSOM I.

The fundamental difference between the philosophies and activities of UNOSOM I and UNITAF is comparable to the distinction that many fail to make between peacekeeping and operations variously called peacekeeping or peace enforcement. The former assumes that sovereign nations, having agreed to end hostilities, agree also to the presence of a UN force on their territories to monitor compliance with the terms under which the nations had agreed to end their belligerency. Some have defined this type of operation as one that could be carried out by a civilian police force. UNOSOM I, as were most UN peace support operations prior to 1989, was intended to be this type of intervention, and was authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter.

Professor Walter S. Clarke is a Senior Foreign Service Officer in the US Department of State, with more than 25 years of experience in Africa affairs, during a 35-year Foreign Service career. He now serves as Professor of International Relations in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the US Army War College. He was State Department Advisor to the President and Professor of International Relations at the US Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island, 1970-72. He created the Embassy and served as Chargé d’Affaires, A.I., at the American Embassy in Djibouti from 1977 to 1980. Professor Clarke also served at diplomatic posts in Addis Ababa, Bogota, Belgrade, Brussels, Lagos, Madrid, and San Juan. He has authored several works on the Horn of Africa, including A Developmental Bibliography for the Republic of Djibouti in 1978, “The Early Dreamers: A Fancier in the Ogaden War,” in Northeast Africa Studies (No. 1, 1991), and Somalia: Background Information for Operation Restore Hope 1992-1993, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, December 1992. From March to June 1993, Professor Clarke was detailed to the United States Liaison Office in Mogadishu, Somalia, where he served as Deputy Director. As with all permanent articles, the opinions expressed are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the views of the US Department of State, the US Army, or the US Army War College.
Figure 1. Humanitarian Relief Sectors in Somalia.

provide medical care to the sick. In the absence of an initiative from Europe or elsewhere, the United States led the way.

The area of Somalia covered by Operation Restore Hope was divided into nine humanitarian relief sectors (HRSs), and eventually accommodated military forces from 18 UN states, including a fair proportion from Africa and Western Europe. South central Somalia—the "triangle of death"—was selected as the UNITAF area of operations because it had the highest rates of death from starvation. It appears on the map as the area within the triangle formed by the cities of Mogadishu, Bardera, and Kismayo. By no coincidence, this area was largely under the control of General Mohamed Farah (hereafter referred to as Aideed) and his allies.

As straightforward as the UNITAF plan of operations appeared, it created conditions that would lead to confrontation. With its overwhelming military force, UNITAF gained the operational initiative and initially caused the warlords to back off. The Bush Administration hoped to leave all political initiatives to the United Nations, and to "such participants as the French, the Italians and the Pakistanis," who were judged to have "political, economic and religious ties . . . far more substantive and longstanding than ours." Despite this apparently clear indication of Administration desires, the first public hints of operational ambiguities in the UNITAF mission can be found in former President Bush's original announcement of Operation Restore Hope to the American people:

This operation is not open-ended. We will not stay one day longer than is absolutely necessary. Let me be very clear: Our mission is humanitarian, but we will not tolerate armed gangs ripping off their own people, condemning them to death by starvation. (CENTCOM Commander) General Hoar and his troops have the authority to take whatever military action is necessary to safeguard the lives of our troops and the lives of Somalia's people.

The dilemma for US policymakers developed from the different levels of authority granted to UNOSOM I and UNITAF. Under Chapter VI, UNOSOM I forces were limited to defensive military actions and were severely constrained in their political options. The Bush Administration's strategy meant that any decisions considered to be "political" were deferred to the entity that represented the UN directly—UNOSOM I—which lacked enforcement powers, while UNITAF held its much stronger Chapter VII mandate in reserve. UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali believed that the US commitment would inevitably lead to "nation-building," a prospect fully consonant with the enlarged role of the United Nations laid out in his 1992 report to the Security Council, An Agenda for Peace. The United Nations was to encounter great difficulties in putting together a military force comparable to that of UNITAF.

UNITAF Achievements

Quite apart from its narrow political mandate, the UNITAF operation was a flawless military exercise. The number of US troops committed to UNITAF on the ground or afloat peaked at 25,426 on 15 January 1993. Total US and foreign forces deployed to UNITAF peaked at 38,301 on 23 January 1993. The logistical and social achievements of the UNITAF coalition in nearly five months on the ground in Somalia are truly impressive:

- the daily death rate in Bardera fell from more than 300 in November 1992 to five or less in April 1993;
- the number of daily gunshot victims admitted to Mogadishu hospitals fell from about 50 to five or less;
- the street price of an AK-47 rose from $50 to $1000, while the price of a 50-pound sack of wheat fell from $100 to about $10.
"By its very nature, Operation Restore Hope was always more than a simple humanitarian operation."

predicted the UN-sponsored meeting from breaking down. In the end, Aideed succeeded in establishing the principle that the warlords were to control the political agenda.

At the 15 January conference that followed these negotiations, the 14 Somali factions agreed to surrender all heavy weapons to the UNITAF/UN cease-fire monitoring group, to place the militias of all political movements in encampments, to disarm all bandits, and to return all properties unlawfully taken during the previous hostilities. Contrast their solemn agreements, there was very little disarmament, clashes occurred when one or another of the participants felt his interests were at stake, and travel remained possible only with armed UNITAF convoys. The principal achievement of the first reconciliation conference was an agreement by the warlords to meet again, with the option of selecting those with whom they would discuss the future of the country.

When the second national reconciliation conference convened in Addis Ababa on 15 March, a significant changeover in UNOSOM I civilian leadership had just been completed. Ambassador Kotani—the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and a career UN official of Japanese nationality—was sitting. US Admiral (Ret.) Jonathan Howe, former deputy national security advisor in the Bush Administration, was named to take his place. Howe’s deputy, the Guinean Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Lansana Kouyate, arrived in Mogadishu two weeks before the second Addis Ababa reconciliation conference, which he subsequently chaired.

The second conference was not easy to follow because much of it was held behind closed doors. Diplomats on the ground in Mogadishu believed that the goals of the conference should be modest and incremental, with local bodies to be established throughout the country before the creation of a central authority. There was also a general belief that individuals or groups excluded from any political process out of fear of the warlords (elders, women, humanitarian group representatives, intellectuals, and professional people) should be given a voice. It would not be the role of the United Nations or any outside authority to dictate the form of government for the Somalis. The UN could, however, sponsor and protect public gatherings, which the Somalis call guurti. Somali cultural traditions and political attitudes place a high value on dialogue and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

The results of the second Addis Ababa conference were quite different from the expectations of its sponsors. The warlords first agreed to a modest project to empower regional political organizations and to advance the peacemaking process. This was evidently not sufficiently strong for the United Nations, which rejected the agreement after it had been signed by the warlords. The first response of the warlords was to walk out in protest over this intervention. They were induced to return by an offer that effectively gave them the opportunity to dominate a national transitional body. To buy their approval, each warlord was provided a guaranteed seat in a Transitional National Council (TNC).

One encouraging outcome was entirely unanticipated. A conference of aid donors was in progress in Addis Ababa at the same time as the warlords were meeting. Upon its completion, the building in which the warlords were meeting was surrounded by a group of very vocal and insistent women who had been attending the aid donors meeting. Their intervention produced a guarantee that one-third of the seats in the TNC would be reserved for women. The Addis Ababa agreement gave no hint how the remaining unencumbered seats were to be contested. This agreement, which guarantees a seat at the table for all warlords and other self-declared political leaders, remains at this writing the basic political planning text in Somalia. UNOSOM subsequently took the position that the international arrest warrant issued for Aideed made him ineligible to sit on the TNC.

Transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II

When UNITAF transferred its responsibilities to UNOSOM II on 4 May 1993, there were great expectations for improvement in the administration of law and justice in central-south Somalia. The Security Council Resolution that established UNOSOM II strengthened the UN mandate in Somalia and removed some of the ambiguities that had persisted throughout the UNITAF deployment. With the assistance of USLO, which provided a UN Agency for International Development study outlining steps for reintroducing the pre-Slaa Barre legal system, the Special Representative of the Secretary General, Admiral Howe, declared the 1962-63 Somali penal code the law of the land.

During the first week of its new mandate, UNOSOM II took a series of decisive actions to demonstrate that it had the situations in Mogadishu and Kismayo under control. Show of force operations were initiated on 5 May in all areas of operations, including the city of Mogadishu. On the following day, a number of warning letters were delivered to various troublesome factional leaders, including General Morgan, whose confederates were at the time still causing trouble in Kismayo. Osman "Atto," Aideed’s deputy, armorer, and principal financier, was also told to stay away from Kismayo."
Demilitarization figures for confiscated weapons were in the thousands, and while this represented only a fraction of the number of light weapons available in the country, UNITAF succeeded in having a good portion of the heavier weapons stored in fixed cantonment sites. Little known to critics of the original decision to deploy troops to Somalia are the facts that UNITAF repaired more than 1800 kilometers of roads, restored two airfields (Mogadishu and Kismayo) to C-5 standards and seven others to C-130 standards, and reworked 14 water wells. For a relatively brief deployment, these are truly impressive figures.

Some political initiatives did take place during the UNITAF period. Spurred by UNITAF and the US Liaison Office (USLO), southern Mogadishu warlord Aideed and northern Mogadishu leader Ali Mahdi signed a cease-fire and a general truce on 11 December 1992. Their seven-point agreement called for reconstitution of their fractured political party, the United Somali Congress, disarmament of all irregulars, including the so-called "technicals," and the removal of all internal city barriers, including the "green line" separating the two forces. This political activity produced a number of joint committees, one of which, the political committee, met regularly at the USLO offices. For a while these committees served as effective fora for airing grievances and for peaceful settlement of disputes. The police committee almost single-handedly took on the responsibility of setting up a police constabulary in Mogadishu. It soon had enrolled 3000 former policemen, a group that had largely escaped the scandals of the Siad Barre era. A judicial committee also was formed, with an equal number of magistrates and judges named by the Aideed and Ali Mahdi factions. This group had a less-than-desirable effect on the legal system, however, because neither group would permit its own members to remain in jail.

In a larger sense, the policy of letting the appointees of Ali Mahdi and Aideed provide political, police, and judicial liaison with UNOSOM and UNITAF proved to be a very ineffective expedient. When a group of Aideed henchmen attempted to resume extortion operations against the largest humanitarian relief organizations (HROs) in early March, the task of protecting the Mogadishu offices of CARE and the World Food Programme was turned over to Pakistani forces in UNOSOM. No effort was made to arrest the offending thugs. UNITAF forces were always available in the event that UNOSOM I forces could not maintain control of any given situation. UNITAF, for operational reasons that can well be understood, declined to define the readiness of its forces. This ambiguity was felt strongly by the various HROs in Mogadishu, whose contract guards had been disturbed shortly after UNITAF arrived. So long as the international authorities (UNOSOM I and UNITAF) deferred to the warlords and their followers—or appeared to do so—there was little likelihood that effective political processes would be established by Somalis not associated with them.

Political Action Under UNOSOM I

A Chapter VI mandate implies that the UN force has the approval of all local authorities. Lacking such approval—there was no central government in Somalia—the United Nations decided to assist in the creation of a national authority. As a first step, a UN-sponsored planning meeting was held in Addis Ababa on 4 January 1993, with 14 Somali factions represented. It immediately ran into problems. Aideed refused to accept any delegation which had been associated with former dictator Siad Barre or which had not been involved in the fight against Siad Barre. This exclusion was primarily directed at Siad Barre's son-in-law, Mohamed Siad Herti (Morgan). Morgan's forces were at the time threatening the vital southern port city of Kismayo, which had changed hands several times during the 1991-92 civil war. Only the personal intercession of Ethiopian President Meles Zenawi
UNOSOM II thus sought to demonstrate an even-handed approach to solving political issues by putting General Morgan on notice at the same time in May 1993 that Aideed and his confederates received warning letters.

A period of rapidly rising tensions followed the turnover from the US-led UNITAOF to UNOSOM II. The warlord-controlled radio station in Mogadishu immediately stepped up its anti-colonial diatribes. Additional US forces were deployed to Kismayo, the southern port city where most observers believed the first test between the UN and the frustrated warlords would take place. It seemed likely to those in Mogadishu that a confrontation between the international forces and the local "authorities" was inevitable, although no one could predict what form it would take.

The Split With Aideed

The turning point that eventually led to open conflict between Aideed and UN forces began innocently enough. On 13 May, only nine days after the United Nations assumed responsibility for all military operations in Somalia, Aideed sent a letter to UNOSOM II headquarters asking the UN to convene a conference to disengage forces in the central region, immediately north of UNITAOF's original area of operations. The conference was ostensibly to settle the political issues between Aideed's Habr Gediir clan, dominant in the south central zones of Somalia, and the Mijertan clan, which controls substantial parts of the northeast region of the country.

On its face, this was an attractive initiative. The three militia forces ranged across the town of Galcayo in the central region controlled the largest collection of heavy weapons remaining outside of UN cantonment sites. Disarmament of Galcayo would permit UNOSOM II to extend its area of responsibility from the Kenya frontier through the central region to Bosaso, the capital of the northeast, nearly doubling the size of its area of responsibility. It would have opened land communications with the northeast, which for months had been clamoring for a UN military presence. Because it still pursued a policy of accommodating the warlords, reflecting its Chapter VI habit, UNOSOM II hastened to reply affirmatively to Aideed's offer.

Within a week, however, UNOSOM II and Aideed were quarreling openly about the rules for the conference. UN officials had assumed that the "Galcayo Conference" would take place under their leadership. Aideed insisted that because it was his idea, he should be in charge. At first, he would not even agree to a UN presence. His propaganda organs augmented their vituperative condemnations of UNOSOM II and of Admiral Howe. The UNOSOM II staff belatedly realized that it had been duped; in fact, the international organization had agreed to sponsor a conference designed to raise the political profile of Aideed, its primary antagonist, at the expense of its own authority.

In the end there were two conferences on Galcayo. Aideed's rump conference moved around town, from site to site, hoping to avoid any hint of UN supervision. The UNOSOM II Conference on Galcayo never got off the ground; at one point, Aideed's supporters stole the tables and chairs from the UN site and frightened away most of UNOSOM II's Somali supporters. The Aideed-sponsored conference concluded on 4 June, the day before the attack on the Pakistanis that killed 24 peacekeepers and severely wounded another 50. Some observers believe that the whole Galcayo conference exercise represented an effort by Aideed to humiliate the UN and to mobilize potential allies for a military confrontation with UN forces.

Ambiguity in Handling Aideed Left Unresolved

It remains unclear whether the series of uncertain tactics and awkward missteps by UNOSOM II after it took over on 4 May were caused by micro-management from UN Headquarters in New York or were simply miscalculations based on faulty reading of Somali politics on the ground in Mogadishu. It is apparent, however, that in either case, the United Nations had no plan for handling the warlords. Aideed astutely held on to the political initiative and threatening to resign UNOSOM II off balance. Even after the public disagreement between Aideed's people and the UN had reached a fever pitch, Admiral Howe paid a well-publicized call on Aideed at his headquarters on 22 May. Howe evidently hoped to reach a last-minute accommodation with Aideed on the critical Galcayo meeting. For those Somali who hoped that the United Nations would finally stand up to the warlords, the call by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Aideed was an acute disappointment. Aideed apparently believed that he had no particular stocks to cooperate with the UN. He saw UN efforts to accommodate him as weakness; he hoped to strengthen waning support in his own faction and to draw followers from other clan groups by portraying UNOSOM II as anti-Islamic, and by emphasizing xenophobic and anti-colonial issues in his broadcasts. These remained his primary themes as he evaded UN efforts to arrest him.

Aideed demonstrated considerable skill in exploiting the weaknesses of Operation Restore Hope. He used both UNATIF and UNOSOM to gain stature and enhance his prospects for being declared the legitimate future leader of Somalia. Aideed did not attack American troops in UNITAOF directly. He simply waited UNITAOF out, preparing actions to be used against UNOSOM II in the event that his political position was not respected. He astutely kept himself in the center of any potential political settlement. He was keenly conscious of the importance of the media and staged attacks. sometimes cunning down his own Habr Gediir women and children in order to have bodies to show on US evening news broadcasts. Aideed has exploited command and control problems within UNOSOM II. With allies in that headquarters, he managed to keep abreast of tactical plans and to split UNOSOM II cohesion.
Aided has weaknesses that UNOSOM II has shown little skill in exploiting. His center of gravity is his relations with the Hawiye/Habr Gedir sub-clan, which accepted him as its leader so long as he could defend them and maintain his credibility as the country's next leader. The Habr Gedir, who are one of the largest sub-clans in the country, perhaps 800,000 out of a pre-civil war national population of 7.5 million, have been political outsiders since before World War II. They were particularly mistrusted by Siad Barre, who brutally suppressed them. It is easy to understand why, in the context of the times, the Habr Gedir wanted Aided to be "their dictator," the next Siad Barre. If the Habr Gedir finally realize that he is a lost cause, a leader who would have no standing in the world, he probably would be eliminated by his own clansmen.6

Political Features of Chapter VII Peacemaking Operations

There are numerous examples, particularly in West Africa, in which the peoples of largely failed states held national conferences of reconciliation. Among the prime examples are the national conferences of Benin, Niger, Congo (Brazzaville), and Mali. In each of these cases, national authorities were established that were based on compromises among regional and ethnic groups. These conferences sometimes lasted for months. As noted, such gatherings are also part of the Somali cultural tradition. Meetings of elders and their communities became widespread after the defeat of Siad Barre; their very popularity caused these guurwi to be largely suppressed when the warlords asserted control over regions in which clan groups other than their own predominated.

A four-month conference of elders in Boroma, in northwestern Somalia, ended in early June 1993, having produced a provisional president and a national charter. Although this gathering resolved to seek recognition of national independence, largely as the result of genocidal atrocities of the Siad Barre administration in the north, it serves as a recent example of the Somali tradition of compromise and practicality. The optimal political goal for Somalis would be to create a body in which all Somalis could meet and decide what form their political future should take. At a neutral site, and protected by forces from UNOSOM II, such a gathering might also last for months. However, the process could be a lot less expensive in human lives and military hardware than what happened in Somalia between May and October 1993. The ability to provide the people of Somalia an opportunity to act politically without coercion would constitute a success for the various international groups in Somalia. Although few facts are available, the United Nations sponsored a successful reconciliation conference recently in Kismayo, confronting the same range of issues that would have arisen during the abortive Galcayo conference.

The organization of a national conference should become a fundamental component of every United Nations Chapter VII operation. If this were to become general practice—the price that national communities in distress would be obliged to pay for international peacemaking assistance—a model could be developed for integrating political and military goals, objectives, and methods in Chapter VII operations. The model would facilitate the development of appropriate end states for military forces committed in support of such operations, and just might eliminate many hours of empty debate in the UN Security Council. If the New World Order is to continue to be such a messy affair, it should be the business of the world community to establish some elementary ground rules before attempting any more Chapter VII operations.

Issues Raised by Operation Restore Hope

One cannot deploy more than 26,000 troops to a country the size of Somalia without becoming a major force in the domestic political situation of the country where they are deployed. It is not realistic to plan a humanitarian operation that includes such an overwhelming force without a well-defined political agenda. Nearly all Somalia who were in contact with the US Liaison Office in Mogadishu, including Somalis not necessarily sympathetic to the UN deployment, were incredulous that the UN seemed to have such limited objectives.

When there is no central government, the occupying force in a Chapter VII operation can become the de facto government. The strongest criticism leveled at the UNITAF intervention in Somalia is not that it did so much, but that it did too little. UNITAF did not disarm the warlords or establish law and order.

The five-month UNITAF occupation of south-central Somalia created an appearance of normalcy. In retrospect, it appears that the warlords simply decided to wait for the coalition to leave. As soon as UNITAF left, the warlords sharply increased their bullying and extortion of fellow Somalis and international assistance agencies.

When UNOSOM II, armed with its strong Chapter VII mandate, began operations in early May 1993, much of the international coalition's credibility had dissipated. Experts in the field of international military operations claim that "the average UN mission has about six weeks from initial deployment to demonstrate its competence and win local trust. If that trust is lost, or never fully realized, an operation can be crippled and its personnel put in jeopardy." The nonconfrontational approach taken by UNITAF during the five months that its forces operated in Somalia created a credibility gap that the United Nations has never been able to fill.

Command and control of UNOSOM II is very much more complicated than it was for UNITAF. For many UN military forces, the chain of command runs through their respective national capitals.

The United Nations must assure itself that all coalition partners agree with the basic purpose and the goals for which the coalition was created. This is as much a function of credible leadership in New York and national capitals as it is in the area where units are deployed.
It is as true today as it was in December 1992 that "victory" in Somalia will be defined by the political situation that the United Nations—and by direct implication the United States, because we dominated the original operation—leave behind.

Restore Hope was always more than a simple humanitarian operation. A narrow mandate can be pursued in future such operations, but in the end someone must pay the price of earlier short-term successes.

Conclusions

It is not too early to reach judgment on a situation which saw the UN engaged in combat against part of the population that its forces were committed to save. Serious policy miscalculations preceded the breakdown of Operation Restore Hope and led to the attacks by Aideed's forces on Pakistani peacekeepers on 5 June 1993. The UN was unable to fill the political vacuum that existed in the UNITA F area of operations. Although there were points of open dispute with the UN, particularly in keeping the peace in the southern port city of Kismayo, UNITAF forces generally followed a policy of nonconfrontation with them. In the end, this policy was interpreted by some of the warlords and their allies as weakness.

The UN appeared uncertain about the transition from the constraints of a Chapter VI operation to the greater freedom and authority of a Chapter VII mandate. Unable to look beyond the warlords, it failed to develop coherent political goals for the entire population of Somalia. Consequently, UN-sponsored conferences in Addis Ababa in January and March 1993 created a process which ultimately escaped UN control, creating significant impediments to peace enforcement.

Aideed's megalomaniac ambitions were encouraged, inadvertently or by design, by both UNOSOM I and UNITAF. He was accorded virtual chief of state status by various diplomatic and business dealings. He was permitted by UNOSOM I to determine the membership of police and judicial committees, some of which became extensions of his broad-based criminal organization.

If the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) were to be ended precipitously, no one familiar with the political situation there doubts that the humanitarian crisis that sparked the original UNOSOM I and UNITAF operations would recur.

There must be common understanding among the partners of a coalition regarding its military and political goals and objectives, and the measures to be taken to attain the goals. There can be unity of purpose in an operation even as coalition partners maintain direct links with their ministries of defense.

In future peacemaking or peace enforcement operations, the United States and its coalition allies must develop a strategy for meeting the terms of their mandate that integrates military end states with effective political action. Failure to do so will invariably provide local RAMHOS the opportunities they seek to get inside UN and coalition decision processes and turn events to their own advantage.

Although it seems unnecessary to state it explicitly, never commit to a peace support operation within a political structure or a geographical region if the force is constrained by the UN to operate at different levels of authority. The entire structure or region must be under the same chapter of the UN charter to preclude the kinds of problems that all forces in Somalia have had to contend with since early 1993.

While important mistakes and omissions have occurred throughout the conduct of Operation Restore Hope, the purpose of this article has not been to assign blame, but to point out certain fundamental issues inherent in managing peacemaking operations. The crisis in Somalia may be a paradigm of the New World Order. There are many more Somalias out there, especially in Africa, where debt, drought, disease, and politics threaten states with political implosion. If the United Nations, in partnership with the United States and other peacemaking coalition partners, fails to learn from the lessons of Somalia how to manage those operations, and fails to develop the unity of purpose and coherent political strategy required to bring such operations to successful conclusions, the prospects for multilateral peacemaking in this troubled new era look very bleak indeed.

NOTES:

1. Operation Restore Hope was selected by President Bush as the name of the operation. Admiral Jonathan Howe, the retired American admiralm who served as commander of the UN peacemaking operation in Somalia on 4 May 1993, rechristened the exercise as Operation Continue Hope, which has not been broadly adopted. We will continue to refer to the Somalia humanitarian intervention as Operation Restore Hope. Other members of the UN coalition have their own designations for the Somali relief exercise (e.g., France, Operation Orly; Italy, Operation Dru)


3. See Alberto Colli, "For U.S., Hidden Risks in Somalia's Feudal Chaos," The Wall Street Journal, 7 September 1993, p. 12. Professor Colli was a senior official in Pentagon during the Bush Administration. This article provides a broad glimpse into the thinking of the policymakers of the period.


6. The United States invested something close to $200 million in improving the port and artificled of Berbera as the northernmost. When the agreements to use these facilities came up for renewal in 1988, the United States declined to renew them. Said Barre's perennial dependencies in the northwest made continuation of the agreement out of the question.

7. Colli.
MR. KOPPEL: If after American troops are on the ground and peace does not hold -- and that does seem like a reasonable question, and I'm sure it's one you've considered -- what do U.S. troops do? Do they become involved or do they pull out again?

GEN. SHALIKASHVILI: I think that the degree to which you send in a force that is on the very clearly defined rules of engagement, very robust chain of command, that the forces themselves are structured to be able to take care of themselves and the rules of engagement make it certain that how you will react to a threatening situation. You first of all, through all of that, greatly minimize the chance that someone will take you on or threaten the peacekeeping force, and that even minor skirmishes will break out into larger fights. So I think it's very important to understand that you want to send in a force that is militarily robust enough to do what you asked it to do, and militarily robust enough to protect itself.

MR. KOPPEL: Is not the lesson of Somalia that even a fellow like Mohamed Aideed can, with a relatively small lightly armed force, extract enough casualties that the political pressure on the United States then to withdraw its forces will be so great that they cannot be resisted?

GEN. SHALIKASHVILI: I think that much of that depends on whether that is true. It depends how well you have articulated before you went in the dangers and the risks involved. The less you've done that, the less you've convinced the people of the merits of involvement, and the less you've convinced Congress of the merits of involvement, the more the chance that what you postulate will happen.

MR. KOPPEL: You surely don't think that that has been done?

GEN. SHALIKASHVILI: No, I don't think it has been done. I think I have said repeatedly that we need to do a much better job in articulating why it is important for the United States not to stand idly by when it comes time to help implement the peace plan, but also what the risks would be involved in our involvement in such an operation.
MR. KOPPEL: General Shalikashvili, let's take a break. When we come back, I'm going to ask precisely those questions and give you an opportunity to enunciate those answers. Thank you. We'll be back in a moment.

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(Announcements.)

MR. KOPPEL: And we're back once again with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Shalikashvili, you raised the questions, now you see if you can answer them. What needs to be conveyed to the American public is what will happen if American troops are sent into Bosnia, and then if they come under attack?

GEN. SHALIKASHVILI: I think that's a question that you need to ask before. We're all are always very good at asking what happens if we take a certain action, what happens if we go into Bosnia. You also have to think your way through what happens if we don't go into Bosnia. I think that if we understand the implications of inaction, then it is easier to understand why some argue that the instability that continued conflict in Europe would have warrants America's involvement. We have in fact an interest, a very core interest, in European stability. We have a core interest in preserving the credibility of the alliance.

MR. KOPPEL: General, I'm still saying to you that if half a dozen young Americans die in Bosnia sometime in the next year or so, then I'm not sure that what you have set forth here will be a sufficient explanation to the American public as to why American interests are at stake over there.

PRESS RETURN TO CONTINUE OR ENTER ANOTHER REQUEST.

GEN. SHALIKASHVILI: I think that Americans understood very well the risks that they needed to take, and they took them, to build half of Europe that now is the anchor of stability, our greatest trading partner. I'm asking --

MR. KOPPEL: And they understood -- and, General, if you'll forgive me for interrupting -- they understood it because at that time the world was bifurcated between two great powers: there were the Communists on one side represented by the Soviet Union, and there were the democratic nations on the other side. That kind of a reality doesn't exist any more.

GEN. SHALIKASHVILI: And the world today is even more complex and in many ways more dangerous today because of all of the uncertainties, the conflicts that rage around the periphery of the former Soviet Union. And if we do not manage those well we can destroy not only any chance in Eastern Europe, in Central
Europe, in the former Soviet Union for peace and stability, that surely is in our best interests, but it will also have an impact on Western Europe that we have spent so much energy and so many resources in building.

PRESS RETURN TO CONTINUE OR ENTER ANOTHER REQUEST.

I think it is in our best interest to continue to work to reduce the conflicts there now and to bring the stability and the peace to all of Europe -- not just part of Europe -- so all of Europe can become that strong partner of ours that now Western Europe is.

MR. KOPPEL: General, no one has any trouble with the prospect of peace -- that's always accepted. My concern is whether you think that

.Gen. Shalikashvili: I think we must not be frivolous about it. We must not ask Americans to give their lives needlessly.

PRESS RETURN TO CONTINUE OR ENTER ANOTHER REQUEST.

But Americans have understood, perhaps better than most, that freedom isn't free and that to gain the sort of world that we all hunger for for our children we sometimes have to make that sacrifice.

MR. KOPPEL: So, unlike Somalia where clearly a political decision was made that the deaths of a relatively few Americans was such that we had to withdraw our troops from over there, because our vital national interest was not involved -- if I understand you correctly, you are telling me that it is your perception that in Bosnia America's vital interests are involved, and even if Americans start losing their lives over there it is essential that they remain there until peace is established?

.Gen. Shalikashvili: I think America's core interests are involved in Europe, the stability of Europe. Peace on the European continent is one of America's core interests, and we have never shied away after we have thought our way through to doing that which needs to be done to preserve that core interest.

PRESS RETURN TO CONTINUE OR ENTER ANOTHER REQUEST.

MR. KOPPEL: So is the answer to my question yes?

.Gen. Shalikashvili: I think that in Bosnia we have
sufficient core interests involved that justify the commitment of 25,000, or whatever the number is, of Americans to help implement the peace plan. Yes, I believe that.

MR. KOPPEL: With the understanding though that that can lead to casualties and that Americans may die?

GEN. SHALIKASHVILI: Yes, clearly.

MR. KOPPEL: General Shalikashvili, thank you very much. You've been very gracious.

GEN. SHALIKASHVILI: Thank you.

END