AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

BY

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The Fifteenth Edition.

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Printed in the Year M.DCC.LIII.
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§. 2. Besides articulate Sounds, therefore, it was farther necessary, that he should be able to use these Sounds, as Signs of internal Conceptions; and to make them stand as Marks for the Ideas, within his own Mind, whereby they might be made known to others, and the Thoughts of Mens Minds be conveyed from one to another.

§. 3. But neither was this sufficient to make Words so useful, as they ought to be. It is not enough for the Perfection of Language, that Sounds can be made Signs of Ideas, unless those Signs can be so made use of, as to comprehend several particular Things: For the Multiplication of Words would have perplexed their Use, had every particular Thing need of a distinct Name, to be signified by. To remedy this Inconvenience, Language had yet a farther Improvement,
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Improvement, in the Use of general Terms, whereby one Word was made to mark a Multitude of particular Existences: Which advantageous Use of Sounds was obtained only by the Difference of the Ideas they were made Signs of; those Names becoming general, which are made to stand for general Ideas, and those remaining particular, where the Ideas, they are used for, are particular.

§. 4. Besides these Names which stand for Ideas, there be other Words which Men make use of, not to signify any Idea, but the Want, or Absence of some Ideas, simple, or complex, or all Ideas together; such as are Nihil in Latin, and in English, Ignorance, and Barrenness. All which negative, or private Words, cannot be said properly to belong to, or signify no Ideas; for then they would be perfectly insignificant Sounds; but they relate to positive Ideas, and signify their Absence.

§. 5. It may also lead us a little towards the Original of all our Notions and Knowledge, if we remark, how great a Dependence our Words have on common, sensible Ideas; and how those, which are made use of, to stand for Actions and Notions, quite removed from Sense, have their Rise from thence, and from obvious, sensible Ideas, are transferred to more abstruse Significations, and made to stand for Ideas, that come not under the Cognizance of our Senses; e.g. to Imagine, Apprehend, Comprehend, Adhere, Conceive, Infill, Disgust, Disturbance, Tranquility, &c. are all Words, taken from the Operations of sensible Things, and applied to certain Modes of Thinking. Spirit, in its primary Signification, is Breath; Angel, a Messenger: And I doubt not, but, if we could trace them to their Sources, we should find, in all Languages, the Names, which stand for Things, that fall not under our Senses, to have had their first Rise from sensible Ideas. By which we may give some kind of guess, what kind of Notions they were, and whence derived, which filled their Minds, who were the first Beginners of Languages; and how Nature, even in the naming of Things, unawares suggested to Men the Originals and Principles of all their Knowledge: Whilst, to give Names, that might make known to others, any Operati-
Chap. I.  Words, or Language in General.

ons they felt in themselves, or any other Ideas, that came not under their Senses, they were fain to borrow Words from ordinary, known Ideas of Sensation, by that means to make others the more easily to conceive those Operations, they experimented in themselves, which made no outward, sensible Appearances: And then, when they had got known and agreed Names, to signify those internal Operations of their own Minds, they were sufficiently furnished to make known by Words, all their other Ideas; since they could consist of nothing, but either of outward, sensible Perceptions, or of the inward Operations of their Minds about them; we having, as has been proved, no Ideas at all, but what originally come either from sensible Objects without, or what we feel within ourselves, from the inward Workings of our own Spirits, of which we are conscious to ourselves within.

§. 6. But to understand better the Use and Distribution of Language, as subservient to Instruction and Knowledge, it will be convenient to consider,

First, To what it is that Names, in the Use of Language, are immediately applied.

Secondly, Since all (except proper) Names are general, and so stand not particularly, for this, or that single Thing, but for Sorts and Ranks of Things, it will be necessary to consider, in the next Place, what the Sorts and Kinds, or, if you rather like the Latin Names, what the Species and Genera of Things are; wherein they consist, and how they come to be made. These being (as they ought) well looked into, we shall the better come to find the right Use of Words; the natural Advantages and Defects of Language, and the Remedies, that ought to be used, to avoid the Inconveniencies of Obscurity, or Uncertainty, in the Signification of Words, without which it is impossible to discourse with any Clearness, or Order, concerning Knowledge; which, being conversant about Propositions, and those most commonly universal ones, has greater Connexion with Words, than perhaps is suspected.

These Considerations, therefore, shall be the Matter of the following Chapters.

C H A P.
C H A P. II.

Of the Signification of Words.

§ 1. **M** A N, tho' he has great Variety of Thoughts, and such, from which others, as well as himself, might receive Profit and Delight; yet they are all within his own Breast, invisible, and hidden from others, nor can of themselves be made appear. The Comfort and Advantage of Society, not being to be had without Communication of Thoughts, it was necessary that Man should find out some external, sensible Signs, whereby those invisible Ideas, which his Thoughts are made up of, might be made known to others: For this Purpose nothing was so fit, either for Plen-ty, or Quickness, as those articulate Sounds, which, with so much Ease and Variety, he found himself able to make. Thus we may conceive how **W** o **r** d **s**, which were by Nature so well adapted to that Purpose, come to be made use of by Men, as the Signs of their Ideas; not by any natural Connexion, that there is between particular, articulate Sounds, and certain Ideas; for then there would be but one Language amongst all Men; but by a voluntary Imposition, whereby such a Word is made arbitrarily the Mark of such an Idea. The Use, then, of Words, is to be sensible Marks of Ideas; and the Ideas they stand for, are their proper and immediate Signification.

§ 2. The Use Men have of these Marks, being either to record their own Thoughts, for the Assistance of their own Memory; or, as it were, to bring out their Ideas, and lay them before the View of others; **W** or **d** s, *in their primary, or immediate Signification, stand for nothing, but the Ideas in the Mind of him that uses them, how imperfectly soever, or carelessly, those Ideas are collected from Things, which they are
are supposed to represent. When a Man speaks to another, it is that he may be understood; and the End of Speech is, that those Sounds, as Marks, may make known his Ideas to the Hearer. That then which Words are the Marks of, are the Ideas of the Speaker: Nor can any one apply them, as Marks, immediately to any Thing else, but the Ideas, that he himself hath. For this would be to make them Signs of his own Conceptions, and yet apply them to other Ideas; which would be to make them Signs, and not Signs, of his Ideas, at the same time; and so, in effect, to have no Signification at all. Words being voluntary Signs, they cannot be voluntary Signs, imposed by him on Things he knows not. That would be to make them Signs of nothing, Sounds without Signification. A Man cannot make his Words the Signs either of Qualities in Things, or of Conceptions in the Mind of another, whereof he has none in his own. Until he has some Ideas of his own, he cannot suppose them to correspond with the Conceptions of another Man; nor can he use any Signs for them: For thus they would be the Signs of he knows not what, which is in Truth, to be the Signs of nothing. But, when he represents to himself other Mens Ideas, by some of his own, if he consent to give them the same Names, that other Men do, 'tis still to his own Ideas; to Ideas that he has, and not to Ideas that he has not.

§. 3. This is so necessary in the Use of Language, that in this respect, the Knowing, and the Ignorant, the Learned, and the Unlearned, use the Words they speak (with any Meaning) all alike. They, in every Man's Mouth, stand for the Ideas he has, and which he would express by them. A Child having taken Notice of nothing in the Metal he hears called Gold, but the bright, shining, yellow Colour, he applies the Word Gold only to his own Idea of that Colour, and nothing else; and, therefore, calls the same Colour, in a Peacock's Tail, Gold. Another, that hath better observed, adds to shining yellow, great Weight; and then the Sound Gold, when he uses it, stands for a complex Idea of a shining, yellow, and very weighty Substance. Another adds to those Qualities, Fusibility; and then the Word Gold to him signifies
signifies a Body, bright, yellow, fusible, and very heavy. Another adds Malleability: Each of these uses equally the Word Gold, when they have Occasion to express the Idea, which they have applied it to: But it is evident, that each can apply it only to his own Idea; nor can he make it stand, as a Sign of such complex Ideas, as he has not.

Words often secretly referred, Men, can properly and immediately signify nothing, but the Ideas, that are in the Mind of the Speaker; yet they, in their Thoughts, give them a secret Reference to two other Things.

First, They suppose their Words to be Marks of the Ideas in the Minds also of other Men, with whom they communicate: For else they should talk in vain, and could not be understood, if the Sounds they applied to one Idea, were such, as by the Hearer were applied to another, which is to speak two Languages. But in this, Men stand not usually to examine, whether the Idea they, and those they discoursed with, have in their Minds, be the same; but think it enough, that they use the Word, as they imagine, in the common Acceptation of that Language; in which they suppose, that the Idea they make it a Sign of, is precisely the same, to which the Understanding Men of that Country apply that Name.

Secondly, To the Reality of Things.

Secondly, Because Men would not be thought to talk barely of their own Imaginations, but of Things as really they are; therefore they often suppose their Words to stand also for the Reality of Things. But, this relating more particularly to Substances, and their Names, as perhaps the former does to simple Ideas and Modes, we shall speak of these two different ways of applying Words, more at large, when we come to treat of the Names of mixed Modes, and Substances, in particular: Tho' give me leave here to say, that it is a perverting the Use of Words, and brings unavoidable Obscurity and Confusion into their Signification, whenever we make them stand for any Thing, but those Ideas we have in our own Minds.

§. 6. Con-
§. 6. Concerning Words also, it is farther to be considered: First, That they being immediately the Signs of Mens Ideas; and, by that means, the Instruments whereby Men communicate their Conceptions, and express to one another those Thoughts and Imaginations, they have within their own Breasts, there comes, by constant use, to be such a Connexion between certain Sounds, and the Ideas they stand for, that the Names heard, almost as readily excite certain Ideas, as if the Objects themselves, which are apt to produce them, did actually affect the Senses. Which is manifestly so in all obvious, sensible Qualities; and in all Substances, that frequently and familiarly occur to us.

§. 7. Secondly, That tho' the proper and immediate Signification of Words, are Ideas in the Mind of the Speaker; yet, because by familiar use from our Cradles, we come to learn certain articulate Sounds very perfectly, and have them readily on our Tongues, and always at hand in our Memories, but yet are not always careful to examine, or settle their Significations perfectly; it often happens, that Men, even when they would apply themselves to an attentive Consideration, do set their Thoughts more on Words than Things. Nay, because Words are many of them learned before the Ideas are known, for which they stand: Therefore some, not only Children, but Men, speak several Words, no otherwise than Parrots do, only because they have learned them, and have been accustomed to those Sounds. But so far as Words are of Use and Signification, so far is there a constant Connexion between the Sound and the Idea, and a Designation, that the one stands for the other; without which Application of them, they are nothing, but so much insignificant Noise.

§. 8. Words, by long and familiar Use, as has been said, come to excite in Men certain Ideas, so constantly and readily, that they are apt to suppose a natural Connexion between them. But that they signify only Mens peculiar Ideas, and that by a perfectly arbitrary Imposition,
Imposition, is evident, in that they often fail to excite in others (even that use the same Language) the same Ideas, we take them to be the Signs of: And every Man has so inviolable a Liberty, to make Words stand for what Ideas he pleases, that no one hath the Power to make others have the same Ideas in their Minds, that he has, when they use the same Words that he does. And, therefore, the great Augustus himself, in the Possession of that Power, which ruled the World, acknowledged, he could not make a new Latin Word: Which was as much as to say, That he could not arbitrarily appoint what Idea any Sound should be a Sign of, in the Moutths and common Language of his Subjects. 'Tis true, common Use, by a tacit Consent, appropriates certain Sounds to certain Ideas, in all Languages, which so far limits the Signification of that Sound, that, unless a Man applies it to the same Idea, he does not speak properly: And let me add, that unless a Man's Words excite the same Ideas in the Hearer, which he makes them stand for in speaking, he does not speak intelligibly. But, whatever be the Consequence of any Man's using of Words differently, either from their general Meaning, or the particular Sense of the Person to whom he addresses them, this is certain, their Signification, in his Use of them, is limited to his Ideas, and they can be Signs of nothing else.

CHAP. III.

Of General Terms.

The greatest part of Words, general. § 1. All Things that exist being Particulars, it may, perhaps, be thought reasonable that Words, which ought to be conformed to Things, should be so too; I mean, in their Signification: But yet we find the quite contrary. The far greatest part of Words, that make all Languages, are general Terms; which has not been the Effect of Neglect, or Chance, but of Reason, and Necessity.

§ 2. First,
§. 2. **First, It is impossible that every particular Thing should have a distinct, peculiar Name.**

For the Signification and Use of Words, depending on that Connexion, which the Mind makes between its Ideas and the Sounds it uses as Signs of them, it is necessary, in the Application of Names to Things, that the Mind should have distinct Ideas of the Things, and retain also the particular Name that belongs to every one, with its peculiar Appropriation to that Idea. But it is beyond the Power of Human Capacity to frame, and retain distinct Ideas of all the particular Things we meet with: Every Bird, and Beast Men saw; every Tree, and Plant that affected the Senses, could not find a Place in the most capacious Understanding. If it be looked on as an Instance of a prodigious Memory, That some Generals have been able to call every Soldier in their Army by his proper Name; we may easily find a Reason, why Men have never attempted to give Names to each Sheep in their Flock, or Crow that flies over their Heads; much less to call every Leaf of Plants, or Grain of Sand, that came in their way, by a peculiar Name.

§. 3. **Secondly, If it were possible, it would yet be useless;** because it would not serve to the chief End of Language. Men would in vain heap up Names of particular Things, that would not serve them to communicate their Thoughts. Men learn Names, and use them in Talk with others, only that they may be understood; which is then only done, when, by Use, or Consent, the Sound I make, by the Organs of Speech, excites in another Man’s Mind, who hears it, the Idea I apply it to in mine, when I speak it. This cannot be done by Names, applied to particular Things, whereof I alone having the Ideas in my Mind, the Names of them could not be significant, or intelligible to another, who was not acquainted with all those very particular Things, which had fallen under my Notice.

§. 4. **Thirdly, But yet granting this also feasible, (which I think is not) yet a distinct Name for every particular Thing would not be of any great Use, for the Improvement of Knowledge;**
which, tho' founded in particular Things, enlarges itself by general Views; to which, Things reduced into Sorts under general Names, are properly subservient. These, with the Names belonging to them, come within some compass, and do not multiply every Moment, beyond what either the Mind can contain, or Use requires: And, therefore, in these, Men have, for the most part, stopp'd; but yet not so, as to hinder themselves from distinguishing particular Things, by appropriated Names, where Convenience demands it. And, therefore, in these, Men have, for the most part, hop'd; but yet not so, as to hinder themselves from distinguishing particular Things, by appropriated Names, where Convenience demands it. And, therefore, in these, Men have, for the most part, hop'd; but yet not so, as to hinder themselves from distinguishing particular Things, by appropriated Names, where Convenience demands it.

§ 5. Besides Persons, Countries also, Cities, Rivers, Mountains, and other the like Distinctions of Place, have usually found peculiar Names, and that for the same Reason; they being such, as Men have often an Occasion to mark particularly, and, as it were, set before others, in their Discourses with them. And I doubt not, but if we had Reason to mention particular Horses, as often as we have to mention particular Men, we should have proper Names for the one, as familiar as for the other, and Bucephalus would be a Word as much in use, as Alexander. And, therefore, we see that amongst Jockeys, Horses have their proper Names, to be known and distinguished by, as commonly as their Servants; because, amongst them, there is often occasion to mention this, or that particular Horse, when he is out of Sight.

§ 6. The next Thing to be considered, is, how general Words come to be made. For since all Things that exist, are only Particulars, how come we by general Terms, or where find we those general Natures they are supposed to stand for? Words become general, by being made the Signs of general Ideas; and Ideas become general, by separating from them the Circumstances of Time, and Place, and any other Ideas, that may determine them to this, or that particular Existence. By this way of Abstraction,
Chap. III. General Terms.

§ 7. But to deduce this a little more distinctly, it will not, perhaps, be amiss to trace our Notions, and Names, from their Beginning, and observe by what Degrees we proceed, and by what Steps we enlarge our Ideas, from our first Infancy. There is nothing more evident, than that the Ideas of the Persons Children converse with, (to instance in them alone) are like the Persons themselves, only particular. The Ideas of the Nurse, and the Mother, are well framed in their Minds; and, like Pictures of them there, represent only those Individuals. The Names they first gave to them, are confined to these Individuals; and the Names of Nurse and Mamma, the Child uses, determine themselves to those Persons. Afterwards, when Time and a larger Acquaintance has made them observe, that there are a great many other Things in the World, that in some common Agreements of Shape, and several other Qualities, resemble their Father and Mother, and those Persons they have been used to, they frame an Idea, which they find those many Particulars do partake in; and to that they give, with others, the Name Man, for Example. And thus they come to have a general Name, and a general Idea: Wherin they make nothing new, but only leave out of the complex Idea, they had of Peter and James, Mary and Jane, that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them all.

§ 8. By the same way, that they come by the general Name and Idea of Man, they easily advance to more general Names, and Notions. For observing, that several Things, that differ from their Idea of Man, and cannot, therefore, be comprehended under that Name, have yet certain Qualities, wherein they agree with Man, by retaining only those Qualities, and uniting them into one Idea, they have again another and a more general Idea; to which having given a Name, they make a Term of a more comprehensive Extension: Which new Idea is made, not by any new Addition, but only, as before, by leaving out the Shape, and some other Properties, signified by the Name Man,
General Terms. Book III.

Man, and retaining only a Body, with Life, Sense, and spontaneous Motion, comprehended under the Name Animal.

§. 9. That this is the Way, whereby Men first formed general Ideas, and general Names to them, I think, is so evident, that there needs no other Proof of it, but the considering of a Man's self, or others, and the ordinary Proceedings of their Minds in Knowledge: And he that thinks general Natures, or Notions, are any thing else, but such abstract and partial Ideas of more complex ones, taken at first from particular Existences, will, I fear, be at a Loss where to find them. For let any one reflect, and then tell me, wherein does his Idea of Man, differ from that of Peter and Paul; or his Idea of Horse, from that of Bucephalus, but in the leaving out something, that is peculiar to each Individual, and retaining so much of those particular, complex Ideas of several, particular Existences, as they are found to agree in? Of the complex Ideas, signified by the Names, Man and Horse, leaving out but those Particulars wherein they differ, and retaining only those wherein they agree, and of those making a new distinct, complex Idea, and giving the Name Animal to it; one has a more general Term, that comprehends with Man several other Creatures. Leave out of the Idea of Animal, Sense, and spontaneous Motion; and the remaining complex Idea, made up of the remaining simple ones of Body, Life, and Nourishment, becomes a more general one, under the more comprehensive Term, Vivens. And, not to dwell longer upon this Particular, so evident in itself, by the same way the Mind proceeds to Body, Substance, and, at last, to Being, Thing, and such universal Terms, which stand for any of our Ideas whatsoever. To conclude, this whole Mystery of Genera and Species, which make such a noise in the Schools, and are, with Justice, so little regarded out of them, is nothing else but abstract Ideas, more, or less comprehensive, with Names annexed to them. In all which, this is constant and unvariable, That every more general Term, stands for such an Idea, as is but a part of any of those contained under it.

§. 10. This
§. 10. This may shew us the Reason, why, in the defining of Words, which is nothing but declaring their Signification, we make use of the Genus, or next general Word that comprehends it; which is not out of necessity, but only to save the Labour of enumerating the several, simple Ideas, which the next general Word, or Genus, stands for; or, perhaps, sometimes the shame of not being able to do it. But tho' defining by Genus and Differentia, (I crave leave to use these Terms of Art, tho' originally Latin, since they most properly suit those Notions they are applied to) I say, tho' defining by the Genus be the shortest way, yet, I think, it may be doubted, whether it be the best. This, I am sure, it is not the only, and so not absolutely necessary. For, Definition being nothing but making another understand by Words, what Idea the Term defined stands for, a Definition is best made by enumerating those simple Ideas, that are combined in the Signification of the Term defined: And if, instead of such an Enumeration, Men have accustomed themselves to use the next general Term, it has not been out of necessity, or for greater clearness, but for quickness and dispatch sake. For, I think, that to one, who desired to know what Ideas the Word Man stood for, if it should be said, that Man was a solid, extended Substance, having Life, Sense, spontaneous Motion, and the Faculty of Reasoning; I doubt not but the Meaning of the Term Man, would be as well understood, and the Idea, it stands for, be, at least as clearly made known, as when it is defined to be a rational Animal: Which, by the several Definitions of Animal, Vivens, and Corpus, resolves itself into those enumerated Ideas. I have, in explaining the Term, Man, followed here the ordinary Definition of the Schools; which tho', perhaps, not the most exact, yet serves well enough to my present Purpose. And one may, in this Instance, see what gave occasion to the Rule, that a Definition must consist of Genus and Differentia: And it suffices to shew us the little Necessity there is of such a Rule, or Advantage, in the strict observing of it. For Definitions, as has been said, being only the explaining of one Word, by several others, so that
the Meaning, or Idea, it stands for, may be certainly known; Languages are not always made according to the Rules of Logic, that every Term can have its Signification, exactly and clearly expressed by two others. Experience sufficiently satisfies us to the contrary; or else those, who have made this Rule, have done ill, that they have given us so few Definitions conformable to it. But of Definitions, more in the next Chapter.

§. 11. To return to general Words, it is plain, by what has been said, That General and Universal are Creatures of the Understanding. Things; but are the Inventions and Creatures of the Understanding, made by it for its own use, and concern only Signs, whether Words, or Ideas. Words are general, as has been said, when used for Signs of general Ideas, and so are applicable indifferently to many particular Things; and Ideas are general, when they are set up as the Representatives of many particular Things; but Universality belongs not to Things themselves, which are all of them particular in their Existence; even those Words, and Ideas, which, in their Signification, are general. When, therefore, we quit Particulars, the Generals that rest are only Creatures of our own making; their general Nature being nothing but the Capacity they are put into by the Understanding, of signifying, or representing many Particulars. For the Signification they have, is nothing but a Relation, that by the Mind of Man is added to them *

§. 12. The

* Against this the Bishop of Worcester objects, and our Author † answers, as followeth: However, faith the Bishop, the abstracted Ideas are the Works of the Mind, yet they are not mere Creatures of the Minds; as appears by an Instance produced of the Essence of the Sun, being in one, single Individual: In which Case it is granted, That the Idea may be so abstracted, that more Suns might agree in it, and it is as much a sort, as if there were as many Suns as there are Stars. So that here we have a real Essence, subsisting in one Individual, but capable of being multiplied into more, and the same Essence remaining. But in this one Sun, there is a real Essence, and not a mere nominal, or abstracted Essence: But, suppose there were more
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§. 12. The next thing, therefore, to be considered, is, what kind of Signification it is, that General Words have. For, as it is evident, that they do not signify barely one particular Thing; for then they would not be general Terms, but proper Names; so, on the other side, it is as evident, they do not signify a Plurality; for Man and Men would then signify the same, and the Distinction of Numbers (as the Grammarians call them) would be superfluous and useless. That then, which general Words signify, is a sort of Things; and each of them does that, by being a Sign of an abstract Idea in the Mind, to which Idea, as Things existing are found to agree, so they come to be ranked under that Name; or, which is all one, be of that sort. Whereby it is evident, that the Essences of the Sorts, more Suns; would not each of them have the real Essence of the Sun? For what is it makes the Second Sun, but having the same real Essence with the First? If it were but a nominal Essence, then the Second would have nothing but the Name.

This, as I understand it, replies Mr. Locke, is to prove, that the abstract, general Essence of any sort of Things, or Things of the same Denomination, e. g. of Man, or Marigold, hath a real Being, out of the Understanding; which, I confess, I am not able to conceive. Your Lordship's Proof here, brought out of my Essay, concerning the Sun, I humbly conceive, will not reach it: Because what is laid there, does not at all concern the real, but nominal Essence; as is evident from hence, that the Idea, I speak of there, is a complex Idea: But we have no complex Idea of the internal Constitution, or real Essence, of the Sun. Besides, I say expressly, That our distinguishing Substances into Species, by Names, is not at all founded on their real Essences. So that, the Sun being one of these Substances, I cannot, in the Place quoted by your Lordship, be supposed to mean, by Essence of the Sun, the real Essence of the Sun, unless I had so expressed it. But all this Argument will be at an end, when your Lordship shall have explained what you mean by these Words, true Sun. In my Sense of them, any thing will be a true Sun, to which the Name Sun may be truly and properly applied; and to that Substance, or Thing, the name Sun, may be truly and properly applied, which has united in it that Combination of sensible Qualities, by which any thing else, that is called Sun, is distinguished from other Substances, i. e. by the nominal Essence: And thus our Sun is denominated and distinguished from a fixed Star; not by a real Essence, that we do not know (for if we did, it is possible we should find the real Essence, or Constitution, of
Sorts, or (if the Latin Word pleases better) Species of Things, are nothing else but these abstract Ideas. For the having the Essence of any Species, being that which makes any Thing to be of that Species, and the Conformity to the Idea, to which the Name is annexed, being that which gives a Right to that Name; the having the Essence, and the having that Conformity, must needs be the same thing: Since to be of any Species, and to have a Right to the Name of that Species, is all one. As for Example, to be a Man, or of the Species Man, and to have Right to the Name Man, is the same thing. Again, to be a Man, or of the Species Man, and have the Essence of a Man, is the same thing. Now, since nothing can be a Man, or have a Right to the Name Man, but what has a Conformity to the Abstract Idea the Name Man stands for; nor any thing be a Man, or have

of one of the fixed Stars, to be the same with that of our Sun) but by a complex Idea of sensible Qualities co-exiting, which, wherever they are found, make a true Sun. And thus I crave leave to answer your Lordship's Question; for what is it makes the Second Sun to be a true Sun, but having the same real Essence with the first? If it were but a nominal Essence, then the Second would have nothing but the Name.

I humbly conceive, if it had the nominal Essence, it would have something besides the Name, viz. That Nominal Essence, which is sufficient to denominate it truly a Sun, or to make it be a true Sun, tho' we know nothing of that real Essence, whereon that nominal one depends. Your Lordship will then argue, That that real Essence is in the Second Sun, and makes the Second Sun. I grant it, when the Second Sun comes to exist, so as to be perceived by us, to have all the Ideas contained in our complex Idea, i.e. in our nominal Essence of a Sun. For should it be true, (as is now believed by Astronomers) that the real Essence of the Sun were in any of the fixed Stars; yet such a Star could not, for that, be by us called a Sun, whilst it answers not our complex Idea, or nominal Essence of a Sun. But how far that will prove, That the Essences of Things, as they are knowable by us, have a Reality in them, distinct from that of abstract Ideas in the Mind, which are merely Creatures of the Mind, I do not see; and we shall farther enquire, in confidering your Lordship's following Words: Therefore, let you, there must be a real Essence in every Individual of the same Kind. Yes, and I beg leave of your Lordship to lay, of a different Kind too. For that alone is it, which makes it to be what it is.

That
have a Right to the Species *Man*, but what has the Essence of that Species; it follows, that the abstract *Idea*, for which the Name stands, and the Essence of the Species, is one and the same. From whence it is easy to observe, that the Essences of the sorts of Things, and consequently the forting of this, is the Workmanship of the Understanding, that abstractions and makes those general *Ideas*.

§. 13. I *would not* here be thought to forget, much less to deny, that Nature, in the Production of Things, makes several of them alike; there is nothing more obvious, especially in the Races of Animals, and all Things propagated by Seed. But yet, I think, we may say, the *sort* of them under Names, *is the Workmanship* of the Understanding, that abstractions and

That every Individual Substance has a real, internal, individual Constitution, *i.e.* a real Essence, that makes it to be what it is, I readily grant. Upon this your Lordship says, *Peter, James, and John*, are all true and real Men. *Anfw*. Without doubt, supposing them to be Men, they are true and real Men, *i.e.* supposing the Names of that Species belongs to them. And so three *Bobagues* are all true and real *Bobagues*, supposing the Name of that Species of Animals belongs to them.

For I beseech your Lordship to consider, Whether, in your way of arguing, by naming them *Peter, James, and John*, Names familiar to us, as appropriated to Individuals of the Species, *Man*, your Lordship does not first suppose them Men; and then very safely ask, Whether they be not all true and real Men? But if I should ask your Lordship, Whether *Weweena, Chuckery* and *Cousbeda*, were true and real Men, or no? your Lordship would not be able to tell me, until I having pointed out to your Lordship the Individuals, called by those Names; your Lordship by examining whether they had in them those sensible Qualities, which your Lordship has combined into that complex *Idea*, to which you give the specific Name, *Man*, determined them all, or some of them, to be of the Species, which you call *Man*, and so to be true and real *Men*. Which when your Lordship has determined, 'tis plain you did it by that, which is only the nominal Essence, as not knowing the real one. But your Lordship farther asks, *What is it makes Peter, James, and John, real Men? Is it the attributing the general Name to them? No certainly; but that the true and real Essence of a Man is in every one of them.*

If, when your Lordship asks, *What makes them Men?* your Lordship used the Word, *making*, in the proper Sense, for the efficient Cause, and in that Sense it were true, that the Essence of a *Man i.e.* the specific
Workmanship of the Understanding, taking occasion from the Similitude it observes amongst them to make abstract, general Ideas, and set them up in the Mind, with Names annexed to them, as Patterns, or Forms, (for in that Sense the Word Form has a very proper Signification) to which as particular Things existing are found to agree, so they come to be of that Species, have that Denomination, or are put into that Class. For when we say, this is a Man, that a Horse; this Justice, that Cruelty; this a Watch, that a Jack; what do we else but rank Things under different, specific Names, as agreeing to those abstract Ideas, of which we have made those Names the Signs? And what are the Essences of those Species, set out and marked by Names, but those abstract Ideas in the Mind; which are, as it were, the Bonds between particular Things that exist, and the Names specific Essence of that Species made a Man; it would undoubtedly follow, that this specific Essence had a Reality, beyond that of being only a generally abstract Idea in the Mind. But when it is said, That it is the true and real Essence of a Man, in every one of them, that makes Peter, James, and John, true and real Men; the true and real Meaning of those Words is no more, but that the Essence of that Species, i.e. the Properties answering the complex, abstract Idea, to which the specific Name is given, being found in them, that makes them be properly and truly called Men, or is the Reason, why they are called Men. Your Lordship adds, And we must be as certain of this as we are, that they are Men.

How, I beseech your Lordship, are we certain, that they are Men, but only by our Senses, finding those Properties in them, which answer the abstract, complex Idea, which is in our Minds, of the specific Idea, to which we have annexed the specific Name Man? This I take to be the true Meaning of what your Lordship says, in the next Words, viz. They take their Denomination of being Men, from that common Nature, or Essence, which is in them; and I am apt to think, these Words will not hold true, in any other Sense.

YOUR Lordship’s fourth Inference begins thus: That the general Idea is not made from the simple Ideas, by the mere Act of the Mind, abstraining from Circumstances, but from Reason and Consideration of the Nature of Things.

I THOUGHT, my Lord, That Reason and Consideration had been Acts of the Mind, mere Acts of the Mind, when any thing was done by them. Your Lordship gives a Reason for it, viz. For, when we see several Individuals, that have the same Powers and Properties, we thence infer, That there must be something common to all, which makes them of one Kind.

I GRANT
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Names they are to be ranked under? And, when general Names have any Connexion with particular Beings, these abstract Ideas are the Medium that unites them; so that the Essences of Species, as distinguished and denominated by us, neither are, nor can be any thing, but those precise, abstract Ideas, we have in our Minds. And therefore, the supposed real Essences of Substances, if different from our abstract Ideas, cannot be the Essences of the Species, we rank Things into. For two Species may be one as rationally, as two different Essences be the Essence of one Species: And I demand, what are the Alterations may, or may not be in a Horse, or Lead, without making either of 'em to be of another Species? In determining the Species of Things, by our abstract Ideas, this is easy to resolve: But if any one will regulate himself herein, by supposed real Essences, he will, I suppose,

I grant the Inference to be true; but must beg leave to deny that this proves, That the general Idea, the Name is annexed to, is not made by the Mind. I have said, and it agrees with what your Lordship here says, * That 'the Mind in making its complex Ideas of Substances, only follows Nature, * B. III. C. 6. and puts no Ideas together, which are not supposed to have an Union in Nature: No body joins the Voice of a Sheep, with the Shape of an Horse; nor the Colour of Lead, with the Weight and Fixedness of Gold, to be the complex Ideas of any real Substances; unless he has a mind to fill his Head with Chimeras, and his Discourse with unintelligible Words.

Men observing certain Qualities always joined and existing together, therein copied Nature, and, of Ideas so united, made their complex ones of Substances, &c. Which is very little different from what your Lordship here says, That 'tis from our Observation of Individuals, that we come to infer, That there is something common to them all. But I do not see how it will thence follow, that the general, or specific Idea is not made by the mere Act of the Mind. No, says your Lordship, There is something common to them all, which makes them of one Kind; and if the Difference of Kinds be real, that which makes them all of one Kind, must not be a Nominal, but Real Essence.

This may be some Objection to the Name of nominal Essence; but is, as I humbly conceive, none to the Thing design'd by it. There is an internal Conjunction of Things, on which their Properties depend. This your Lordship and I are agreed of, and this we call the real Essence. There are also certain complex Ideas, or Combinations of these Properties, in Men's Minds, to which they commonly annex specific Names, or Names of Sorts, or Kinds, of Things.

This,
I suppose, be at a Loss; and he will never be able to know when any thing precisely ceases to be of the Species of a Horse, or Lead.

§. 14. Nor will any one wonder, that I say these Essences, or abstract Ideas, (which are the Measures of Name, and the Boundaries of Species) are the Workmanship of the Understanding, who considers, that, at least, the complex ones are often, in several Men, different Collections of simple Ideas: And, therefore, that is Covetousness to one Man, which is not so to another. Nay, even in Substances, where their abstract Ideas seem to be taken from the Things themselves, they are not constantly the same; no not in that Species, which is most familiar to us, and with which we have the most intimate Acquaintance:

This, I believe, your Lordship does not deny. These complex Ideas, for want of a better Name, I have called nominal Essences; how properly, I will not dispute. But if any one will help me to a better Name for them, I am ready to receive it; till then I must, to express myself, use this. Now, my Lord, Body, Life, and the Power of Reasoning, being not the real Essence of a Man, as I believe your Lordship will agree; will your Lordship say, that they are not enough to make the Thing, wherein they are found, of the Kind called Man; and not of the Kind called Baboon, Because the Difference of these Kinds is real? If this be not real enough to make the Thing of one Kind and not of another, I do not see how Animal rationale can be enough really to distinguish a Man from an Horse; for that is but the Nominal, not real Essence of that Kind, designed by the Name Man. And yet, I suppose, every one thinks it real enough, to make a real Difference between that and other Kinds. And if nothing will serve the turn, to MAKE Things of one Kind and not of another, (which, as I have shewed, signifies no more but ranking of them under different, specific Names) but their real unknown Constitutions, which are the real Essences, we are speaking of, I fear it would be a long while, before we should have really different Kinds of Substances, or distinct Names for them; unless we could distinguish them, by these Differences, of which we have no distinct Conceptions. For, I think, it would not be readily answered me, if I should demand, wherein lies the real Difference, in the internal Constitution of a Stag, from that of a Buck, which are each of them very well known to be of one Kind, and not of the other; and no body questions but that the Kinds, whereof each of them is, are really different.
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ance: It having been more than once doubted, whether the Fæ-tus, born of a Woman, were a Man, even so far, as that it hath been debated, whether it were, or were not to be nourished and baptized: Which could not be, if the abstract Idea of Essence, to which the Name Man belonged, were of Nature's making; and were not the uncertain and various Collection of simple Ideas, which the Understanding puts together, and then abstracting it, affixed a Name to it. So that in truth, every distinct abstract Idea, is a distinct Essence; and the Names, that stand for such distinct Ideas, are the Names of Things essentially different. Thus a Circle is as essentially different from an Oval, as a Sheep from a Goat: And Rain is as essentially different from Snow, as Water from Earth; that abstract Idea, which is the Essence of one, being impossible to be communicated to the other. And thus

Your Lordship farther says, And this Difference doth not depend upon the complex Ideas of Substances, whereby Men arbitrarily join Modes together in their Minds. I confess, my Lord, I know not what to say to this, because I do not know what these complex Ideas of Substances are, whereby Men arbitrarily join Modes together in their Minds. But I am apt to think there is a Miftake in the Matter, by the Words that follow, which are these: For, let them mistake in their Complication of Ideas, either in leaving out, or putting in, what doth not belong to them; and let their Ideas be what they please, the real Essence of a Man, and an Horse, and a Tree, are just what they were.

The Miftake I spoke of, I humbly suppose, is this, That Things are here taken to be distinguished by their real Essences; when, by the very way of speaking of them, it is clear, That they are already distinguished by the nominal Essences, and are so taken to be. For what, I beseech your Lordship, does your Lordship mean, when you say, The real Essence of a Man, and an Horse, and a Tree, but that there are such Kinds, already set out, by the Signification of these Names, Man, Horse, Tree? And what, I beseech your Lordship, is the Signification of each of these specific Names, but the complex Idea it stands for? and that complex Idea is the nominal Essence, and nothing else. So that taking Man, as your Lordship does here, to stand for a kind, or sort of Individuals, all which agree in that common, complex Idea, which that specific Name stands for; it is certain that the real Essence of all the Individuals, comprehended under the specific Name, Man, in your use of it, would be just the same; let others leave out, or put into their complex Idea, of Man, what they please; because the real Essence, on which that unaltered, complex
thus any two abstract Ideas, that in any part vary one from another, with two distinct Names annexed to them, constitute two distinct Sorts, or, if you please, Species, as essentially different as any two of the most remote, or opposite in the World.

§. 15. But since the Essences of Things are thought, by some (and not without Reason) to be wholly unknown; it may not be amiss to consider the several Significations of the Word Essence.

First, Essence may be taken for the Being of any Thing, whereby it is what it is. And thus the real, internal, but generally in Substances unknown, Constitution of Things, whereon their discoverable Qualities depend, may be called their Essence. This is the proper, original Signification of the Word, as is evident from the Formation of it; 

Essentia, in its primary Notation,

complex Idea, i. e. those Properties depend, must necessarily be concluded to be the same.

For I take it for granted, That in using the Name, Man, in this Place, your Lordship uses it for that complex Idea, which is in your Lordship's Mind, of that Species. So that your Lordship, by putting it for, or substituting it in the Place of that complex Idea, where you say, the real Essence of it is just as it was, or the very fame it was, does suppose the Idea it stands for, to be steadily the same. For, if I change the Signification of the Word, Man, whereby it may not comprehend just the same Individuals, which, in your Lordship's Sense, it does but shut out some of those that, to your Lordship, are Men, in your Signification of the Word, Man; or take in others, to which your Lordship does not allow the Name, Man; I do not think your Lordship will say, that the real Essence of Man, in both these Senses, is the same; and yet your Lordship seems to say so, when you say, Let Men mistake, in the Complication of their Ideas, either in leaving out, or putting in, what does not belong to them; and let their Ideas be what they please, the real Essence of the Individuals, comprehended under the Names, annexed to these Ideas, will be the same: For I, I humbly conceive, it must be put, to make out what your Lordship aims at. For as your Lordship puts it, by the Name of Man, or any other specific Name, your Lordship seems to me to suppose, that that Name stands for, and not for the same Idea, at the same time.

For Example, my Lord, let your Lordship's Idea, to which you annex the Sign Man, be a rational Animal: Let another Man's Idea be a rational Animal of such a Shape; let the third Man's Idea be of an Animal, of such a Size, and Shape, leaving out Rationality; let a fourth be an Animal, with a Body of such a Shape, and an immaterial
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on, signifying properly Being. And in this Sense it is still used, when we speak of the Essence of particular Things, without giving them any Name.

Secondly, The Learning and Disputes of the Schools, having been much busied about Genus and Species, the Word Essence has almost lost its primary Signification; and, instead of the real Constitution of Things, has been almost wholly applied to the artificial Constitution of Genus and Species. It is true, there is ordinarily supposed a real Constitution of the sorts of Things; and it is past doubt, there must be some real Constitution, on which any Collection of simple Ideas, co-existing, must depend. But it being evident, that Things are ranked under Names into sorts of Species, only as they agree to certain abstract Ideas, to which we have annexed those Names; the Essence of each

Genus,

material Substance, with the Power of Reasoning; let a fifth leave out of his Idea, an immaterial Substance; 'tis plain every one of these will call his, a Man, as well as your Lordship; and yet 'tis as plain that, Man, as standing for all these distinct, complex Ideas, cannot be supposed to have the same internal Constitution, i. e. the same real Essence. The Truth is, every distinct, abstract Idea, with a Name to it, makes a real, distinct kind, whatever the real Essence (which we know not of any of them) be.

And therefore, I grant it true what your Lordship says, in the next Words, And let the nominal Essences differ never so much, the real, common Essence, or Nature, of the several Kinds, are not at all altered by them; i. e. That our Thoughts, or Ideas, cannot alter the real Constitutions, that are in Things that exist, there is nothing more certain. But yet it is true, that the Change of Ideas, to which we annex them, can, and does alter the Signification of their Names, and thereby alter the Kinds, which, by these Names, we rank and sort them into. Your Lordship farther adds, And these real Essences are unchangeable, i. e. the internal Constitutions are unchangeable. Of what, I beseech your Lordship, are the internal Constitutions unchangeable? Not of any thing that exists, but of God alone; for they may be changed all as easily, by that Hand that made them, as the internal Frame of a Watch. What then is it that is unchangeable? The internal Constitution, or real Essence of a Species; which, in plain English, is no more but this, whilst the same specific Name, v. g. of Man, Horse, or Tree, is annexed to, or made the Sign of the same, abstract, complex Idea, under which I rank several individuals, it is impossible, but the real Constitution, on which that unaltered, complex Idea, or nominal Essence depends, must be the same, i. e. in other Words
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*Genus,* or Sort, comes to be nothing but that abstract *Idea,* which the General, or *Sortal* (if I may have leave so to call it from *Sort,* as I do *General* from *Genus*) Name stands for. And this we shall find to be that, which the Word *Essence* imports, in its most familiar Use. These two Sorts of *Essences,* I suppose, may not unhappily be termed, the one the *Real,* the other the *Nominal Essence.*

§. 16. Between the nominal Essence, and the Name, there is so near a *Connexion,* that the Name of any sort of Things cannot be attributed to any particular Being, but what has this *Essence,* whereby it answers that abstract *Idea,* whereof that Name is the Sign.

§. 17. Concerning the real Essences of corporeal Substances, (to mention those only) there are, if I mistake not, two Opinions. The one is of those, who, using the Word *Essence* for they know not what, suppose a certain Number of those Essences, according to which all natural Things are made, and wherein they do exactly every one of them partake, and so become of this, or that *Species.* The other, and more rational Opinion, is of those, who look on all natural Things to have a real, but unknown Constitution of their insensible Parts; from which flow those sensible Qualities, which serve us to distinguish them one from another, according as we have Occasion to rank them into sorts, under common Denominations. The former of these Words, where we find all the same Properties, we have Reason to conclude there is the same real, internal Constitution, from which those Properties flow.

But your Lordship proves the real Essences to be unchangeable, because God makes them, in these following Words: *For, however there may happen some Variety in Individuals, by particular Accidents, yet the Essences of Men, and Horses, and Trees, remain always the same, because they do not depend on the Ideas of Men, but on the Will of the Creator, who hath made several Sorts of Beings.*

It is true, the real Constitutions, or Essences, of particular Things existing, do not depend on the Ideas of Men, but on the Will of the Creator: But their being ranked into Sorts, under such and such Names, does depend, and wholly depend, upon the Ideas of Men.
of these Opinions, which supposes these Essences, as a certain Number of Forms, or Moulds, wherein all natural Things, that exist, are cast, and do equally partake, has, I imagine, very much perplexed the Knowledge of natural Things. The frequent Productions of Monsters, in all the Species of Animals, and of Changelings, and other strange Issues of human Birth, carry with them Difficulties, not possible to confit with this Hypothesis: Since it is as impossible, that two Things, partaking exactly of the same real Essence, should have different Properties, as that two Figures, partaking in the same real Essence of a Circle, should have different Properties. But were there no other Reason against it, yet the Supposition of Essences, that can not be known, and the making them nevertheless to be that, which distinguishes the Species of Things, is so wholly useless, and unserviceable to any part of our Knowledge, that That alone were sufficient to make us lay it by, and content ourselves with such Essences of the Sorts, or Species of Things, as come within the Reach of our Knowledge: Which, when seriously considered, will be found, as I have said, to be nothing else, but those abstract, complex Ideas, to which we have annexed distinct, general Names.

§. 18. Essences being thus distinguished into Nominal and Real, we may farther observe, that in the Species of Simple Ideas and Modes, they are always the same; but in Substances always quite different. Thus a Figure, including a Space between three Lines, is the real, as well as nominal Essence of a Triangle; it being not only the abstract Idea, to which the general Name is annexed, but the very Essentia, or Being of the Thing itself, that Foundation, from which all its Properties flow, and to which they are all inseparably annexed. But it is far otherwise, concerning that Parcel of Matter, which makes the Ring on my Finger, wherein these two Essences are apparently different. For it is the real Constitution of its insensible Parts, on which depend all those Properties of Colour, Weight, Fusibility, Fixedness, &c. which makes it to be Gold, or gives it a Right to that Name, which is
therefore its nominal Essence: Since nothing can be called Gold, but what has a Conformity of Qualities to that abstract, complex Idea, to which that Name is annexed. But this Distinction of Essences, belonging particularly to Substances, we shall, when we come to consider their Names, have an Occasion to treat of more fully.

§ 19. That such abstract Ideas, with Names to them, as we have been speaking of, are Essences, may farther appear, by what we are told concerning Essences, viz. that they are all ingenerable and incorruptible. Which cannot be true of the real Constitutions of Things, which begin and perish with them. All Things that exist, besides their Author, are all liable to Change; especially those Things we are acquainted with, and have ranked into Bands, under distinct Names, or Ensigns. Thus that, which was Grass To-day, is To-morrow the Flesh of a Sheep; and, within few Days after, becomes part of a Man: In all which, and the like Changes, it is evident, their real Essence, i.e. that Constitution, whereon the Properties of these several Things depended, is destroyed, and perishes with them. But Essences being taken for Ideas, established in the Mind, with Names annexed to them, they are supposed to remain steadily the same, whatever Mutations the particular Substances are liable to. For whatever becomes of Alexander and Bucephalus, the Ideas, to which Man and Horse are annexed, are supposed nevertheless to remain in the same: And so the Essences of those Species are preserved whole and undestroyed, whatever Changes happen to any, or all of the Individuals of those Species. By this means the Essence of a Species rests safe and entire, without the Existence of so much as one Individual of that kind. For were there now no Circle existing, any where in the World, (as perhaps that Figure exists not any where, exactly marked out) yet the Idea annexed to that Name would not cease to be what it is; nor cease to be as a Pattern, to determine which, of the particular Figures we meet with, have, or have not a Right to the Name Circle, and so to shew which of them, by having that Essence, was of that Species. And tho' there neither were, nor had been,
in Nature such a Beast as an *Unicorn*, nor such a Fish as a *Mermaid*; yet supposing those Names to stand for complex, abstract Ideas, that contained no Inconsistency in them, the Essence of a *Mermaid* is as intelligible as that of a *Man*; and the Idea of an *Unicorn* as certain, steady, and permanent, as that of a Horse. From what has been said, it is evident, that the Doctrine of the Immutability of Essences proves them abstract Ideas; and is only to be founded on the Relation established between them, and certain Sounds, as Signs of them; and will always be true, as long as the same Name can have the same Signification.

§. 20. To conclude, This is that which, in Recapitulation, short, I would say, (viz.) That all the great Business of Genera and Species, and their Essences, amount to no more but this, That Men, making abstract Ideas, and settling them in their Minds, with Names annexed to them, do thereby enable themselves to consider Things, and discourse of them, as it were in Bundles, for the easier and readier Improvement and Communication of their Knowledge; which would advance but slowly, were their Words and Thoughts confined only to Particulars.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Names of Simple Ideas.

§. 1. T
O' all Words, as I have shewn, signify nothing immediately but the Ideas in the Mind of the Speaker; yet, upon a nearer Survey, we shall find, that the Names of Simple Ideas, mixed Modes, (under which I comprise Relations too,) and natural Substances, have each something peculiar, and different from the other. For Example:

§. 2. First, The Names of Simple Ideas, and Substances, with the abstract Ideas in the Minds, which they immediately signify, intimate also some
intimate real Existence.

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some real Existence, from which was derived their original Pattern. But the Names of mixed Modes terminate in the Idea that is in the Mind, and lead not the Thoughts any farther, as we shall see more at large in the following Chapter.

§. 3. Secondly, The Names of Simple Ideas, and Modes, signify always the real, as well as nominal Essence of their Species. But the Names of natural Substances signify rarely, if ever, any thing but barely the nominal Essences of those Species, as we shall shew in the Chapter, that treats of the Names of Substances, in particular.

§. 4. Thirdly, The Names of Simple Ideas are not capable of any Definitions; the Names of all complex Ideas are. It has not, what I know, been yet observed by any body, that Words are, and what are not capable of being defined; the want whereof is (as I am apt to think) not seldom the Occasion of great Wrangling and Obscurity in Mens Discourses, whilst some demand Definitions of Terms, that cannot be defined: And others think, they ought to rest satisfied in an Explication, made by a more general Word, and its Restriction, (or to speak in Terms of Art, by a Genus and Difference) when even after such Definition made, according to Rule, those who hear it, have often no more a clear Conception of the Meaning of the Word, than they had before. This, at least, I think, that the shewing what Words are, and what are not capable of Definition, and wherein consists a good Definition, is not wholly besides our present Purpose; and, perhaps, will afford so much Light to the Nature of these Signs, and our Ideas, as to deserve a more particular Consideration.

§. 5. I will not here trouble myself, to prove that all Terms are not definable from that Progress, in infinitum, which it will visibly lead us into, if we should allow, that all Names could be defined. For, if the Terms of one Definition were still to be defined by another, Where at last should we
we stop? But I shall, from the Nature of our Ideas, and the Signification of our Words, shew, why some Names can, and others cannot be defined, and which they are.

§. 6. I think, it is agreed, that a Definition is nothing else, but the shewing the Meaning of one Word, by several other not synonymous Terms. The Meaning of Words being only the Ideas they are made to stand for, by him that uses them; the Meaning of any Term is then shewed, or the Word is defined, when, by other Words, the Idea it is made the Sign of, and annexed to, in the Mind of the Speaker, is as it were represented, or set before the View of another; and thus its Signification ascertained. This is the only use and end of Definitions; and, therefore, the only Measure of what is, or is not a good Definition.

§. 7. This being premised, I say, that the Names of Simple Ideas, and those only, are incapable of being defined. The Reason whereof is this, That the several Terms of a Definition, signifying several Ideas, they can altogether, by no means, represent an Idea, which has no Composition at all: And, therefore, a Definition, which is properly nothing but the shewing the Meaning of one Word, by several others, not signifying each the same thing, can, in the Names of Simple Ideas, have no Place.

§. 8. The not observing this Difference in our Ideas, and their Names, has produced that eminent trifling in the Schools, which is so easy to be observed in the Definitions they give us, of some few of these Simple Ideas. For, as to the greatest part of them, even those Masters of Definitions were fain to leave them untouched, merely by the Impossibility they found in it. What more exquisite Jargon could the Wit of Man invent, than this Definition; The Act of a Being in Power, as far forth as in Power? which would puzzle any rational Man, to whom it was not already known, by its famous Absurdity, to guess what Word it could ever be supposed to be the Explication of. If Tully, asking a Dutchman, what Beweeginge was, should have received this Explication in his own Language, that it was, Actus entis in potencia,
Names of Simple Ideas. Book III.

§. 9. Nor have the Modern Philosophers, who have endeavoured to throw off the Jargon of the Schools, and speak intelligibly, much better succeeded in defining Simple Ideas, whether by explaining their Causes, or any otherwise. The Atomists, who define Motion to be a Passage from one Place to another, what do they more than put one synonimous Word for another? For what is Passage, other than Motion? And if they were asked what Passage was, how would they better define it than by Motion? For is it not, at least, as proper and significant to say, Passage is a Motion from one Place to another, as to say, Motion is a Passage, &c.? This is to translate, and not to define, when we change two Words of the same Signification one for another; which, when one is better understood than the other, may serve to discover what Idea the unknown stands for; but is very far from a Definition, unless we will say, every English Word in the Dictionary is the Definition of the Latin Word it answers, and that Motion is the Definition of Motus. Nor will the successive Application, of the Parts of the Superficies of one Body, to those of another, which the Cartesians give us, prove a much better Definition of Motion, when well examined.

§. 10. The AEt of Perspicuous, as far forth as Perspicuous, is another Peripatetic Definition of a Simple Idea; which, tho’ not more absurd than the former of Motion, yet betrays its Uselesnes and Insignificancy more plainly, because Experience will easily convince any one, that it cannot make the Meaning of the Word Light (which it pretends to define) at all understood by a blind Man; but the Definition of Motion appears not at first sight so useles, because it scapes this way of Trial. For this Simple Idea, entering by the Touch as well as Sight, it is impossible to fiew an Example of any one, who has no other way to get the Idea of Motion, but barely by the Definition of that Name. Those who tell us, that Light is a great Number
Number of little Globules, striking briskly on the Bottom of the Eye, speak more intelligibly than the Schools; but yet these Words, ever so well understood, would make the Idea, the Word Light stands for, no more known to a Man that understands it not before, than if one should tell him, that Light was nothing but a Company of little Tennis-balls, which Fairies all the Day long struck with Rackets against some Mens Foreheads, whilst they passed by others. For, granting this Explication of the Thing to be true; yet the Idea of the Cause of Light, if we had it ever so exact, would no more give us the Idea of Light itself, as it is such a particular Perception in us, than the Idea of the Figure and Motion of a sharp Piece of Steel would give us the Idea of that Pain which it is able to cause in us. For the Cause of any Sensation, and the Sensation itself, in all the Simple Ideas of one Sense, are two Ideas; and two Ideas so different, and distant one from another, that no two can be more so. And, therefore, should Des Cartes's Globules strike ever so long on the Retina of a Man, who was blind by a Gutta Serena, he would thereby never have any Idea of Light, or any thing approaching to it, tho' he understood what little Globules were, and what striking on another Body was, ever so well. And, therefore, the Cartesians very well distinguish between that Light, which is the Cause of that Sensation in us, and the Idea, which is produced in us by it, and is that which is properly Light.

§ 11. Simple Ideas, as has been shewn, are only to be got by those Impressions Objects themselves make on our Minds, by the proper Inlets, appointed to each sort. If they are not receiv-ed this way, all the Words in the World, made use of to explain, or define any of their Names, will never be able to produce in us the Idea it stands for. For Words being Sounds, can produce in us no other Simple Ideas than of those very Sounds; nor excite any in us, but by that voluntary Connexion, which is known to be between them, and those Simple Ideas, which common Use has made them Signs of. He that thinks otherwise, let him try if any Words can give him the Taste of a Pine-Apple, and make him have the true Idea of the Relish of that celebrated delicious Fruit.
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Fruit. So far as he is told it has a Resemblance with any Tastes, whereas he has the Ideas already in his Memory, imprinted there by sensible Objects, not Strangers to his Palate, so far may he approach that Resemblance in his Mind. But this is not giving us that Idea by a Definition, but exciting in us other Simple Ideas, by their known Names; which will be still very different from the true Taste of that Fruit itself. In Light and Colours, and all other Simple Ideas, it is the same thing; for the Signification of Sounds is not natural, but only imposed and arbitrary. And no Definition of Light, or Redness, is more fitted, or able to produce either of those Ideas in us, than the Sound, Light, or Red, by itself. For to hope to produce an Idea of Light, or Colour, by a Sound, however formed, is to expect that Sounds should be visible, or Colours audible, and to make the Ears do the Office of all the other Senses. Which is all one as to say, that we might Taste, Smell, and See by the Ears; a sort of Philosophy worthy only of Sancho Pancho, who had the Faculty to see Dulcinea by Hearsay. And, therefore, he that has not before received into his Mind, by the proper Inlet, the Simple Idea, which any Word stands for, can never come to know the Signification of that Word by any other Words, or Sounds whatsoever, put together, according to any Rules of Definition. The only way is, by applying to his Senses the proper Object; and so producing that Idea in him, for which he has learned the Name already. A studious, blind Man, who had mightily beat his Head about visible Objects, and made use of the Explication of his Books and Friends, to understand those Names of Light and Colours, which often came in his way, bragged one Day, That he now understood what Scarlet signified. Upon which his Friend demanded what Scarlet was? The blind Man answered, it was like the Sound of a Trumpet. Just such an Understanding of the Name of any other Simple Idea will he have, who hopes to get it only from a Definition, or other Words made use of to explain it.

§. 12. The Cafe is quite otherwise in Complex Ideas; which consisting of several Simple ones, it is in the Power of Words, standing for
the several Ideas, that make that Composition, to imprint complex Ideas in the Mind, which were never there before, and so make their Names be understood. In such Collections of Ideas, passing under one Name, Definition, or the teaching the Signification of one Word, by several others, has place, and may make us understand the Names of Things, which never came within the reach of our Senses; and frame Ideas suitable to those in other Mens Minds, when they use those Names; provided that none of the Terms of the Definition stand for any such simple Ideas, which he, to whom the Explication is made, has never yet had in his Thought. Thus the Word Statue may be explained to a blind Man, by other Words, when Picture cannot; his Senses having given him the Idea of Figure, but not of Colours, which therefore Words cannot excite in him. This gained the Prize to the Painter, against the Statuary; each of which, contending for the Excellency of his Art, and the Statuary bragging, that his was to be preferred, because it reached farther, and even those who had lost their Eyes, could yet perceive the Excellency of it: The Painter agreed to refer himself to the Judgment of a blind Man; who being brought where there was a Statue made by the one, and a Picture drawn by the other, he was first led to the Statue, in which he traced with his Hands all the Lineaments of the Face and Body, and with great Admiration applauded the Skill of the Workman. But being led to the Picture, and having his Hand laid upon it, was told, That he now touched the Head, and then the Forehead, Eyes, Nose, &c. as his Hand moved over the Parts of the Picture on the Cloth, without finding any the least Distinction: Whereupon he cried out, that certainly that must needs be a very admirable and divine Piece of Workmanship, which could represent to them all those Parts, where he could neither feel, nor perceive any Thing.

§ 13. He that should use the Word Rainbow to one, who knew all those Colours, but yet had never seen that Phenomenon, would, by enumerating the Figure, Largeness, Position, and Order of the Colours, so well define that Word, that it might
might be perfectly understood. But yet that *Definition*, how exact and perfect soever, would never make a blind Man understand it; because several of the Simple *Ideas* that make that complex one, being such, as he never received by Sensation and Experience, no Words are able to excite them in his Mind.

§. 14. *Simple Ideas*, as has been shewed, can only be got by Experience, from those Objects, which are proper to produce in us those Perceptions. When, by this means, we have our Minds stored with them, and know the Names for them, then we are in a Condition to define, and by Definition to understand the Names of complex *Ideas*, that are made up of them. But when any Term stands for a Simple *Idea*, that a Man has never yet had in his Mind, it is impossible by any Words to make known its Meaning to him. When any Term stands for an *Idea* a Man is acquainted with, but is ignorant that That Term is the Sign of it, there another Name, of the fame *Idea*, which he has been accustomed to, may make him understand its Meaning. But in no case whatsoever, is any Name, of any Simple *Idea*, capable of a Definition.

§. 15. Fourthly, But tho’ the Names of *Simple Ideas* have not the Help of *Definition*, to determine their Signification, yet that hinders not, but that they are generally less doubtful and uncertain, than those of mixed *Modes* and *Substances*:

Because they standing only for one Simple Perception, Men, for the most part, easily and perfectly agree in their Signification; and there is little room for Mistake and Wrangling about their Meaning. He that knows once that Whiteness is the Name of that Colour, he has observed in Snow, or Milk, will not be apt to misapply that Word, as long as he retains that *Idea*; which, when he has quite lost, he is not apt to mistake the Meaning of it, but perceives he understands it not. There is neither a Multiplicity of Simple *Ideas* to be put together, which makes the Doubtfulness in the Names of mixed *Modes*; nor a suppos- ed, but an unknown, real *Effence*, with Properties depending thereon,
thereon, the precise Number whereof are also unknown, which makes the Difficulty in the Names of Substances. But, on the contrary, in Simple Ideas the whole Signification of the Name is known at once, and consists not of Parts, whereof more, or less, being put in, the Idea may be varied, and so the Signification of its Name be obscure, or uncertain.

§. 16. Fifthly, This farther may be observ-ed, concerning Simple Ideas, and their Names, that they have but few Ascents in linea predica-mentali, (as they call it) from the lowest Species to the summum Genus. The Reason whereof is, that the lowest Species being but one Simple Idea, nothing can be left out of it; that so, the Difference being taken away, it may agree with some other Thing in one Idea common to them both; which having one Name, is the Genus of the other two: V.g. There is nothing that can be left out of the Idea of White and Red, to make them agree in one common Appearance, and so have one general Name; as Rationality being left out of the complex Idea of Man, makes it agree with Brute, in the more general Idea and Name of Animal: And, therefore, when to avoid unpleasant Enumerations, Men would comprehend both White and Red, and several other such Simple Ideas, under one general Name, they have been fain to do it by a Word, which denotes only the Way they get into the Mind. For when White, Red, and Yellow, are all comprehended under the Genus, or Name Colour, it signifies no more but such Ideas as are produced in the Mind only by the Sight, and have Entrance only thro' the Eyes. And when they would frame yet a more general Term, to comprehend both Colours and Sounds, and the like Simple Ideas, they do it by a Word that signifies all such as come into the Mind only by one Sense: And so the general Term, Quality, in its ordinary Acceptation, comprehends Colours, Sounds, Tastes, Smells, and tangible Qualities, with Distinction from Extension, Number, Motion, Pleasure, and Pain, which make Impressions on the Mind, and introduce their Ideas by more Senses than one.

§. 17. Sixthly,
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Sixthly, Names of Simple Ideas stand for Ideas not at all arbitrary.

§. 17. Sixthly, The Names of Simple Ideas, Substances, and mixed Modes, have also this Difference; that those of mixed Modes stand for Ideas perfectly arbitrary; those of Substances, are not perfectly so, but refer to a Pattern, tho' with some Latitude; and those of Simple Ideas are perfectly taken from the Existence of Things, and are not arbitrary at all. Which, what Difference it makes in the Significations of their Names, we shall see in the following Chapters.

The Names of Simple Modes differ little from those of Simple Ideas.

C H A P. V.

Of the Names of Mixed Modes and Relations.

§. 1. The Names of Mixed Modes being general, they stand as has been shewn, for Sorts, or Species of Things, each of which has its peculiar Essence.

The Essences of these Species also, as has been shewed, are nothing but the abstract Ideas in the Mind, to which the Name is annexed. Thus far the Names and Essences of Mixed Modes, having nothing but what is common to them with other Ideas: But if we take a little nearer Survey of them, we shall find that they have something peculiar, which, perhaps, may deserve our Attention.

First, The Ideas they stand for are made by the Understanding.

§. 2. The first Particularity I shall observe in them is, that the abstract Ideas, or, if you please, the Essences of the several Species of Mixed Modes, are made by the Understanding, wherein they differ from those of simple Ideas; in which sort the Mind has no Power to make any one, but only receives such as are presented to it, by the real Existence of Things operating upon it.

§. 3. In
§. 3. In the next Place, these *Essences of the Species of Mixed Modes*, are not only made by the Mind, but made *very arbitrarily*, made without Patterns, or Reference to any real Existence. Wherein they differ from those of Substances, which carry with them the *Supposition of some real Being*, from which they are taken, and to which they are conformable. But in its complex *Ideas* of Mixed Modes, the Mind takes a Liberty not to follow the Existence of Things exactly. It unites and retains certain Collections, as so many distinct, specific *Ideas*, whilst others, that as often occur in Nature, and are as plainly suggested by outward Things, pass neglected without particular Names, or Specifications. Nor does the Mind, in these of Mixed Modes, as in the complex *Ideas* of Substances, examine them by the real Existence of Things; or verify them by Patterns, containing such peculiar Compositions in Nature. To know whether his *Idea* of Adultery, or Incest, be right, will a Man seek it any where amongst Things existing? Or is it true, because any one has been Witness to such an Action? No: but it suffices here, that Men have put together such a Collection into one complex *Idea*, that makes the Archetype, and specific *Idea*, whether ever any such Action were committed in rerum natura, or no.

§. 4. To understand this aright, we must consider *wherein this making of these complex Ideas* consists; and that is not in the making any new *Idea*, but putting together those which the Mind had before; wherein the Mind does these three Things: *First*, It chuses a certain Number. *Secondly*, It gives them Connexion, and makes them into one *Idea*. *Thirdly*, It ties them together by a Name. If we examine how the Mind proceeds in these, and what Liberty it takes in them, we shall easily observe, how these Essences of the Species of Mixed Modes are the Workmanship of the Mind, and consequentially, that the Species themselves are of Mens making.

§. 5. No body can doubt, but that these *Ideas* of Mixed Modes are made by a voluntary Collection of *Ideas* put together in the Mind, independent from any original Patterns in Nature, *Evidently arbitrary*, that the *Idea* is often before the Existence.
who will but reflect, that this fort of complex Ideas may be made, abstracted, and have Names given them; and so a Species be constituted before any one Individual of that Species ever existed. Who can doubt but the Ideas of Sacrilege, or Adultery, might be framed in the Mind of Men, and have Names given them; and so these Species of Mixed Modes be constituted, before either of them was ever committed; and might be as well discovered of, and reasoned about, and as certain Truth discovered of them, whilst yet they had no Being but in the Understanding, as well as now, that they have but too frequently a real Existence? Whereby it is plain, how much the sorts of Mixed Modes are the Creatures of the Understanding, where they have a Being as subservient to all the Ends of real Truth and Knowledge, as when they really exist: And we cannot doubt, but Law-makers have often made Laws about Species of Actions, which were only the Creatures of their own Understandings; Beings that had no other Existence, but in their own Minds. And, I think, no body can deny, but that the Resurrection was a Species of Mixed Modes in the Mind, before it really existed.

§ 6. To see how arbitrarily these Essences of Instances; Mixed Modes are made by the Mind, we need but take a View of almost any of them. A little looking into them will satisfy us, that ’tis the Mind that combines several scattered, independent Ideas, into one complex one; and by the common Name it gives them, makes them the Essence of a certain Species, without regulating itself by any Connexion they have in Nature. For what greater Connexion in Nature has the Idea of a Man, than the Idea of a Sheep, with Killing; that this is made a particular Species of Action, signified by the Word Murder, and the other not? Or what Union is there in Nature, between the Idea of the Relation of a Father, with Killing, than that of a Son, or Neighbour; that those are combined into one complex Idea, and thereby made the Essence of the distinct Species Parricide, whilst the other make no distinct Species at all? But, tho’ they have made Killing a Man’s Father, or Mother, a distinct Species from Killing his Son, or Daughter; yet, in some other Cases, Son and Daughter are taken in
in too, as well as Father and Mother; and they are all equally comprehended in the same Species, as in that of Incest. Thus the Mind in Mixed Modes, arbitrarily unites into complex Ideas, such as it finds convenient; whilst others, that have altogether as much Union in Nature, are left loose, and never combined into one Idea, because they have no need of one Name. It is evident then, that the Mind, by its free Choice, gives a Connexion to a certain Number of Ideas, which in Nature have no more Union with one another, than others that it leaves out: Why else is the Part of the Weapon, the Beginning of the Wound is made with, taken Notice of, to make the distinct Species called Stabbing, and the Figure and Matter of the Weapon left out? I do not say this is done without Reason, as we shall see more by and by; but this I say, that it is done by the free Choice of the Mind, pursuing its own Ends; and that, therefore, these Species of Mixed Modes are the Workmanship of the Understanding; and there is nothing more evident, than that, for the most part, in the framing these Ideas, the Mind searches not its Patterns in Nature, nor refers the Ideas it makes, to the real Existence of Things; but puts such together, as may best serve its own Purposes, without tying itself to a precise Imitation of any Thing that really exists.

§ 7. But tho' these complex Ideas, or Essences of Mixed Modes, depend on the Mind, and are made by it, with great Liberty; yet they are not made at random, and jumbled together without any reason at all. Tho' these complex Ideas be not always copied from Nature, yet they are always suited to the End, for which abstract Ideas are made: And, tho' they be Combinations made of Ideas, that are loose enough, and have as little Union in themselves, as several other, to which the Mind never gives a Connexion, that combines them into one Idea; yet they are always made for the Convenience of Communication, which is the chief End of Language. The Use of Language is, by short Sounds, to signify, with Ease and Dispatch, general Conceptions; wherein not only Abundance of Particulars may be contained, but also a great Variety of independent Ideas, collected into one complex one. In the
the making, therefore, of the Species of Mixed Modes, Men have had regard only to such Combinations, as they had occasion to mention one to another. Those they have combined into distinct, complex Ideas, and given Names to; whilst others, that in Nature have as near an Union, are left loose and unregarded. For, to go no farther than human Actions themselves, if they would make distinct, abstract Ideas of all the Varieties might be observed in them, the Number must be infinite, and the Memory confounded with the Plenty, as well as over-charged to little Purpose. It suffices, that Men make and name so many complex Ideas of those Mixed Modes, as they find they have occasion to have Names for, in the ordinary Occurrence of their Affairs. If they join to the Idea of Killing, the Idea of Father, or Mother, and so make a distinct Species, from killing a Man's Son, or Neighbour, it is because of the different Heinousness of the Crime, and the distinct Punishment is due to the murdering a Man's Father, or Mother, different from what ought to be inflicted on the Murder of a Son, or Neighbour; and, therefore, they find it necessary to mention it by a distinct Name, which is the End of making that distinct Combination. But, tho' the Ideas of Mother and Daughter, are so differently treated, in reference to the Idea of Killing, that the one is joined with it, to make a distinct, abstract Idea, with a Name, and so a distinct Species, and the other not; yet, in respect of carnal Knowledge, they are both taken in, under Incest: And that still, for the same convenience of expressing under one Name, and reckoning of one Species, such unclean Mixtures, as have a peculiar Turpitude beyond others; and this to avoid Circumlocutions, and tedious Descriptions.

Whereof the intranslatable Words of diverse Languages are a Proof.

§ 8. A moderate Skill, in different Languages, will easily satisfy one of the Truth of this; it being so obvious to observe great Store of Words in one Language, which have not any that answer them in another. Which plainly shews, that those of one Country, by their Customs and Manner of Life, have found occasion to make several complex Ideas, and give Names to them, which others never collected into specific Ideas. This
This could not have happened, if these Species were the steady Workmanship of Nature, and not Collections, made and abstrackted by the Mind, in order to naming, and for the convenience of Communication. The Terms of our Law, which are not empty Sounds, will hardly find Words, that answer them in the Spanish, or Italian, no scanty Languages; much less, I think, could any one translate them into the Caribbee, or Westoe Tongues: And the Verfura of the Romans, or Corban of the Jews, have no Words in other Languages to answer them; the Reason whereof is plain, from what has been said. Nay, if we will look a little more nearly into this Matter, and exactly compare different Languages, we shall find, that tho' they have Words, which in Translations and Dictionaries, are supposed to answer one another; yet there is scarce one of ten, amongst the Names of complex Ideas, especially of Mixed Modes, that stands for the same precise Idea, which the Word does, that in Dictionaries it is rendered by. There are no Ideas more common, and least compounded, than the Measures of Time, Extension, and Weight, and the Latin Names, Hora, Pes, Libra, are without Difficulty rendered by the English Names, Hour, Foot, and Pound; but yet there is nothing more evident, than that the Ideas a Roman annexed to these Latin Names, were very far different from those, which an Englishman expresses by those English ones. And if either of these should make use of the Measures, that those of the other Language designed by their Names, he would be quite out in his Account. These are too sensible Proofs to be doubted; and we shall find this much more so, in the Names of more abstract and compounded Ideas, such as are the greatest part of those, which make up moral Discourses; whose Names, when Men come curiously to compare with those they are translated into, in other Languages, they will find very few of them exactly to correspond in the whole Extent of their Significations.

§ 9. The Reason, why I take so particular notice of this, is, that we may not be mistaken about Genera, and Species, and their Essences, as if they were Things regularly and constantly made by Nature, and had a real Existence in Things;
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Things; when they appear, upon a more wary Survey, to be nothing else but an Artifice of the Understanding, for the easier signifying such Collections of Ideas, as it should often have occasion to communicate, by one general Term; under which divers Particulars, as far forth as they agreed to that abstract Idea, might be comprehended. And, if the doubtful Signification of the Word, Species, may make it found harsh to some, that I say, the Species of Mixed Modes are made by the Understanding; yet, I think, it can by no body be denied, that it is the Mind makes those abstract, complex Ideas, to which specific Names are given. And if it be true, as it is, that the Mind makes the Patterns for sorting and naming of Things, I leave it to be considered, who makes the Boundaries of the Sort, or Species; since, with me, Species and Sort have no other difference, than that of a Latin and English Idiom.

In Mixed Modes, it is the Name that ties the Combination together, and makes it a Species.

§ 10. The near Relation that there is between Species, Essences, and their general Name, at least in Mixed Modes, will farther appear, when we consider, that it is the Name that seems to preserve those Essences, and give them their lasting Duration. For the Connexion, between the loose Parts of those complex Ideas, being made by the Mind, this Union, which has no particular Foundation in Nature, would cease again, were there not something, that did, as it were, hold it together; and keep the Parts from scattering. Tho', therefore, it be the Mind, that makes the Collection, it is the Name which is, as it were, the Knot that ties them fast together. What a vast Variety of different Ideas, does the Word Triumphus hold together, and deliver to us as one Species! Had this Name been never made, or quite loft, we might, no doubt, have had Descriptions of what passed in that Solemnity: But yet, I think, that which holds those different Parts together, in the Unity of one complex Idea, is that very Word annexed to it; without which, the several Parts of that would no more be thought to make one Thing, than any other Shew, which having never been made but once, had never been united into one complex Idea, under one Denomination. How much
much therefore, in Mixed Modes, the Unity necessary to any Essence depends on the Mind, and how much the continuation and fixing of that Unity depends on the Name in common Use annexed to it, I leave to be considered by those, who look upon Essences and Species as real, established Things in Nature.

§. 11. Suitable to this, we find, that Men, speaking of Mixed Modes, seldom imagine, or take any other for Species of them, but such as are set out by Name: Because they being of Man's making, only in order to naming, no such Species are taken notice of, or supposed to be, unless a Name be joined to it, as the Sign of Man's having combined, into one Idea, several loose ones; and, by that Name, giving a lasting Union to the Parts, which would otherwise cease to have any, as soon as the Mind laid by that abstract Idea, and ceased actually to think on it. But, when a Name is once annexed to it, wherein the Parts of that complex Idea have a settled, and permanent Union; then is the Essence, as it were, established, and the Species looked on as complete. For, to what Purpose should the Memory charge itself with such Compositions, unless it were by Abstraction to make them general? And to what Purpose make them general, unless it were, that they might have general Names, for the Convenience of Discourse, and Communication? Thus we see, that killing a Man, with a Sword, or a Hatchet, are looked on as no distinct Species of Action: But, if the Point of the Sword first enter the Body, it passes for a distinct Species, where it has a distinct Name; as in England, in whose Language it is called Stabbing: But in another Country, where it has not happened to be specified under a peculiar Name, it passes not for a distinct Species. But in this Species of corporeal Substances, the Mind that makes the nominal Essence; yet, since those Ideas, which are combined in it, are supposed to have an Union in Nature, whether the Mind joins them, or no, therefore those are looked on as distinct Species, without any Operation of the Mind, either abstracting, or giving a Name to that complex Idea.

§. 12. Con-
Names of Mixed Modes.  Book III.

§ 12. Conformable also to what has been said, concerning the Essences of the Species of Mixed Modes, that they are Creatures of the Understanding, rather than the Works of Nature: Conformable, I say, to this, we find that their Names lead our Thoughts to the Mind, and no farther. When we speak of Justice, or Gratitude, we frame to ourselves no Imagination of any Thing existing, which we would conceive; but our Thoughts terminate in the abstract Ideas of those Virtues, and look no farther; as they do, when we speak of a Horse, or Iron, whose specific Ideas we consider not, as barely in the Mind, but as in Things themselves, which afford the original Patterns of those Ideas. But in Mixed Modes, at least the most considerable Parts of them, which are moral Beings, we consider the original Patterns, as being in the Mind; and to those we refer for the distinguishing of particular Beings under Names. And hence, I think, it is, That these Essences, of the Species of Mixed Modes, are, by a more particular Name, called Notions; as by a peculiar Right appertaining to the Understanding.

§ 13. Hence, likewise, we may learn, Why the complex Ideas of Mixed Modes are commonly more compounded and decompounded, than those of natural Substances. Because they being the Workmanship of the Understanding, pursuing only its own Ends, and the Conveniency of expressing in short those Ideas, it would make known to another, does, with great Liberty, unite often, into one abstract Idea, Things that in their Nature have no Coherence; and so, under one Term, bundle together a great Variety of compounded and decompounded Ideas. Thus the Name of Procession, what a great Mixture of Independent Ideas of Persons, Habits, Tapers, Orders, Motions, Sounds, does it contain in that complex one, which the Mind of Man has arbitrarily put together, to express by that one Name? Whereas the complex Ideas of the Sorts of Substances are usually made up of only a small Number of simple ones; and in the Species of Animals,
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mals, these two, viz. Shape and Voice, commonly make the whole nominal Essence.

§. 14. Another thing we may observe, from what has been said, is, that the Names of Mixed Modes always signify (when they have any determined Signification) the real Essences of their Species. For these abstract Ideas, being the Workmanship of the Mind, and not referred to the real Existence of Things, there is no Supposition of any thing more signified by that Name, but barely that complex Idea, the Mind itself has formed, which is all it would have expressed by it; and is that, on which all the Properties of the Species depend, and from which alone they all flow; and so in these the real and nominal Essence is the same; which, of what Concernment it is to the certain Knowledge of general Truth, we shall see hereafter.

§. 15. This also may shew us the Reason, why, for the most part, the Names of Mixed Modes are got, before the Ideas they stand for are perfectly known. Because there being no Species of these ordinarily taken notice of, but what have Names, and these Species, or rather their Essences, being abstract, complex Ideas, made arbitrarily by the Mind, it is convenient, if not necessary, to know the Names, before one endeavour to frame these complex Ideas; unless a Man will fill his Head with a Company of abstract, complex Ideas, which others have no Names for, he has nothing to do with, but to lay by and forget again. I confess, that in the Beginning of Languages, it was necessary to have the Idea, before one gave it the Name: And so it is still, where making a new complex Idea, one also, by giving it a new Name, makes a new Word. But this concerns not Languages made, which have generally pretty well provided for Ideas, which Men have frequent occasion to have, and communicate: And in such, I ask, whether it be not the ordinary Method, that Children learn the Names of Mixed Modes, before they have their Ideas? What one of a thousand ever frames the abstract Idea of Glory and Ambition, before he has heard the Name of them? In simple Ideas of Substances,
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Substances, I grant it is otherwise; which being such Ideas, as have a real Existence and Union in Nature, the Ideas, or Names, are got one before the other, as it happens.

§ 16. What has been said here of Mixed Modes, is with very little Difference, applicable also to Relations; which, since every Man himself may observe, I may spare myself the Pains to enlarge on; especially, since what I have here said, concerning Words, in this third Book, will possibly be thought by some to be much more, than what so slight a Subject required. I allow it might be brought into a narrower Compass: But I was willing to stay my Reader on an Argument, that appears to me new, and a little out of the way, (I am sure it is one I thought not of, when I began to write) That by searching it to the Bottom, and turning it on every Side, some part or other might meet with every one's Thoughts, and give occasion to the most averse, or negligent, to reflect on a general Miscarriage; which, tho' of great Consequence, is little taken Notice of. When it is considered, what a Pother is made about Effences, and how much all sorts of Knowledge, Discourse, and Conversation, are pestered and disordered by the careless and confused Ufe and Application of Words, it will, perhaps, be thought worth while thoroughly to lay it open. And I shall be pardoned, if I have dwelt long on an Argument, which, I think, therefore, needs to be inculcated; because the Faults, Men are usually guilty of, in this kind, are not only the greatest Hindrances of true Knowledge; but are so well thought of, as to pafs for it. Men would often see, what a small Pittance of Reason and Truth, or, possibly, none at all, is mixed with those huffing Opinions they are swelled with; if they would but look beyond fashionable Sounds, and observe what Ideas are, or are not comprehended under these Words, with which they are so armed at all Points, and with which they so confidently lay about them. I shall imagine I have done some Service to Truth, Peace, and Learning, if, by any Enlargement on this Subject, I can make Men reflect on their own Ufe of Language; and give them Reason to suspect, that, since it is fre-
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quent for others, it may also be possible for them to have sometimes very good and approved Words, in their Mouths, and Writings, with very uncertain, little, or no Signification. And, therefore, it is not unreasonable for them to be wary herein themselves, and not be unwilling to have them examined by others. With this Design, therefore, I shall go on with what I have farther to say concerning this Matter.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Names of Substances.

§. i. THE common Names of Substances, as well as other general Terms, stand for Sorts; which is nothing else, but the being made Signs of such complex Ideas, wherein several particular Substances do, or might agree, by virtue of which they are capable of being comprehended in one common Conception, and signified by one Name. I say, do, or might agree: For tho' there be but one Sun existing in the World, yet the Idea of it being abstracted, so that more Substances (if there were several) might each agree in it; it is as much a Sort, as if there were as many Suns as there are Stars. They want not their Reasons, who think there are, and that each fixed Star would answer the Idea the Name Sun stands for, to one who were placed in a due distance; which, by the way, may shew us how much the Sorts, or, if you please, Genera and Species of Things (for those Latin Terms signify to me no more, than the English Word Sort) depend on such a Collections of Ideas, as Men have made, and not on the real Nature of Things; since it is not impossible, but that, in Propriety of Speech, that might be a Sun to one, which is a Star to another.

§. 2. The Measure and Boundary of each Sort, or Species, whereby it is constituted that particular Sort, and distinguished from others,
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is that we call its Essence, which is nothing but that abstract Idea to which the Name is annexed: So that every Thing, contained in that Idea, is essential to that Sort. This, tho' it be all the Essence of natural Substances that we know, or by which we distinguish them into Sorts; yet I call it by a peculiar Name, the Nominal Essence, to distinguish it from that real Constitution of Substances, upon which depends this nominal Essence, and all the Properties of that Sort; which, therefore, as has been said, may be called the real Essence, v.g. the nominal Essence of Gold, is that complex Idea the Word Gold stands for, let it be, for Instance, a Body yellow, of a certain Weight, malleable, fusible, and fixed. But the real Essence is the Constitution of the insensible Parts of that Body, on which those Qualities, and all the other Properties of Gold depend. How far these two are different, tho' they are both called Essence, is obvious, at first Sight, to discover.

§. 3. For tho', perhaps, voluntary Motion, with Sense and Reason, join'd to a Body of a certain Shape, be the complex Idea, to which I, and others, annex the Name Man, and so be the nominal Essence of the Species so called; yet no body will say, that that complex Idea is the real Essence and Source of all those Operations, which are to be found in any Individual of that Sort. The Foundation of all those Qualities, which are the Ingredients of our complex Idea, is something quite different: And had we such a Knowledge of that Constitution of Man, from which his Faculties of Moving, Sensation, and Reasoning, and other Powers flow, and on which his so regular Shape depends, as 'tis possible Angels have, and 'tis certain his Maker has, we should have a quite other Idea of his Essence, than what now is contained in our Definition of that Species, be it what it will; and our Idea of any individual Man would be as far different from what it now is, as is his who knows all the Springs and Wheels, and other Contrivances within, of the famous Clock at Strasburg, from that which a gazing Countryman has of it, who barely sees the Motion of the Hand, and hears the Clock strike, and observes only some of the outward Appearances.

§. 4. That
§ 4. That Essence, in the ordinary Use of the Word, relates to Sorts; and that it is considered in particular Beings, no farther than as they are ranked into Sorts, appears from hence, that take but away the abstract Ideas, by which we sort Individuals, and rank them under common Names, and then the Thought of any Thing essential to any of them, instantly vanishes; we have no Notion of the one, without the other; which plainly shews their Relation. It is necessary for me to be as I am; God and Nature has made me so: But there is nothing I have is essential to me. An Accident, or Disease, may very much alter my Colour, or Shape; a Fever, or Fall, may take away my Reason, or Memory, or both; and an Apoplexy leave neither Sense, nor Understanding, no, nor Life. Other Creatures of my Shape may be made with more and better, or fewer, and worse Faculties than I have; and others may have Reason and Sense, in a Shape and Body very different from mine. None of these are essential to the one, or the other, or to any Individual whatsoever, till the Mind refers it to some Sort, or Species of Things; and then prefently, according to the abstract Idea of that Sort, something is found essential. Let any one examine his own Thoughts, and he will find, that, as soon as he supposes, or speaks of Essential, the Consideration of some Species, or the complex Idea, signified by some general Name, comes into his Mind: And it is in reference to that, that this, or that Quality, is said to be essential. So that if it be asked, whether it be essential to me, or any other particular, corporeal Being, to have Reason? I say, no; no more than it is essential to this white Thing I write on, to have Words in it. But if that particular Being be to be counted of the Sort Man, and to have the Name Man given it, then Reason is essential to it, supposing Reason to be a part of the complex Idea, the Name Man stands for; as it is essential to this Thing I write on to contain Words, if I will give it the Name Treatise, and rank it under that Species. So that essential, and not essential, relate only to our abstract Ideas, and the Names annexed to them; which amounts to no more but this, That whatever particular Thing has not in it those Qualities, which are contained in the abstract Idea, which any general
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Term stands for, cannot be ranked under that Species, nor be called by that Name, since that abstract Idea is the very Essence of that Species.

§. 5. Thus, if the Idea of Body, with some People, be bare Extension, or Space, then Solidity is not essential to Body. If others make the Idea, to which they give the Name Body, to be Solidity and Extension, then Solidity is essential to Body. That, therefore, and that alone is considered as essential, which makes a part of the complex Idea, the Name of a Sort stands for, without which no particular Thing can be reckoned of that Sort, nor be entitled to that Name. Should there be found a Parcel of Matter, that had all the other Qualities that are in Iron, but wanted Obedience to the Loadstone, and would neither be drawn by it, nor receive Direction from it, would anyone question, whether it wanted any thing essential? It would be absurd to ask, Whether a Thing, really existing, wanted any thing essential to it: Or could it be demanded, Whether this made an essential, or specific Difference, or no, since we have no other Measure of essential, or specific, but our abstract Ideas? And to talk of specific Differences in Nature, without Reference to general Ideas and Names, is to talk unintelligibly. For I would ask any one, What is sufficient to make an essential Difference in Nature, between any two particular Beings, without any Regard had to some abstract Idea, which is looked upon as the Essence and Standard of a Species? All such Patterns and Standards, being quite laid aside, particular Beings, considered barely in themselves, will be found to have all their Qualities equally essential; and every Thing, in each Individual, will be essential to it, or, which is more, nothing at all. For tho' it may be reasonable to ask, Whether obeying the Magnet be essential to Iron? yet, I think, it is very improper and insignificant to ask, Whether it be essential to the particular Parcel of Matter, I cut my Pen with, without considering it under the Name Iron, or as being of a certain Species? And if, as has been said, our abstract Ideas, which have Names annexed to them, are the Boundaries of Species, nothing can be essential but what is contained in those Ideas.

§. 6. 1r
§ 6. It is true, I have often mentioned a real Essence, distinct in Substances, from those abstract Ideas of them, which I call their Nominal Essence. By this real Essence, I mean, that real Constitution of any thing, which is the Foundation of all those Properties, that are combined in, and are constantly found to co-exist with the nominal Essence; that particular Constitution, which every Thing has within itself, without any Relation to any Thing without it. But Essence, even in this Sense, relates to a sort, and supposes a Species: For being that real Constitution, on which the Properties depend, it necessarily supposes a Sort of Things, Properties belonging only to Species, and not to Individuals; e.g. Supposing the nominal Essence of Gold to be a Body of such a peculiar Colour and Weight, with Malleability and Fusibility, the real Essence is that Constitution of the Parts of Matter, on which these Qualities, and their Union, depend; and is also the Foundation of its Solubility in Aqua Regia, and other Properties accompanying that complex Idea. Here are Essences and Properties, but all upon Supposition of a Sort, or general, abstract Idea, which is consider'd as immutable; but there is no individual Parcel of Matter, to which any of these Qualities are so annexed, as to be essential to it, or inseparable from it. That which is essential belongs to it as a Condition; whereby it is of this, or that Sort: But take away the Consideration of its being ranked, under the Name of some abstract Idea, and then there is nothing necessary to it, nothing inseparable from it. Indeed, as to the real Essences of Substances, we only suppose their being, without precisely knowing what they are; but that, which annexes them still to the Species, is the nominal Essence, of which they are the supposed Foundation and Cause.

§ 7. The next Thing to be considered, is, by which of those Essences it is, that Substances are determined into Sorts, or Species; and that, it is evident, is by the nominal Essence. For it is that alone, that the Name, which is the Mark of the Sort, signifies. It is impossible, therefore, that any thing should determine the Sorts of Things, which we rank under general Names, but that Idea, which that Name is design'd as a Mark for;
for; which is that, as has been shewn, which we call the Nominal Essence. Why do we say, This is a Horse, and that a Mule; this is an Animal, that an Herb? How comes any particular Thing to be of this, or that Sort, but because it has that nominal Essence, or which is all one, agrees to that abstract Idea, that Name is annexed to? And I desire any one but to reflect on his own Thoughts, when he hears, or speaks any of those, or other Names of Substances, to know what Sort of Essences they stand for.

§. 8. And that the Species of Things to us, are nothing, but the ranking them under distinct Names, according to the complex Ideas in us; and not according to precise, distinct, real Essences in them, is plain from hence, That we find many of the Individuals, that are ranked into one Sort, called by one common Name, and so received as being of one Species, have yet Qualities depending on their real Constitutions, as far different one from another, as from others, from which they are accounted to differ specifically. This, as it is easy to be observed by all, who have to do with natural Bodies, so Chymists especially are often, by sad Experience, convinced of it, when they, sometimes in vain, seek for the same Qualities in one Parcel of Sulphur, Antimony, or Vitriol, which they have found in others. For tho' they are Bodies of the same Species, having the same nominal Essence, under the same Name; yet do they often, upon severe ways of Examination, betray Qualities so different one from another, as to frustrate the Expectation and Labour of very wary Chymists. But, if Things were distinguished into Species, according to their real Essences, it would be as impossible to find different Properties, in any two individual Substances of the same Species, as it is to find different Properties in two Circles, or two equilateral Triangles. That is properly the Essence to us, which determines every Particular to this, or that Class; or, which is the same Thing, to this, or that general Name, and what can that be else, but that abstract Idea, to which that Name is annexed? and so has, in Truth, a Reference, not so much to the Being of particular Things, as to their general Denominations.

§. 9. Nor,
§. 9. Nor, indeed, can we rank, and sort Things, and consequently (which is the end of sorting) denominate them by their real Essences, because we know them not. Our Faculties carry us no farther towards the Knowledge and Distinction of Substances, than a Collection of those sensible Ideas, which we observe in them; which however made with the greatest Diligence and Exactness, we are capable of, yet is more remote from the true, internal Constitution, from which those Qualities flow, than, as I said, a Countryman's Idea is from the inward Contrivance of that famous Clock at Straßburg, whereof he only sees the outward Figure and Motions. There is not so contemptible a Plant, or Animal, that does not confound the most enlarged Understanding. Tho' the familiar Use of Things about us, take oft our Wonder; yet it cures not our Ignorance. When we come to examine the Stones, we tread on, or the Iron, we daily handle, we presently find, we know not their Make, and can give no Reason of the different Qualities we find in them. It is evident the internal Constitution, whereon their Properties depend, is unknown to us. For, to go no farther than the grossest and most obvious we can imagine amongst them, What is that Texture of Parts, that real Essence, that makes Lead and Antimony fusible; Wood and Stones not? What makes Lead and Iron malleable; Antimony and Stones not? And yet how infinitely these come short of the fine Contrivances, and inconceivable real Essences of Plants, or Animals, every one knows. The Workmanship of the All-wise and Powerful God, in the great Fabric of the Universe, and every Part thereof, farther exceeds the Capacity and Comprehension of the most inquisitive and intelligent Man than the best Contrivance of the most ingenious Man, doth the Conceptions of the most ignorant of rational Creatures. Therefore we in vain pretend to range Things into Sorts, and dispose them into certain Classes, under Names, by their real Essences, that are so far from our Discovery, or Comprehension. A blind Man may as soon sort Things by their Colours, and he that has lost his Smell, as well distinguish a Lilly and a Rose, by their Odours, as by those internal
internal Constitutions which he knows not. He that thinks he can distinguish Sheep and Goats by their real Essences, that are unknown to him, may be pleased to try his Skill in those Species, called Cassiowary, and Queerechinchie; and by their internal, real Essences, determine the Boundaries of these Species, without knowing the complex Idea of sensible Qualities, that each of those Names stand for, in the Countries where those Animals are to be found.

§ 10. Those, therefore, who have been taught, that the several Species of Substances had their distinct, internal, substantial Forms; and that it was those Forms, which made the Distinction of Substances into their true Species and Genera, were led yet farther out of the Way, by having their Minds set upon fruitless Enquiries after substantial Forms, wholly unintelligible, and whereof we have scarce so much as any obscure, or confused Conception in general.

§ 11. That, our ranking and distinguishing natural Substances into Species, consists in the nominal Essences the Mind makes, and not in the real Essences to be found in the Things themselves, is farther evident from our Ideas of Spirits. For the Mind getting, only by reflecting on its own Operations, those simple Ideas which it attributes to Spirits, it hath, or can have, no other Notion of Spirit, but by attributing all those Operations, it finds in itself, to a Sort of Beings, without Consideration of Matter. And even the most advanced Notion we have of God, is but attributing the same simple Ideas, which we have got from Reflection on what we find in ourselves, and which we conceive to have more Perfection in them, than would be in their Absence; attributing, I say, those simple Ideas to him in an unlimited Degree. Thus having got, from reflecting on ourselves, the Idea of Existence, Knowledge, Power, and Pleasure, each of which we find it better to have, than to want; and the more we have of each, the better; joining all these together, with Infinity to each of them, we have the complex Idea of an Eternal, Omniscient, Omnipotent,
tent, infinitely Wise, and Happy Being. And tho' we are told, that there are different Species of Angels; yet we know not how to frame distinct, specific Ideas of them; not out of any Conceit, that the Existence of more Species, than one, of Spirits, is impossible, but because having no more simple Ideas (nor being able to frame more) applicable to such Beings, but only those few taken from ourselves, and from the Actions of our own Minds in thinking, and being delighted, and moving several Parts of our Bodies, we can no otherwise distinguish in our Conceptions the several Species of Spirits, one from another, but by attributing those Operations and Powers, we find in ourselves, to them in a higher, or lower Degree; and so have no very distinct, specific Ideas of Spirits, except only of God, to whom we attribute both Duration, and all those other Ideas with Infinity; to the other Spirits, with Limitation. Nor, as I humbly conceive, do we, between God and them in our Ideas, put any Difference, by any Number of simple Ideas, which we have of one, and not of the other, but only that of Infinity. All the particular Ideas of Existence, Knowledge, Will, Power, and Motion, &c. being Ideas derived from the Operations of our Minds, we attribute all of them to all Sorts of Spirits, with the Difference only of Degrees, to the utmost we can imagine, even Infinity, when we would frame, as well as we can, an Idea of the first Being; who yet, it is certain, is infinitely more remote in the real Excellency of His Nature, from the highest and perfectest of all created Beings, than the greatest Man, nay, purest Seraph, is from the most contemptible part of Matter; and consequently must infinitely exceed what our narrow Understandings can conceive of Him.

§ 12. It is not impossible to conceive, nor repugnant to Reason, that there may be many Species of Spirits, as much separated and diversified one from another, by distinct Properties, whereof we have no Ideas, as the Species of sensible Things are distinguished one from another, by Qualities, which we know, and observe in them. That there should be more Species of intelligent Creatures above us, than there are of sensible and

Whereof there are probably numberless Species.
and material below us, is probable to me from hence, that, in all the visible, corporeal World, we see no Chasms, or Gaps. All quite down from us, the Descent is by easy Steps, and a continued Series of Things, that in each Remove differ very little one from the other. There are Fishes that have Wings, that are not Strangers to the airy Region; and there are some Birds, that are Inhabitants of the Water, whose Blood is cold as Fishes, and their Flesh is so like in taste, that the scrupulous are allowed them on Fish-days. There are Animals so near of kin both to Birds and Beasts, that they are in the Middle between both: Amphibious Animals link the Terrestrial and Aquatic together; Seals live at Land and at Sea, and Porpoises have the warm Blood and Entrails of a Hog; not to mention what is confidently reported of Mermaids, or Sea-men. There are some Brutes, that seem to have as much Knowledge and Reason, as some that are called Men; and the Animal and Vegetable Kingdoms are so nearly joined, that if you will take the lowest of one, and the highest of the other, there will scarce be perceived any great Difference between them; and so on, till we come to the lowest, and the most inorganical Parts of Matter, we shall find every where, that the several Species are linked together, and differ but in almost insensible Degrees. And, when we consider the infinite Power and Wisdom of the Maker, we have Reason to think, that it is suitable to the magnificent Harmony of the Universe, and the great Design and infinite Goodness of the Architect, that the Species of Creatures should also, by gentle Degrees, ascend upward from us toward His infinite Perfection, as we see they gradually descend from us downwards: Which, if it be probable, we have Reason then to be persuaded, that there are far more Species of Creatures above us, than there are beneath; we being, in Degrees of Perfection, much more remote from the Infinite Being of God, than we are from the lowest State of Being, and that which approaches nearest to nothing. And yet of all those distinct Species, for the Reasons above said, we have no clear, distinct Ideas.

§ 13. But
§ 13. But to return to the Species of corporeal Substances. If I should ask any one, whether Ice and Water were two distinct Species of Things, I doubt not but I should be answer- ed in the affirmative: And it cannot be denied, but he that says, they are two distinct Species, is in the right. But if an Englishman, bred in Jamaica, who, perhaps, had never seen nor heard of Ice, coming into England in the Winter, find the Water, he put in his Basin at Night, in a great part frozen in the Morning, and not knowing any peculiar Name it had, should call it hardened Water; I ask, Whether this would be a new Species to him, different from Water? And, I think, it would be answered here. It would not be to him a new Species, no more than congealed Jelly, when it is cold, is a distinct Species, from the same Jelly fluid and warm; or than liquid Gold, in the Furnace, is a distinct Species from hard Gold in the Hands of a Workman. And if this be so, it is plain, that our distinct Species are nothing but distinct, complex Ideas, with distinct Names annexed to them. It is true, every Substance, that exists, has its peculiar Constitution, whereon depend those sensible Qualities, and Powers, we observe in it; but the ranking of Things into Species, which is nothing but sorting them under several Titles, is done by us, according to the Ideas that we have of them: Which, tho' sufficient to distinguish them by Names, so that we may be able to discourse of them, when we have them not present before us; yet if we suppose it to be done by their real, internal Constitutions, and that Things existing are distinguished by Nature into Species, by real Essences, according as we distinguish them into Species by Names, we shall be liable to great Mistakes.

§ 14. To distinguish Substantial Beings into Species, according to the usual Supposition, that there are certain, precise Essences, or Forms of Things, whereby all the Individuals existing, are by Nature distinguished into Species, these Things are necessary.
§. 15. First, To be assured, that Nature, in the Production of Things, always designes them to partake of certain, regulated, established Essences, which are to be the Models of all Things to be produced. This, in that crude Sense it is usually proposed, would need some better Explication, before it can fully be assented to.

§. 16. Secondly, It would be necessary to know, whether Nature always attains that Essence, it designs in the Production of Things. The irregular and monstrous Births, that in divers Sorts of Animals have been observed, will always give us reason to doubt of one, or both these.

§. 17. Thirdly, It ought to be determined, whether those we call Monsters be really a distinct Species, according to the scholastic Notion of the Word Species; since it is certain, that every Thing, that exists, has its particular Constitution: And yet we find, that some of these monstrous Productions have few, or none of those Qualities, which are supposed to result from, and accompany the Essence of that Species, from whence they derived their Originals, and to which, by their Descent, they seem to belong.

§. 18. Fourthly, The real Essences of those Things, which we distinguish into Species, and as so distinguished we name, ought to be known, i.e. we ought to have Ideas of them. But since we are ignorant in these four Points, the supposed real Essences of Things stand us not in stead for the distinguishing Substances into Species.

§. 19. Fifthly, The only imaginable Help in this Case would be, that having framed perfect, complex Ideas of the Properties of Things, flowing from their different, real Essences, we should thereby distinguish them into Species. But neither can this be done; for being ignorant of the real Essence itself, it is impossible to know all those Properties that flow from it, and are so annexed to it, that any one of them being away, we may certainly conclude, that That Essence is not there, and so the Thing is not of that Species. We can never know what are the precise Number of Properties, depending on the real Essence of Gold,
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Gold, any one of which failing, the real Essence of Gold, and consequently Gold, would not be there, unless we knew the real Essence of Gold itself, and by that determined that Species. By the Word Gold here, I must be understood to design a particular Piece of Matter; v.g. the last Guinea that was coined. For, if it should stand here in its ordinary Signification for that complex Idea, which I, or any one else calls Gold; i.e. for the nominal Essence of Gold, it would be Jargon; so hard is it to shew the various Meaning and Imperfection of Words, when we have nothing else but Words to do it by.

§ 20. By all which it is clear, That our distinguishing Substances into Species by Names, is not at all founded on their real Essences; nor can we pretend to range and determine them exactly into Species, according to the internal, essential Differences.

§ 21. But since, as has been remarked, we have need of general Words, tho' we know not the real Essences of Things; all we can do, is to collect such a Number of simple Ideas, as by Examination we find to be united together in Things existing, and thereof to make one complex Idea. Which, tho' it be not real the Essence of any Sub stance that exists, is yet the specific Essence, to which our Name belongs, and is convertible with it; by which we may at least try the Truth of these nominal Essences. For Example, There be that say, that the Essence of Body is Extension: If it be so, we can never mistake in putting the Essence of any Thing for the Thing itself. Let us then, in Discourse, put Extension for Body; and when we would say, that Body moves, let us say that Extension moves, and see how it will look. He that should say that one Extension by impulse moves another Extension, would, by the bare Expression, sufficiently shew the Absurdity of such a Notion. The Essence of any Thing, in respect of us, is the whole complex Idea, comprehended and marked by that Name; and in Substances, besides the several distinct, simple Ideas, that make them up, the confused one of Substance, or of an unknown Support and Cause of their Union, is always a part; and, therefore, the Essence of Body is not bare Extension, but an extended, solid Thing; and
and so to say an extended, solid Thing moves, or impels another, is all one, and as intelligible, as to say, Body moves, or impels. Likewise to say, that a rational Animal is capable of Conversation, is all one, as to say, a Man. But no one will say, That Rationality is capable of Conversation, because it makes not the whole Essence, to which we give the Name Man.

§ 22. There are Creatures in the World, that have Shapes like ours, but are Hairy, and want Language, and Reason. There are Naturals amongst us, that have perfectly our Shape, but want Reason, and some of them Language too. There are Creatures, as 'tis said, (fit fides penes authorem, but there appears no Contradiction that there should be such) that with Language, and Reason, and a Shape in other Things agreeing with ours, have hairy Tails; others where the Males have no Beards, and others where the Females have. If it be asked, Whether these be all Men, or no, all of human Species; 'tis plain, the Question refers only to the nominal Essence: For those of them, to whom the Definition of the Word Man, or the complex Idea signified by that Name, agrees, are Men, and the other not. But, if the Enquiry be made, concerning the supposed real Essence, and whether the internal Constitution and Frame of these several Creatures be specifically different, it is wholly impossible for us to answer, no part of that going into our specific Idea: only we have Reason to think, that where the Faculties, or outward Frame, so much differs, the internal Constitution is not exactly the same: But what Difference in the internal, real Constitution, makes a specific Difference, it is in vain to enquire; whilst our Measure of Species, be, as they are, only our abstract Ideas, which we know; and not that internal Constitution, which makes no part of them. Shall the Difference of Hair only on the Skin, be a Mark of a different, internal, specific Constitution between a Changeling and a Drill, when they agree in Shape, and want of Reason and Speech? And shall not the Want of Reason and Speech be a Sign to us of different, real Constitutions and Species between a Changeling and a reasonable
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able Man? and so of the rest, if we pretend that the Distinction of Species, or Sorts, is fixedly established by the real Frame, and secret Constitution of Things.

§. 23. Nor let any one say, that the Power of Propagation in Animals, by the Mixture of Male and Female, and in Plants, by Seeds, keeps the supposed, real Species distinct and entire. For, granting this to be true, it would help us in the Distinction of the Species of Things no farther than the Tribes of Animals and Vegetables. What must we do for the rest? But in those too it is not sufficient; for, if History lyce not, Women have conceived by Drills; and what real Species, by that Measure, such a Production will be in Nature, will be a new Question; and we have Reason to think this is not impossible, since Mules and Jumarts, the one from the Mixture of an Ass and a Mare, the other from the Mixture of a Bull and a Mare, are so frequent in the World. I once saw a Creature that was the Issue of a Cat and a Rat, and had the plain Marks of both about it; wherein Nature appeared to have followed the Pattern of neither Sort alone, but to have jumbled them both together. To which, he that shall add the monstrous Productions, that are so frequently to be met with in Nature, will find it hard, even in the Race of Animals, to determine, by the Pedigree, of what Species every Animal’s Issue is; and be at a Loss about the real Essence, which he thinks certainly conveyed by Generation, and has alone a Right to the specific Name. But farther, if the Species of Animals and Plants are to be distinguished only by Propagation, must I go to the Indies to see the Sire and Dam of the one, and the Plant from which the Seed was gathered, that produced the other, to know whether this be a Tyger, or that Tea?

§. 24. Upon the whole Matter, it is evident, that it is their own Collections of sensible Qualities, that Men make the Essences of their several Sorts of Substances; and that their real, internal Structures are not considered, by the greatest part of Men, in the sorting them. Much less were any Substantial Forms ever thought on by any, but those, who have in this one Part of the Word learned the Language.
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Language of the Schools: And yet those ignorant Men, who pretend not any Insight into real Essences, nor trouble themselves about substantial Forms, but are content with knowing Things one from another, by their sensible Qualities, are often better acquainted with their Differences, can more nicely distinguish them from their Uses, and better know what they may expect from each, than those learned, quick-witted Men, who look so deep into them, and talk so confidently of something more hidden and essential.

§. 25. But, supposing that the real Essences of Substances were discoverable, by those that would severely apply themselves to that Enquiry, yet we could not reasonably think, that the ranking of Things under general Names, was regulated by those internal, real Constitutions, or any Thing else, but their obvious Appearances: Since Languages, in all Countries, have been established long before Sciences. So that they have not been Philosophers, or Logicians, or such who have troubled themselves about Forms and Essences, that have made the general Names, that are in use amongst the several Nations of Men: But those more, or less comprehensive Terms have, for the most part, in all Languages, received their Birth and Signification from ignorant and illiterate People, who sorted and denominated Things, by those sensible Qualities they found in them; thereby to signify them, when absent, to others, whether they had any Occasion to mention a Sort, or a particular Thing.

§. 26. Since then it is evident, that we sort and name Substances, by their nominal, and not by their real Essences; the next Thing to be considered is, how, and by whom these Essences come to be made. As to the latter, it is evident they are made by the Mind, and not by Nature: For were they Nature's Workmanship, they could not be so various and different in several Men, as Experience tells us they are. For if we will examine it, we shall not find the nominal Essence, of any one Species of Substances, in all Men the same; no not of that, which of all others, we are the most intimately acquainted with. It could
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could not possibly be, that the abstract idea, to which the Name Man is given, should be different in several Men, if it were of Nature's making; and that to one it should be Animal Rationale, and to another, Animal implume, bipes, latis unguibus. He that annexes the Name Man, to a complex idea, made up of Sense and spontaneous Motion, joined to a Body of such a Shape, has thereby one Essence of the Species Man; and he that, upon farther Examination, adds Rationality, has another Essence of the Species he calls Man: By which means, the same individual will be a true Man to the one, which is not so to the other. I think, there is scarce any one will allow this upright Figure, so well known to be the essential Difference of the Species, Man; and yet, how far Men determine of the Sorts of Animals, rather by their Shape, than Descent, is very visible: Since it has been more than once debated, whether several human Fatus's should be preserved, or received to Baptism, or no, only because of the difference of their outward Configuration from the ordinary Make of Children, without knowing whether they were not as capable of Reason, as Infants cast in another Mould: Some whereof, tho' of an approved Shape, are never capable of as much Appearance of Reason, all their Lives, as is to be found in an Ape, or an Elephant; and never give any Signs of being acted by a rational Soul. Whereby it is evident, that the outward Figure, which only was found wanting, and not the Faculty of Reason, which no body could know would be wanting in its due Season, was made essential to the human Species. The Learned Divine and Lawier, must, on such Occasions, renounce his sacred Definition of Animal Rationale, and substitute some other Essence of the human Species. Monsieur Menage furnishes us with an Example, worth the taking Notice of on this Occasion. When the Abbot of St. Martin, says he, was born, he had so little of the Figure of a Man, that it bespoke him rather a Monster. It was for some time under Deliberation, whether he should be baptized, or no? However, he was baptized, and declared a Man provisionally, [till Time should shew what he would prove.] Nature had moulded him so untowardly, that he was called all his Life the Abbot Malottrue, i. e. Ill-shaped. He was of Caen.
Caen. Menagiana \(\frac{3}{7} \). This Child, we see, was very near being excluded out of the Species of Man, barely by his Shape. He escaped very narrowly as he was, and 'tis certain a Figure a little more oddly turned had cast him, and he had been executed, as a Thing not to be allowed to pass for a Man. And yet there can be no Reason given, why, if the Lincaments of his Face had been a little altered, a rational Soul could not have been lodged in him, why a Village somewhat longer, or a Nose flatter, or a wider Mouth, could not have consifted, as well as the rest of his ill Figure, with such a Soul, such Parts, as made him, disfigured as he was, capable to be a Dignitary in the Church.

§ 27. Wherein then, would I gladly know, confifts the precise and unmovable Boundaries of that Species? It is plain, if we examine, there is no such Thing made by Nature, and established by her amongst Men. The real Essence of that, or any other Sort of Substances, it is evident, we know not; and, therefore, are so undetermined in our nominal Essence, which we make ourselves, that if several Men were to be asked, concerning some oddly shaped Fetus, as soon as born, whether it were a Man, or no? It is past doubt, one should meet with different Anfwers: Which could not happen, if the nominal Essences, whereby we limit and diftinguifh the Species of Substances, were not made by Man, with some Liberty; but were exactly copied from precise Boundaries, fet by Nature, whereby it diftinguifhed all Substances into certain Species. Who would undertake to resolve, what Species that Monster was of, which is mentioned by Lice- tus, Lib. I. C. 3. with a Man's Head and Hog's Body? Or those other, which to the Bodies of Men had the Heads of Beasts, as Dogs, Horses, &c.? If any of these Creatures had lived, and could have spoke, it would have increafed the Difficulty. Had the upper Part, to the middle, been of Human Shape, and all below Swine; had it been Murder to destroy it? or must the Bishop have been consulted, whether it were Man enough to be admitted to the Font, or no? As, I have been told, it happened in France some Years since, in somewhat a like Case. So uncertain are the Boundaries of Species of Animals to us, who have no other Measures than the complex Ideas of our own collecting:
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And so far are we from certainly knowing what a Man is; tho', perhaps, it will be judged great Ignorance to make any doubt about it. And yet, I think, I may say, that the certain Boundaries of that Species, are so far from being determined, and the precise Number of simple Ideas, which make the nominal Essence, so far from being settled, and perfectly known, that very material Doubts may still arise about it. And, I imagine, none of the Definitions of the Word Man, which we yet have, nor Descriptions of that Sort of Animal, are so perfect and exact, as to satisfy a considerate, inquisitive Person; much less to obtain a general Consent, and to be that, which Men would every where flock by, in the Decision of Cases, and determining of Life and Death, Baptism, or no Baptism, in Productions that might happen.

§. 28. But, tho' these nominal Essences of Substances, are made by the Mind, they are not yet made so arbitrarily as those of mixed Modes. To the making of any nominal Essence, it is necessary, First, That the Ideas whereof it consists, have such an Union as to make but one Idea, how compounded soever. Secondly, That the particular Ideas so united be exactly the same, neither more nor less. For if two abstract, complex Ideas, differ either in Number, or Sorts, of their component Parts, they make two different, and not one and the same Essence. In the first of these, the Mind, in making its complex Ideas of Substances, only follows Nature; and puts none together, which are not supposed to have an Union in Nature. No body joins the Voice of a Sheep, with the Shape of a Horse; nor the Colour of Lead, with the Weight and Fixedness of Gold, to be the complex Ideas of any real Substances: Unles he has a mind to fill his Head with Chimeras, and his Discourse with unintelligible Words. Men, observing certain Qualities always joined and existing together, therein copied Nature; and of Ideas so united, made their complex ones of Substances. For, tho' Men may make what complex Ideas they please, and give what Names to them they will; yet, if they will be understood, when they speak of Things really existing, they must, in some degree, conform their

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Ideas to the Things they would speak of; or else Mens Language will be like that of Babel, and every Man's Words, being intelligible only to himself, would no longer serve to Conversation, and the ordinary Affairs of Life, if the Ideas, they stand for, be not some way answering the common Appearances and Agreement of Substances, as they really exist.

§. 29. Secondly, T'ho' the Mind of Man, in making its complex Ideas of Substances, never puts any together, that do not really, or are not supposed to co-exist, and so it truly borrows that Union from Nature; yet the Number it combines, depends upon the various Care, Industry, or Fancy of him that makes it. Men generally content themselves with some few, sensible, obvious Qualities; and often, if not always, leave out others as material, and as firmly united, as those that they take. Of sensible Substances there are two Sorts; one of organized Bodies, which are propagated by Seed; and in these, the Shape is that, which to us is the leading Quality, and most characteristic Part, that determines the Species. And, therefore, in Vegetables and Animals, an extended, solid Substance, of such a certain Figure, usually serves the turn. For, however some Men seem to prize their Definition of Animal Rationale, yet should there a Creature be found, that had Language and Reason, but partook not of the usual Shape of a Man, I believe it would hardly pass for a Man, how much soever it were Animal Rationale. And if Balaam's Ais had, all his Life, discoursed as rationally as he did once with his Master, I doubt yet, whether any one would have thought him worthy the Name Man, or allowed him to be of the same Species with himself. As in Vegetables and Animals it is the Shape, so in most other Bodies, not propagated by Seed, it is the Colour we most fix on, and are most led by. Thus, where we find the Colour of Gold, we are apt to imagine all the other Qualities, comprehended in our complex Idea, to be there also; and we commonly take these two obvious Qualities, viz. Shape and Colour, for so presumptive Ideas of several Species, that, in a good Picture, we readily say this is a Lion, and that a Rose; this
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this is a Gold, and that a Silver Goblet, only by the different Figures and Colours, represented to the Eye by the Pencil.

§. 30. But, tho' this serves well enough for gross and confused Conceptions, and unac- Which yet serve for com-
rate ways of Talking and Thinking; yet Men mon: Converse.
am are far enough from having agreed on the precise Number of simple Ideas, or Qualities, belonging to any Sort of Things, signified by its Name. Nor is it a wonder, since it requires much Time, Pains, and Skill, strict Enquiry, and long Examination, to find out what, and how many, those simple Ideas are, which are constantly and inseparably united in Nature, and are always to be found together in the same Subject. Most Men, wanting either Time, Inclination, or Industry enough for this, even to some tolerable degree, content themselves with some few, obvious, and outward Appearances of Things, thereby readily to distinguish and sort them for the common Affairs of Life: And so, without farther Examination, give them Names, or take up the Names already in use. Which, tho' in common Conversation they pass well enough for the Signs of some few, obvious Qualities, co-existing, are yet far enough from comprehending, in a settled Signification, a precise Number of simple Ideas; much less all those, which are united in Nature. He that shall consider, after so much Stir about *Genus* and *Species*, and such a deal of Talk of specific Differences, how few Words we have yet settled Definitions of, may, with Reason, imagine, that those *Forms*, which there hath been so much Noise made about, are only *Chimeras*, which give us no Light into the specific Natures of Things. And he, that shall consider, how far the Names of Substances are from having Significations, wherein all who use them do agree, will have Reason to conclude, that tho' the nominal Essences of Substances are all supposed to be copied from Nature, yet they are all, or most of them, very imperfect. Since the Composition of those complex Ideas are, in several Men, very different: And, therefore, that these Boundaries of *Species* are as Men, and not as Nature makes them, if at least there are in Nature any such prefixed Bounds. It is true, that many particular Substances are so made by Nature, that they have Agreement and
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and likenesses one with another, and so afford a Foundation of being ranked into Sorts. But the sorting of Things by us, or the making of determinate Species, being in order to naming and comprehending them under general Terms, I cannot see how it can be properly said, that Nature sets the Boundaries of the Species of Things: Or, if it be so, our Boundaries of Species are not exactly conformable to those in Nature. For we, having need of general Names for present use, stay not for a perfect Discovery of all those Qualities, which would best shew us their most material Differences and Agreements; but we ourselves divide them, by certain, obvious Appearances, into Species, that we may the easier, under general Names, communicate our Thoughts about them. For having no other Knowledge of any Substance, but of the simple Ideas that are united in it; and observing several particular Things to agree with others, in several of those simple Ideas, we make that Collection our specific Idea, and give it a general Name; that, in recording our own Thoughts, and in our Discourse with others, we may in one short Word design all the Individuals, that agree in that complex Idea, without enumerating the simple Ideas that make it up; and so not waste our Time and Breath in tedious Descriptions; which we see they are fain to do, who would discourse of any new Sort of Things, they have not yet a Name for.

§. 31. But, however these Species of Substances pass well enough in ordinary Conversation, it is plain, that this complex Idea, wherein they observe several Individuals to agree, is by different Men, made very differently; by some more, and others less accurately. In some, this complex Idea contains a greater, and in others a smaller Number of Qualities; and so is apparently such as the Mind makes it. The yellow, shining Colour makes Gold to Children: Others add Weight, Malleableness, and Fusibility; and others yet other Qualities, which they find joined with that yellow Colour, as constantly as its Weight and Fusibility: For in all these, and the like Qualities, one has as good a Right to be put into the complex Idea of that Substance, wherein they are all joined;
as another. And, therefore, different Men, leaving out, or put-
ing in, several simple Ideas, which others do not, according to
their various Examination, Skill, or Observation of that Sub-
ject, have different Effences of Gold, which must, therefore, be
of their own, and not of Nature's making.

§. 32. If the Number of simple Ideas, that make the nominal Effence of the lowest Species,
or first sorting of Individuals, depends on the Mind of Man, variously collecting them, it is
much more evident that they do so, in the
more comprehensive Classis, which, by the Masters of Logic
are called Genera. These are complex Ideas designed imperfect: And it is visible at first Sight, that several of those Qual-
ties, that are to be found in the Things themselves are pur-
purposely left out of generical Ideas. For as the Mind, to make
general Ideas, comprehending several Particulars, leaves out
those of Time, and Place, and such other, that make them in-
communicable to more than one Individual; so to make other
yet more general Ideas, that may comprehend different Sorts,
it leaves out those Qualities that distinguish them, and puts in-
to its new Collection, only such Ideas, as are common to several
Sorts. The same Convenience, that made Men express se-
veral Parcels of yellow Matter coming from Guinea and Peru,
under one Name, sets them also upon making of one Name, that
may comprehend both Gold and Silver, and some other Bodies
of different Sorts. This is done, by leaving out those Quali-
ties, which are peculiar to each Sort; and retaining a com-
plex Idea, made up of those that are common to them all. To
which the Name Metal being annexed, there is a Genus con-
stituted; the Effence whereof being that abstract Idea, containing
only Malleableness and Fusibility, with certain Degrees of
Weight and Fixedness, wherein some Bodies of several Kinds
agree, leaves out the Colour, and other Qualities peculiar to
Gold and Silver, and the other Sorts comprehended under the
Name Metal; whereby it is plain, that Men follow not exactly
the Patterns set them by Nature, when they make their gen-
eral Ideas of Substances; since there is no Body to be found,
which has barely Malleableness and Fusibility in it, without other
Qualities,
Qualities, as inseparable as those. But Men, in making their general Ideas, seeking more the Convenience of Language and quick Dispatch, by short and comprehensive Signs, than the true and precise Nature of Things, as they exist, have, in the framing their abstract Ideas, chiefly pursued that end, which was to be furnished with store of general, and variously comprehensive Names. So that, in this whole Business of Genera and Species, the Genus, or more comprehensive, is but a partial Conception of what is in the Species, and the Species but a partial Idea of what is to be found in each Individual. If, therefore, any one will think, that a Man, and a Horse, and an Animal, and a Plant, &c. are distinguished by real Essences, made by Nature, he must think Nature to be very liberal of these real Essences, making one for Body, another for an Animal, and another for a Horse; and all these Essences liberally bestowed upon Bucephalus. But if he would rightly consider what is done, in all these Genera and Species, or Sorts, we should find, that there is no new Thing made, but only more, or less comprehensive Signs, whereby we may be enabled to express, in a few Syllables, great Numbers of particular Things, as they agree in more, or less general Conceptions, which we have framed to that purpose. In all which we may observe, that the more general Term is always the Name of a less complex Idea; and that each Genus is but a partial Conception of the Species comprehended under it. So that if these abstract, general Ideas, be thought to be complete, it can only be in respect of a certain, established Relation between them and certain Names, which are made use of to signify them; and not in respect of any Thing existing, as made by Nature.

§. 33. This is adjusted to the true end of Speech, which is to be the easiest and shortest way of communicating our Notions. For thus he, that would discourse of Things, as they agreed in the complex Idea of Extension and Solidity, needed but use the Word Body, to denote all such. He that to these would join others, signified by the Words Life, Sense, and Spontaneous Motion, needed but use the Word Animal,
mal, to signify all which partook of those Ideas; and he that had made a complex Idea of a Body, with Life, Sense, and Motion, with the Faculty of Reasoning, and a certain Shape joined to it, needed but use the short Monosyllable Man, to express all Particulars that correspond to that complex Idea. This is the proper Business of Genus and Species; and this Men do, without any Consideration of real Essences, or Substantial Forms, which come not within the reach of our Knowledge, when we think of those Things; nor within the Signification of our Words, where we discourse with others.

§. 34. Were I to talk with any one, of a Sort of Birds I lately saw in St. James's Park, about three or four Feet high, with a Covering of something between Feathers and Hair, of a dark, brown Colour, without Wings, but in the Place thereof, two or three little Branches, coming down like Sprigs of Spanish Broom, long great Legs, with Feet only of three Claws, and without a Tail; I must make this Description of it, and so may make others understand me: But when I am told, that the Name of it is Cassuarius, I may then use that Word to stand in Discourse for all my complex Idea, mentioned in that Description; tho', by that Word, which is now become a specific Name, I know no more of the real Essence, or Constitution of that Sort of Animals, than I did before; and knew probably as much of the Nature of that Species of Birds, before I learned the Name, as many Englishmen do of Swans, or Herons, which are specific Names, very well known, of Sorts of Birds common in England.

§. 35. From what has been said, it is evident, that Men make Sorts of Things. For it being different Essences alone, that make different Species, it is plain, that they who make those abstract Ideas, which are the nominal Essences, do thereby make the Species, or Sort. Should there be a Body found, having all the other Qualities of Gold, except Malleableness, it would, no doubt, be made a Question, whether it were Gold, or no; i.e. whether it were of that Species. This could be determined only by that abstract Idea, to which every one annexed the Name Gold;
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Gold: so that it would be true Gold to him, and belong to that Species, who included not Malleableness, in his nominal Essence, signified by the Sound Gold; and, on the other Side, it would not be true Gold, or of that Species to him, who included Malleableness in his specific Idea. And who, I pray, is it that make these diverse Species, even under one and the same Name, but Men, that make two different abstract Ideas, consisting not exactly of the same Collection of Qualities? Nor is it a mere Supposition to imagine, that a Body may exist, wherein the other obvious Qualities of Gold may be, without Malleableness; since it is certain, that Gold itself, will be sometimes so eager, (as Artificers call it) that it will as little endure the Hammer, as Glass itself. What we have said, of the putting in, or leaving Malleableness out of the complex Idea, the Name Gold is by any one annexed to, may be said of its peculiar Weight, Fixedness, and several other the like Qualities: For whatsoever is left out, or put in, it is still the complex Idea, to which that Name is annexed, that makes the Species; and, as any particular Parcel of Matter answers that Idea, so the Name of the Sort belongs truly to it; and it is of that Species. And thus any Thing is true Gold, perfect Metal. All which Determination of the Species, it is plain, depends on the Understanding of Man, making this, or that complex Idea.

§. 36. This then, in short, is the Case: Nature makes the Similitude. Nature makes many particular Things, which do agree one with another, in many sensible Qualities, and probably too, in their internal Frame and Constitution: But it is not this real Essence, that distinguishes them into Species; it is Men, who, taking occasion from the Qualities they find united in them, and wherein they observe often several Individuals to agree, range them into Sorts, in order to their Naming, for the Convenience of comprehensive Signs; under which Individuals, according to their Conformity to this, or that abstract Idea, come to be ranked, as under Ensigns; so that this is of the Blue, that the Red Regiment; this is a Man, that a Drill: And in this, I think, consists the whole Business of Genus and Species.

§. 37. I do
§. 37. I do not deny but Nature, in the constant Production of particular Beings, makes them not always new and various, but very much alike, and of kin one to another: But I think it nevertheless true, that the Boundaries of the Species, whereby Men sort them, are made by Men; since the Essences of the Species, distinguished by different Names, are, as has been proved, of Man's making, and seldom adequate to the internal Nature of the Things they are taken from. So that we may truly say, such a manner of sorting of Things, is the Workmanship of Men.

§. 38. One Thing, I doubt not, but will seem very strange in this Doctrine; which is, that, from what has been said, it will follow, that each abstract Idea, with a Name to it, makes a distinct Species. But who can help it, if Truth will have it so? For so it must remain, till some body can shew us the Species of Things, limited and distinguished by something else; and let us see, that general Terms signify not our abstract Ideas, but something different from them. I would fain know, why a Shock and a Hound, are not as distinct Species, as a Spaniel and an Elephant. We have no other Idea of the different Essence of an Elephant and a Spaniel, than we have of the different Essence of a Shock and a Hound; all the essental Difference, whereby we know and distinguish them one from another, consisting only in the different Collection of simple Ideas, to which we have given those different Names.

§. 39. How much the making of Species and Genera is in order to general Names, and how much general Names are necessary, if not to the Being, yet at least to the completing of a Species, and making it pass for such, will appear, besides what has been said above, concerning Ice and Water, in a very familiar Example. A silent, and a striking Watch, are but one Species, to those who have but one Name for them: But he that has the Name Watch for one, and Clock for the other, and distinct, complex Ideas, to which those Names belong, to him they are different Species. It will be said, perhaps, that the inward Contrivance

And continues it in the Races of Things.
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ance and Constitution is different between these two, which the Watchmaker has a clear Idea of. And yet, it is plain, they are but one Species to him, when he has but one Name for them. For what is sufficient in the inward Contrivance to make a new Species? There are some Watches that are made with four Wheels, others with five: Is this a specific Difference to the Workman? Some have Strings and Physies, and others none; some have the Balance loose, and others regulated by a spiral Spring, and others by Hog's Bristles: Are any, or all of these, enough to make a specific Difference to the Workman, that knows each of these, and several other different Contrivances, in the internal Constitutions of Watches? It is certain each of these hath a real Difference from the rest; but whether it be an essential, a specific Difference, or no, relates only to the complex Idea, to which the Name Watch is given: As long as they all agree in the Idea, which that Name stands for, and that Name does not, as a generical Name, comprehend different Species under it, they are not essentially, nor specifically different. But, if any one will make minuter Divisions, from Differences that he knows in the internal Frame of Watches, and to such precise, complex Ideas, give Names, that shall prevail, they will then be new Species to them, who have those Ideas, with Names to them; and can, by those Differences, distinguish Watches into these several Sorts, and then Watch will be a generical Name. But yet, they would be no distinct Species to Men, ignorant of Clock-work, and the inward Contrivances of Watches, who had no other Idea but the outward Shape and Bulk, with the marking of the Hours by the Hand. For to them, all those other Names would be but synonimous Terms for the same Idea, and signify no more, nor no other Thing but a Watch. Just thus, I think, it is in natural Things. No body will doubt, but the Wheels, or Springs (if I may so say) within, are different in a rational Man, and a Changeling, no more than that there is a Difference in the Frame between a Drill and a Changeling. But whether one, or both these Differences, be essential, or specific, is only to be known to us, by their Agreement, or Disagreement, with the complex Idea that the Name Man stands
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stands for: For by that alone can it be determined, whether one, or both, or neither of those, be a Man, or no.

§ 40. From what has been before said, we may see the Reason why, in the Species of artificial Things, there is generally less Confusion and Uncertainty, than in Natural. Because an artificial Thing, being a Production of a Man, which the Artificer designed, and therefore well knows the Idea of, the Name of it is supposed to stand for no other Idea, nor to import any other Essence, than what is certainly to be known, and easy enough to be apprehended. For the Idea, or Essence, of the several Sorts of artificial Things, consisting, for the most part, in nothing but the determinate Figure of sensible Parts; and sometimes Motion depending thereon, which the Artificer fashions in Matter, such as he finds for his Turn; it is not beyond the reach of our Faculties to attain a certain Idea thereof, and so settle the Signification of the Names, whereby the Species of artificial Things are distinguished, with less Doubt, Obscurity and Equivocation, than we can in Things natural, whose Differences and Operations depend upon Contrivances, beyond the reach of our Discoveries.

§ 41. I must be excused here, if I think artificial Things are of distinct Species, as well as natural: Since I find they are as plainly and orderly ranked into Sorts, by different, abstract Ideas, with the general Names annexed to them, as distinct one from another, as those of natural Substances. For, why should we not think a Watch and Pistol, as distinct Species one from another, as a Horse and a Dog, they being expressed in our Minds by distinct Ideas, and to others, by distinct Appellations?

§ 42. This is farther to be observed, concerning Substances, that they alone, of all our several Sorts of Ideas, have particular, or proper Names, whereby one only particular Thing is signified. Because, in simple Ideas, Modes, and Relations, it seldom happens that Men have Occasion to mention often this, or that Particular, when it is absent. Besides, the greatest Part
Part of mixed Modes, being Actions which perish in their Birth, are not capable of a lasting Duration, as Substances, which are the Actors; and wherein the simple Ideas, that make up the complex Ideas, designed by the Name, have a lasting Union.

§ 43. I must beg Pardon of my Reader, for having dwelt so long upon this Subject, and, perhaps, with some Obscurity. But I desire it may be considered, how difficult it is, to lead another, by Words, into the Thoughts of Things, stripped of these specific Differences we give them: Which Things, if I name not, I say nothing; and if I do name them, I thereby rank them into some Sort, or other, and suggest to the Mind the usual abstract Idea of that Species, and so crofs my Purpose. For to talk of a Man, and to lay by, at the same time, the ordinary Signification of the Name Man, which is our complex Idea, usually annexed to it; and bid the Reader consider Man, as he is in himself, and as he is really distinguished from others, in his internal Constitution, or real Essence, that is, by something, he knows not what, looks like trifling: And yet thus one must do, who would speak of the supposed, real Essences and Species of Things, as thought to be made by Nature, if it be but only to make it understood, that there is no such Thing signified by the general Names, which Substances are called by. But because it is difficult, by known, familiar Names, to do this, give me leave to endeavour, by an Example, to make the different Consideration the Mind has, of specific Names and Ideas, a little more clear; and to shew how the complex Ideas of Modes are referred, sometimes to Archetypes in the Minds of other intelligent Beings; or, which is the same, to the Signification annexed by others to their received Names; and sometimes to no Archetypes at all. Give me leave also to shew how the Mind always refers its Ideas of Substances, either to the Substances themselves, or to the Signification of their Names, as the Archetypes; and also to make plain the Nature of Species, or Sorting of Things, as apprehended, and made use of by us; and of the Essences belonging to those Species, which is, perhaps, of more Moment, to discover the Extent and Certainty of our Knowledge, than we at first imagine.

§ 44: Let
§. 44. Let us suppose Adam in the State of a grown Man, with a good Understanding, but in a strange Country, with all Things new, and unknown about him; and no other Faculties, to attain the Knowledge of them, but what one of this Age has now. He observes Lamech more melancholy than usual, and imagines it to be from a Suspicion he has of his Wife Adah, (whom he most ardently loved) that she had too much Kindness for another Man. Adam discourses these his Thoughts to Eve, and desires her to take care that Adah commit not Folly: And, in these Discourses with Eve, he makes use of these two new Words, Kinneah and Niouph. In time, Adam's Mistake appears, for he finds Lamech's Trouble proceeded from having killed a Man: But yet the two Names, Kinneah and Niouph; the one standing for Suspicion, in a Husband, of his Wife's Disloyalty to him, and the other, for the Act of committing Disloyalty, lost not their distinct Significations. It is plain, then, that here were two distinct, complex Ideas of mixed Modes, with Names to them, two distinct Species of Actions, essentially different; I ask, wherein consisted the Essences of these two distinct Species of Actions? And 'tis plain, it consisted in a precise Combination of Ideas, different in one from the other. I ask, whether the complex Idea in Adam's Mind, which he called Kinneah, were adequate, or no? And it is plain, it was; for it being a Combination of simple Ideas, which he, without any regard to any Archetype, without respect to any Thing as a Pattern, voluntarily put together, abstracted and gave the Name Kinneah to, to express in short to others, by that one Sound, all the simple Ideas contained and united in that complex one; it must necessarily follow, that it was an adequate Idea. His own Choice having made that Combination, it had all in it he intended it should, and so could not but be perfect, could not but be adequate, it being referred to no other Archetype, which it was supposed to represent.

§. 45. These Words, Kinneah and Niouph, by degrees grew into common Use; and then the Case was somewhat altered. Adam's Children had the same Faculties, and thereby the same Power
Names of Substances.  Book III.

Power that he had, to make what complex Ideas of mixed Modes they pleased, in their own Minds, to abstract them, and make what Sounds they pleased the Signs of them: But the Use of Names being to make our Ideas within us known to others, that cannot be done, but when the same Sign stands for the same Idea in two, who would communicate their Thoughts, and discourse together. Those, therefore, of Adam's Children, that found these two Words, Kinneah and Niouph, in familiar Use, could not take them for insignificant Sounds; but must needs conclude, they stood for something, for certain Ideas, abstract Ideas, they being general Names, which abstract Ideas were the Essences of the Species distinguished by those Names. If, therefore, they would use these Words, as Names of Species, already established and agreed on, they were obliged to conform the Ideas in their Minds, signified by these Names, to the Ideas, that they stood for, in other Mens Minds, as to their Patterns and Archetypes; and then, indeed, their Ideas of these complex Modes were liable to be inadequate, as being very apt (especially those that consisted of Combinations of many simple Ideas) not to be exactly conformable to the Ideas in other Mens Minds, using the same Names: Tho' for this there be usually a Remedy at Hand, which is, to ask the Meaning of any Word we understand not, of him that uses it: It being as impossible to know certainly, what the Words Jealousy and Adultery (which, I think, answer יִּזְדָּעִי and יִּזְדַעִי) stand for in another Man's Mind, with whom I would discourse about them; as it was impossible, in the Beginning of Language, to know what Kinneah and Niouph stood for, in another Man's Mind, without Explication, they being voluntary Signs in every one.

§ 46. Let us now also consider, after the same Instances of Substances in Zahab.

One of Adam's Children, roving in the Mountains, lights on a glittering Substance, which pleases his Eye; home he carries it to Adam, who, upon Consideration of it, finds it to be hard, to have a bright, yellow Colour, and exceeding great Weight. These, perhaps, at first, are all the Qualities he takes notice of in it; and, abstracting this complex
complex Idea, consisting of a Substance, having that peculiar bright Yellowness, and a Weight very great, in Proportion to its Bulk, he gives it the Name Zahab, to denominate and mark all Substances, that have these sensible Qualities in them. It is evident now, that in this Case, Adam acts quite differently from what he did before, in forming those Ideas of mixed Modes, to which he gave the Name Kinneah and Nioph. For there he put Ideas together, only by his own Imagination, not taken from the Existence of any Thing; and to them he gave Names to denote all Things, that should happen to agree to those his abstract Ideas, without considering whether any such Thing did exist, or no; the Standard there was of his own making. But, in the forming his Idea of his new Substance, he takes the quite contrary Course; here he has a Standard made by Nature; and, therefore, being to represent that to himself, by the Idea he has of it, even when it is absent, he puts in no simple Idea into his complex one, but what he has the Perception of, from the Thing itself. He takes care that his Idea be conformable to this Archetype, and intends the Name should stand for an Idea so conformable.

§. 47. This Piece of Matter, thus denominated Zahab by Adam, being quite different from any he had seen before, no body, I think, will deny to be a distinct Species, and to have its peculiar Essence; and that the Name Zahab is the Mark of the Species, and a Name belonging to all Things, partaking in that Essence. But here, it is plain, the Essence, Adam made the Name Zahab stand for, was nothing but a Body hard, shining, yellow, and very heavy. But the inquisitive Mind of Man, not content with the Knowledge of these, as I may say, superficial Qualities, puts Adam on farther Examination of this Matter. He therefore knocks and beats it with Flints, to see what was discoverable in the Inside: He finds it yield to Blows, but not easily separate into Pieces: He finds it will bend without breaking. Is not now Fusibility to be added to his former Idea, and made Part of the Essence of the Species, that Name Zahab stands for? Farther Trials discover Fusibility and Fixedness. Are not they also, by the same reason that any of the others were, to be put into
Names of Substances. Book III.

into the complex Idea, signified by the Name Zahab? If not, what reason will there be shewn more for the one than the other? If these must, then all the other Properties, which any farther Trials shall discover in this Matter, ought, by the same reason, to make a Part of the Ingredients of the complex Idea, which the Name Zahab stands for, and so be the Essence of the Species, marked by that Name. Which Properties, because they are endless, it is plain, that the Idea, made after this Fashion, by this Archetype, will be always inadequate.

§ 48. But this is not all, it would also follow, that the Names of Substances would not only have, (as in Truth they have) but would also be supposed to have different Significations, as used by different Men, which would very much cumber the Use of Language. For if every distinct Quality, that were discovered in any Matter by any one, were supposed to make a necessary Part of the complex Idea, signified by the common Name given it, it must follow, that Men must suppose the same Word to signify different Things in different Men; since they cannot doubt, but different Men may have discovered several Qualities in Substances of the same Denomination, which others know nothing of.

Therefore, to fix their Species, a real Essence is supposed.

§ 49. To avoid this, therefore, they have supposed a real Essence belonging to every Species, from which these Properties all flow, and would have their Name of the Species stand for that. But they not having any Idea of that real Essence in Substances, and their Words signifying nothing but the Ideas they have, that which is done by this Attempt, is only to put the Name, or Sound, in the Place and Stead of the Thing having that real Essence, without knowing what the real Essence is; and this is that which Men do, when they speak of Species of Things, as supposing them made by Nature, and distinguished by real Essences.

Which Supposition is of no use.

§ 50. For let us consider, when we affirm, that all Gold is fixed, either it means that Fixedness is a Part of the Definition, Part of the nominal
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Names of Substances.

minal Essence the Word Gold stands for; and so this Affirmation, All Gold is fixed, contains nothing but the Signification of the Term Gold: Or else it means, that Fixedness, not being a Part of the Definition of the Word Gold, is a Property of that Substance itself: In which Case, it is plain, that the Word Gold stands in the Place of a Substance, having the real Essence of a Species of Things, made by Nature. In which way of Substitution, it has so confused and uncertain a Signification, that, tho' this Proposition, Gold is fixed, be, in that Sense, an Affirmation of something real, yet it is a Truth will always fail us in its particular Application, and so is of no real Use, nor Certainty. For let it be never so true, that all Gold, i. e. all that has the real Essence of Gold, is fixed, What serves this for, whilst we know not, in this Sense, what is, or is not Gold? For, if we know not the real Essence of Gold, it is impossible we should know what Parcel of Matter has that Essence, and so whether it be true Gold, or no.

§. 51. To conclude: What Liberty Adam had at first to make any complex Ideas of mixed Modes, by no other Pattern, but by his own Thoughts, the same have all Men ever since had. And the same Necessity of conforming his Ideas of Substances to Things without him, as to Archetypes made by Nature, that Adam was under, if he would not wilfully impose upon himself, the same are all Men ever since under too. The same Liberty also, that Adam had of affixing any new Name to any Idea, the same has one still (especially the Beginners of Languages, if we can imagine any such) but only with this Difference, that in Places, where Men in Society have already established a Language amongst them, the Significations of Words are very warily and sparingly to be altered: Because, Men being furnished already with Names for their Ideas, and common Use having appropriated known Names to certain Ideas, an affected Misapplication of them cannot but be very ridiculous. He that hath new Notions, will, perhaps, venture sometimes on the coining new Terms to express them: But Men think it a Boldness, and it is uncertain, whether common Use will ever make them pass for current. But in Com-
munication with others, it is necessary, that we conform the
Ideas we make the Vulgar Words of any Language stand for,
to their known, proper Significations, (which I have explained at
large already) or else to make known that new Signification, we
apply them to.

C H A P. VII.

Of Particles.

§. 1. BESIDES Words, which are Names of Ideas in the Mind, there are a
great many others that are made
use of, to signify the Connexion that the Mind
gives to Ideas, or Propositions, one with another. The Mind, in
communicating its Thoughts to others, does not only need
Signs of the Ideas it has then before it, but others also, to shew,
or intimate some particular Action of its own, at that time, re-
lating to those Ideas. This it does several ways; as Is, and Is
not, are the general Marks of the Mind, affirming, or denying.
But besides Affirmation, or Negation, without which there is in
Words no Truth, or Falshood, the Mind does, in declaring its
Sentiments to others, connect not only the Parts of Propositions,
but whole Sentences one to another, with their several Relations and Dependencies, to make a coherent Discourse.

§. 2. The Words, whereby it signifies what
Connexion it gives to the several Affirmations and Negations, that it unites in one continued Reasoning, or Narration, are generally called
Particles; and it is in the right Use of these, that more par-
ticularly consits the Clearness and Beauty of a good Stile.
To think well, it is not enough, that a Man has Ideas clear
and distinct in his Thoughts, nor that he observes the Agree-
ment, or Disagreement of some of them; but he must think
in train, and observe the Dependence of his Thoughts and Rea-
sonings, one upon another. And to express well such metho-
dical
dical and rational Thoughts, he must have Words to shew what Connexion, Restriction, Distinction, Opposition, Emphasis, &c. he gives to each respective part of his Discourse. To mistake in any of these, is to puzzle, instead of informing his Hearer; and therefore it is, that those Words, which are not truly, by themselves, the Names of any Ideas, are of such constant and indispensible Use in Language, and do much contribute to Mens well expressing themselves.

§ 3. This part of Grammar has been, perhaps, as much neglected; as some others over-diligently cultivated. It is easy for Men to write, one after another, of Cases and Genders, Moods and Tenses, Gerunds and Supines. In these, and the like, there has been great Diligence used; and Particles themselves, in some Languages, have been, with great shew of Exactness, ranked into their several Orders. But, tho' Prepositions and Conjunctions, &c. are Names well known in Grammar, and the Particles contained under them carefully ranked into their distinct Sub-divisions; yet, he who would shew the right Use of Particles, and what Significancy and Force they have, must take a little more Pains, enter into his own Thoughts, and observe nicely the several Postures of his Mind in discoursing.

§ 4. Neither is it enough, for the explaining of these Words, to render them, as is usual in Dictionaries, by Words of another Tongue, which come nearest to their Signification. For what is meant by them, is commonly as hard to be understood in one, as another Language. They are all Marks of some Action, or Intimation of the Mind; and, therefore, to understand them rightly, the several Views, Postures, Stands, Turns, Limitations, and Exceptions, and several other Thoughts of the Mind, for which we have either none, or very deficient Names, are diligently to be studied. Of these, there are a great Variety, much exceeding the Number of Particles, that most Languages have to express them by; and, therefore, it is not to be wondered, that most of these Particles have diverse, and sometimes almost opposite Significations. In the Hebrew Tongue, there is a Particle consisting but of one single Letter, of which there
there are reckoned up, as I remember, Seventy, I am sure above Fi{ty several Significations.

§. 5. But is a Particle, none more familiar in our Language; and he that says it is a discretionary Conjunction, and that it answers Sed in Latin, or Mais in French, thinks he has sufficiently explained it. But it seems to me to intimate several Relations, the Mind gives to the several Propositions, or Parts of them, which it joins by this Mono-syllable.

First, But to say no more: Here it intimates a Stop of the Mind, in the Course it was going, before it came to the End of it.

Secondly, I saw But two Plants: Here it shews, that the Mind limits the Sense to what is expressed, with a Negation of all other.

Thirdly, You pray; But it is not that God would bring you to the true Religion,

Fourthly, But that he would confirm you in your own. The first of these Buts intimates a Supposition in the Mind of something other-wise than it should be; the latter shews, that the Mind makes a direct Opposition between that, and what goes before it.

Fifthly, All Animals have Sense; But a Dog is an Animal: Here it signifies little more, but that the latter Proposition is joined to the former, as the Minor of a Syllogism.

§. 6. To these, I doubt not, might be added a great many other Significations of this Particle, if it were my Business to examine it in its full Latitude, and consider it in all the Places it is to be found, which if one should do, I doubt, whether, in all those Manners it is made use of, it would deserve the Title of Discretive, which Grammarians give to it. But I intend not here a full Explication of this sort of Signs. The Instances I have given, in this one, may give Occasion to reflect upon their Use and Force in Language, and lead us into the Contemplation of several Actions of our Minds in discoursing, which it has found a way to intimate to others, by these

Particles;
Of Abstract and Concrete Terms.

CHAP. VIII. Of Abstract and Concrete Terms.

§ 1. The ordinary Words of Language, and our common Use of them, would have given us Light into the Nature of our Ideas, if they had been but considered with Attention. The Mind, as has been shewn, has a Power to abstract its Ideas, and so they become Essences, general Essences, whereby the Sorts of Things are distinguished. Now, each abstract Idea being distinct, so that of any two, the one can never be the other, the Mind will, by its intuitive Knowledge, perceive their Difference; and, therefore, in Propositions, no two whole Ideas can ever be affirmed one of another. This we see in the common Use of Language, which permits not any two abstract Words, or Names of abstract Ideas, to be affirmed one of another. For how near of kin soever they may seem to be, and how certain soever it is, that Man is an Animal, or Rational, or White, yet every one, at first hearing, perceives the Falseness of these Propositions; Humanity is Animality, or Rationality, or Whiteness: And this is as evident, as any of the most allowed Maxims. All our Affirmations then are only inconstant, which is the affirming, not one abstract Idea to be another, but one abstract Idea to be joined to another; which abstract Ideas, in Substances, may be of any Sort; in all the rest, are little else but of Relations; and in Substances, the most frequent are of Powers: v.g. A Man is White, signifies, that the Thing, that has the Essence of a Man, has also in it the Essence of Whiteness, which is nothing, but a Power to produce the Idea of Whiteness in one, whose Eyes can discover ordinary Objects; or a Man is rational, signifies, that
that the same Thing that hath the Essence of a Man, hath also in it the Essence of Rationality, i.e. a Power of Reasoning.

§ 2. This Distinction of Names, shews us also the Difference of our Ideas: For, if we observe them, we shall find, that our simple Ideas have all Abstract, as well as Concrete Names; the one whereof is (to speak the Language of Grammarians) a Substantive, the other an Adjective; as Whiteness, White; Sweetness, Sweet. The like also holds in our Ideas of Modes and Relations; as Justice, Just; Equality, Equal; only with this Difference, that some of the Concrete Names of Relations, amongst Men chiefly, are Substantives; as Paternitas, Pater; whereof it were easy to render a Reason. But, as to our Ideas of Substances, we have very few, or no abstract Names at all. For, tho' the Schools have introduced Animalitas, Humanitas, Corporietas, and some others; yet they hold no Proportion with that infinite Number of Names of Substances, to which they never were ridiculous enough to attempt the coining of abstract ones; and those few that the Schools forged, and put into the Mouths of their Scholars, could never yet get Admittance into common Use, or obtain the Licence of public Approbation. Which seems to me at least to intimate the Confection of all Mankind, that they have no Ideas of the real Essences of Substances, since they have not Names for such Ideas: Which no doubt they would have had, had not their Consciousness to themselves, of their Ignorance of them, kept them from so idle an Attempt. And, therefore, tho' they had Ideas enough to distinguish Gold from a Stone, and Metal from Wood; yet they but timorously ventured on such Terms, as Aurietas and Saxietas, Metallietas and Lignietas, or the like Names, which should pretend to signify the real Essences of those Substances, whereof they knew they had no Ideas. And, indeed, it was only the Doctrine of Substantial Forms, and the Confidence of mistaken Pretenders to a Knowledge that they had not, which first coined, and then introduced Animalitas, and Humanitas, and the like; which yet went very little farther than their own Schools, and could never get to be current amongst understanding Men. Indeed, Humanitas was a Word familiar
Chap. IX.  Imperfection of Words.

familiar amongst the Romans, but in a far different Sense, and stood not for the abstract Essence of any Substance; but was the abstract Name of a Mode, and its Concrete Humanus, not Homo.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Imperfection of Words.

§ 1. FROM what has been said in the foregoing Chapters, it is easy to perceive what Imperfection there is in Language, and how the very Nature of Words makes it almost unavoidable for many of them to be doubtful and uncertain in their Significations. To examine the Perfection, or Imperfection of Words, it is necessary first to consider their Use and End: For, as they are more, or less fitted to attain that, so are they more, or less perfect. We have, in the former Part of this Discourse, often, upon Occasion, mentioned a double Use of Words.

First, One for the recording of our own Thoughts.

Secondly, The other for the communicating of our Thoughts to others.

§ 2. As to the first of these, for the recording our own Thoughts, for the help of our own Memories, whereby, as it were, we talk to ourselves, any Words will serve the Turn. For, since Sounds are voluntary and indifferent Signs of any Ideas, a Man may use what Words he pleases, to signify his own Ideas to himself; and there will be no Imperfection in them, if he constantly use the same Sign for the same Idea; for then he cannot fail of having his Meaning understood, wherein consists the right Use and Perfection of Language.

§ 3. Secondly, As to Communication of Words, that too has a double Use.

I. Civil.

II. Philosophical.

Words are used for recording and communicating our Thoughts.
First, By their Civil Use, I mean such a Communication of Thoughts and Ideas by Words, as may serve for the upholding common Conversation and Commerce, about the ordinary Affairs and Conveniencies of Civil Life, in the Societies of Men one amongst another.

Secondly, By the Philosophical Use of Words, I mean such an Use of them, as may serve to convey the precise Notions of Things, and to express, in general Propositions, certain and undoubted Truths, which the Mind may rest upon, and be satisfied with, in its search after true Knowledge. These two Uses are very distinct; and a great deal less Exactness will serve in the one than in the other, as we shall see in what follows.

§. 4. The chief End of Language, in Communication, being to be understood, Words serve not well for that end, neither in Civil, nor Philosophical Discourse, when any Word does not excite in the Hearer the same Idea which it stands for in the Mind of the Speaker. Now, since Sounds have no natural Connexion with our Ideas, but have all their Signification from the arbitrary Impostion of Men, the Doubtfulness and Uncertainty of their Signification, which is the Imperfection we are here speaking of, has its Cause more in the Ideas they stand for, than in any Incapacity there is in one Sound, more than in another, to signify any Idea: For in that regard they are all equally perfect.

That then which makes Doubtfulness and Uncertainty in the Signification of some, more than other Words, is the Difference of Ideas they stand for.

§. 5. Words having naturally no Signification, the Idea, which each stands for, must be learned and retained by those, who would exchange Thoughts, and hold intelligible Discourse with others, in any Language. But this is hardest to be done, where,

First, The Ideas, they stand for, are very complex, and made up of a great Number of Ideas put together.

Secondly, Where the Ideas, they stand for, have no certain Connexion in Nature; and so no settled Standard, any where in Nature existing, to rectify and adjust them by.

Third-
Thirdly, where the Signification of the Word is referred to a Standard, which Standard is not easy to be known.

Fourthly, where the Signification of the Word, and the real Essence of the Thing, are not exactly the same.

These are Difficulties that attend the Signification of several Words, that are intelligible. Those, which are not intelligible at all, such as Names standing for any simple Ideas, which another has not Organs, or Faculties to attain; as the Names of Colours to a blind Man, or Sounds to a deaf Man, need not here be mentioned.

In all these Cases we shall find an Imperfection in Words, which I shall more at large explain, in their particular Application to our several Sorts of Ideas: For, if we examine them, we shall find, that the Names of mixed Modes are most liable to Doubtfulness and Imperfection, for the two first of these Reasons; and the Names of Substances chiefly for the two latter.

§. 6. First, the Names of mixed Modes are many of them liable to great Uncertainty and Obscurity in their Signification.

I. Because of that great Composition these complex Ideas are often made up of. To make Words serviceable, to the end of Communication, it is necessary (as has been said) that they excite in the Hearer exactly the same Idea, they stand for in the Mind of the Speaker. Without this, Men fill one another’s Heads with Noise and Sounds; but convey not thereby their Thoughts, and lay not before one another their Ideas, which is the End of Discourse and Language. But, when a Word stands for a very complex Idea, that is compounded and decomposed, it is not easy for Men to form and retain that Idea so exactly, as to make the Name, in common Use, stand for the same precise Idea, without any the least Variation. Hence it comes to pass, that Mens Names of very compound Ideas, such as for the most part are moral Words, have seldom, in two different Men, the same precise Signification; since one Man’s complex Idea seldom agrees with another’s, and often differs from
from his own, from that which he had Yesterday, or will have To-morrow.

§ 7. II. Because the Names of mixed Modes, for the most part, want Standards in Nature, whereby Men may rectify and adjust their Significations; therefore they are very various and doubtful. They are Assemblages of Ideas, put together at the Pleasure of the Mind, pursuing its own Ends of Discourse, and suited to its own Notions; whereby it designs not to copy any Thing really existing, but to denominate and rank Things, as they come to agree, with those Archetypes, or Forms it has made. He that first brought the Word Sham, Wheedle, or Banter, in use, put together, as he thought fit, those Ideas he made it stand for: And, as it is with any new Names of Modes, that are now brought into any Language; so was it with the old ones, when they were first made use of. Names, therefore, that stand for Collections of Ideas, which the Mind makes at pleasure, must needs be of doubtful Signification, when such Collections are no where to be found constantly united in Nature, nor any Patterns to be shewn, whereby Men may adjust them. What the Word Murder, or Sacrilege, &c. signifies, can never be known from Things themselves: There be many of the Parts of those complex Ideas, which are not visible in the Action itself: The Intention of the Mind, or the Relation of holy Things, which make a Part of Murder, or Sacrilege, have no necessary Connexion with the outward and visible Action of him that commits either; and the pulling the Trigger of the Gun, with which the Murder is committed, and is all the Action, that perhaps is visible, has no natural Connexion with those other Ideas, that make up the complex one, named Murder. They have their Union and Combination only from the Understanding, which unites them under one Name: But uniting them without any Rule, or Pattern, it cannot be but that the Signification of the Name, that stands for such voluntary Collections, should be often various in the Minds of different Men, who have scarce any standing Rule to regulate themselves, and their Notions by, in such arbitrary Ideas.

§ 8. It
§ 8. It is true, common Use, that is the Rule of Propriety, may be supposed here to afford some Aid, to settle the Signification of Lan-
guage; and it cannot be denied, but that in some Measure it does. Common Use regulates the Meaning of Words pretty well for common Conversation; but no body having an Authority to establish the precise Signification of Words, nor determine to what Ideas any one shall annex them; common Use is not sufficient to adjust them to philosophical Discourses; there being scarce any Name, of any very complex Idea, (to say nothing of others) which, in common Use, has not a great Latitude, and which, keeping within the Bounds of Propriety, may not be made the Sign of far different Ideas. Besides, the Rule and Measure of Propriety itself being nowhere established, it is often Matter of Dispute, whether this, or that way of using a Word, be Propriety of Speech, or no. From all which, it is evident, that the Names of such kind of very complex Ideas, are naturally liable to this Imperfection, to be of doubtful and uncertain Signification; and even in Men, that have a Mind to understand one another, do not always stand for the same Idea in Speaker and Hearer. Tho' the Names Glory and Gratitude be the same in e-
evry Man's Mouth, through a whole Country; yet the complex, collective Idea, which every one thinks on, or intends by that Name, is apparently very different in Men using the same Lan-
guage.

§ 9. The way also, wherein the Names of mixed Modes are ordinarily learned, does not a little contribute to the Doubtfulness of their Signification. For if we will observe how Children learn Languages, we shall find, that to make them understand what the Names of simple Ideas, or Substances stand for, People ordinarily shew them the Thing, whereof they would have them have the Idea; and then repeat to them, the Name that stands for it, as White, Sweet, Milk, Sugar, Cat, Dog. But as for mixed Modes, especially the most material of them, moral Words, the Sounds are usually learned first; and then to know what complex Ideas they stand for, they are either behold-
en to the Explication of others, or (which happens for the most part) are left to their own Observation and Industry; which being little laid out in the Search of the true and precise Meaning of Names, these moral Words are, in most Mens Mouths, little more than bare Sounds; or, when they have any, it is for the most part but a very loose and undetermined, and consequently obscure and confused Signification. And even those themselves, who have with more Attention settled their Notions, do yet hardly avoid the Inconvenience, to have them stand for complex Ideas, different from those which other, even intelligent and studious Men, make them the Signs of. Where shall one find any, either controversial Debate, or familiar Discourse, concerning Honour, Faith, Grace, Religion, Church, &c. wherein it is not easy to observe the different Notions Men have of them? which is nothing but this, that they are not agreed in the Signification of those Words; nor have in their Minds the same complex Ideas, which they make them stand for; and so all the Contests that follow thereupon, are only about the Meaning of a Sound. And hence we see, that in the Interpretation of Laws, whether Divine, or Human, there is no End; Comments beget Comments, and Explications make new Matter for Explications: And of limiting, distinguishing, varying the Signification of those moral Words, there is no End. These Ideas of Mens making, are, by Men, still having the same Power, multiplied in infinitum. Many a Man, who was pretty well satisfied of the Meaning of a Text of Scripture, or Clause in the Code, at first reading, has, by consulting Commentators, quite lost the Sense of it, and by those Elucidations, given Rise, or Increase to his Doubts, and drawn Obscurity upon the Place. I say not this, that I think Commentaries needles; but to shew how uncertain the Names of mixed Modes naturally are, even in the Mouths of those, who had both the Intention and the Faculty of speaking, as clearly as Language was capable to express their Thoughts.

Hence unavoidable Obscurity this has unavoidably brought upon the Writings of Men, who have lived in remote Ages, and different Countries.
it will be needlefs to take notice; since the nu-
merous Volumes of learned Men, employing
their Thoughts that way, are Proofs more than enough to shew
what Attention, Study, Sagacity, and Reasoning are required, to
find out the true Meaning of Antient Authors. But there being
no Writings we have any great Concernment to be very follicit-
ous about the Meaning of, but thofe that contain either Truths
we are required to believe, or Laws we are to obey, and draw
Inconveniences on us, when we mistake, or tranfgrefs, we may
be left anxious about the Senfe of other Authors; who writ-
ing but their own Opinions, we are under no greater necessity
to know them, than they to know ours. Our Good, or Evil,
depending not on their Decrees, we may safely be ignorant of
their Notions: And, therefore, in the reading of them, if they
do not ufe their Words with a due Clearness and Perspicuity, we
may lay them aside, and, without any Injury done them, re-
solve thus with ourfelves,

\[Si \textit{non vis intelligi, debes negligi}.\]

§. II. If the Signification of the Names of
mixed Modes be uncertain, because there are
no real Standards exifing in Nature, to which
thofe Ideas are referred, and by which they
may be adjusted, the \textit{Names of Sub-
stances}, of
doubtful Signi-
fication,
for a contrary Reason, viz. because the Ideas, they ftand
for, are fuppofed conformable to the Reality of Things, and are
referred to Standards made by Nature. In our Ideas of Sub-
ftances we have not the Liberty, as in mixed Modes, to frame
what Combinations we think fit, to be the charafTerifical Notes,
to rank and denominate Things by. In these we must follow
Nature, fuit our complex Ideas to real Exiftences, and regulate
the Signification of their Names by the Things themfelves, if
we will have our Names to be the Signs of them, and ftand for
them. Here, it is true, we have Patterns to fow; but Pat-
terns that will make the Signification of their Names very un-
certain: For Names muft be of a very unfteady and various Mean-
ing, if the Ideas, they ftand for, be referred to Standards without
§ 12. The Names of Substances have, as has been shewed, a double Reference in their ordinary Use.

First, Sometimes they are made to stand for, and so their Signification is supposed to agree to, The real Constitution of Things, from which all their Properties flow, and in which they all centre. But this real Constitution, or (as it is apt to be called) Essence, being utterly unknown to us, any Sound that is put to stand for it, must be very uncertain in its Application; and it will be impossible to know what Things are, or ought to be called an Horse, or Antimony, when those Words are put for real Essences, that we have no Ideas of at all. And, therefore, in this Supposition, the Names of Substances being referred to Standards that cannot be known, their Significations can never be adjusted and established by those Standards.

§ 13. Secondly, The simple Ideas, that are found to co-exist in Substances, being that which their Names immediately signify, these, as united in the several Sorts of Things, are the proper Standards to which their Names are referred, and by which their Significations may best be rectified. But neither will these Archetypes so well serve to this Purpose, as to leave these Names, without very various and uncertain Significations. Because these simple Ideas, that co-exist, and are united in the same Subject, being very numerous, and having all an equal Right to go into the complex, specific Idea, which the specific Name is to stand for, Men, tho' they propose to themselves the very same Subject to consider, yet frame very different Ideas about it; and so the Name, they use for it, unavoidably comes to have, in several Men, very different Significations. The simple Qualities, which make up the complex Ideas, being most of them Powers, in relation to Changes, which they are apt to make in, or receive from other Bodies, are almost infinite. He that shall but observe, what a great Variety
Variety of Alterations, any one of the bafer Metals is apt to receive, from the different Application only of Fire; and how much a greater Number of Changes any of them will receive, in the Hands of a Chymift, by the Application of other Bodies, will not think it strange, that I count the Properties of any sort of Bodies not easy to be collected, and completely known, by the ways of Enquiry, which our Faculties are capable of. They being, therefore, at least so many, that no Man can know the precise and definite Number, they are differently discovered by different Men, according to their various Skill, Attention, and Ways of handling; who, therefore, cannot chuse but have different Ideas of the same Substances, and, therefore, make the Signification of its common Name, very various and uncertain. For the complex Ideas of Substances, being made up of such simple ones as are supposed to co-exist in Nature, every one has a right to put into his complex Idea, those Qualities he has found to be united together. For tho' in the Substance, Gold, one satisfies himself with Colour and Weight, yet another thinks Solubility in Aqua Regia as necessary to be joined with that Colour, in his Idea of Gold, as any one does its Fusibility; Solubility in Aqua Regia being a Quality as constantly joined with its Colour and Weight, as Fusibility, or any other; others put in its Ductility, or Fixedness, &c. as they have been taught by Tradition, or Experience. Who of all these has established the right Signification of the Word Gold? Or who shall be the Judge to determine? Each has his Standard in Nature, which he appeals to, and with Reason thinks, he has the same right to put into his complex Idea, signified by the Word Gold, those Qualities, which upon Trial he has found united; as another, who has not so well examined, has to leave them out; or a third, who has made other Trials, has to put in others. For the Union in Nature of these Qualities, being the true Ground of their Union in one complex Idea, who can say, one of them has more Reason to be put in, or left out, than another? From whence it will always unavoidably follow, that the complex Ideas of Substances, in Men using the same Name for them, will be very various; and so the Significations of those Names very uncertain.

§. 14. Besides,
§ 14. Besides, there is scarce any particular Thing existing, which, in some of its simple Ideas, does not communicate with a greater, and in others with a less Number of particular Beings: Who shall determine in this Case, which are those that are to make up the precise Collection, that is to be signified by the specific Name; or can with any just Authority prescribe, which obvious, or common Qualities are to be left out; or which more secret, or more particular, are to be put into the Signification of the Name of any Substance? All which, together, seldom, or never fail to produce that various and doubtful Signification in the Names of Substances, which causes such Uncertainty, Disputes, or Mistakes, when we come to a Philosophical Use of them.

§ 15. It is true, as to civil and common Conversation, the general Names of Substances, regulated in their ordinary Signification, by some obvious Qualities, (as by the Shape and Figure, in Things of known, seminal Propagation, and in other Substances, for the most part, by Colour, joined with some other sensible Qualities) do well enough to design the Things Men would be understood to speak of: And so they usually conceive well enough the Substances, meant by the Word Gold, or Apple, to distinguish the one from the other. But in Philosophical Enquiries and Debates, where general Truths are to be established, and Consequences drawn from Positions laid down; there the precise Signification of the Names of Substances will be found, not only not to be well established, but also very hard to be so. For Example, he that shall make Malleableness, or a certain Degree of Fixedness, a part of his complex Idea of Gold, may make Propositions concerning Gold, and draw Consequences from them, that will truly and clearly follow from Gold, taken in such a Signification: But yet such as another Man can never be forced to admit, nor be convinced of their Truth, who makes not Malleableness, or the same Degree of Fixedness, part of that complex Idea, that the Name Gold, in his Use of it, stands for.

§ 16. This
§. 1.6. This is a natural, and almost unavoidable Imperfection in almost all the Names of Substances, in all Languages whatsoever, which Men will easily find, when once passing from confused, or loose Notions, they come to more strict and close Enquiries. For then they will be convinced how doubtful and obscure those Words are in their Signification, which in ordinary Use appeared very clear and determined. I was once in a Meeting of very learned and ingenious Physicians, where by chance there arose a Question, Whether any Liquor passed through the Filaments of the Nerves? The Debate having been managed a good while, by Variety of Arguments on both sides, I (who had been used to suspect, that the greatest part of Disputes were more about the Signification of Words, than a real Difference in the Conception of Things) desired, That before they went any farther on in this Dispute, they would first examine, and establish among them, what the Word Liquor signify'd. They at first were a little surprized at the Proposal; and had they been Persons less ingenious, they might, perhaps, have taken it for a very frivolous, or extravagant one: Since there was no one there, that thought not himself to understand very perfectly, what the Word Liquor stood for; which I think too none of the most perplexed Names of Substances. However, they were pleased to comply with my Motion, and upon Examination found, that the Signification of that Word was not so settled and certain, as they had all imagined; but that each of them made it a Sign of a different, complex Idea. This made them perceive, that the main of their Dispute was about the Signification of that Term; and that they differed very little in their Opinions, concerning some fluid and subtle Matter, passing through the Conduits of the Nerves; tho' it was not so easy to agree, whether it was to be called Liquor, or no; a Thing which, when considered, they thought it not worth the contending about.

§. 1.7. How much this is the Case, in the greatest part of Disputes, that Men are engaged so hotly in, I shall, perhaps, have an Occasion in another Place to take Notice. Let us only here consider a little

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more exactly the forementioned Instance of the Word, Gold, and 
we shall see how hard it is precisely to determine its Signification. I think all agree, to make it stand for a Body of a certain 
yellow, shining Colour; which being the Idea, to which Chil-
dren have annexed that Name, the shining, yellow part of a 
Peacock's Tail is properly to them Gold. Others, finding Fusi-
bility joined with that yellow Colour, in certain Parcels of 
Matter, make of that Combination a complex Idea, to which 
they give the Name Gold, to denote a sort of Substances; and 
so exclude from being Gold all such yellow, shining Bodies, as 
by Fire will be reduced to Ashes; and admit to be of that 
Species, or to be comprehended under that Name Gold, only 
such Substances, as having that shining, yellow Colour, will by 
Fire be reduced to Fusion, and not to Ashes. Another, by the 
same Reason, adds the Weight, which, being a Quality, as 
straitly joined with that Colour, as its Fusibility, he thinks, has 
the same Reason to be joined in its Idea, and to be signified by 
its Name: And, therefore, the other made up of Body, of such 
a Colour and Fusibility, to be imperfect; and so on of all the 
rest: Wherin no one can shew a Reason, why some of the 
inseparable Qualities, that are always united in Nature, should 
be put into the nominal Essence, and others left out: Or why 
the Word Gold, signifying that sort of Body, the Ring on his 
Finger is made of, should determine that sort rather by its Co-
lour, Weight, and Fusibility, than by its Colour, Weight, and 
Solubility in Aqua Regia: Since the dissolving it, by that Liquor, 
is as inseparable from it, as the Fusion by Fire; and they are 
both of them nothing, but the Relation, which that Substance 
has to two other Bodies, which have a Power to operate differ-
ently upon it. For by what Right is it, that Fusibility comes 
to be a part of the Essence, signified by the Word Gold, and Solu-
bility but a Property of it? Or why is its Colour part of the 
Essence, and its Malleableness but a Property? That which I 
mean, is this, That these being all but Properties, depending on 
its real Constitution, and nothing but Powers, either active, or 
passive, in reference to other Bodies; no one has Authority to 
determine the Signification of the Word Gold, (as referred to 
such
such a Body existing in Nature) more to one Collection of Ideas, to be found in that Body, than to another: Whereby the Signification of that Name must unavoidably be very uncertain; since, as has been said, several People observe several Properties in the same Substance; and, I think, I may say, no body all. And, therefore, have but very imperfect Descriptions of Things, and Words have very uncertain Significations.

§. 18. From what has been said, it is easy to observe, what has been before remarked, viz. That the Names of simple Ideas are, of all others, the least liable to Mistakes, and that for these Reasons. First, Because the Ideas, they stand for, being each but one single Perception, are much easier got, and more clearly retained, than the more complex ones, and, therefore, are not liable to the Uncertainty, which usually attends those compounded ones of Substances and mixed Modes, in which the precise Number of simple Ideas, that make them up, are not easily agreed, and so readily kept in the Mind. And, Secondly, Because they are never referred to any other Essence, but barely that Perception they immediately signify: Which Reference is that which renders the Signification of the Names of Substances naturally so perplexed, and gives Occasion to so many Disputes. Men, that do not perverly use their Words, or on purpose set themselves to cavil, seldom mistake in any Language, which they are acquainted with, the Use and Signification of the Names of simple Ideas: White and Sweet, Yellow and Bitter, carry a very obvious Meaning with them, which every one precifely comprehends, or easily perceives he is ignorant of, and seeks to be informed. But what precise Collection of simple Ideas, Modesty, or Frugality stand for, in another's Use, is not so certainly known. And however we are apt to think, we well enough know, what is meant by Gold, or Iron; yet the precise, complex Idea, others make them the Signs of, is not so certain: And I believe it is very seldom that in Speaker and Hearer they stand for exactly the same Collection. Which must needs produce Mistakes and Disputes, when they are made use of in Discourses, wherein Men have to do with universal Propositions, and would settle
settle in their Minds universal Truths, and consider the Consequences that follow from them.

§. 19. By the same Rule, the Names of simple Modes, are, next to those of simple Ideas, least liable to Doubt and Uncertainty, especially those of Figure and Number, of which Men have so clear and distinct Ideas. Whoever, that had a Mind to understand them, mistook the ordinary Meaning of Seven, or a Triangle? And in general the least compounded Ideas in every kind have the least dubious Names.

§. 20. The most doubtful are the Names of very compounded mixed Modes and Substances. But the Names of mixed Modes, which comprehend a great Number of simple Ideas, are commonly of a very doubtful and undetermined Meaning, as has been shewn. The Names of Substances, being annexed to Ideas, that are neither the real Essences, nor exact Representations of the Patterns they are referred to, are liable yet to greater Imperfection and Uncertainty, especially when we come to a Philosophical Use of them.

§. 21. The great Disorder, that happens in our Names of Substances, proceeding for the most part from our want of Knowledge, and Inability to penetrate into their real Constitutions, it may probably be wondered, why I charge this as an Imperfection, rather upon our Words than Understandings. This Exception has so much appearance of Justice, that I think myself obliged to give a Reason, why I have followed this Method. I must confess then, that when I first began this Discourse of the Understanding, and a good while after, I had not the least Thought, that any Consideration of Words was at all necessary to it. But when, having passed over the Original and Composition of our Ideas, I began to examine the Extent and Certainty of our Knowledge, I found it had so near a Connexion with Words, that unless their Force and Manner of Signification were first well observed, there could...
could be very little said clearly and pertinently concerning Knowledge; which being conversant about Truth, had constantly to do with Propositions. And tho' it terminated in Things, yet it was for the most part so much by the Intervention of Words, that they seemed scarce separable from our general Knowledge. At least they interpose themselves so much between our Understandings, and the Truth, which it would contemplate and apprehend, that, like the Medium thro' which visible Objects pass, their Obscurity and Disorder does not seldom cast a Mist before our Eyes, and impose upon our Understandings. If we consider, in the Fallacies Men put upon themselves, as well as others, and the Mistakes in Mens Disputes and Notions, how great a part is owing to Words, and their uncertain, or mistaken Significations, we shall have Reason to think this no small Obstacle in the Way to Knowledge; which, I conclude, we are the most carefully to be warned of, because it has been so far from being taken Notice of, as an Inconvenience, that the Arts of improving it have been made the Business of Mens Study; and obtained the Reputation of Learning and Subtlety, as we shall see in the following Chapter. But I am apt to imagine, that were the Imperfections of Language, as the Instrument of Knowledge, more thoroughly weighed, a great many of the Controversies, that make such a Noise in the World, would of themselves cease; and the Way to Knowledge, and, perhaps, Peace too, lie a great deal opener than it does.

§. 22. Sure I am, that the Signification of Words, in all Languages, depending very much on the Thoughts, Notions, and Ideas of him that uses them, must unavoidably be of great Uncertainty to Men of the same Language and Country. This is so evident in the Greek Authors, that he, that shall peruse their Writings, will find, in almost every one of them, a distinct Language, tho' the same Words. But when, to this natural Difficulty in every Country, there shall be added different Countries, and remote Ages, wherein the Speakers and Writers had very different Notions, Tem-
pers, Customs, Ornaments, and Figures of Speech, &c. every one of which influenced the Signification of their Words then, tho' to us now they are lost and unknown; it would become us to be charitable one to another in our Interpretations, or Misunderstanding of those antient Writings, which, tho' of great Concernment to be understood, are liable to the unavoidable Difficulties of Speech, which (if we except the Names of simple Ideas, and some very obvious Things) is not capable, without a constant defining the Terms, of conveying the Sense and Intention of the Speaker, without any manner of Doubt and Uncertainty, to the Hearer. And in Discourses of Religion, Law, and Morality, as they are Matters of the highest Concernment, so there will be the greatest Difficulty.

§. 23. The Volumes of Interpreters and Commentators on the Old and New Testament, are but too manifest Proofs of this. Tho' every Thing said in the Text be infallibly true, yet the Reader may be, nay cannot chuse but be, very fallible in the understanding of it. Nor is it to be wondered, that the Will of God, when clothed in Words, should be liable to that Doubt and Uncertainty, which unavoidably attends that Sort of Conveyance; when even His Son, whilst clothed in Flesh, was subject to all the Frailties and Inconveniences of human Nature, Sin excepted. And we ought to magnify His Goodness, that He hath spread before all the World, such legible Characters of His Works and Providence, and given all Mankind so sufficient a Light of Reason, that they, to whom this written Word never came, could not (whenever they set themselves to search) either doubt of the Being of a God, or of the Obedience due to Him. Since then the Precepts of Natural Religion are plain, and very intelligible to all Mankind, and seldom come to be controverted; and other revealed Truths, which are conveyed to us by Books and Languages, are liable to the common and natural Obscurities and Difficulties incident to Words; methinks it would become us to be more careful and diligent in observing the former, and less magisterial, positive, and imperious, in imposing our own Sense and Interpretations of the latter.

C H A P.
CHAP. X.

Of the Abuse of Words.

§. 1. Besides the Imperfection, that is naturally in Language, and the Obscurity and Confusion, that is so hard to be avoided in the Use of Words, there are several wilful Faults and Neglects, which Men are guilty of, in this way of Communication, whereby they render these Signs less clear and distinct in their Signification, than naturally they need to be.

§. 2. First, in this kind, the first and most palpable Abuse is, the using of Words without clear and distinct Ideas; or, which is worse, Signs without any Thing signified. Of these there are two Sorts:

I. One may observe, in all Languages, certain Words, that if they be examined, will be found, in their first Original, and their appropriated Use, not to stand for any clear and distinct Ideas. These, for the most part, the several Sects of Philosophy and Religion have introduced. For their Authors, or Promoters, either affecting something singular, and out of the way of common Apprehensions, or to support some strange Opinions, or cover some Weaknesses of their Hypothesis, seldom fail to Coin new Words, and such as, when they come to be examined, may justly be called insignificant Terms. For having either had no determinate Collection of Ideas annexed to them, when they were first invented; or at least such as, if well examined, will be found inconfident; it is no wonder if afterwards, in the vulgar Use of the same Party, they remain empty Sounds, with little, or no Signification, amongst those who think it enough to have them often in their Mouths, as the distinguishing Characters of their Church, or School, without much troubling their Heads to examine what are the precise Ideas they stand for. I shall not
not need here to heap up Instances; every one's Reading and Conversation will sufficiently furnish him: Or if he wants to be better stored, the great Mint-Masters of these kind of Terms, I mean the School-men and Metaphysicians (under which, I think, the disputing, Natural and Moral Philosophers of these latter Ages may be comprehended) have wherewithal abundantly to content him.

§ 3. ii. Others there be, who extend this Abuse yet farther, who take so little care to lay by Words, which, in their primary Notation, have scarce any clear and distinct Ideas, which they are annexed to, that, by an unpardonable Negligence, they familiarly use Words, which the Propriety of Language has affixed to very important Ideas, without any distinct Meaning at all. Wisdom, Glory, Grace, &c. are Words frequent enough in every Man's Mouth; but if a great many, of those who use them, should be asked what they mean by them, they would be at a stand, and not know what to answer: A plain Proof, that tho' they have learned those Sounds, and have them ready at their Tongue's End, yet there are no determined Ideas laid up in their Minds, which are to be expressed to others by them.

§ 4. Men having been accustomed from their Occasioned by learning Cradles to learn Words, which are easily got and retained, before they knew, or had framed the Ideas they belong to. complex Ideas, to which they were annexed, or which were to be found in the Things, they were thought to stand for, they usually continue to do so all their Lives; and without taking the pains necessary to settle in their Minds determined Ideas, they use their Words for such unsleady and confused Notions as they have, contenting themselves with the same Words other People use; as if their very Sound necessarily carried with it constantly the same Meaning. This, tho' Men make a shift with, in the ordinary Occurrences of Life, where they find it necessary to be understood, and, therefore, they make Signs till they are so; yet this Insignificance in their Words, when they come to reason, concerning either their Tenets, or Interest, manifestly fills their Discourse with abundance of empty, unintelligible Noise and Jargon, especially in Moral Matters,
Chap. X. **Abuse of Words.**

Matters, where the Words, for the most part, standing for arbitrary and numerous Collections of *Ideas*, not regularly and permanently united in Nature, their bare Sounds are often only thought on, or, at least, very obscure and uncertain Notions annexed to them. Men take the Words they find in use, amongst their Neighbours; and, that they may not seem ignorant what they stand for, use them confidently, without much troubling their Heads about a certain, fixed Meaning: Whereby, besides the Ease of it, they obtain this Advantage, That, as in such Discourses they seldom are in the Right, so they are as seldom to be convinced, that they are in the Wrong; it being all one to go about to draw those Men out of their Mistakes, who have no settled Notions, as to dispossess a Vagrant of his Habitation, who has no settled abode. This I guess to be so; and every one may observe in himself and others, whether it be, or no.

§ 5. Secondly, Another great Abuse of Words is, *Inconstancy* in the Use of them. It is hard to find a Discourse, written of any Subject, especially of Controversy, wherein one shall not observe, if he read with Attention, the same Words (and those commonly the most material in the Discourse, and upon which the Argument turns) used sometimes for one Collection of simple *Ideas*, and sometimes for another; which is a perfect Abuse of Language. Words being intended for Signs of my *Ideas*, to make them known to others, not by any natural Signification, but by a voluntary Imposition, it is plain cheat and abuse, when I make them stand sometimes for one Thing, and sometimes for another; the wilful doing whereof, can be imputed to nothing but great Folly, or greater Dishonesty. And a Man, in his Accounts with another, may, with as much Fairness, make the Characters of Numbers stand sometimes for one, and sometimes for another Collection of Units, (*e.g.* this Character 3 stand sometimes for three, sometimes for four, and sometimes for eight) as in his Discourse, or Reasoning, make the same Words stand for different Collections of simple *Ideas*. If Men should do so in their Reckonings, I wonder who would have to do with them? One who would speak thus, in the Affairs.
fairs and Business of the World, and call 8 sometimes seven, and
sometimes nine, as best served his Advantage, would presently
have clapped upon him one of the two Names Men constantly
are disgusted with. And yet, in Arguings, and learned Contests,
the same sort of Proceeding passes commonly for Wit and
Learning: But to me it appears a greater Dishonesty, than the
misplacing of Counters, in the casting up a Debt; and the Cheat
the greater, by how much Truth is of greater Concernment
and Value than Money.

§. 6. Thirdly, Another Abuse of Language
Thirdly, Affect ed Obscurity, by either applying old
Words to new and unusual Significations, or
introducing new and ambiguous Terms, with-
out defining either; or else putting them to-
gether, as may confound their ordinary Meaning. Tho' the
Peripatetic Philosophy has been most eminent in this way, yet
other Sects have not been wholly clear of it. There is scarce
any of them, that are not cumbered with some Difficulties,
(such is the Imperfection of Human Knowledge) which they
have been fain to cover with Obscurity of Terms, and to con-
found the Signification of Words, which, like a Mift before
People's Eyes, might hinder their weak Parts from being dis-
covered. That Body and Extension, in common Use, stand for
two distinct Ideas, is plain, to any one that will but reflect a little.
For, were their Signification precisely the same, it would be
proper, and as intelligible, to say, the Body of an Extension, as the
Extension of a Body; and yet there are those, who find it neces-
fary to confound their Signification. To this Abuse, and the
Mischiefs of confounding the Signification of Words, Logic,
and the liberal Sciences, as they have been handled in the
Schools, have given Reputation; and the admired Art of Disput-
ing hath added much to the natural Imperfection of Langua-
ges, whilst it has been made use of, and fitted, to perplex the
Signification of Words, more than to discover the Knowledge
and Truth of Things: And he that will look into that sort of
learned Writings, will find the Words there much more obscure,
uncertain,
uncertain, and undetermined in their Meaning, than they are in ordinary Conversation.

§. 7. **This is unavoidably to be so, where Mens Parts and Learning are estimated by their Skill in Disputing.** And if Reputation and Reward shall attend these Conquests, which depend mostly on the Fineness and Niceties of Words; it is no Wonder if the Wit of Men so employed, should perplex, involve, and subtilize the Signification of Sounds, so as never to want something to say, in opposing, or defending any Question; the Victory being adjudged, not to him who had Truth on his Side, but the last Word in the Dispute.

§. 8. **This, tho' a very useless Skill, and that which I think the direct opposite to the Ways of Knowledge, hath yet passed hitherto under the laudable and esteemed Names of Subtlety and Acuteness; and has had the Applause of the Schools, and the Encouragement of one Part of the learned Men of the World.** And no wonder, since the Philosophers of old, (the disputing and wrangling Philosophers, I mean, such as Lucian wittily and with Reason taxes) and the Schoolmen since, aiming at Glory and Esteem, for their great and universal Knowledge, easier a great deal to be pretended to, than really acquired, found this a good Expedient to cover their Ignorance, with a curious and inexplicable Web of perplexed Words, and procure to themselves the Admiration of others, by unintelligible Terms, the apter to produce Wonder, because they could not be understood: Whilst it appears in all History, that these profound Doctors were no wiser, nor more useful than their Neighbours; and brought but small Advantage to human Life, or the Societies wherein they lived: Unless the coining of new Words, where they produced no new Things to apply them to, or the perplexing, or obscuring the Signification of old ones, and so bringing all Things into question, and dispute, were a Thing profitable to the Life of Man, or worthy Commendation and Reward.

§. 9. For,
For, notwithstanding these learned Disputants, these all-knowing Doctors, it was to the unscholastic Statesman, that the Governments of the World owed their Peace, Defence, and Liberties; and from the illiterate and contemned Mechanic, (a Name of Disgrace) that they received the Improvements of useful Arts. Nevertheless, this artificial Ignorance, and learned Gibberish, prevailed mightily in these last Ages, by the Interest and Artifice of those, who found no easier Way to that Pitch of Authority and Dominion they have attained, than by amusing the Men of Business, and Ignorant, with hard Words, or employing the Ingenious and Idle, in intricate Disputes, about unintelligible Terms, and holding them perpetually entangled in that endless Labyrinth: Besides, there is no such way to gain Admittance, or give Defence to strange and absurd Doctrines, as to guard them round about with Legions of obscure, doubtful, and undefined Words: Which yet make these Retreats more like the Dens of Robbers, or Holes of Foxes, than the Fortresses of fair Warriors; which if it be hard to get them out of, it is not for the Strength that is in them, but the Briars and Thorns, and the Obscurity of the Thickets they are beset with. For Untruth being unacceptable to the Mind of Man, there is no other Defence left for Absurdity, but Obscurity.

Thus learned Ignorance, and this Art of keeping, even inquisitive Men, from true Knowledge, hath been propagated in the World, and hath much perplexed, whilst it pretended to inform the Understanding. For we see, that other well-meaning and wise Men, whose Education and Parts had not acquired that Acuteness, could intelligibly express themselves to one another; and in its plain Use, make a Benefit of Language. But these unlearned Men well enough understood the Words White and Black, &c. and had constant Notions of the Ideas signified by those Words; yet there were Philosophers found, who had Learning and Subtlety enough to prove, that Snow was black, i.e. to prove, that White was Black; whereby they had the Advantage to destroy the Instruments.
SM. 11. These learned Men did equally instruct Mens Understandings, and profit their Lives, as he, who should alter the Signification of known Characters, and, by a subtle Device of Learning, far surpassing the Capacity of the Illiterate, Dull, and Vulgar, should in his Writing, shew, that he could put A for B, and D for E, &c. to the no small Admiration and Benefit of his Reader. It being as senseless to put Black, which is a Word agreed on to stand for one sensible Idea, to put it, I say, for another, or the contrary Idea, i. e. to call Snow Black, as to put this Mark A, which is a Character agreed on to stand for one Modification of Sound, made by a certain Motion of the Organs of Speech, for B; which is agreed on to stand for another Modification, made by another certain Motion of the Organs of Speech.

§. 12. Nor hath this Mischief stopped in logical Niceties, or curious, empty Speculations, it hath invaded the great Concernments of human Life and Society, obscured and perplexed the material Truths of Law and Divinity; brought Confusion, Disorder and Uncertainty into the Affairs of Mankind; and if not destroyed, yet in great Measure rendered useless, those two great Rules, Religion and Justice. What have the greatest part of the Comments, and Disputes, upon the Laws of God and Man, served for, but to make the Meaning more doubtful, and perplex the Sense? What have been the Effect of those multiplied, curious Distinguishings, and acute Niceties, but Obscurity and Uncertainty, leaving the Words more unintelligible, and the Reader more at a loss? How else comes it to pass, that Princes, speaking, or writing to their Servants, in their ordinary Commands, are easily understood; speaking to their People, in their Laws, are not so? And, as I remarked before, doth it not often happen, that a Man of an ordinary Capacity, very well un-
understands the Text, or a Law, that he reads, till he consults an Expositor, or goes to Council; who, by that time he hath done explaining them, makes the Words signify either nothing at all, or what he pleases.

§ 13. Whether any By-Interests of these Professions have occasioned this, I will not here examine; but I leave it to be consider'd, whether it would not be well for Mankind, whose Concernment it is to know Things as they are, and to do what they ought, and not to spend their Lives in talking about them, or tofing Words to and fro; whether it would not be well, I say, that the Use of Words were made plain and direct, and that Language, which was given us for the Improvement of Knowledge, and Bond of Society, should not be employed to darken Truth, and unsettle Peoples Rights; to raise Misfs, and render unintelligible both Morality and Religion? Or that, at least, if this will happen, it should not be thought Learning, or Knowledge to do so?

§ 14. Fourthly, another great Abuse of Words is, the taking them for Things. This, tho' it in some degree concerns all Names in general, yet more particularly affects those of Substances. To this Abuse those Men are most subject, who most confine their Thoughts to any one System, and give themselves up into a firm Belief of the Perfection of any received Hypothefis; whereby they come to be persuaded, that the Terms of that Seft are so united to the Nature of Things, that they perfectly correspond with their real Exiftence. Who is there, that has been bred up in the Peripatetic Philosophy, who does not think the ten Names, under which are ranked the ten Predicaments, to be exactly conformable to the Nature of Things? Who is there of that School, that is not persuaded, that substantial Forms, vegetative Souls, Abhorrence of a Vacuum, intentional Species, &c. are something real? These Words Men have learned from their very Entrance upon Knowledge, and have found their Mafter and Systems lay great Stress upon them; and, therefore, they cannot quit the Opinion, that they are conformable to Nature, and are the Representations of something
thing that really exists. The Platonists have their Soul of the World, and the Epicureans their Endeavour towards Motion in their Atoms, when at rest. There is scarce any Sect in Philosophy has not a distinct Set of Terms, that others understand not; but yet this Gibberish, which, in the Weakness of human Understanding, serves so well to palliate Mens Ignorance, and cover their Errors, comes by familiar Use, among those of the same Tribe, to seem the most important part of Language, and of all other the Terms the most significant. And should Aerial and Ætherial Vehicles come once, by the Prevalency of that Doctrine, to be generally received any where, no doubt, those Terms would make Impressions on Mens Minds, so as to establish them in the Persuasion of the Reality of such Things, as much as Peripatetic Forms and intentional Species have here-tofore done.

§. 15. How much Names, taken for Things, are apt to mislead the Understanding, the attentive reading of Philosophical Writers would abundantly discover; and that, perhaps, in Words little suspected of any such Misuse. I shall instance in one only, and that a very familiar one: How many intricate Disputes have there been about Matter, as if there were some such Thing really in Nature, distinct from Body; as it is evident, the Word Matter stands for an Idea distinct from the Idea of Body? For if the Ideas these two Terms stand for, were precisely the same, they might indifferently, in all Places, be put one for another. But we see, that tho' it be proper to say, There is one Matter of all Bodies, one cannot say, There is one Body of all Matters: We familiarly say, one Body is bigger than another; but it sounds, harsh (and I think is never used) to say, one Matter is bigger than another. Whence comes this then? viz. from hence, that tho' Matter and Body be not really distinct, but wherever there is the one, there is the other; yet Matter and Body stand for two different Conceptions, whereof the one is incomplete, and but a part of the other. But Body stands for a solid, extended, figured Substance, whereof Matter is but a partial and more confused Conception, it seeming to me to be used for the Sub-
Substance and Solidity of Body, without taking in its Extension and Figure: And, therefore it is that, speaking of Matter, we speak of it always as one, because in truth, it expressly contains nothing but the Idea of a solid Substance, which is every where the same, every where uniform. This being our Idea of Matter, we no more conceive, or speak of different Matters in the World, than we do of different Solidities; tho' we both conceive, and speak of different Bodies, because Extension and Figure are capable of Variation. But since Solidity cannot exist, without Extension and Figure, the taking Matter to be the Name of something, really existing under that Precision, has no doubt produced those obscure and unintelligible Discourses and Disputes, which have filled the Heads and Books of Philosophers, concerning Materia prima; which Imperfection, or Abuse, how far it may concern a great many other general Terms, I leave to be considered. This, I think, I may at least say, that we should have a great many fewer Disputes in the World, if Words were taken for what they are, the Signs of our Ideas only, and not for Things themselves. For when we argue about Matter, or any the like Term, we truly argue only about the Idea we express by that Sound, whether that precise Idea agree to any Thing really existing in Nature, or no. And, if Men would tell, what Ideas they make their Words stand for, there could not be half that Obscurity, or Wrangling, in the Search, or Support of Truth, that there is.

§ 16. But, whatever Inconvenience follows from this mistake of Words, this I am sure, that by constant and familiar Use, they charm Men into Notions, far remote from the Truth of Things. It would be a hard Matter to persuade any one, that the Words which his Father, or School-master, the Parson of the Parish, or such a Reverend Doctor used, signified nothing that really existed in Nature; which, perhaps, is none of the least Causes, that Men are so hardly drawn to quit their Mistakes, even in Opinions purely Philosophical, and where they have no other Interest but Truth. For the Words, they have a long time been used to, re-
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remaining firm in their Minds, ’tis no wonder, that the wrong notions, annexed to them, should not be removed.

§. 17. Fifthly, Another Abuse of Words, is the setting them in the Place of Things, which they do, or can by no means signify. We may observe, that, in the general Names of Substances, whereof the nominal Essences are only known to us, when we put them into Propositions, and affirm, or deny any thing about them, we do most commonly tacitly suppose, or intend they should stand for the real Essence of a certain sort of Substances. For when a Man says, Gold is Malleable, he means, and would insinuate something more than this, that what I call Gold is Malleable, (tho’ truly it amounts to no more) but would have this understood, viz. that Gold, i. e. what has the real Essence of Gold, is Malleable; which amounts to thus much, that Malleableness depends on, and is inseparable from the real Essence of Gold. But a Man not knowing wherein that real Essence consists, the Connexion in his Mind of Malleableness, is not truly with an Essence he knows not, but only with the Sound Gold, he puts for it. Thus when we say, that Animal Rationale is, and Animal imphume, bipes, latis unguibus, is not a good Definition of a Man; ’tis plain, we suppose the Name Man, in this case, to stand for the real Essence of a Species, and would signify, that a rational Animal better described that real Essence, than a two legged Animal, with broad Nails, and without Feathers. For else, why might not Plato as properly make the Word ἀνθρώπος, or Man, stand for his complex Idea, made up of the Ideas of a Body, distinguished from others by a certain Shape, and other outward Appearances, as Aristotle, makes the complex Idea, to which he gave the Name ἀνθρώπος, or Man, of Body, and the Faculty of Reasoning joined together; unless the Name ἀνθρώπος, or Man, were supposed to stand for something else, than what it signifies; and to be put in the Place of some other Thing, than the Idea a Man professes he would express by it.

§. 18. ’Tis true, the Names of Substances would be much more useful, and Propositions, V. g. Putting them for the made
made in them, much more certain, were the real Essences of Substances the Ideas in our Minds, which those Words signified. And it is for want of those real Essences, that our Words convey so little Knowledge, or Certainty, in our Discourses about them: And, therefore, the Mind, to remove that Imperfection, as much as it can, makes them, by a secret Supposition, to stand for a Thing having that real Essence, as if thereby it made some nearer Approaches to it. For tho' the Word Man, or Gold, signify nothing truly but a complex Idea of Properties, united together in one sort of Substances; yet there is scarce any body, in the Use of these Words, but often supposes each of those Names to stand for a Thing, having the real Essence, on which those Properties depend. Which is so far from diminishing the Imperfection of our Words, that by a plain Abuse it adds to it, when we would make them stand for something, which not being in our complex Idea, the Name we use can no ways be the Sign of.

Hence we think every Change of our Idea in Substances, not to change the Species.

§ 19. This shews us the Reason, why in mixed Modes any of the Ideas that make the Composition of the complex one, being left out, or changed, it is allowed to be another Thing, i.e. to be of another Species, as is plain in Chance-medley, Man-slaughter, Murder, Parricide, &c. The Reason whereof is, because the complex Idea, signified by that Name, is the real, as well as nominal Essence; and there is no secret Reference of that Name to any other Essence but that. But in Substances, it is not so. For tho', in that called Gold, one puts into his complex Idea, what another leaves out, and vice versa; yet Men do not usually think that therefore the Species is changed: Because they secretly in their Minds refer that Name, and suppose it annexed to a real, immutable Essence of a Thing existing, on which those Properties depend. He that adds to his complex Idea of Gold, that of Fixedness, or Solubility, in Aqu. Regia, which he put not in it before, is not thought to have changed the Species; but only to have a more perfect Idea, by adding another simple Idea, which is always in fact joined with those other, of which his former, complex Idea consisted. But this Reference of
of the Name to a Thing, whereof we have not the Idea, is so far from helping at all, that it only serves the more to involve us in Difficulties. For, by this tacit Reference to the real Essence of that Species of Bodies, the Word Gold, (which by standing for a more, or less perfect Collection of simple Ideas, serves to design that sort of Body well enough in civil Discourse) comes to have no Signification at all, being put for somewhat, whereof we have no Idea at all, and so can signify nothing at all, when the Body itself is away. For, however it may happen to be thought all one; yet, if well considered, it will be found a quite different Thing, to argue about Gold in Name, and about a Parcel of the Body itself, v. g. a Piece of Leaf Gold laid before us; tho' in Discourse we are fain to substitute the Name for the Thing.

§. 20. That which, I think, very much disposes Men to substitute their Names for the real Essences of Species, is the Supposition before-mentioned, that Nature works regularly in the Production of Things, and sets the Boundaries to each of those Species, by giving exactly the same real, internal Constitution to each Individual, which we rank under one general Name. Whereas any one, who observes their different Qualities, can hardly doubt, that many of the Individuals, called by the same Name, are, in their internal Constitution, as different one from another, as several of those, which are ranked under different, specific Names. This Supposition, however, that the same precise, internal Constitution, goes always with the same specific Name, makes Men forward to take those Names for the Representatives of those real Essences, tho' indeed, they signify nothing, but the complex Ideas they have in their Minds, when they use them. So that, if I may so say, signifying one Thing, and being supposed for, or put in the Place of another, they cannot but, in such a kind of Use, cause a great deal of Uncertainty in Mens Discourses; especially in those, who have thoroughly imbibed the Doctrine of Substantial Forms, whereby they firmly imagine the several Species of Things to be determined and distinguished.

§. 21. But,
§ 21. But, however preposterous and absurd it be, to make our Names stand for Ideas we have not, or (which is all one) Essences that we know not, it being in effect to make our Words the Signs of nothing; yet it is evident to any one, who ever so little reflects on the Use Men make of their Words, that there is nothing more familiar. When a Man asks, whether this, or that Thing he sees, let it be a Drill, or a monstrous Fœtus, be a Man, or no; it is evident, the Question is not, Whether that particular Thing agree to his complex Idea, expressed by the Name Man; but whether it has in it the real Essence of a Species of Things, which he supposes his Name Man to stand for. In which way of using the Names of Substances, there are these false Suppositions contained.

First, That there are certain, precise Essences, according to which Nature makes all particular Things, and by which they are distinguished into Species. That every Thing has a real Constitution, whereby it is what it is, and on which its sensible Qualities depend, is past doubt: But I think it has been proved, that this makes not the Distinction of Species, as we rank them; nor the Boundaries of their Names.

Secondly, This tacitly also insinuates, as if we had Ideas of these proposed Essences. For to what Purpose else is it, to enquire, whether this, or that Thing, have the real Essence of the Species Man, if we did not suppose that there were such a specific Essence known? which yet is utterly false: And, therefore, such Application of Names, as would make them stand for Ideas, which we have not, must needs cause great Disorder, in Discourses and Reasonings about them, and be a great Inconvenience in our Communication by Words.

Sixthly, A Supposition, that Words have a certain and evident Signification.

§ 22. Sixthly, There remains yet another more general, tho’ perhaps less observed, Abuse of Words; and that is, that Men having by a long and familiar Use annexed to them certain Ideas, they are apt to imagine so near and necessary a Connexion between the Names and the Signification they use them in, that they forwardly suppose one cannot but
but understand what their Meaning is; and, therefore, one ought
to acquiesce in the Words delivered, as if it were past doubt, that
in the Use of those common, received Sounds, the Speaker and
Hearer had necessarily the same precise Ideas: Whence presum-
ing, that when they have in Discourse used any Term, they have
thereby, as it were, set before others, the very Thing they talk
of. And so likewise taking the Words of others, as naturally
flanding for just what they themselves have been accustomed to
apply them to, they never trouble themselves to explain their
own, or understand clearly others Meaning. From whence commonly proceeds Noise and Wrangling, without Improve-
ment, or Information; whilst Men take Words to be the con-
stant, regular Marks of agreed Notions, which, in truth, are no
more but the voluntary and unsteady Signs of their own Ideas.
And yet Men think it strange, if in Discourse, or (where it is
often absolutely necessary) in Dispute, one sometimes asks the
meaning of their Terms: Tho' the Arguings one may every Day
observe in Conversation; make it evident, that there are few
Names of complex Ideas, which any two Men use for the same
just, precise Collection. It is hard to name a Word, which will
not be a clear Instance of this. Life is a Term, none more fa-
miliar. Any one almost would take it for an Affront, to be ask-
ed what he meant by it. And yet if it comes in Question, whe-
ther a Plant, that lies ready formed in the Seed, have Life; whe-
ther the Embrio in an Egg, before Incubation, or a Man in a
Swoon, without Sense, or Motion, be alive, or no; it is easy to
perceive, that a clear, distinct, settled Idea, does not always ac-
company the Use of so known a Word, as that of Life is. Some
grofs and confused Conceptions Men indeed ordinarily have, to
which they apply the common Words of their Language; and
such a loose Use of their Words, serves them well enough in
their ordinary Discourses, or Affairs. But this is not sufficient for
Philosophical Enquiries. Knowledge and Reasoning require
precise, determinate Ideas. And tho' Men will not be so im-
portunately dull, as not to understand what others say, with-
out demanding an Explication of their Terms; nor so trouble-
sonely critical, as to correct others in the Use of the Words,
they receive from them: Yet where Truth and Knowledge are concerned in the Case, I know not what Fault it can be to desire the Explication of Words, whose Sense seems dubious; or why a Man should be ashamed to own his Ignorance, in what Sense another Man uses his Words, since he has no other way of certainly knowing it, but by being informed. This Abuse, of taking Words upon Trust, has no where spread so far, nor with so ill Effects, as amongst Men of Letters. The Multiplication and Obstinacy of Disputes, which has so laid waste the intellectual World, is owing to nothing more, than to this ill Use of Words. For, tho’ it be generally believed, that there is great Diversity of Opinions in the Volumes and variety of Controversies the World is distracted with; yet the most I can find, that the contending, learned Men of different Parties do, in their Arguings one with another, is, that they speak different Languages. For I am apt to imagine, that when any of them, quitting Terms, think upon Things, and know what they think, they think all the same; tho’, perhaps, what they would have, be different.

§. 23. To conclude this Consideration, of the Imperfection and Abuse of Language; the Ends of Language, in our Discourse with others, being chiefly these Three: First, To make known one Man’s Thoughts, or Ideas, to another. Secondly, To do it with as much Ease and Quickness as is possible; and, Thirdly, Thereby to convey the Knowledge of Things. Language is either abused, or deficient, when it fails of any of these Three.

First, Words fail in the first of these Ends, and lay not open one Man’s Ideas to another’s View: First, When Men have Names in their Mouths, without any determined Ideas in their Minds, whereof they are the Signs: Or, Secondly, When they apply the common, received Names of any Language to Ideas, to which the common Use of that Language does not apply them: Or, Thirdly, When they apply them very unsteadily, making them stand now for one, and by and by for another Idea.

§. 24. Secondly,
§. 24. Secondly, Men fail of conveying their Thoughts, with all the Quickness and Ease that may be, when they have complex Ideas, without having distinct Names for them. This is sometimes the Fault of the Language itself, which has not in it a Sound yet applied to such a Signification; and sometimes the Fault of the Man, who has not yet learned the Name for that Idea he would shew another.

§. 25. Thirdly, There is no Knowledge of Things, conveyed by Men's Words, when their Ideas agree not to the Reality of Things. Tho' it be a Defect, that has its Original in our Ideas, which are not so conformable to the Nature of Things, as Attention, Study, and Application might make them; yet it fails not to extend itself to our Words too, when we use them as Signs of real Beings, which yet never had any Reality, or Existence.

§. 26. First, He that hath Words of any Language, without distinct Ideas in his Mind, to which he applies them, does, so far as he uses them in Discourse, only make a Noise, without any Sense, or Signification; and how learned soever he may seem, by the Use of hard Words, or learned Terms, is not much more advanced thereby in Knowledge, than he would be in Learning, who had nothing in his Study, but the bare Titles of Books, without possessing the Contents of them. For all such Words, however put into Discourse, according to the right Construction of Grammatical Rules, or the Harmony of well turned Periods, do yet amount to nothing but bare Sounds, and nothing else.

§. 27. Secondly, He that has complex Ideas, without particular Names for them, would be in no better a Case than a Bookseller, who had, in his Warehouse, Volumes that lay there unbound, and without Titles; which he could therefore make known to others, only by shewing the loose Sheets, and communicate them only by Tale. This Man is hindered in his Discourse, for want of Words to communicate his complex Ideas, which he is therefore
fore forced to make known, by an Enumeration of the simple ones that compose them; and so is fain often to use twenty Words, to express what another Man signifies in one.

§. 28. Thirdly, He that puts not constantly the same Sign for the same Idea, but uses the same Words sometimes in one, and sometimes in another Signification, ought to pass, in the Schools and Conversation, for as fair a Man, as he does in the Market and Exchange, who sells several Things under the same Name.

§. 29. Fourthly, He that applies the Words of any Language, to Ideas different from those, to which the common Use of that Country applies them, however his own Understanding may be filled with Truth and Light, will not, by such Words, be able to convey much of it to others, without defining his Terms. For however the Sounds are such as are familiarly known, and easily enter the Ears of those, who are accustomed to them; yet, standing for other Ideas than those they usually are annexed to, and are wont to excite in the Mind of the Hearers, they cannot make known the Thoughts of him, who thus uses them.

§. 30. Fifthly, He that hath imagined to himself Substances, such as never have been, and filled his Head with Ideas, which have not any Correspondence with the real Nature of Things, to which yet he gives settled and defined Names, may fill his Discourse, and, perhaps, another Man's Head, with the fantastical Imaginations of his own Brain, but will be very far from advancing thereby one jot in real and true Knowledge.

§. 31. He that hath Names without Ideas, wants meaning in his Words, and speaks only empty Sounds. He that hath complex Ideas, without Names for them, wants Liberty and Dispatch in his Expressions, and is necessitated to use Periphrases. He that uses his Words loosely and unsteadily, will either be not minded, or not understood. He that applies his Names to Ideas, different from their common Use, wants Propriety in his Language, and speaks Gibberish. And he, that hath Ideas of Substances, disagreeing with the real Existence of Things, so far wants the Materials of true Knowledge, in his Understanding, and hath instead thereof Chimeras.

§. 32. In
§. 32. In our Notions concerning Substances, we are liable to all the former Inconveniencies: 

V. g. He that uses the Word, Tarantula, without having any Imagination, or Idea of what it stands for, pronounces a good Word: But so long means nothing at all by it.

2. He that, in a new discovered Country, shall see several sorts of Animals and Vegetables, unknown to him before, may have as true Ideas of them, as of a Horse, or a Stag; but can speak of them only by a Description, till he shall either take the Names the Natives call them by, or give them Names himself.

3. He that uses the Word Body, sometimes for pure Extension, and sometimes for Extension and Solidity together, will talk very fallaciously.

4. He that gives the Name Horse to that Idea, which common Usage calls Mule, talks improperly, and will not be understood.

5. He that thinks the Name, Centaur, stands for some real Being, imposes on himself, and mistakes Words for Things.

§. 33. In Modes and Relations, generally, we are liable only to the Four first of these Inconveniencies; (viz.) 1. I may have in my Memory the Names of Modes, as Gratitude, or Charity, and yet not have any precise Ideas, annexed in my Thoughts to those Names.

2. I may have Ideas, and not know the Names that belong to them; v. g. I may have the Idea of a Man's drinking, till his Colour and Humour be altered, till his Tongue trips, and his Eyes look red, and his Feet fail him; and yet not know, that it is to be called Drunkenness. 3. I may have the Ideas of Virtues, or Vices, and Names also, but apply them amiss; v. g. when I apply the Name Frugality to that Idea, which others call and signify by this Sound, Covetousness.

4. I may use any of those Names with Inconstancy.

5. But in Modes and Relations, I cannot have Ideas disagreeing to the Existence of Things: For Modes being complex Ideas, made by the Mind at pleasure; and Relation being but my way of considering, or comparing two Things together, and so also an Idea of my own making; these Ideas can scarce be found to disagree, with any thing existing, since they are not in the Mind, as the Copies of Things regularly.
ly made by Nature, nor as Properties, inseparably flowing from the internal Constitution, or Essence of any Substance; but, as it were, Patterns lodged in my Memory, with Names annexed to them, to denominate Actions and Relations by, as they come to exist. But the Mistake is commonly in my giving a wrong Name to my Conceptions; and so using Words in a different Sense from other People, I am not understood, but am thought to have wrong Ideas of them, when I give wrong Names to them. Only if I put in my Ideas of mixed Modes, or Relations, any inconsistent Ideas together, I fill my Head also with Chimeras; since such Ideas, if well examined, cannot so much as exist in the Mind, much less any real Being be ever denominated from them.

Seventhly, Figurative Speech also an Abuse of Language.

§. 34. Since Wit and Fancy finds easier Entertainment in the World, than dry Truth and real Knowledge, figurative Speeches, and Allusion in Language, will hardly be admitted, as an Imperfection, or Abuse of it. I confess, in Discourses, where we seek rather Pleasure and Delight, than Information and Improvement, such Ornaments, as are borrowed from them, can scarce pass for Faults. But yet, if we would speak of Things as they are, we must allow, that all the Art of Rhetoric, besides Order and Clearness, all the artificial and figurative Application of Words Eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else, but to insinuate wrong Ideas, move the Passions, and thereby mislead the Judgment, and so, indeed, are perfect Cheats: And, therefore, however laudable, or allowable, Oratory may render them, in Harangues and popular Addresses, they are certainly, in all Discourses that pretend to inform, or instruct, wholly to be avoided; and where Truth and Knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great Fault, either of the Language, or Person, that makes use of them. What, and how various they are, will be superfluous here to take notice; the Books of Rhetoric, which abound in the World, will instruct those who want to be informed: Only I cannot but observe, how little the Preservation and Improvement of Truth and Knowledge, is the Care and Concern of Mankind; since the Arts of Fallacy are endowed
dowed and preferred. It is evident how much Men love to deceive, and to be deceived, since Rhetoric, that powerful Instrument of Error and Deceit, has its established Professors, is publicly taught, and has always been had in great Reputation: And, I doubt not, but it will be thought great Boldness, if not Brutality in me, to have said thus much against it. *Elocution*, like the Fair Sex, has too prevailing Beauties in it, to suffer itself ever to be spoken against. And it is in vain to find fault with those Arts of Deceiving, wherein Men find pleasure to be deceived.

**CHAP. XI.**

**Of the Remedies of the foregoing Imperfections and Abuses.**

§. 1. **The** natural and improved Imperfections of Languages, we have seen above at large; and Speech being the great Bond that holds Society together, and the common Conduit, whereby the Improvements of Knowledge are conveyed from one Man, and one Generation, to another, it would well deserve our most serious Thoughts, to consider what Remedies are to be found for these Inconveniences above mentioned.

§. 2. I am not so vain to think, that any one can pretend to attempt the perfect Reforming the Languages of the World, no not so much as of his own Country, without rendering himself ridiculous. To require that Men should use their Words constantly in the same Sense, and for none but determined and uniform Ideas, would be to think, that all Men should have the same Notions, and should talk of nothing, but what they have clear and distinct Ideas of: Which is not to be expected by any one, who hath not Vanity enough to imagine he can prevail with Men to be very knowing, or very silent. And he must be very little skilled in the World, who thinks that a voluble Tongue shall accompany only a good Understanding;
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Understanding; or that Mens talking much, or little, shall hold Proportion only to their Knowledge.

§ 3. But, tho' the Market and Exchange must be left to their own ways of Talking, and Gossipings not to be robbed of their ancient Privilege; tho' the Schools, and Men of Argument would, perhaps, take it amiss to have any Thing offered, to abate the Length, or lessen the Number of their Disputes; yet, methinks, those who pretend seriously to search after, or maintain Truth, should think themselves obliged to study, how they might deliver themselves without Obscurity, Doubtfulness, or Equivocation, to which Mens Words are naturally liable, if care be not taken.

§ 4. For he that shall well consider the Errors and Obscurity, the Mistakes and Confusion, that are spread in the World by an ill Use of Words, will find some Reason to doubt, whether Language, as it has been employed, has contributed more to the Improvement, or Hindrance of Knowledge amongst Mankind. How many are there, that when they would think on Things, fix their Thoughts only on Words, especially when they would apply their Minds to moral Matters? And who then can wonder, if the Result of such Contemplations and Reasonings, about little more than Sounds, whilst the Ideas, they annexed to them, are very confused, or very unsteady, or, perhaps, not at all; who can wonder, I say, that such Thoughts and Reasonings end in nothing but Obscurity and Mistake, without any clear Judgment, or Knowledge?

§ 5. This Inconvenience, in an ill Use of Words, Men suffer in their own private Meditations; but much more manifest are the Disorders, which follow from it, in Conversation, Discourse, and Arguings with others. For Language being the great Conduit, whereby Men convey their Discoveries, Reasonings, and Knowledge, from one to another, he that makes an ill Use of it, tho' he does not corrupt the Fountains of Knowledge, which are in Things themselves; yet he does, as much as in him lies, break, or stop the Pipes,
Pipes, whereby it is distributed to the public Use and Advantage of Mankind. He that uses Words, without any clear and steady Meaning, what does he but lead himself and others into Errors? And he that designedly does it, ought to be looked on as an Enemy to Truth and Knowledge. And yet who can wonder, that all the Sciences and Parts of Knowledge, have been so over-charged with obscure and equivocal Terms, and insignificant and doubtful Expressions, capable to make the most attentive, or quick-sighted, very little, or not at all the more Knowing, or Orthodox; since Subtlety, in those, who make Profession to teach, or defend Truth, hath passed so much for a Virtue. A Virtue, indeed, which consisting for the most part, in nothing but the fallacious and illusory Use of obscure, or deceitful Terms, is only fit to make Men more conceited in their Ignorance, and obstinate in their Errors.

§. 6. Let us look into the Books of Controversy of any kind; there we shall see, that the effect of obscure, unsteady, or equivocal Terms, is nothing but Noise and Wrangling about Sounds, without convincing, or bettering a Man’s Understanding. For if the Idea be not agreed on, betwixt the Speaker and Hearer, for which the Words stand, the Argument is not about Things, but Names. As often as such a Word, whose Signification is not ascertained betwixt them, comes in Use, their Understandings have no other Object, wherein they agree, but barely the Sound; the Things that they think on at that Time, as expressed by that Word, being quite different.

§. 7. Whether a Bat be a Bird, or no, is not a Question; whether a Bat be another Thing than indeed it is, or have other Qualities than indeed it has, for that would be extremely absurd to doubt of: But the Question is, 1. Either between those that acknowledged themselves to have but imperfect Ideas of one, or both of those Sort of Things, for which these Names are supposed to stand; and then it is a real Enquiry, concerning the Nature of a Bird, or a Bat, to make their yet imperfect Ideas of it more complete, by examining, whether all the simple Ideas,
to which, combined together, they both give the Name *Bird*, be all to be found in a *Bat*: But this is a Question only of Enquirers, (not Disputers) who neither affirm, nor deny, but examine. Or, 2. It is a Question between Disputants, whereof the one affirms, and the other denies, that a *Bat* is a *Bird*. And then the Question is barely about the Signification of one, or both these Words; in that they not having both the same complex *Ideas*, to which they give these two Names; one holds, and the other denies, that these two Names may be affirmed one of another. Were they agreed in the Signification of these two Names, it were impossible they should dispute about them: For they would presently and clearly see, (were that adjusted between them) whether all the simple *Ideas*, of the more general Name *Bird*, were found in the complex *Idea* of a *Bat*, or no; and so there could be no doubt, whether a *Bat* were a *Bird*, or no. And here I desire it may be considered, and carefully examined, whether the greatest part of the Disputes in the World are not merely Verbal, and about the Signification of Words; and whether, if the Terms they are made in, were defined, and reduced in their Signification (as they must be, where they signify any thing) to determined Collections of the simple *Ideas* they do, or should stand for, those Disputes would not end of themselves, and immediately vanish. I leave it then to be considered, what the Learning of Disputation is, and how well they are employed for the Advantage of themselves, or others, whose Business is only the vain Ostentation of Sounds; *i.e.* those who spend their Lives in Disputes and Controversies. When I shall see any of those Combatants strip all his Terms of Ambiguity and Obscurity, (which every one may do, in the Words he uses himself) I shall think him a Champion for Knowledge, Truth, and Peace, and not the Slave of Vain-glory, Ambition, or a Party.

§.8. *To remedy the Defects of Speech* before mentioned, to some Degree, and to prevent the Inconveniencies that follow from them, I imagine the Observation of these following Rules may be of use, till some body better able shall judge it worth his while,
while, to think more maturely on this Matter, and oblige the
World with his Thoughts on it.

First, A Man should take care to use no Word
without a Signification, no Name without an
Idea, for which he makes it stand. This Rule
will not seem altogether needless, to any one,
who shall take the Pains to recollect, how often
he has met with such Words, as Instinct, Sympathy, and Anti-
pathy, &c. in the Discourse of others, so made use of, as he
might easily conclude, that those, that used them, had no Ideas
in their Minds, to which they applied them; but spoke them
only as Sounds, which usually served instead of Reasons, on the
like Occasions. Not but that these Words, and the like, have
very proper Significations, in which they may be used; but
there being no natural Connexion between any Words, and any
Ideas, these, and any other, may be learned, by rote, and pro-
nounced, or writ by Men, who have no Ideas in their Minds, to
which they have annexed them, and for which they make them
stand; which is necessary they should, if Men would speak in-
telligibly, even to themselves alone.

§. 9. Secondly, It is not enough a Man uses
his Words as Signs of some Ideas: Those Ideas
he annexes them to, if they be simple, must be
clear and distinct; if complex, must be determi-
nate, i.e. the precise Collection of simple Ideas
settled in the Mind, with that Sound annexed to it, as the Sign
of that precise, determined Collection, and no other. This is ve-
ry necessary in Names of Modes, and especially moral Words;
which having no settled Objects in Nature, from whence their
Ideas are taken, as from their Original, are apt to be very con-
fused. Justice is a Word in every Man's Mouth, but most com-
monly with a very undetermined, loose Signification: Which
will always be so, unless a Man has in his Mind a distinct Com-
prehension of the component Parts, that complex Idea consists
of; and if it be decompounded, must be able to resolve it still
on, till he at last comes to the simple Ideas that make it up: And
unless this be done, a Man makes an ill use of the Word, let it be
be Justice, for Example, or any other. I do not say, a Man needs stand to recollect, and make this Analysis at large, every time the Word Justice comes in his way: But this, at least, is necessary, that he have so examined the Signification of that Name, and settled the Idea of all its Parts in his Mind, that he can do it, when he pleases. If one, who makes his complex Idea of Justice, to be such a Treatment of the Person, or Goods of another, as is according to Law, hath not a clear and distinct Idea what Law is, which makes a part of his complex Idea of Justice, it is plain, his Idea of Justice itself, will be confused and imperfect. This Exactness will, perhaps, be judged very troublesome; and, therefore, most Men will think they may be excused from settling the complex Ideas of mixed Modes so precisely in their Minds. But yet I must say, till this be done, it must not be wondered, that they have a great deal of Obscurity and Confusion in their own Minds, and a great deal of Wrangling in their Discourses with others.

§. 10. In the Names of Substances, for a right Use of them, something more is required than barely determined Ideas. In these the Names must also be conformable to Things, as they exist: But of this I shall have occasion to speak more at large by and by. This Exactness is absolutely necessary, in Enquiries after Philosophical Knowledge, and in Controversies about Truth. And tho' it would be well too, if it extended itself to common Conversation, and the ordinary Affairs of Life; yet I think that is scarce to be expected. Vulgar Notions suit Vulgar Discourses; and both, tho' confused enough, yet serve pretty well the Market, and the Wake. Merchants and Lovers, Cooks and Taylors, have Words, wherewithal to dispatch their ordinary Affairs; and so, I think, might Philosophers and Disputants too, if they had a Mind to understand, and to be clearly understood.

§. 11. Thirdly, It is not enough, that Men have Ideas, determined Ideas, for which they make these Signs stand; but they must also take care to apply their Words, as near as may be, to such Ideas, as common
common Use has annexed them to. For Words, especially of Languages already framed, being no Man's private Possession, but the common Measure of Commerce and Communication, it is not for any one, at Pleasure, to change the Stamp they are current in, nor alter the Ideas they are affixed to; or at least, when there is a Necessity to do so, he is bound to give Notice of it. Mens Intentions in speaking are, or at least should be, to be understood; which cannot be, without frequent Explanations, Demands, and other the like incommodious Interruptions, where Men do not follow common Use. Propriety of Speech, is that which gives our Thoughts Entrance into other Mens Minds, with the greatest Ease and Advantage; and, therefore, deserves some part of our Care and Study, especially in the Names of moral Words. The proper Signification and Use of Terms, is best to be learned from those, who, in their Writings and Discourses, appear to have had the clearest Notions, and applied to them their Terms with the exactest Choice and Fitness. This way of using a Man's Words, according to the Propriety of the Language, tho' it have not always the good Fortune to be understood; yet most commonly leaves the blame of it on him, who is so unskilful in the Language he speaks, as not to understand it, when made use of as it ought to be.

§. 12. Fourthly, But because common Use has not so visibly annexed any Signification to Words, as to make Men know always, certainly, what they precisely stand for; and because Men, in the Improvement of their Knowledge, come to have Ideas different from the vulgar and ordinary received ones, for which they must either make new Words, (which Men seldom venture to do, for fear of being thought guilty of Affectation, or Novelty) or else must use old ones, in a new Signification. Therefore, after the Observation of the foregoing Rules, it is sometimes necessary, for the ascertaining the Signification of Words, to declare their Meaning, where either common Use has left it uncertain and loose, (as it has in most Names of very complex Ideas) or where the Term, being very material in the Discourse,
and that, upon which it chiefly turns, is liable to any Doubtfulness, or Mistake.

§. 13. As the Ideas, Mens Words stand for, are of different Sorts; so the way of making known the Ideas they stand for, when there is occasion, is also different. For tho' defining be thought the proper Way to make known the proper Signification of Words; yet there are some Words that will not be defined, as there are others, whose precise Meaning cannot be made known, but by Definition; and, perhaps, a third, which partake somewhat of both the other, as we shall see in the Names of simple Ideas, Modes and Substances.

§. 14. First, When a Man makes use of the First, In simple Ideas, by synonómous Terms, or shewing.

Name of any simple Idea, which he perceives is not understood, or is in Danger to be mistaken, he is obliged, by the Laws of Ingenuity, and the End of Speech, to declare his Meaning, and make known what Idea he makes it stand for. This, as has been shewn, cannot be done by Definition; and, therefore, when a synonómous Word fails to do it, there is but one of these Ways left. First, Sometimes the Naming the Subject, wherein that simple Idea is to be found, will make its Name be understood, by those who are acquainted with that Subject, and know it by that Name. So, to make a Countryman understand what a Fiülemorte Colour signifies, it may suffice to tell him, it is the Colour of withered Leaves, falling in Autumn. Secondly, But the only sure way of making known the Signification of the Name of any simple Idea, is, by presenting to his Senses that Subject, which may produce it in his Mind, and make him actually have the Idea, that Word stands for.

§. 15. Secondly, Mixed Modes, especially those belonging to Morality, being most of them such Combinations of Ideas, as the Mind puts together of its own Choice; and whereof there are not always standing Patterns to be found existing; the Signification of their Names cannot be made known, as those of simple Ideas, by any shewing; but in Recompence thereof, may be perfect-
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ly and exactly defined. For they being Combinations of several Ideas, that the Mind of Man has arbitrarily put together, without reference to any Archetypes, Men may, if they please, exactly know the Ideas that go to each Composition, and so both use these Words in a certain and undoubted Signification, and perfectly declare, when there is Occasion, what they stand for. This, if well considered, would lay great blame on those, who make not their Discourses, about moral Things, very clear and distinct. For, since the precise Signification of the Names of mixed Modes, or, which is all one, the real Essence of each Species is to be known, they being not of Nature’s, but Man’s making, it is a great Negligence and Perverfence to discourse of moral Things, with Uncertainty and Obscurity; which is more pardonable in treating of natural Substances, where doubtful Terms are hardly to be avoided, for a quite contrary Reason, as we shall see by and by.

§ 16. Upon this Ground it is, that I am bold to think, that Morality is capable of Demonstration, as well as Mathematics: Since the precise, real Essence of the Things, moral Words stand for, may be perfectly known; and so the Congruity, or Incongruity, of the Things themselves, be certainly discovered, in which consists perfect Knowledge. Nor let any one object, That the Names of Substances are often to be made use of in Morality, as well as those of Modes, from which will arise Obscurity. For as to Substances, when concerned in moral Discourses, their diverse Natures are not so much enquired into, as supposed; v.g. when we say, that a Man is subject to Law; we mean nothing by Man, but a corporeal, rational Creature: What the real Essence, or other Qualities, of that Creature are, in this Case, is no way considered. And, therefore, whether a Child, or Changeling, be a Man, in a physical Sense, may, amongst the Naturalists, be as disputable as it will, it concerns not at all the Moral Man, as I may call him, which is this immoveable, unchangeable Idea, a corporeal, rational Being. For were there a Monkey, or any other Creature to be found, that had the Use of Reason, to such a degree, as to be able to understand general Signs, and to de-
duce Consequences about general Ideas, he would, no doubt, be subject to Law, and, in that Sense, be a Man, how much soever he differed in Shape from others of that Name. The Names of Substances, if they be used in them, as they should, can no more disturb Moral, than they do Mathematical Discourses: Where, if the Mathematician speaks of a Cube, or Globe of Gold, or any other Body, he has his clear, settled Idea, which varies not, tho' it may, by Mistake, be applied to a particular Body, to which it belongs not.

§. 17. This I have here mentioned by the bye, to shew of what Consequence it is for Men, in their Names of mixed Modes, and consequently in all their moral Discourses, to define their Words when there is Occasion; since thereby moral Knowledge may be brought to so great Clearness and Certainty. And it must be great Want of Ingenuity, (to say no worse of it) to refuse to do it: Since a Definition is the only way, whereby the precise Meaning of moral Words can be known; and yet a way, whereby the Meaning may be known certainly, and without leaving any room for any Contest about it. And, therefore, the Negligence, or Perverseness of Mankind, cannot be excused, if their Discourses in Morality be not much more clear, than those in Natural Philosophy; since they are about Ideas in the Mind, which are none of them false, or disproportionate; they having no external Beings for the Archetypes, which they are referred to, and must correspond with. It is far easier for Men to frame in their Minds an Idea, which shall be the Standard to which they will give the Name Justice, with which Pattern, so made, all Actions that agree shall pass under that Denomination, than, having seen Arisides, to frame an Idea, that shall in all Things be exactly like him, who is as he is, let Men make what Idea they please of him. For the one, they need but know the Combination of Ideas, that are put together, within their own Minds; for the other, they must enquire into the whole Nature, and abstruse, hidden Constitution, and various Qualities of a Thing existing without them.

§. 18. An-
§. 18. Another Reason, that makes the defining of mixed Modes so necessary, especially of moral Words, is what I mentioned a little before, viz. That it is the only Way whereby the Signification of the most of them can be known with Certainty. For the Ideas, they stand for, being for the most part such, whose component Parts no where exist together, but scattered and mingled with others, it is the Mind alone that collects them, and gives them the Union of one Idea: And it is only by Words, enumerating the several simple Ideas, which the Mind has united, that we can make known to others what their Names stand for; the Assistance of the Senses in this Case not helping us, by the Proposal of sensible Objects, to shew the Ideas, which our Names of this kind stand for, as it does often in the Names of sensible, simple Ideas, and also to some Degree in those of Substances.

§. 19. Thirdly, For the explaining the Signification of the Names of Substances, as they stand for the Ideas we have of the distinct Species, both the forementioned Ways, viz. of shewing and defining, are requisite, in many Cases, to be made use of. For there being ordinarily in each Sort some leading Qualities, to which we suppose the other Ideas, which make up our complex Idea of that Species, annexed; we forwardly give the specific Name to that Thing, wherein that characteristic Mark is found, which we take to be the most distinguishing Idea of that Species. These leading, or characteristic (as I may so call them) Ideas, in the Sorts of Animals, and Vegetables, is (as has been before remarked, Chap. VI. §. 29. and Chap. IX. §. 15.) mostly Figure, and in inanimate Bodies, Colour, and in some both together. Now,

§. 20. These leading, sensible Qualities, are those which make the chief Ingredients of our specific Ideas, and, consequently, the most observable and unvariable part in the Definitions of our specific Names, as attributed to Sorts of Substances, coming under our Knowledge. For tho' the Sound Man, in its own Nature, be as apt to signify a complex Ideas, of the leading Qualities of Substances, are best got by shewing.
plex *Idea*, made up of Animality and Rationality, united in the same Subject, as to signify any other Combination; yet, used as a Mark to stand for a Sort of Creatures we count of our own kind, perhaps the outward Shape is as necessary to be taken into our complex *Idea*, signified by the Word *Man*, as any other we find in it; and, therefore, why *Plato's Animal impleme, hippes, latis unguibus*, should not be a good Definition of the Name *Man*, standing for that Sort of Creatures, will not be easy to shew: For it is the Shape, as the leading Quality, that seems more to determine that Species, than a Faculty of Reasoning, which appears not at first, and in some never. And if this be not allowed to be so, I do not know how they can be excused from Murder, who kill monstrous Births, (as we call them) because of an unordinary Shape, without knowing whether they have a rational Soul, or no; which can be no more discerned in a well-formed, than ill-shap'd Infant, as soon as born. And who is it has informed us, that a rational Soul can inhabit no Tene-ment, unless it has just such a sort of Frontispiece, or can join itself to, and inform no sort of Body, but one that is just of such an outward Structure?

§. 21. Now these leading Qualities are best made known by shewing, and can hardly be made known otherwise. For the Shape of an *Horse*, or *Caffuary*, will be but rudely and imperfectly imprinted on the Mind by Words, the Sight of the Animals doth it a thousand times better: And the *Idea* of the particular Colour of *Gold* is not to be got by any Description of it, but only by the frequent Exercise of the Eyes about it, as is evident in those who are used to this Metal, who will frequently distinguish true from counterfeit, pure from adulterate, by the Sight; where others (who have as good Eyes, but yet, by use, have not got the precise, nice *Idea* of that peculiar Yellow) shall not perceive any Difference. The like may be said of those other simple *Ideas*, peculiar in their kind to any Substance; for which precise *Ideas*, there are no peculiar Names. The particular Ringing Sound there is in *Gold*, distinct from the Sound of other Bodies, has no particular Name annexed to it, no more than the particular Yellow, that belongs to that Metal.

§. 22. But
§ 22. But because many of the simple Ideas, that make up our specific Ideas of Substances, are Powers, which lie not obvious to our Senses in the Things, as they ordinarily appear; therefore, in the Signification of our Names of Substances, some part of the Signification will be better made known by enumerating those simple Ideas, than in shewing the Substance itself. For he that, to the yellow, shining Colour of Gold, got by Sight, shall, from my enumerating them, have the Ideas of great Ductility, Fusibility, Fixedness, and Solubility in Aqua Regia, will have a perfecter Idea of Gold, than he can have by seeing a Piece of Gold, and thereby imprinting in his Mind only its obvious Qualities. But, if the formal Constitution of this shining, heavy, ductile Thing, (from whence all these its Properties flow) lay open to our Senses, as the formal Constitution, or Essence of a Triangle does, the Signification of the Word Gold, might as easily be ascertained, as that of Triangle.

§ 23. Hence we may take Notice, how much the Foundation of all our Knowledge of corporeal Things lies in our Senses. For how Spirits, separate from Bodies, (whose Knowledge, and Ideas of those Things, are certainly much more perfect than our's) know them, we have no Notion, no Idea at all. The whole Extent of our Knowledge, or Imagination, reaches not beyond our own Ideas, limited to our ways of Perception. Tho' yet it be not to be doubted, that Spirits, of a higher Rank than those immersed in Flesh, may have as clear Ideas of the radical Constitution of Substances, as we have of a Triangle, and so perceive how all their Properties and Operations flow from thence; but the manner how they come by that Knowledge exceeds our Conceptions.

§ 24. But tho' Definitions will serve to explain the Names of Substances, as they stand for our Ideas; yet they leave them not without great Imperfection, as they stand for Things. For our Names of Substances being not put barely for our Ideas, but being made use of ultimately to repre-
fent Things, and so are put in their Place, their Signification must agree with the Truth of Things, as well as with Mens Ideas. And, therefore, in Substances, we are not always to rest in the ordinary, complex Idea, commonly received as the Signification of that Word, but must go a little farther, and enquire into the Nature and Properties of the Things themselves, and thereby perfect, as much as we can, our Ideas of their distinct Species; or else learn them from such as are used to that Sort of Things, and are experienced in them. For since it is intended their Names should stand for such Collections of simple Ideas, as do really exist in Things themselves, as well as for the complex Idea, in other Mens Minds, which in their ordinary Acceptation they stand for; therefore, to define their Names right, natural History is to be enquired into; and their Properties are, with Care and Examination, to be found out. For it is not enough, for the avoiding Inconveniences, in Discourses and Arguings about natural Bodies and substantial Things, to have learned from the Propriety of the Language, the common, but confused, or very imperfect Idea, to which each Word is applied, and to keep them to that Idea in our Use of them: But we must, by acquainting ourselves with the History of that Sort of Things, rectify and settle our complex Idea belonging to each specific Name; and in Discourse with others (if we find them mistake us) we ought to tell what the complex Idea is, that we make such a Name stand for. This is the more necessary to be done, by all those who search after Knowledge, and Philosophical Verity, in that Children, being taught Words whilst they have but imperfect Notions of Things, apply them at random, and without much thinking, and seldom frame determined Ideas, to be signified by them. Which Custom, (it being easy, and serving well enough for the ordinary Affairs of Life and Conversation) they are apt to continue, when they are Men: And so begin at the wrong End, learning Words first and perfectly, but make the Notions, to which they apply those Words afterwards, very overtly. By this means it comes to pass, that Men, speaking the proper Language of their Country, i.e. according to Grammar Rules of that Language, do yet speak very improperly of Things themselves; and by
by their arguing one with another, make but small Progress in the Discoveries of useful Truths, and the Knowledge of Things, as they are to be found in themselves, and not in our Imaginations; and it matters not much, for the Improvement of our Knowledge, how they are called.

§ 25. It were therefore to be wished, That Men, versed in Physical Enquiries, and acquainted with the several Sorts of natural Bodies, would set down those simple Ideas, wherein they observe the Individuals of each Sort constantly to agree. This would remedy a great deal of that Confusion, which comes from several Persons, applying the same Name to a Collection of a smaller, or greater Number of sensible Qualities, proportionably as they have been more, or less acquainted with, or accurate in examining the Qualities of any Sort of Things, which come under one Denomination. But a Dictionary of this Sort, containing, as it were, a Natural History, requires too many Hands, as well as too much Time, Cost, Pains, and Sagacity, ever to be hoped for; and till that be done, we must content ourselves with such Definitions of the Names of Substances, as explain the Sense Men use them in. And it would be well, where there is Occasion, if they would afford us so much. This yet is not usually done; but Men talk to one another, and dispute in Words, whose Meaning is not agreed between them, out of a Mistake, that the Signification of common Words are certainly established, and the precise Ideas, they stand for, perfectly known; and that it is a Shame to be ignorant of them. Both which Suppositions are false: No Names of complex Ideas having so settled, determined Significations, that they are constantly used for the same precise Ideas. Nor is it a Shame for a Man not to have a certain Knowledge of any Thing, but by the necessary ways of attaining it; and so it is no Discredit not to know, what precise Idea any Sound stands for, in another Man's Mind, without he declare it to me, by some other way than barely using that Sound, there being no other way, without such a Declaration, certainly to know it. Indeed the Necessity of Communication by Language, brings Men to an Agreement in the Signification
nification of common Words, within some tolerable Latitude, that may serve for ordinary Conversation; and so a Man cannot be supposed wholly ignorant of the Ideas, which are annexed to Words by common Use, in a Language familiar to him. But common Use, being but a very uncertain Rule, which reduces itself at last to the Ideas of particular Men, proves often but a very variable Standard. But tho' such a Dictionary, as I have above mentioned, will require too much Time, Cost, and Pains, to be hoped for in this Age; yet, methinks, it is not unreasonable to propose, that Words, standing for Things, which are known and distinguished by their outward Shapes, should be expressed by little Draughts and Prints made of them. A Vocabulary made after this Fashion would, perhaps, with more Ease, and in less Time, teach the true Signification of many Terms, especially in Languages of remote Countries, or Ages, and settle truer Ideas in Mens Minds of several Things, whereof we read the Names in antient Authors, than all the large and laborious Comments of learned Critics. Naturalists, that treat of Plants and Animals, have found the Benefit of this way: And he that has had occasion to consult them, will have reason to confess, that he has a clearer Idea of Apium, or Ibex, from a little Print of that Herb, or Beast, than he could have from a long Definition of the Names of either of them. And so no doubt, he would have of Strigil and Sistrum, if, instead of a Currycomb and Cymbal, which are the English Names Dictionaries render them by, he could see stamped in the Margin, small Pictures of these Instruments, as they were in use amongst the Ancients. Toga, Tunica, Pallium, are Words easily translated by Gown, Coat, and Cloak; but we have thereby no more true Ideas of the Fashion of those Habits amongst the Romans, than we have of the Faces of the Taylors who made them. Such Things as these, which the Eye distinguishes by their Shapes, would be best let into the Mind by Draughts made of them, and more determine the Signification of such Words, than any other Words set for them, or made use of to define them. But this only by the bye.

§ 26. Fiftily,
§ 26. Fifthly, If Men will not be at the Pains to declare the Meaning of their Words, and Definitions of their Terms are not to be had; yet this is the least that can be expected, that in all Discourses, wherein one Man pretends to instruct, or convince another, he should use the same Word, constantly, in the same Sense: If this were done, (which no body can refuse, without great Disingenuity) many of the Books extant might be spared; many of the Controversies in dispute would be at an end; several of those great Volumes, swollen with ambiguous Words, now used in one Sense, and by and by in another, would shrink into a very narrow Compass; and many of the Philosophers (to mention no other) as well as Poets Works, might be contained in a Nut-shell.

§ 27. But after all, the Provision of Words is so scanty in respect of that infinite variety of Thoughts, that Men, wanting Terms to suit their precise Notions, will, notwithstanding their utmost Caution, be forced often to use the same Word, in somewhat different Senses. And tho' in the Continuation of a Discourse, or the Pursuit of an Argument, there be hardly room to digress into a particular Definition, as often as a Man varies the Signification of any Term; yet the Import of the Discourse will, for the most part, if there be no designed Fallacy, sufficiently lead candid and intelligent Readers into the true Meaning of it; but where that is not sufficient to guide the Reader, there it concerns the Writer to explain his Meaning, and shew in what Sense he there uses that Term.
BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

Of Knowledge in General.

Our Knowledge conversant about our Ideas.

§ 1. Since the Mind, in all its Thoughts and Reasonings, hath no other immediate Object but its own Ideas, which it alone does, or can contemplate; it is evident, that our Knowledge is only conversant about them.

Knowledge is the Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of two Ideas.

§ 2. Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the Perception of the Connexion and Agreement, or Disagreement and Repugnancy of any of our Ideas. In this alone it consists. Where this Perception is, there is Knowledge; and where it is not, there, tho' we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of Knowledge. For, when we know that White is not Black, what do we else but perceive, that these two Ideas do not agree? When we possess ourselves, with the utmost Security of the Demonstration, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones, what do we more but perceive, that Equality to two right ones does necessarily agree to, and is inseparable from the three Angles of a Triangle?*

§ 3. But

* The placing of Certainty, as Mr. Locke does, in the Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of our Ideas, the Bishop of Worcester su[bs]ects may be of dangerous Consequence to that Article of Faith which he has endeavoured to defend; to which Mr. Locke answers, † Since your Lordship Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, p. 83, &c.

† In his 2d Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, p. 83, &c.
§. 3. But to understand a little more distinctly, wherein this Agreement, or Disagreement consists, I think, we may reduce it all to these four Sorts:

1. Identity, or Diversity.
2. Relation.
3. Co-existence, or necessary Connexion.
4. Real Existence.

§. 4. First, As to the first Sort of Agreement, or Disagreement, viz. Identity, or Diversity. It is the first Act of the Mind, when it has any Sentiments, or Ideas at all, to perceive its Ideas; and so far as it perceives them, to know each what it is, and thereby also to perceive their Difference, and that one is not another. This is so Fear, that it may be of dangerous Consequence to it; which, as I humbly conceive, is no Proof that it is any way inconsistent with that Article.

No body, I think, can blame your Lordship, or any one else, for being concerned for any Article of the Christian Faith: But if that Concern (as it may, and, as we know, it has done) makes one apprehend Danger, where no Danger is; are we, therefore, to give up and condemn any Proposition, because any one, tho' of the first Rank, and Magnitude, fears it may be of dangerous Consequence to any Truth of Religion, without shewing that it is so? If such Fears be the Measures, whereby to judge of Truth and Falshood, the affirming that there are Antipodes would be still a Hereby; and the Doctrine of the Motion of the Earth must be rejected, as overthrowing the Truth of the Scripture: For of that dangerous Consequence, it has been apprehended to be, by many learned and pious Divines, out of their great Concern for Religion. And yet, notwithstanding those great Apprehensions of what dangerous Consequence it might be, it is now universally received by Learned Men, as an undoubted Truth; and writ for by some, whose Belief of the Scriptures is not at all questioned; and particularly, very lately, by a Divine of the Church of England, with great Strength of Reason, in his wonderfully ingenious New Theory of the Earth.

The Reason your Lordship gives, of your Fears, that it may be of such dangerous Consequence to that Article of Faith, which your Lordship endeavours to defend, tho' it occurs, in more Places than one, is only this, viz. That it is made use of, by ill Men, to do Mischief; i.e. to oppose that Article of Faith, which your Lordship hath
so absolutely necessary, that without it there could be no Knowledge, no Reasoning, no Imagination, no distinct Thoughts at all. By this the Mind clearly and infallibly perceives each Idea to agree with itself, and to be what it is; and all distinct Ideas to disagree, i.e. the one not to be the other: And this it does without Pains, Labour, or Deduction; but at first view, by its natural Power of Perception and Distinction. And tho' Men of Art have reduced this into those general Rules, What is, is; and It is impossible for the same Thing to be, and not to be; for ready Application in all Cases, wherein there may be occasion to reflect on it; yet it is certain, that the first Exercise of this Faculty, is about particular Ideas. A Man infallibly knows, as soon as ever he has them in his Mind, that the Ideas he calls White and Round, are the very Ideas they are; and that they are not other Ideas; which he calls Red, or Square. Nor can any

hath endeavoured to defend. But, my Lord, if it be a Reason to lay by any thing, as bad, because it is, or may be used to an ill Purpose; I know not what will be innocent enough to be kept. Arms, which were made for our Defence, are sometimes made use of to do Mischief; and yet they are not thought of dangerous Consequence, for all that. No body lays by his Sword and Pistols, or thinks them of such dangerous Consequence, as to be neglected, or thrown away; because Robbers, and the worst of Men, sometimes make use of them, to take away honest Mens Lives, or Goods: And the Reason is, because they were designed, and will serve to preserve them. And who knows, but this may be the present Case? If your Lordship thinks, that placing of Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of Ideas, be to be rejected as false, because you apprehend it may be of dangerous Consequence to that Article of Faith; on the other side, perhaps, others, with me, may think it a Defence against Error, and so (as being of good use) to be received and adhered to.

I would not, my Lord, be hereby thought to set up my own, or any one's Judgment against your Lordship's: But I have said this only to shew, while the Argument lies for, or against the Truth of any Proposition, barely in an Imagination, that it may be of Consequence to the supporting, or overthrowing of any remote Truth; it will be impossible, and way, to determine, of the Truth, or Falsity of that Proposition. For Imagination will be set up against Imagination, and the stronger probably will be against your Lordship; the strongest Imaginations being usually in the weakest Heads. The only way, in this Case, to put it past doubt, is, to shew the Inconsistency
any Maxim, or Proposition in the World, make him know it
clearer, or surer than he did before, and without any such ge-
neral Rule. This then is the first Agreement, or Disagreement,
which the Mind perceives in its Ideas; which it always per-
ceives at first Sight: And if there ever happen any doubt about
it, it will always be found to be about the Names, and not the
Ideas themselves, whose Identity and Diversity will always be
perceived, as soon and as clearly as the Ideas themselves are;
nor can it possibly be otherwise.

5. 5. Secondly, The next Sort of Agreement,
or Disagreement, the Mind perceives in any of
its Ideas, may, I think, be called Relative, and
is nothing, but the Perception of the Relation between any two
Ideas, of what kind soever, whether Substances, Modes, or any
other. For since all different Ideas must eternally be known not
to

constitution of the two Propositions; and then it will be seen, that
one overthrows the other; the true, the false one.

Your Lordship says, indeed, This is a new Method of Certainty.
I will not lay so myself, for fear of deserving a second Reproof from
your Lordship, for being too forward to assume to myself the Honour
of being an Original. But this, I think, gives me occasion, and will
excuse me from being thought impertinent. If I ask your Lordship,
whether there be any other, or older Method of Certainty? And
what it is? For if there be no other, nor older than this, either this
was always the Method of Certainty, and so mine is no new one; or
else the World is obliged to me for this new one, after having been
so long, in the want of it, necessary a thing, as a Method of Certainty.
If there be an older, I am sure your Lordship cannot but know it;
your condemning mine, as new, as well as your thorough Insight in-
to Antiquity, cannot but satisfy every body that you do. And,
therefore, to set the World right, in a thing of that great Concer-
ment, or to overthrow mine, and thereby prevent the dangerous
Consequence there is, in my having unseafonably started it, will not,
I humbly conceive, misbecome your Lordship's Care of that Article
you have endeavoured to defend; nor the good Will you bear to
Truth in general: For I will be answerable for myself, that I shall;
and I think, I may be, for all others, that they all will give off the
placing of Certainty, in the Perception of the Agreement, or Dis-
agreement of Ideas, if your Lordship will be pleased to shew, that
it lies in any thing else.

But truly, not to ascribe to myself an Invention of what has been
as old, as Knowledge is in the World, I must own, I am not guilty
of
to be the same, and so be universally and constantly denied one of another, there could be no room for any positive Knowledge at all, if we could not perceive any Relation between our Ideas, and find out the Agreement, or Disagreement, they have one with another, in several ways the Mind takes of comparing them.

§. 6. Thirdly, The third Sort of Agreement, Co-existence. of what your Lordship is pleased to call starting new Methods of Certainty. Knowledge, ever since there has been any in the World, has conslisted in one particular Action of the Mind; and so, I conceive, will continue to do, to the End of it: And to start new Methods of Knowledge, or Certainty, (for they are to me the same thing) t. e. to find out and propose new Methods of attaining Knowledge, either with more Ease and Quickness, or in Things yet unknown, is what, I think, no body could blame: But this is not that, which your Lordship here means, by new Methods of Certainty. Your Lordship, I think, means by it, the placing of Certainty in something, wherein either it does not consist, or else, where it was not placed before now; if this be to be called a new Method of Certainty: As to the latter of thefe, I shall know, whether I am guilty, or no, when your Lordship will do me the Favour to tell me, wherein it was placed before; which your Lordship knows, I professed myself ignorant of, when I writ my Book, and so am still. But if starting of new Methods of Certainty, be the placing of Certainty in something, wherein it does not consist; whether I have done that, or no, I must appeal to the Experience of Mankind.

There are several Actions of Mens Minds, that they are conscious to themselves of performing; as willing, believing, knowing, &c. which they have so particular a Sense of, that they can distinguish them one from another; or else they could not say, when they willéd, when they believed, and when they knew any Thing. But thefe Actions were different enough, from one another, not to be confounded by those, who spoke of them; yet no body, that I had met
Chap. I. Knowledge.

ness, Weight, Fusibility, Malleableness, and Solubility in *Aqua Regia*, which make our complex *Idea*, signified by the Word *Gold*.

§ 7. Fourthly, The fourth and last Sort is, that of *actual real Existence*, agreeing to any *real Existence*, *Idea*. Within these four Sorts of Agreement, or Disagreement, is, I suppose, contained all the Knowledge we have, or are capable of: For all the Enquiries, that we can make concerning any of our *Ideas*, all that we know, or can affirm concerning any of them, is, That it is, or is not, the same with some other; that it does, or does not, always co-exist with some other *Idea* in the same Subject; that it has this, or that Relation to some other *Idea*; or that it has a real Existence without the Mind. Thus *Blue is not Yellow*, is of Identity: *Two Triangles upon equal Bases*, between two Parallels are equal, is of Relation: *Iron is susceptible of magnetical Impressions*, met with, had, in their Writings, particularly set down, wherein the *Act of Knowing* precisely consisted.

To this Reflection, upon the Actions of my own Mind, the Subject of my Essay concerning Human Understanding naturally led me; wherein, if I have done any thing new, it has been to describe to others, more particularly than had been done before, what it is their Minds do, when they perform that Action, which they call *Knowing*; and if, upon Examination, they observe, I have given a true Account of that Action of their Minds, in all the Parts of it; I suppose it will be in vain to dispute, against what they find, and feel, in themselves: And if I have not told them right, and exactly what they find and feel in themselves, when their Minds perform the *Act* of knowing, what I have said, will be all in vain; Men will not be persuaded against their Senses. Knowledge is an internal Perception of their Minds; and if, when they reflect on it, they find it is not, what I have said it is, my groundless Conceit will not be hearkened to, but be exploded by every body, and die of itself; and no body need to be at any Pains to drive it out of the World: So impossible is it to find out, or start new *Methods of Certainty*, or to have them received, if any one places it in any thing, but in that, wherein it really consists: Much less can any one be in danger to be misled into Error, by any such new, and, to every one visibly, senseless Project. Can it be supposed, that any one could start a new *Method of Seeing*, and persuade Men thereby, that they do not see what they do see? Is it to be feared, That any one can cast such a Mift over their Eyes, that they should not know, when they see, and so be led out of their way by it?
Knowledge.  

Book IV.

ours, is of Co-existence: God is, is of real Existence. Tho' I-
dentity and Co-existence are truly nothing but Relations, yet
they are so peculiar ways of Agreement, or Disagreement of
our Ideas, that they deserve well to be considered as distinct
Heads, and not under Relation in general; since they are so
different Grounds of Affirmation and Negation, as will easily
appear to any one, who will but reflect on what is said in seve-
ral Places of this Essay. I should now proceed to examine the
several Degrees of our Knowledge, but that it is necessary first
to consider the different Acceptations of the Word Knowledge.

§ 8. There are several ways, wherein the

actual, or ha-
bital.

Mind is possessed of Truth, each of which is
called Knowledge.

1. There is actual Knowledge, which is the present View the
Mind has of the Agreement, or Disagreement of any of its Ideas,
or of the Relation they have one to another.

Knowledge, I find, in myself, and, I conceive, in others, con-
sists in the Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of the
immediate Objects of the Mind in Thinking, which I call Ideas: But
whether it does so, in others, or no, must be determined by their
own Experience, reflecting upon the Action of their Mind, in know-
ing; for that I cannot alter, nor, I think, they themselves: But,
whether they will call those immediate Objects of their Minds, in
thinking, Ideas, or no, is perfectly in their own Choice. If they
dislike that Name, they may call them Notions, or Conceptions, or
how they please; it matters not, if they use them so, as to avoid Ob-
scenity and Confusion. If they are constantly used in the name and
a known Sense, every one has the Liberty to please himself in his
Terms; there lies neither Truth, nor Error, nor Science, in that;
ths' those, that take them for Things, and not for what they are,
bare arbitrary Signs of our Ideas, make a great deal ado often a-
bout them, as if some great Matter lay in the use of this, or that
Sound. All that I know, or can imagine, of Difference about them,
is, that those Words are always best, whose Significations are best
known, in the Sense they are used; and so are least apt to breed Con-
fusion.

My Lord, your Lordship has been pleased to find fault with my
use of the new Term, Ideas, without telling me a better Name, for
the immediate Objects of the Mind, in thinking. Your Lordship has
also been pleased to find fault with my Definition of Knowledge,
without doing me the Favour to give me a better: For it is only about
my Definition of Knowledge, that all this Stir, concerning Certain-
ty, is made. For with me, to know and to be certain, is the same
Thing:
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2. A Man is said to know any Proposition, which having been once laid before his Thoughts, he evidently perceived the Agreement, or Disagreement of the Ideas, whereof it consists; and so lodged it in his Memory, that, whenever that Proposition comes again to be reflected on, he, without doubt, or hesitation, embraces the right Side, assents to, and is certain of the Truth of it. This, I think, one may call habitual Knowledge: And thus a Man may be said to know all those Truths, which are lodged in his Memory, by a foregoing clear and full Perception, whereof the Mind is assured, past doubt, as often as it has Occasion to reflect on them. For our finite Understandings being able to think clearly and distinctly but on one Thing at once, if Men had no Knowledge of any more than what they actually thought on, they would all be very ignorant; and he that knew most, would know but one Truth, that being all he was able to think on at one time.

§. 9. Or

Thing; what I know, that I am certain of: And what I am certain of, that I know. What reaches to Knowledge, I think, may be called Certainty; and what comes short of Certainty, I think, cannot be called Knowledge; as your Lordship could not but observe, in Section 18th of Chap. 4. of my 4th Book, which you have quoted.

My Definition of Knowledge, in the Beginning of the 4th Book of my Essay, stands thus: Knowledge seems to me to be nothing but the Perception of the Connexion, and Agreement, or Disagreement, and Repugnancy of any of our Ideas: This Definition your Lordship dislikes, and apprehends it may be of dangerous Consequence, as to that Article of Christian Faith, which your Lordship has endeavoured to defend. For this, there is a very easy Remedy: It is but for your Lordship to set aside this Definition of Knowledge, by giving us a better, and this Danger is over. But your Lordship chuses rather to have a Controversy with my Book, for having it in it, and to put me upon the Defence of it; for which I must acknowledge myself obliged to your Lordship, for affording me so much of your Time, and for allowing me the Honour of conversing so much with one, so far above me in all respects.

Your Lordship favs. It may be of dangerous Consequence to that Article of Christian Faith, which you have endeavoured to defend. Tho' the Laws of Disputing allow bare Denial as a sufficient Answer to Sayings, without any Offer of a Proof; yet, my Lord, to shew how willing I am to give your Lordship all Satisfaction, in what you apprehend may be of dangerous Consequence, in my Book, as to that Article, I shall not stand still sullenly, and put your Lordship upon the Difficulty of shewing, wherein that Danger lies: But shall, on the other side, endeavour to shew your Lordship, that That Definition of
Habitual Knowledge, twofold. §. 9. Of habitual Knowledge, there are also, vulgarly speaking, two Degrees:

First, The one is of such Truths laid up in the Memory, as whenever they occur to the Mind, it actually perceives the Relation is between those Ideas. And this is in all those Truths, whereof we have an intuitive Knowledge; where the Ideas themselves, by an immediate View, discover their Agreement, or Disagreement one with another.

Secondly, The other is of such Truths, whereof the Mind having been convinced, it retains the Memory of the Conviction, without the Proofs. Thus a Man that remembers certainly, that he once perceived the Demonstration, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones, is certain that he knows it, because he cannot doubt of the Truth of it. In his Adherence to a Truth, where the Demonstration, by which it was at

of mine, whether true, or false, right, or wrong, can be of no dangerous Consequence to that Article of Faith. The Reason, which I shall offer for it, is this; because it can be of no Consequence to it at all.

That which your Lordship is afraid it may be dangerous to, is an Article of Faith: That, which your Lordship labours, and is concerned for, is the Certainty of Faith. Now, my Lord, I humbly conceive the Certainty of Faith, if your Lordship thinks fit to call it so, has nothing to do with the Certainty of Knowledge: And to talk of the Certainty of Faith, seems all one to me, as to talk of the Knowledge of Believing, a way of speaking not easy to me to understand.

Place Knowledge in what you will, start what new Methods of Certainty you please, that are apt to leave Men Minds more doubtful than before; place Certainty on such Grounds, as will leave little, or no Knowledge in the World: (For these are the Arguments your Lordship uses, against my Definition of Knowledge) this makes not at all, nor in the least concerns the Assurance of Faith; that is quite distinct from it, neither stands, nor falls with Knowledge.

Faith stands by itself, and upon Grounds of its own; nor can be removed from them, and placed on those of Knowledge. Their Grounds are so far from being the same, or having any thing common, that when it is brought to Certainty, Faith is destroyed; it is Knowledge then, and Faith no longer.

With what Assurance ever of Believing, I assent to any Article of Faith, so that I stedfastly venture my All upon it, it is still but Believing. Bring it to Certainty, and it ceases to be Faith. I believe that
at first known, is forgot, tho' a Man may be thought rather to believe his Memory, than really to know, and this way of entertaining a Truth seemed formerly to me like something between Opinion and Knowledge; a sort of Assurance, which exceeds bare Belief, for that relies on the Testimony of another: Yet upon a due Examination, I find it comes not short of perfect Certainty, and is in effect true Knowledge. That, which is apt to mislead our first Thoughts into a Mistake in this Matter, is, that the Agreement, or Disagreement of the Ideas in this Case is not perceived, as it was at first, by an actual View of all the intermediate Ideas, whereby the Agreement, or Disagreement of those in the Proposition was at first perceived; but by other intermediate Ideas, that shew the Agreement, or Disagreement of the Ideas, contained in the Proposition, whose Certainty we remember. For Example, in this Proposition, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones, one who has seen and clearly perceived the Demonstration of this Truth, knows that Jesus Christ was crucified, dead, and buried, rose again the third Day from the Dead, and ascended into Heaven: Let now such Methods of Knowledge, or Certainty, be stated, as leave Men's Minds more doubtful than before: Let the Grounds of Knowledge be resolv'd into what any one pleases, it touches not my Faith: The Foundation of that stands as sure as before, and cannot be at all shaken by it: And one may as well say, That any thing, that weakens the Sight, or calls a Mist before the Eyes, endangers the Hearing; as that any thing, which alters the Nature of Knowledge (if that could be done) should be of dangerous Consequence to an Article of Faith.

Whether then I am, or am not mistaken, in the placing Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of Ideas; whether this Account of Knowledge be true, or false, enlarges, or straitens, the Bounds of it, more than it should, Faith still stands upon its own Basis, which is not at all altered by it; and every Article of that has just the same unmoved Foundation, and the very same Credibility that it had before. So that, my Lord, whatever I have said about Certainty, and how much sooner I may be out in it; if I am mistaken, your Lordship has no reason to apprehend any Danger to any Article of Faith, from thence; every one of them stands upon the same bottom it did before, out of the Reach of what belongs to Knowledge and Certainty. And thus much, of my Way of Certainty by Ideas; which, I hope, will satisfy your Lordship, how far it is from being dangerous to any Article of the Christian Faith whatsoever.
knows it to be true, when that Demonstration is gone out of his Mind; so that at present it is not actually in view, and possibly cannot be recollected; but he knows it in a different way from what he did before. The Agreement of the two Ideas, joined in that Proposition, is perceived, but it is by the Intervention of other Ideas than those which at first produced that Perception. He remembers, i.e. he knows (for Remembrance is but the reviving of some past Knowledge) that he was once certain of the Truth of this Proposition, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones. The Immutability of the same Relations between the same immutable Things, is now the Idea that shews him, that if the three Angles of a Triangle were once equal to two right ones, they will always be equal to two right ones. And hence he comes to be certain, that what was once true in the case, is always true; what Ideas once agreed, will always agree; and consequently what he once knew to be true, he will always know to be true, as long as he can remember that he once knew it. Upon this Ground it is, that particular Demonstrations in Mathematics afford general Knowledge. If then the Perception, that the same Ideas will eternally have the same Habitudes and Relations, be not a sufficient Ground of Knowledge, there could be no Knowledge of general Propositions in Mathematics; for no Mathematical Demonstration would be any other than particular: And when a Man had demonstrated any Proposition, concerning one Triangle, or Circle, his Knowledge would not reach beyond that particular Diagram. If he would extend it farther, he must renew his Demonstration in another Inflance, before he could know it to be true in another like Triangle, and so on: By which means one could never come to the Knowledge of any general Propositions. No body, I think, can deny that Mr. Newton certainly knows any Proposition, that he now at any time reads in his Book, to be true; tho' he has not in actual View that admirable Chain of intermediate Ideas, whereby he at first discovered it to be true. Such a Memory as that, able to retain such a Train of Particulars, may be well thought beyond the reach of Human Faculties; when the very Discovery, Perception, and laying
laying together that wonderful Connexion of Ideas, is found to
surpass most Readers Comprehension. But yet it is evident, the
Author himself knows the Proposition to be true, remembering
he once saw the Connexion of those Ideas, as certainly as he
knows such a Man wounded another, remembering that he saw
him run him through. But because the Memory is not always
so clear as actual Perception, and does in all Men, more, or less
decay, in length of Time, this amongst other Differences is one,
which shews, that demonstrative Knowledge is much more im-
perfect than intuitive, as we shall see in the following Chapter.

CHAP. II.

Of the Degrees of our Knowledge.

§. I. All our Knowledge consisting, as I
have said, in the View the Mind
has of its own Ideas, which is the
utmost Light and greatest Certainty we, with our Faculties, and
in our way of Knowledge, are capable of; it may not be amiss,
to consider a little the Degrees of its Evidence. The different
Clearness of our Knowledge seems to me to lie in the different
Way of Perception the Mind has, of the Agreement, or Dis-
agreement of any of its Ideas. For, if we will reflect on our
own Ways of Thinking, we shall find, that sometimes the Mind
perceives the Agreement, or Disagreement of two Ideas, imme-
diately by themselves, without the Intervention of any other:
And this, I think, we may call intuitive Knowledge. For in this,
the Mind is at no Pains of proving, or examining, but perceives
the Truth, as the Eye doth Light, only by being directed toward
it. Thus the Mind perceives, that White is not Black, that a
Circle is not a Triangle, that Three are more than Two, and equal
to One and Two. Such kind of Truths the Mind perceives, at the
first sight of the Ideas together, by bare Intuition, without the
Intervention of any other Idea; and this kind of Knowledge is
the clearest and most certain, that human Frailty is capable of.
This part of Knowledge is irresistible, and, like bright Sun-shine, forces itself immediately to be perceived, as soon as ever the Mind turns its View that Way; and leaves no room for Hesitation, Doubt, or Examination, but the Mind is presently filled with the clear Light of it. It is on this Intuition, that depends all the Certainty and Evidence of all our Knowledge; which Certainty every one finds to be so great, that he cannot imagine, and, therefore, not require a greater: For a Man cannot conceive himself capable of a greater Certainty, than to know that any Idea in his Mind is such as he perceives it to be; and that two Ideas, wherein he perceives a Difference, are different, and not precisely the same. He that demands a greater Certainty than this, demands he knows not what, and shews only that he has a mind to be a Sceptic, without being able to be so. Certainty depends so wholly on this Intuition, that in the next Degree of Knowledge, which I call Demonstrative, this Intuition is necessary in all the Connexions of the intermediate Ideas, without which we cannot attain Knowledge and Certainty.

§.2. The next Degree of Knowledge is, where Demonstrative. the Mind perceives the Agreement, or Disagreement of any Ideas, but not immediately. Tho’ wherever the Mind perceives the Agreement, or Disagreement of any of its Ideas, there be certain Knowledge; yet it does not always happen, that the Mind sees that Agreement, or Disagreement, which there is between them, even where it is discoverable; and in that Case remains in Ignorance, and at most gets no farther than a probable Conjecture. The Reason, why the Mind cannot always perceive prefently the Agreement, or Disagreement of two Ideas, is, because those Ideas, concerning whose Agreement, or Disagreement, the Enquiry is made, cannot by the Mind be so put together, as to shew it. In this case, then, when the Mind cannot so bring its Ideas together, as by their immediate Comparison, and as it were Juxta-position, or Application one to another, to perceive their Agreement, or Disagreement, it is fain, by the Intervention of other Ideas, (one, or more, as it happens) to discover the Agreement, or Disagreement, which it searches; and this is that which we call Reasoning.
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Reasoning. Thus the Mind being willing to know the Agreement, or Disagreement in bigness, between the three Angles of a Triangle, and two right ones, cannot, by an immediate View and comparing them, do it: Because the three Angles of a Triangle cannot be brought at once, and be compared with any one, or two Angles; and so of this the Mind has no immediate, no intuitive Knowledge. In this Case the Mind is fain to find out some other Angles, to which the three Angles of a Triangle have an Equality; and finding those equal to two right ones, comes to know their Equality to two right ones.

§ 3. Those intervening Ideas, which serve to shew the Agreement of any two others, are called Proofs; and where the Agreement, or Disagreement is by this means plainly and clearly perceived, it is called Demonstration, it being shown to the Understanding, and the Mind made to see that it is so. A Quickness in the Mind to find out these intermediate Ideas, (that shall discover the Agreement, or Disagreement of any other) and to apply them right, is, I suppose, that which is called Sagacity.

§ 4. This Knowledge by intervening Proofs, tho' it be certain, yet the Evidence of it is not altogether so clear and bright, nor the Assent so ready, as in intuitive Knowledge. For tho', in Demonstration, the Mind does at last perceive the Agreement, or Disagreement of the Ideas it considers; yet it is not without Pains and Attention: There must be more than one transient View to find it. A steady Application and Pursuit is required to this Discovery: And there must be a Progression by Steps and Degrees, before the Mind can in this Way arrive at Certainty, and come to perceive the Agreement, or Repugnancy between two Ideas that need Proofs, and the Use of Reason to shew it.

§ 5. Another Difference between intuitive and demonstrative Knowledge, is, that tho' in the latter all Doubt be removed, when, by the Intervention of the intermediate Ideas, the Agreement, or Disagreement is perceived; yet, before the Demonstration, there was a Doubt, which, in intuitive Knowledge, cannot happen to the Mind,
Mind, that has its Faculty of Perception left to a Degree capable of distinct Ideas, no more than it can be a Doubt to the Eye, (that can distinctly see White and Black) whether this Ink and this Paper be all of a Colour. If there be Sight in the Eyes, it will, at first Glimpse, without Hesitation, perceive the Words printed on this Paper, different from the Colour of the Paper: And so, if the Mind have the Faculty of distinct Perceptions, it will perceive the Agreement, or Disagreement of those Ideas that produce intuitive Knowledge. If the Eyes have lost the Faculty of Seeing, or the Mind of Perceiving, we in vain enquire after the Quickness of Sight in one, or Clearness of Perception in the other.

§. 6. It is true, the Perception produced by Not so clear. Demonstration is also very clear, yet it is often with a great Abatement of that evident Lusture and full Assurance, that always accompany that which I call intuitive, like a Face reflected by several Mirrors one to another, where as long as it retains the Similitude and Agreement with the Object, it produces a Knowledge; but it is still in every successive Reflexion, with a lessening of that perfect Clearness and Distinctness, which is in the first, till at last, after many Removes, it has a great Mixture of Dimness, and is not at first Sight so knowable, especially to weak Eyes. Thus it is, with Knowledge, made out by a long Train of Proofs.

§. 7. Now, in every Step Reason makes, in de- Each Step must monstrative Knowledge, there is an intuitive have intuitive Evidence Knowledge of that Agreement, or Disagreement, it seeks with the next intermediate Idea, which it uses as a Proof: For, if it were not so, that yet would need a Proof: Since, without the Perception of such Agreement, or Disagreement, there is no Knowledge produced. If it be perceived by itself, it is intuitive Knowledge: If it cannot be perceived by itself, there is need of some intervening Idea, as a common Measure, to shew their Agreement, or Disagreement. By which it is plain, that every Step in Reasoning, that produces Knowledge, has intuitive Certainty; which, when the Mind perceives, there is no more required, but to remember it,
it, to make the Agreement, or Disagreement of the Ideas, concerning which we enquire, visible and certain. So that to make any thing a Demonstration, it is necessary to perceive the immediate Agreement of the intervening Ideas, whereby the Agreement, or Disagreement of the two Ideas under Examination, (whereof the one is always the first, and the other the last in the the Account) is found. This intuitive Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of the intermediate Ideas, in each Step and Progression of the Demonstration, must also be carried exactly in the Mind, and a Man must be sure that no Part is left out: Which, because in long Deductions, and the Use of many Proofs, the Memory does not always so readily and exactly retain; therefore it comes to pass, that this is more imperfect than intuitive Knowledge, and Men embrace often Fallacy for Demonstrations.

§. 8. The Necessity of this intuitive Knowledge, in each Step of scientifical, or demonstrative Reasoning, gave occasion, I imagine, to that mistaken Axiom, That all Reasoning was ex praecognitis, & praecessis; which, how far it is mistaken, I shall have occasion to shew more at large, when I come to consider Propositions, and particularly those Propositions which are called Maxims; and to shew that it is by a Mistake, that they are supposed to be the Foundations of all our Knowledge and Reasonings.

§. 9. It has been generally taken for granted, that Mathematics alone are capable of demonstrative Certainty: But to have such an Agreement, or Disagreement, as may intuitively be perceived, being, as I imagine, not the Privilege of the Ideas of Number, Extension, and Figure alone; it may, possibly, be the want of due Method and Application in us, and not of sufficient Evidence in Things, that Demonstration has been thought to have so little to do in other Parts of Knowledge, and been scarce so much as aimed at, by any but Mathematicians. For, whatever Ideas we have, wherein the Mind can perceive the immediate Agreement, or Disagreement that is between them, there the Mind is

Hence the Mistake, ex praecognitis, & praecessis.

Demonstration not limited to Quantity.
is capable of intuitive Knowledge; and where it can perceive the Agreement, or Disagreement of any two Ideas, by an intuitive Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement they have with any intermediate Ideas, there the Mind is capable of Demonstration, which is not limited to Ideas of Extension, Figure, Number, and their Modes.

§. 10. The Reason why it has been generally supposed to be only in those, I imagine has been, not only the general usefulness of those Sciences; but because, in comparing their Equality, or Excess, the Modes of Numbers have every the least Difference very clear and perceptible: And tho', in Extension, every the least Excess is not so perceptible, yet the Mind has found out Ways to examine and discover demonstratively the just Equality of two Angles, or Extensions, or Figures; and both these, i. e. Numbers and Figures, can be set down by visible, and lasting Marks, wherein the Ideas under Consideration are perfectly determined; which, for the most part, they are not, where they are marked only by Names and Words.

§. 11. But in other simple Ideas, whose Modes and Differences are made, and counted by Degrees, and not Quantity, we have not so nice and accurate a Distinction of their Differences, as to perceive, or find Ways to measure their just Equality, or the least Differences. For those other simple Ideas, being Appearances, or Sensations, produced in us by the Size, Figure, Number, and Motion of minute Corpuscles, singly insensible, their different Degrees also depend upon the Variation of some, or all of those Causes; which, since it cannot be observed by us in Particles of Matter, whereof each is too subtle to be perceived, it is impossible for us to have any exact Measures of the different Degrees of these simple Ideas. For, supposing the Sensation, or Idea, we name Whiteness, be produced in us by a certain Number of Globules, which, having a Verticity about their own Centers, strike upon the Retina of the Eye, with a certain Degree of Rotation, as well as progressive Swiftness; it will hence easily follow, that the more the superficial Parts of any Body are so ordered, as to reflect the greater Number of Globules
Degrees of Knowledge.

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bules of Light, and to give them that proper Rotation, which is fit to produce this Sensation of White in us, the more White will that Body appear, that, from an equal Space, sends to the Retina the greater Number of such Corpuscles, with that peculiar sort of Motion. I do not say, that the Nature of Light consists in very small, round Globules, nor of Whiteness, in such a Texture of Parts, as gives a certain Rotation to these Globules, when it reflects them; for I am not now treating Physically of Light, or Colours: But this, I think, I may say, That I cannot (and I would be glad any one would make intelligible that he did) conceive, how Bodies without us can any ways affect our Senses, but by the immediate Contact of the sensible Bodies themselves, as in Tasting and Feeling, or the Impulse of some insensible Particles coming from them, as in Seeing, Hearing, and Smelling; by the different Impulse of which Parts, caused by their different Size, Figure, and Motion, the Variety of Sensations is produced in us.

§. 12. Whether then they be Globules, or no; or whether they have a Verticity about their own Centers, that produce the Idea of Whiteness in us, this is certain, that the more Particles of Light are reflected from a Body, fitted to give them that peculiar Motion, which produces the Sensation of Whiteness in us; and, possibly too, the quicker that peculiar Motion is, the whiter does the Body appear, from which the greater Number are reflected, as is evident in the same Piece of Paper put in the Sunbeams, in the Shade, and in a dark Hole; in each of which, it will produce in us the Idea of Whiteness in far different Degrees.

§. 13. Not knowing, therefore, what Number of Particles, nor what Motion of them is fit to produce any precise Degree of Whiteness, we cannot demonstrate the certain Equality of any two Degrees of Whiteness, because we have no certain Standard to measure them by, nor means to distinguish every the least real Difference, the only Help we have being from our Senses, which in this Point fail us. But where the Difference is so great, as to produce in the Mind clearly distinct Ideas, whose Differences can be perfectly retained, there these Ideas of Colours, as we see in different Kinds, as Blue and Red, are as capable of Demonstration
tion as Ideas of Number and Extension. What I have here said of Whiteness and Colours, I think, holds true in all secondary Qualities, and their Modes.

§ 14. These two, (viz.) Intuition and Demonstration, are the Degrees of our Knowledge; whatever comes short of one of these, with what Assurance soever embraced, is but Faith, or Opinion, but not Knowledge, at least in all general Truths. There is, indeed, another Perception of the Mind, employed about the particular Existence of finite Beings, without us; which, going beyond bare Probability, and yet not reaching perfectly to either of the foregoing Degrees of Certainty, passes under the Name of Knowledge. There can be nothing more certain, than that the Idea, we receive from an external Object, is in our Minds; this is intuitive Knowledge. But whether there be any thing more than barely that Idea in our Minds, whether we can thence certainly infer the Existence of any thing without us, which corresponds to that Idea, is that, whereof some Men think there may be a Question made; because Men may have such Ideas in their Minds, when no such thing exists, no such Object affects their Senses. But yet here, I think, we are provided with an Evidence, that puts us past doubting: For I ask any one, whether he be not invincibly conscious to himself of a different Perception, when he looks on the Sun by Day, and thinks on it by Night; when he actually tastes Wormwood, or smells a Rose, or only thinks on that Savour, or Odour? We as plainly find the Difference there is between any Idea, revived in our Minds by our own Memory, and actually coming into our Minds by our Senses, as we do between any two distinct Ideas. If any one say, a Dream may do the same Thing, and all these Ideas may be produced in us without any external Objects, he may please to dream that I make him this Answer: 1. That it is no great matter, whether I remove this Scruple, or no: Where all is but Dream, Reasoning, and Arguments, are of no use, Truth and Knowledge nothing. 2. That I believe he will allow a very manifest Difference between Dreaming of being in the Fire, and being actually in it. But yet, if he be re-
solved to appear so sceptical, as to maintain, that what I call being actually in the Fire is nothing but a Dream; and that we cannot thereby certainly know, that any such Thing as Fire actually exists without us: I answer, That we certainly finding that Pleasure, or Pain, follows upon the Application of certain Objects to us, whose Existence we perceive, or dream that we perceive, by our Senses: This Certainty is as great as our Happiness, or Misery, beyond which we have no Concernment to know, or to be. So that, I think, we may add, to the two former Sorts of Knowledge, this also, of the Existence of particular, external Objects, by that Perception and Consciousness we have of the actual Entrance of Ideas from them, and allow these three Degrees of Knowledge, viz. Intuitive, Demonstrative, and Sensitive: In each of which, there are different Degrees and Ways of Evidence and Certainty.

§. 15. But, since our Knowledge is founded on, and employed about our Ideas only, will it not follow from thence, that it is conformable to our Ideas; and that, where our Ideas are clear and distinct, or obscure and confused, our Knowledge will be so too? To which I answer, No: For our Knowledge consisting in the Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement, of any two Ideas, its Clearness, or Obscurity, consists in the Clearness, or Obscurity of that Perception, and not in the Clearness, or Obscurity of the Ideas themselves; viz. a Man, that has as clear Ideas of the Angles of a Triangle, and of Equality to two right ones, as any Mathematician in the World, may yet have but a very obscure Perception of their Agreement, and so have but a very obscure Knowledge of it. But Ideas, which, by reason of their Obscurity, or otherwise, are confused, cannot produce any clear, or distinct Knowledge; because, as far as any Ideas are confused, so far the Mind cannot perceive clearly, whether they agree, or disagree. Or to express the same Thing in a Way less apt to be misunderstood: He that hath not determined Ideas to the Words he uses, cannot make Propositions of them, of whose Truth he can be certain.
§ 1. Knowledge, as has been said, lying in the Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of any of our Ideas, it follows from hence, That,

First, We can have Knowledge no farther than we have Ideas.

Secondly, No farther than we can perceive their Agreement, or Disagreement.

Thirdly, Intuitive Knowledge extends itself not to all the Relations of all our Ideas.

§ 2. Secondly, That we can have no Knowledge farther than we can have Perception of that Agreement, or Disagreement. Which Perception being, 1. Either by Intuition, or the immediate comparing any two Ideas: Or, 2. By Reason, examining the Agreement, or Disagreement of two Ideas, by the Intervention of some others: Or, 3. By Sensation, perceiving the Existence of particular Things: Hence it also follows,

§ 3. Thirdly, That we cannot have an Intuitive Knowledge, that shall extend itself to all our Ideas, and all that we would know about them; because we cannot examine and perceive all the Relations they have one to another, by Juxta-position, or an immediate Comparison one with another. Thus having the Ideas of an obtuse, and an acute angled Triangle, both drawn from equal Bases, and between Parallels, I can, by intuitive Knowledge, perceive the one not to be the other, but cannot that way know, whether they be equal, or no; because their Agreement, or Disagreement, in Equality, can never be perceived by an immediate comparing them: The Difference of Figure makes their Parts uncapable of an exact, immediate Application; and, therefore, there is need of some intervening Quantities to measure them by, which is Demonstration, or rational Knowledge.

§ 4. Fourthly,
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§ 4. Fourthly, It follows also, from what is above observed, that our rational Knowledge cannot reach to the whole Extent of our Ideas: Because between two different Ideas we would examine, we cannot always find such Mediums, as we can connect one to another with an intuitive Knowledge, in all the Parts of the Deduction; and wherever that fails, we come short of Knowledge and Demonstration.

§ 5. Fifthly, Sensitive Knowledge, reaching no farther than the Existence of Things, actually present to our Senses, is yet much narrower than either of the former.

§ 6. From all which it is evident, that the Extent of our Knowledge comes not only short of the Reality of Things, but even of the Extent of our own Ideas. Tho' our Knowledge be limited to our Ideas, and cannot exceed them either in Extent, or Perfection; and tho' these be very narrow Bounds, in respect of the Extent of All-Being, and far short of what we may juftly imagine to be in some, even created Understandings, not tied down to the dull and narrow Information, is to be received from some few, and not very acute ways of Perception, such as are our Senses; yet it would be well with us, if our Knowledge were but as large as our Ideas, and there were not many Doubts and Enquiries concerning the Ideas we have, whereof we are not, nor, I believe, ever shall be in this World, resolved. Nevertheless, I do not question, but that Human Knowledge, under the present Circumstances of our Beings and Constitutions, may be carried much farther than it hitherto has been, if Men would sincerely, and with Freedom of Mind, employ all that Industry and Labour of Thought, in improving the means of discovering Truth, which they do for the Colouring, or Support of Falshood, to maintain a System, Interest, or Party, they are once engaged in. But yet, after all, I think I may, without Injury to Human Perfection, be confident, that our Knowledge would never reach to all we might desire to know,
concerning those Ideas we have; nor be able to surmount all the Difficulties, and resolve all the Questions might arise concerning any of them. We have the Ideas of a Square, a Circle, and Equality; and yet, perhaps, shall never be able to find a Circle equal to a Square, and certainly know that it is so. We have the Ideas of Matter and Thinking, * but, possibly, shall never be able to know, whether any mere, material Being thinks, or

* Against that Assertion of Mr. Locke, That possibly we shall never be able to know, whether any material Beings think, or not, &c. the Bishop of Worcester argues thus: If this be true, then, for all that we can know by our Ideas of Matter and Thinking, Matter may have a Power of Thinking: And if this hold, then it is impossible to prove a spiritual Substance in us, from the Idea of Thinking: For how can we be assured by our Ideas, that God hath not given such a Power of Thinking, to Matter, so disposed, as our Bodies are? especially since it is said, † "That in respect of our

† Essay of "Notions, it is not much more remote from our
Human Underf. B. iv.

"Comprehension to conceive, that God can, if he
pleaseth, superadd to our Idea of Matter a Faculty of Thinking, than that he should superadd to it
"another Substance, with a Faculty of Thinking." Whatever affers this, can never prove a spiritual Substance in us, from a Faculty of Thinking; because he cannot know, from the Idea of Matter and Thinking, that Matter so disposed cannot think. And he cannot be certain, that God hath not framed the Matter of our Bodies, so as to be capable of it.

To which Mr. Locke ‡ answers thus: Here your

‡ In his first Lordship argues, that, upon my Principles, it cannot be proved that there is a spiritual Substance in us,
Letter to the Bishop of Wor-
cester, P. 64. To which give me leave, with Submission, to say,
65, &c. That I think it may be proved from my Principles, and I think I have done it; and the Proof in my Book stands thus. First, we experiment in our selves

Thinking. The Idea of this Action, or Mode of Thinking, is inconsistent with the Idea of Self-Subsistence; and, therefore, has a necessary Connexion with a Support, or Subject of Inception: The Idea of that Support is what we call Substance; and so from Thinking, experimented in us, we have a Proof of a thinking Substance in us, which, in my Sense, is a Spirit. Against this your Lordship will argue, That, by what I have said, of the Possibility that God may, if he pleaseth, superadd to Matter a Faculty of Thinking, it can never be proved, that there is a spiritual Substance in us, because, upon that Supposition, it is possible it may be a material Substance, that thinks in us. I grant it; but add, that the general Idea of Substance being the
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the same every where, the Modification of Thinking, or the Power of Thinking joined to it, makes it a Spirit, without considering what other Modifications it has, as, whether it has the Modification of Solidity, or no. As, on the other side, Substance, that has the Modification of Solidity, is Matter, whether it has the Modification of Thinking, or no. And, therefore, if your Lordship means by a Spiritual, an immaterial Substance, I grant I have not proved, nor upon my Principles can it be proved (your Lordship meaning, as I think you do, demonstratively proved) That there is an immaterial Substance in us, that thinks. Tho' I premise, from what I have said about the Supposition of a System of Matter, Thinking (which there demonstrates §. 16. that God is Immaterial) will prove it in the highest Degree probable, that the thinking Substance in us is Immaterial. But your Lordship thinks not Probability enough; and by charging the want of Demonstration upon my Principles, that the thinking Thing in us is immaterial, your Lordship seems to conclude it demonstrable, from Principles of Philosophy. That Demonstration I should with joy receive from your Lordship, or any one. For, tho' all the great Ends of Morality and Religion are well enough secured without it, as $§. 6.$ have shewn, yet it would be a great Advance of our Knowledge in Nature and Philosophy.

To what I have said in my Book, to shew that all the great Ends of Religion and Morality are secured, barely by the Immortality of the Soul, without a necessary Supposition that the Soul is immaterial, I crave leave to add, That Immortality may and shall be annexed to that, which in its own Nature is neither immaterial nor immortal, as the Apostle expressly declares in these Words; * For this Corruptible must put on Incorruption, and this Mortal must put on Immortality.

Perhaps my using the Word Spirit, for a thinking Substance, without excluding Materiality out of it, will be thought too great a Liberty, and such as deservcs Censure, because I leave Immateriality out of the Idea, I make it a Sign of. I readily own, that Words should be sparingly ventured on, in a Sense wholly new; and nothing, but absolute Necessity, can excuse the Boldness of using any Term, in a Sense, whereof we can produce no Example. But, in the present Case, I think I have great Authorities to justify me. The Soul is agreed, on all Hands, to be that in us, which thinks. And he, that will look into the first Book of Cicero's Tusculan Questions, and into the fifth Book of Virgil's Æneids, will find, that these two great Men, who of all the Romans best understood Philosophy, thought, or at least did not deny, the Soul to be a subtle Matter, which might come under the Name of Air, or Ignis, or Aëther; and this Soul, they both of them called Spiritus; In the Notion of which, it is plain, they included only Thought and active Motion, without the total Exclusion of Matter. Whether they thought right in this, I do not say, that is not the Question: But whether they spok
spoke properly, when they called an active, thinking, subtle Sub-
stance, out of which they excluded only gross and palpable Matter,
Spiritus, Spirit: I think that no body will deny, That if any among
the Romans can be allowed to speak properly, Tully and Virgil are
the two, who may most securely be depended on for it: And one of
them, speaking of the Soul, says Dum spiritus hos regit artus; and
the other, Vita continetur corpore & spiritu. Where it is plain, by,
Corpus, he means (as generally every where) only gross Matter that
may be felt and handled; as appears by these Words: Si cor, aut
fagus, aut cerebrum est animus, certè, quoniam est Corpus, interit
cum reliquo Corpo; si anima est, fortè dissipabitur; si ignis extingue-
tur. Tusc. Quest. i. i. c. 11. Here Cicero opposes Corpus to
Ignis and Anima, i. e. Aura, or Breath: And the Foundation of
that his Difinction of the Soul, from that which he calls Corpus, or
Body, he gives a little lower in thes Words; Tanta ejus tenuitas
ut fugiat aciem. ib. c. 22. Nor was it the Heathen World alone,
that had this Notion of Spirit; the most enlightened of all the antient
People of God, Solomon himself, speaks after the
same manner: That, which befalleth the Sons of Men,
befalleth Beasts, even one thing befalleth them; as the
one dieth, so dieth the other, yea they have all one Spirit. So I tran-
slate the Hebrew Word מט, here, for so I find it
Ver. 21.
translated the very next Verle but one; Who know-
eth the Spirit of a Man that goeth upward, and the
Spirit of a Beast that goeth down to the Earth. In which Places it is
plain that Solomon applies the Word מט, and our Translators of him
the Word Spirit, to a Substance, out of which Immateriality was not
wholly excluded, unless the Spirit of a Beast, that goeth downwards
to the Earth, be immaterial. Nor did the way of speaking in our
Saviour's Time vary from this: St. Luke tells us,
Gh. xxiv. 37. That when our Saviour, after his Resurrection,
stood in the midst of them, they were affrighted,
and supposed that they had seen מט, the Greek Word which al-
ways answerers Spirit, in English; and so the Translators of the Bible
render it here, They supposed that they had seen a Spirit. But our
Saviour says to them, Behold my Hands and my Feet, that it is I my-
self, handle me and see; for a Spirit hath not Flesh and Bones, as you
see me have. Which Words of our Saviour put the same Difinction
between Body and Spirit, that Cicero did in the Place above-cited,
viz. That the one was a gross Compages, that could be felt and
handled; and the other such as Virgil describes the Ghost, or Soul
of Aechiæs.

Ter countus ibi collo dare brachia circum,
Ter frufrâ comperfa manus effugit imago,
Par lecités, ventis, volucrique simillima somno. Lib. VI.

I WOULD
I would not be thought hereby to say, That Spirit never does signify a purely immaterial Substance. In that Senec the Scripture, I take it, speaks, when it says, God is a Spirit: And in that Senec I have used it; and in that Senec I have proved, from my Principles, that there is a spiritual Substance; and am certain that there is a spiritual, immaterial Substance: Which is, I humbly conceive, a direct Answer to your Lordship's Question in the Beginning of this Argument, viz. How come we to be certain, that there are spiritual Substances, supposing this Principle to be true, that the simple Ideas by Sensation and Reflexion, are the sole Matter and Foundation of all our Reaoning? But this hinderers not, but that if God, that infinite, omnipotent, and perfectly immaterial Spirit, should please to give a System of very subtile Matter, Sensè, and Motion, it might, with Propriety of Speech, be called Spirit; tho' Materiality were not excluded out of its complex Idea. Your Lordship proceeds: It is said indeed elsewhere, That it is repugnant to the Idea of sensile Matter, that it should put into itself Sensè, Perception, and Knowledge. But this doth not reach the present Case; which is not what Matter can do of itself, but what Matter prepared by an omnipotent Hand can do. And what certainty can we have, that he hath not done it? We can have none from the Ideas, for those are given up in this Case; and, consequently, we can have no Certainty upon these Principles, whether we have any spiritual Substance within us, or not.

Your Lordship in this Paragraph proves, that from what I say, We can have no Certainty whether we have any spiritual Substance in us, or not. If, by spiritual Substance, your Lordship means an immaterial Substance in us, as you speak, P. 246. I grant what your Lordship says is true, That it cannot, upon these Principles, be demonstrated. But I must crave leave to say, at the same time, That, upon these Principles, it can be proved, to the highest degree of Probability. If, by spiritual Substance, your Lordship means a thinking Substance, I must dissent from your Lordship, and say, That we can have a Certainty, upon my Principles, that there is a spiritual Substance in us. In short, my Lord, upon my Principles, i. e. from the Idea of Thinking, we can have a Certainty that there is a thinking Substance in us; from hence we have a Certainty that there is an eternal, thinking Substance. This thinking Substance, which has been from Eternity, I have proved to be immaterial. This eternal, immaterial, thinking Substance, has put into us a thinking Substance, which, whether it be a material, or immaterial Substance, cannot be infallibly demonstrated from our Ideas; tho' from them it may be proved, that it is to the highest degree probable, that it is immaterial.

Again, the Bishop of Worcester undertakes to prove, from Mr. Locke's Principles, that we may be certain, "That the first, eternal, thinking Being, or omnipotent Spirit cannot, if he would, give to "certain Systems of created, sensible Matter, put together as he sees "fit, some degrees of Sensè, Perception, and Thought.
To which Mr. Locke has made the following Answer, in his Third Letter, P. 396, 397, &c.

Your first Argument I take to be this, That, according to me, the Knowledge we have being by our Ideas, and our Idea of Matter in general, being a solid Substant, and our Idea of Body a solid, extended, figured Substant; if I admit Matter to be capable of Thinking, I confound the Idea of Matter, with the Idea of a Spirit: To which I answer, No; no more than I confound the Idea of Matter, with the Idea of an Horse, when I say that Matter, in general, is a solid, extended Substant; and that an Horse is a material Animal, or an extended, solid Substant, with Sense and spontaneous Motion.

The Idea of Matter is an extended, solid Substant; wherever there is such a Substant, there is Matter, and the Essence of Matter, whatever other Qualities, not contained in that Essence, it shall please God to superadd to it. For Example, God creates an extended, solid Substant, without the superadding any thing else to it, and so we may consider it at rest: To some Parts of it he superadds Motion, but it has still the Essence of Matter: Other Parts of it he frames into Plants, with all the Excellencies of Vegetation, Life, and Beauty, which is to be found in a Rose, or Peach-Tree, &c. above the Essence of Matter in general, but it is still but Matter: To other Parts he adds Sense and spontaneous Motion, and those other Properties, that are to be found in an Elephant. Hitherto it is not doubted, but the Power of God may go, and that the Properties of a Rose, a Peach, or an Elephant, superadded to Matter, change not the Properties of Matter; but Matter is in these things Matter still. But if one venture to go one Step farther, and say, God may give to Matter Thought, Reason, and Volition, as well as Sense and spontaneous Motion, there are Men ready presently to limit the Power of the omnipotent Creator, and tell us, he cannot do it; because it destroys the Essence, or changes the essential Properties of Matter. To make good which Assertion, they have no more to say, but that Thought and Reason are not included in the Essence of Matter. I grant it; but whatever Excellency, not contained in its Essence, be superadded to Matter, it does not destroy the Essence of Matter, if it leaves it an extended, solid Substant; wherever that is, there is the Essence of Matter: And if every thing of greater Perfection, superadded to such a Substant, destroys the Essence of Matter, what will become of the Essence of Matter in a Plant, or an Animal, whose Properties far exceed those of a mere, extended, solid Substant?

But it is farther urged, that we cannot conceive how Matter can think. I grant it; but to argue from thence, that God, therefore, cannot give to Matter a Faculty of Thinking, is to say, God’s Omnipotency is limited to a narrow Compass, because Man’s Understanding is so; and brings down God’s infinite Power to the Size of our Capacities. If God can give no Power to any Parts of Matter, but what Men can account for, from the Essence of Matter in general: If all such Qualities and Properties must destroy the Essence, or change the Essential Properties of Matter, which are, to our Conceptions,
exceptions, above it, and we cannot conceive to be the natural Con-
sequence of that Essence; it is plain, that the Essence of Matter is de-
stroyed, and its essential Properties changed, in most of the sensible
Parts of this our System. For it is visible, that all the Planets have
Revolutions about certain, remote Centers, which I would have any
one explain, or make conceivable, by the bare Essence, or natural
Powers, depending on the Essence of Matter in general, without
something added to that Essence, which we cannot conceive: For
the moving of Matter in a crooked Line, or the Attraction of Matter
by Matter, is all that can be said in the Case; either of which is
above our Reach to derive from the Essence of Matter, or Body in
general; tho' one of these two must unavoidably be allowed to be
superadded, in this Instance, to the Essence of Matter in general. The
Omnipotent Creator advised not with us, in the making of the World,
and his Ways are not the less excellent, because they are past our
finding out.

In the next place, the vegetable Part of the Creation is not doubt-
ed to be wholly material; and yet, he that will look into it, will
observe Excellencies and Operations, in this Part of Matter, which
he will not find contained in the Essence of Matter in general, nor
be able to conceive, how they can be produced in it. And will he,
therefore, say, That the Essence of Matter is destroyed in them, be-
cause they have Properties and Operations, not contained in the ef-
sential Properties of Matter, as Matter, nor explicable by the Essence
of Matter in general?

Let us advance one step farther, and we shall, in the Animal World,
meet with yet greater Perfections and Properties, no ways explicable
by the Essence of Matter in general. If the Omnipotent Creator
had not superadded to the Earth, which produced the irrational Ani-
mals, Qualities far surpassing those of the dull, dead, Earth, out of
which they were made, Life, Sensæ, and spontaneous Motion, nobler
Qualities, than were before in it, it had still remained rude, senselss
Matter; and if, to the Individuals of each Species, he had not super-
added a Power of Propagation, the Species had perished with those
Individuals: But, by these Essences, or Properties of each Species,
superadded to the Matter, which they were made of, the Essence, or
Properties of Matter in general, were not destroyed, or changed, any
more than any thing, that was in the Individuals before, was de-
stroyed, or changed, by the Power of Generation, superadded to
them, by the first Benediction of the Almighty.

In all such Cases, the Superinducement of greater Perfections, and
nobler Qualities, destroys nothing of the Essence, or Perfections,
that were there before; unless there can be shewed a manifest Repug-
nancy between them; but all the Proof, offered for that, is only,
That we cannot conceive how Matter, without such superadded Per-
fections, can produce such Effects; which is, in truth, no more than
to say, Matter in general, or every Part of Matter, as Matter, has
them not; but is no Reason to prove, that God, if He pleases, can-
ot superadd them to some Parts of Matter; unless it can be proved

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to be a Contradiction, that God should give, to some Parts of Matter, Qualities, and Perfections, which Matter, in general, has not; tho' we cannot conceive how Matter is invested with them, or how it operates, by virtue of those new Endowments. Nor is it to be wondered, that we cannot, whilst we limit all its Operations to those Qualities, it had before, and would explain them, by the known Properties of Matter in general, without any such superinduced Perfections. For, if this be a right Rule of Reasoning, to deny a Thing to be, because we cannot conceive the manner how it comes to be; I shall desire them, who use it, to stick to this Rule, and see what Work it will make, both in Divinity, as well as Philosophy; and whether they can advance any thing more in favour of Scepticism.

For to keep within the present Subject of the Power of Thinking and Self-motion, bestowed by Omnipotent Power, on some Parts of Matter: The Objection to this is, I cannot conceive how Matter should think. What is the Consequence? Ergo, God cannot give it a Power to think. Let this stand for a good Reason, and then proceed in other Cases, by the same. You cannot conceive how Matter can attract Matter, at any Diftance, much less at the Diftance of 1,000,000 Miles; Ergo, God cannot give it such a Power. You cannot conceive, how Matter should feel, or move itself, or affect an immaterial Being, or be moved by it; Ergo, God cannot give it such Powers: Which is, in effect, to deny Gravity, and the Revolution of the Planets about the Sun; to make Brutes mere Machines, without Sense, or spontaneous Motion; and to allow Man neither Sense, nor voluntary Motion.

Let us apply this Rule one Degree farther: You cannot conceive how an extended, solid Substance should think, therefore God cannot make it think: Can you conceive how your own Soul, or any Substance thinks? You find, indeed, that you do think, and so do I; but I want to be told how the Action of Thinking is performed: This, I confess, is beyond my Conception; and I would be glad any one, who conceives it, would explain it to me. God, I find, has given me this Faculty; and since I cannot but be convinced of his Power, in this Instance, which, tho' I every Moment experiment in myself, yet I cannot conceive the Manner of; what would it be less, than an inoffent Absurdity, to deny his Power, in other like Cases, only for this Reason, because I cannot conceive the manner how?

To explain this Matter a little farther: God has created a Substance; let it be, for Example, a solid, extended Substance: Is God bound to give it, besides Being, a Power of Action? That, I think, no body will say. He, therefore, may leave it in a State of Inactivity, and it will be nevertheless a Substance; for Action is not necessary to the Being of any Substance that God does create. God has, likewise, created and made to exist, de novo, an immaterial Substance, which will not lose its Being of a Substance, tho' God should beflow on it nothing more, but this bare Being, without giving it any Activity at all. Here are now two distinct Substances, the one Material, the other Immaterial, both in the State of perfect Inactivity: Now,
Now, I ask, What Power God can give to one of these Substances, (supposing them to retain the same distinct Natures, that they had, as Substances, in their State of Inactivity) which He cannot give to the other: In that State, it is plain, neither of them thinks; for Thinking being an Action, it cannot be denied, that God can put an end to any Action, of any created Substance, without annihilating of the Substance, whereof it is an Action: And if it be so, He can also create, or give Existence to such a Substance, without giving that Substance any Action at all. By the same Reason, it is plain, that neither of them can move itself. Now, I would ask, why Omnipotency cannot give to either of these Substances, which are equally in a State of perfect Inactivity, the same Power that it can give to the other? Let it be, for Example, that of spontaneous, or Self-motion, which is a Power that it is supposed God can give to an unsolid Substance, but denied that He can give to a solid Substance.

If it be asked, why they limit the Omnipotency of God, in reference to the one, rather than the other of these Substances? All that can be said to it, is, That they cannot conceive, how the solid Substance should ever be able to move itself. And as little, say I, are they able to conceive, how a created, unsolid Substance, should move itself. But there may be something in an immaterial Substance, that you do not know: I grant it; and in a material one too: For Example, Gravitation of Matter towards Matter, and in the several Proportions observable, inevitably shews, that there is something in Matter, that we do not understand, unless we can conceive Self-motion in Matter; or an inexplicable and inconceivable Attraction in Matter, at immense and almost incomprehensible Distances: It must, therefore, be confessed, that there is something in solid, as well as unsolid Substances, that we do not understand. But this we know, that they may, each of them, have their distinct Beings, without any Activity superadded to them; unless you will deny, That God can take from any Being its Power of acting, which, it is probable, will be thought too presumptuous for any one to do; and, I say, it is as hard to conceive Self-motion in a created, immaterial, as in a material Being, consider it how you will: And, therefore, this is no Reason to deny Omnipotency to be able to give a Power of Self-motion to a material Substance, if He pleases, as well as to an immaterial; since neither of them can have it from themselves, nor can we conceive, how it can be in either of them.

The same is visible, in the other Operation of Thinking; both these Substances may be made, and exist without Thought; neither of them has, or can have, the Power of Thinking, from itself; God may give it to either of them, according to the good Pleasure of His Omnipotency; and in which ever of them it is, it is equally beyond our Capacity to conceive, how either of these Substances thinks. But for that Reason, to deny that God, who had Power enough to give them both a Being out of nothing, can, by the same Omnipotency, give them what other Powers and Perfections He pleases; has no better a Foundation, than to deny His Power of Creation, because we cannot...
cannot conceive how it is performed; and there, at last, this way of Reasoning must terminate.

That Omnipotency cannot make a Substance to be solid, and not solid, at the same time, I think, with due Reverence, we may say; but that a solid Substance may not have Qualities, Perfections, and Powers, which have no natural, or visibly necessary Connexion with Solidity and Extension, is too much for us (who are but of Yesterday, and know nothing) to be positive in. If God cannot join Things together by Connexions inconceivable to us, we must deny even the Conspicuity and Being of Matter itself; since every Particle of it, having some Bulk, has its Parts connected by ways inconceivable to us. So that all the Difficulties, that are raised, against the Thinking of Matter, from our Ignorance, or narrow Conceptions, stand not at all in the way of the Power of God, if He pleases to ordain it so; nor prove any thing against His having actually endued some Parcels of Matter, so disposed, as He thinks fit, with a Faculty of Thinking, till it can be shewn, that it contains a Contradiction to suppose it.

Tho' to me Sensation be comprehended, under Thinking in general, yet, in the foregoing Discourse, I have spoke of Sense in Brutes, as distinct from Thinking: Because your Lordship, as I remember, speaks of Sense in Brutes. But here I take Liberty to observe, That, if your Lordship allows Brutes to have Sensation, it will follow, either that God can, and doth give, to some Parcels of Matter, a Power of Perception and Thinking; or that all Animals have immaterial, and, consequently, according to your Lordship, immortal Souls, as well as Men: And to say that Fleas and Mites, &c. have immortal Souls, as well as Men, will possibly be looked on, as going a great way to serve an Hypothesis, and it would not very well agree with what your Lordship says, Anfw. 2. P. 64. to the Words of Solomon, quoted out of Eccles. C. iii.

I have been pretty large, in making this Matter plain, that they, who are so forward to bestow hard Cenfures, or Names, on the Opinions of thofe, who differ from them, may consider, whether sometimes they are not more due to their own: And that they may be persuaded a little to temper that Heat, which supposing the Truth, in their current Opinions, gives them (as they think) a Right to lay what Imputations they please, on thofe, who would fairly examine the Grounds they stand upon. For talking with a Supposition, and Infinuations, that Truth and Knowledge, nay, and Religion too, stands and falls with their Systems, is, at best, but an imperious way of begging the Question, and assuming to themselves, under the Pretence of Zeal for the Cause of God, a Title to Infallibility. It is very becoming, that Mens Zeal for Truth should go, as far as their Proofs, but not go for Proofs themselves. He that attacks received Opinions, with any thing but fair Arguments, may, I own, be justly suspected not to mean well, nor to be led by the Love of Truth; but the same may be said of him too, who so defends them. An Error is not the better for being common, nor Truth the worse, for having
laid neglected: And if it were put to the Vote, any where in the World, I doubt, as Things are managed, whether Truth would have the Majority; at least, whilst the Authority of Men, and not the Examination of Things, must be its Measure. The Imputation of Scepticis, and those broad Infallations, to render what I have writ suspected, so frequent, as if that were the great Business of all this Pains, you have been at about me, has made me lay thus much, my Lord, rather as my Sense of the way to establish Truth in its full Force and Beauty, than that I think the World will need to have any thing laid to it, to make it distinguish between your Lordship's and my Design in Writing; which, therefore, I securely leave to the Judgment of the Reader, and return to the Argument in Hand.

What I have above laid, I take to be a full Answer to all that your Lordship would infer, from my Idea of Matter, of Liberty, and of Identity, and from the Power of Abstraction. You ask, * How can my Idea of Liberty agree with the Idea, that Bodies can operate only by Motion and Impulse? * Answ. By the Omnipotency of God, who can make all Things agree, that involve not a Contradiction. * 'Tis true, I say, * "That Bodies operate by Impulse, and "nothing else." And so I thought, when I writ * Elsay, B. II. it, and can yet conceive no other way of their Operation: But I am since convinced, by the judicious Mr. Newton's incomparable Book, that it is too bold a Presumption to limit God's Power, in this Point, by my narrow Conceptions. The Gravitation of Matter towards Matter, by ways inconceivable to me, is not only a Demonstration that God can, if he pleases, put into Bodies, Powers, and Ways of Operation, above what can be derived from our Idea of Body, or can be explained by what we know of Matter; but also an unquestionable, and every where visible Instance, that He has done so: And, therefore, in the next Edition of my Book, I shall take care to have that Passage rectified.

As to Self-consciousness, your Lordship asks, * What is there like Self-consciousness in Matter? * Answ. Nothing at all in Matter as Matter: But that God cannot bestow, on some Parcels of Matter, a Power of Thinking, and, with it, Self-consciousness will never be proved by asking, * How is it possible to apprehend, that mere Body should perceive that it doth perceive? The Weakness of our Apprehension I grant, in the Case: I confess, as much as you please, that we cannot conceive how a solid, no, nor how an unsole, created Substance thinks; but this Weakness of our Apprehensions reaches not the Power of God, whose Weakness is stronger than any thing in Man.

Your Argument from Abstraction, we have, in this Question, * If it may be in the Power of Matter to think, how comes it to be so impossible for such organized Bodies, as the Brutes have, to enlarge their Ideas by Abstraction? * Answ. This seems to suppose, that I place Thinking within the natural Power of Matter. If that be your Meaning,
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Meaning, my Lord, I neither say, nor suppose, that all Matter has naturally in it a Faculty of Thinking, but the direct contrary. But if you mean that certain Parcels of Matter, ordered by the Divine Power, as seems fit to Him, may be made capable of receiving, from His Omnipotency, the Faculty of Thinking; that, indeed, I say, and that being granted, the Answer to your Question is easy; since, if Omnipotency can give Thought to any solid Substance, it is not hard to conceive, that God may give that Faculty in an higher, or lower Degree, as it pleases Him, who knows what Disposition of the Subject is suited to such a particular way, or degree of Thinking.

Another Argument to prove, That God cannot endue any Parcel of Matter with the Faculty of Thinking, is taken from those Words of mine, * where I shew, P. 159. by what Conjunction of Ideas we may come to know, That God is an inmaterial Substance. They are these: "The Idea of an eternal, actual, knowing Being, with the Idea " of Immateriaility, by the Intervention of the Idea of Matter, and " of its actual Division, Divisibility, and want of Perception," &c. From whence your Lordship P. 77. thus argues, † Here the want of Perception is owned to be so essential to Matter, that God is, therefore, concluded to be immaterial. Anf. Perception and Knowledge, in that one, eternal Being, where it has its Source, it is visible, must be essentially inseparable from it; therefore the actual want of Perception in so great a part of the particular Parcels of Matter, is a Demonstration, that the first Being, from whom Perception and Knowledge is inseparable, is not Matter. How far this makes the want of Perception an essential Property of Matter, I will not dispute; it suffices, that it shews, That Perception is not an essential Property of Matter; and, therefore, Matter cannot be that eternal, original Being, to which Perception and Knowledge is essential. Matter, I say, naturally is without Perception: Ergo, says your Lordship, want of Perception is an essential Property of Matter, and God doth not change the essential Properties of Things, their Nature remaining. From whence you infer, That God cannot bestow on any Parcel of Matter (the Nature of Matter remaining) a Faculty of Thinking. If the Rules of Logic, since my Days, be not changed, I may safely deny this Consequence. For an Argument that runs thus, God does not, Ergo, He cannot; I was taught, when I came first to the University, would not hold. For I never said God did; but, ‡ "That 3. C. IV. "I see no Contradiction in it, that He should, if He 6. "pleased, give to some Systems of fenile Matter, "a Faculty of Thinking." And I know no body, before Des Cartes, that ever pretended to shew that there was any Contradiction in it. So that at worst, my not being able to see, in Matter, any such Incapacity, as makes it impossible for Omnipotency to bestow on it, a Faculty of Thinking, makes me opposite only to the Car- telians. For, as far as I have seen, or heard, the Fathers of the Christian Church never pretended to demonstrate, that Matter was incapable to receive
receive a Power of Sensation, Perception, and Thinking, from the
Hand of the Omnipotent Creator. Let us, therefore, if you please, sup-
pose the Form of your Argumentation right, and that your Lordship
means, God cannot: And then, if your Argument be good, it proves,
that God could not give Balaam's Afs a Power to speak to his Matter,
as he did; for the want of rational Discourse, being natural to that
Species, it is but for your Lordship to call it an essential Property,
and then God cannot change the essential Properties of Things, their
Nature remaining; hereby it is proved, That God cannot, with all
His Omnipotency, give to an Afs a Power to speak, as Balaam's did.

You say, * my Lord, you do not set Bounds to
God's Omnipotency: For He may, if He pleases, change * i. Answ. P. 78.
a Body into an immaterial Substance; i.e. take a-
way from a Substance the Solidity, which it had before, and which
made it Matter, and then give it a Faculty of Thinking, which it
had not before, and which makes it a Spirit, the same Substance re-
main ing. For if the same Substance remains not, Body is not chang-
ed into an immaterial Substance, but the solid Substance, and all be-
 longing to it, is annihilated, and an immaterial Substance created;
which is not a Change of one Thing into another, but the destroying
of one, and making another de novo. In this Change, therefore, of
a Body, or material Substance, into an immaterial, let us observe
these distinct Considerations.

First, you say, God may, if He pleases, take away, from a solid
Substance, Solidity, which is that, which makes it a material Sub-
stance, or Body, and may make it an immaterial Substance, i.e. a
Substance without Solidity. But this Privation of one Quality gives
it not another: The bare taking away a lower, or less noble Quality,
does not give it an higher, or nobler; that must be the Gift of God.
For the bare Privation of one, and the meaner Quality, cannot be
the Possession of an higher, and better; unless any one will say, that
Cogitation, or the Power of Thinking, results from the Nature of
Substance itself, which, if it do, then, where ever there is Substance,
there must be Cogitation, or a Power of Thinking. Here then, upon
our Lordship's own Principles, is an immaterial Substance, with-
out the Faculty of Thinking.

In the next place, you will not deny, but God may give to this
Substance, thus deprived of Solidity, a Faculty of Thinking; for you
suppose it made capable of that, by being made immaterial; whereby
you allow, that the same numerical Substance may be sometimes
wholly incogitative, or without a Power of Thinking, and at other
times perfectly cogitative, or endued with a Power of Thinking.

Further, you will not deny but God can give it a Solidity, and
make it material again: For, I conclude, it will not be denied, that
God can make it again, what it was before. Now I crave leave to
ask your Lordship, Why God, having given to this Substance the
Faculty of Thinking, after Solidity was taken from it, cannot restore
to it Solidity again, without taking away the Faculty of Thinking?
When you have resolved this, my Lord, you will have proved it im-
possible,
possible, for God's Omnipotence, to give a solid Substance a Faculty of Thinking; but till then, nor having proved it impossible, and yet, denying that God can do it, is to deny, that He can do what is in itself possible; which, as I humbly conceive, is visibly

* I Anf. P. 78. to set Bounds to God's Omnipotence; tho' you say here, * you do not set Bounds to God's Omnipotence.

If I should imitate your Lordship's way of Writing, I should not omit to bring in *Epicurus* here, and take Notice that this was his way, *Deum verbis ponere, re tollere.* And then add, that I am certain, you do not think he promoted the great Ends of Morality and Religion.

For it is, with such candid and kind Infinuations,

† I Anf. P. 55. as these, that you bring in both † *Hobbes*, and † *Spinoza*, into your Discourse here, about God's being able, if He please, to give to some Parcels of Matter, ordered as He thinks fit, a Faculty of Thinking: Neither of those Authors having, as appears by any Passages you bring out of them, said any thing to this Question, nor having, as it seems, any other Busines here, but, by their Names, skilfully to give that Character to my Book, with which you would recommend it to the World.

I pretend not to inquire what measure of Zeal, nor for what, guides your Lordship's Pen, in such a way of Writing, as your has all along been with me: Only I cannot but consider, what Reputation it would give to the Writings of the Fathers of the Church, if they should think Truth required, or Religion allowed them to imitate such Patterns. But, God be thanked, there be those amongst them, who do not admire such ways of managing the Cause of Truth, or Religion; they being sensible, that, if every one, who believes, or can pretend he has Truth on his side, is thereby authorized, without Proof, to insinuate whatever may serve to prejudice Mens Minds against the other side, there will be a great Ravage made on Charity and Practice, without any Gain to Truth, or Knowledge: And that the Liberties frequently taken by Disputants, to do so, may have been the Cause, that the World, in all Ages, has received so much Harm, and so little Advantage, from Controversies in Religion.

These are the Arguments, which your Lordship has brought to to confute one Saying in my Book, by other Passages in it; which, therefore, being all but *Argumenta ad Hominem*, if they did prove, what they do not, are of no other use, than to gain a Victory over me: A thing, methinks, so much beneath your Lordship, that it does not deserve one of your Pages. The Question is, whether God can, if He pleases, bestow on any Parcel of Matter, ordered as He thinks fit, a Faculty of Perception and Thinking. You say,

|| I Anf. P. 79. You look upon a Mistake herein to be of dangerous Consequence, as to the great Ends of Religion and Morality: If this be so, my Lord, I think one may well wonder, why your Lordship has brought no Arguments, to establish the Truth itself, which You look on to be of such dangerous Consequence, to be mistaken in; but have spent so many Pages, only in a Personal Matter, in endeavouring to shew, That I had Inconstancies in my Book; which, if any such thing had been shewed, the
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the Question would be still as far from being decided, and the Danger of mistaking about it as little prevented, as if nothing of all this had been said. If, therefore, your Lordship's Care of the great Ends of Religion and Morality have made You think it necessary to clear this Question, the World has Reason to conclude, there is little to be said against that Proposition, which is to be found in my Book, concerning the Possibility, that some Parcels of Matter might be so ordered by Omnipotence, as to be ended with a Faculty of Thinking, if God so pleased; since your Lordship's Concern, for the promoting the great Ends of Religion and Morality, has not enabled you to produce one Argument, against a Proposition, that you think of so dangerous Consequence to them.

And here I crave leave to observe, That tho', in your Title Page, you promise to prove, that my Notion of Ideas is inconsistent with itself, (which, if it were, it could hardly be proved to be inconsistent with any thing else) and with the Articles of the Christian Faith; yet your Attempts, all along, have been to prove me, in some Passages of my Book, inconsistent with myself, without having shewn any Proposition, in my Book, inconsistent with any Article of the Christian Faith. I think, your Lordship has, indeed, made use of one Argument of your own; but it is such an one, that, I confess, I do not see how it is apt much to promote Religion, especially the Christian Religion, founded on Revelation. I shall let down your Lordship's Words, that they may be considered. You say, * That you are of Opinion, that the great Ends of Religion and Morality are best secured, by the Proofs of the Immortality of the Soul, from its Nature and Properties; and which, you think, proves it immaterial. Your Lordship does not question, whether God can give Immortality to a material Substance; but you say, it takes off very much from the Evidence of Immortality, if it depend wholly upon God's giving that, which, of its own Nature, it is not capable of, &c. So likewise you say, † If a Man cannot be certain, but that Matter may think, (as I affirm) then what becomes of the Soul's Immateri- lality (and consequently Immortality) from its Opera- tions? But for all this, say I, his Assurance of Faith remains on its own Basis. Now you appeal to any Man of Sense, whether the finding the Uncertainty of his own Principles, which he went upon, in point of Reason, doth not weaken the Credibility of these fundamental Articles, when they are considered purely as Matters of Faith? For before, there was a natural Credibility in them, on the Account of Reason; but, by going on wrong Grounds of Certainty, all that is lost; and, instead of being certain, he is more doubtful than ever. And, if the Evidence of Faith fall so much short of that of Reason, it must needs have left Effect upon Mens Minds, when the Subserviency of Reason is taken away; as it must be, when the Grounds of Certainty, by Reason, are vanished. Is it at all probable, That he, who finds Reason deceive him, in such fundamental Points, should have his Faith stand firm and unmoveable, on the Account of Revelation? For, in Matters
Matters of Revelation, there must be some antecedent Principles sup
posed, before we can believe any thing, on the Account of it.

More to the same Purpose we have some Pages farther; where,
from some of my Words, your Lordship says, * You
cannot but observe, That we have no Certainty, up
on my Grounds, that Self-consciousness depends upon
an individual, immaterial Substance: and, consequently, that a mate
rival Substance may, according to my Principles, have Self-conscious
ness in it; at least, that I am not certain of the contrary. Whereupon
your Lordship bids me consider, whether this doth not a little affect the
whole Article of the Resurrection? What does all this tend to, but to
make the World believe, that I have lessened the Credibility of the Im
mortality of the Soul, and the Resurrection, by saying, That, tho' it
be most highly probable, that the Soul is immaterial; yet, upon my
Principles, it cannot be demonstrated; because it is not impossible to
God's Omnipotency, if He pleases, to bestow upon some Parcels of
Matter, disposed as He sees fit, a Faculty of Thinking?

This your Accumulation, of my lessening the Credibility of these Ar
icles of Faith, is founded on this, That the Article of the Immorta
lity of the Soul abates of its Credibility, if it be allowed, That its
Immateriality (which is the supposed Proof, from Reason and Phi
losophy, of its Immortality) cannot be demonstrated from natural
Reason. Which Argument of your Lordship's bottoms, as I humbly
conceive, on this, That Divine Revelation abates of its Credibility,
in all those Articles, it proposes, proportionably as Human Reason
fails to support the Testimony of God. And all that your Lordship,
in those Passages, has said, when examined, will, I suppose, be found
to import thus much, viz. Does God propose anything to Mankind
to be believed? It is very fit and credible to be believed, if Reason
can demonstrate it to be true. But, if Human Reason comes short
in the Case, and cannot make it out, its Credibility is thereby lef
sened; which is, in effect, to say, That the Veracity of God is not
a firm and sure Foundation of Faith to rely upon, without the concur
rent Testimony of Reason; i. e. with Reverence be it spoken, God
is not to be believed on His own Word, unless what He reveals
be in itself credible, and might be believed without Him.

If this be a way to promote Religion, the Christian Religion in all
its Articles, I am not sorry, that it is not a way to be found, in any of
my Writings; for I imagine any thing, like this, would (and I should
think deferred to) have other Titles, than bare Skepticism, beflow
ed upon it, and would have raised no small Outcry against any one,
who is not to be supposed to be in the right, in all that he says, and
so may securely say what he pleases. Such as I, the Prophanum
Vulgaris, who take too much upon us, if we would examine, have no
thing to do, but to hearken and believe, tho' what he said should
subvert the very Foundations of the Christian Faith.

What I have observed, is so visibly contained in your Lordship's Ar
gument, that when I met with it, in your Answer to my first Let
ter, it seemed so strange, for a Man of your Lordship's Character,
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and in a Dispute in Defence of the Doctrine of the Trinity, that I could hardly persuade myself, but it was a Slip of your Pen: But, when I found it, in your second 1 Anf. P. 28, Letter, I made use of again, and seriously enlarged, and 29. as an Argument of Weight to be insifted upon, I was convinced, that it was a Principle that you heartily embraced, how little favourable foever it was to the Articles of the Christian Religion, and particularly those, which you undertook to defend.

I desire my Reader to perufe the Passages, as they stand in your Letters themselves, and see, whether what you say, in them, does not amount to this, That a Revelation from God is more, or less credible, according as it has a stronger, or weaker Confirmation from Human Reason. For,

1. Your Lordship says, *You do not question,* whether God can give Immortality to a material Substance; but you say, it takes off very much from the Evidence of Immortality, if it depends wholly upon God's giving that, which, of its own Nature, it is not capable of.

To which I reply, any one's not being able to demonstrate the Soul to be immaterial, takes off not very much, nor at all, from the Evidence of its Immortality, if God has revealed that it shall be immortal: Because the Veracity of God is a Demonstration of the Truth of what He has revealed, and the want of another Demonstration of a Proposition, that is demonstratively true, takes not off from the Evidence of it. For, where there is a clear Demonstration, there is as much Evidence, as any Truth can have that is not self-evident. God has revealed that the Souls of Men shall live for ever: But, says your Lordship, from this Evidence it takes off very much, if it depends wholly upon God's giving that, which, of its own Nature, it is not capable of; i.e. The Revelation and Testimony of God loses much of its Evidence, if this depends wholly upon the good Pleasure of God, and cannot be demonstratively made out, by natural Reason, that the Soul is immaterial, and, consequently, in its own Nature, immortal. For that is all that here is, or can be meant, by these Words, *which, of its own Nature, it is not capable of,* to make them to the Purpose. For the whole of your Lordship's Discourse here, is to prove, that the Soul cannot be material, because, then, the Evidence of its being immortal would be very much lessened. Which is to say, that it is not as credible, upon Divine Revelation, that a material Substance should be immortal, as an immaterial; or, which is all one, That God is not equally to be believed, when He declares, that a material Substance shall be immortal, as when He declares, that an immaterial shall be so; because the Immortality of a material Substance cannot be demonstrated from natural Reason.

Let us try this Rule of your Lordship's a little farther. God hath revealed, that the Bodies Men shall have, after the Resurrection, as well as their Souls, shall live to Eternity: Does your Lordship believe the eternal Life of the one of these, more than of the other, because you think you can prove it, of one of them, by natural Reason, and...
of the other not? Or can any one, who admits of Divine Revelation in the Cæde, doubt of one of them, more than the other? Or think this Proposition less credible, The Bodies of Men, after the Resurrection, shall live for ever; than this, That the Souls of Men shall, after the Resurrection, live for ever? For that he must do, if he thinks either of them is less credible than the other. If this be so, Reason is to be consulted, how far God is to be believed, and the Credit of Divine Testimony must receive its Force from the Evidence of Reason: Which is evidently to take away the Credibility of Divine Revelation, in all supernatural Truths, wherein the Evidence of Reason fails. And how much such a Principle, as this, tends to the Support of the Doctrine of the Trinity, or the promoting the Christian Religion, I shall leave it to your Lordship to consider.

I am not so well read in Hobbes, or Spinoza, as to be able to say, what were their Opinions in this Matter. But, possibly, there be those, who will think your Lordship’s Authority of more Use to them, in the Cæde, than those justly decried Names; and be glad to find your Lordship a Patron of the Oracles of Reason, so little to the Advantage of the Oracles of Divine Revelation.

* I Anf. Words, at the Bottom of the next Page *, That those, who have gone about to lessen the Credibility of the Articles of Faith, which evidently they do, who say, they are less credible, because they cannot be made out demonstratively, by natural Reason; have not been thought to secure several of the Articles of the Christian Faith; especially those of the Trinity, Incarnation, and Resurrection of the Body, which are those, upon the Account of which I am brought, by your Lordship, into this Dispute.

I shall not trouble the Reader with your Lordship’s Endeavours, in the following Words, to prove, That, if the Soul be not an immaterial Substance, it can be nothing but Life; your very first Words visibly confuting all that you allude to that Purpose. They are, † If the Soul be a material Substance, it is really nothing but Life; which is to say, That, if the Soul be really a Substance, it is not really a Substance, but really nothing else, but an Affection of a Substance; for the Life, whether of a material, or immaterial Substance, is not the Substance itself, but an Affection of it.

2. You say, † Altho’ we think the separate State of the Soul, after Death, is sufficiently revealed in the Scripture; yet it creates a great Difficulty in understanding it, if the Soul be nothing but Life, or a material Substance, which must be dissolved when Life is ended. For, if the Soul be a material Substance, it must be made up, as others are, of the Cohesion of solid and separate Parts, how minute and invisible soever they be. And what is it should keep them together, when Life is gone? So that it is no easy Matter to give an Account, how the Soul should be capable of Immortality, unless it be an immaterial Substance;
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Substance; and then we know, the Solution and Texture of Bodies cannot reach the Soul, being of a different Nature.

Let it be as hard a matter as it will, to give an Account what it is, that should keep the Parts of a material Soul together, after it is separated from the Body; yet it will be always as easy to give an Account of it, as to give an Account what it is, which should keep together a material and immaterial Substance. And yet the Difficulty that there is, to give an Account of that, I hope does not, with your Lordship, weaken the Credibility of the inseparable Union of Soul and Body, to Eternity: And I persuade myself, that the Men of Sense, to whom your Lordship appeals in the Cafe, do not find their Belief of this Fundamental Point much weakened by that Difficulty. I thought heretofore (and, by your Lordship's Permission, would think so still) that the Union of Parts of Matter, one with another, is as much in the Hands of God, as the Union of a material, and immaterial Substance; and that it does not take off, very much, or at all, from the Evidence of Immortality, which depends on that Union, that it is no easy matter to give an Account, what it is, that should keep them together: Tho' its depending wholly upon the Gift and good Pleasure of God, where the manner creates great Difficulty in the Understanding, and our Reason cannot discover, in the Nature of Things, how it is, be that, which your Lordship positively says, lessens the Credibility of the Fundamental Articles of the Resurrection and Immortality.

But, my Lord, to remove this Objection a little, and to shew how small Force it is, even with your self; give me leave to premise, That your Lordship as firmly believes the Immortality of the Body, after the Resurrection, as any other Article of Faith: If so, then it being no easy matter to give an Account, what it is, that should keep together the Parts of a material Soul, to one, that believes it is material, can no more weaken the Credibility of its Immortality, than the like Difficulty weakens the Credibility of the Immortality of the Body. For, when your Lordship shall find it an easy matter to give an Account what it is, besides the good Pleasure of God, which should keep together the Parts of our material Bodics to Eternity, or even Soul and Body; I doubt not, but any one, who shall think the Soul material, will also find it as easy to give an Account, what it is that shall keep those Parts of Matter also together to Eternity.

Were it not, that the Warmth of Controversy is apt to make Men to forget, as to take up those Principles themselves (when they will serve their turn) which they have highly condemned in others, I should wonder to find your Lordship to argue, that, because it is a Difficulty to understand, what should keep together the minute Parts of a material Soul, when Life is gone; and, because it is not an easy Matter to give an Account how the Soul should be capable of Immortality, unless it be an immaterial Substance: Therefore, it is not so credible, as if it were easy to give an Account, by natural Reason, how it could be. For to this it is, that all this your Discourse tends, as is evident, by what is already set down, out of Page 35, and will be more fully made out, by what your Lordship says in other Places, tho'
tho' there needs no such Proofs, since it would all be nothing against me, in any other Sense.

I thought your Lordship had, in other Places, asserted, and insisted on this Truth, That no Part of Divine Revelation was the less to be believed, because the Thing itself created great Difficulty in the Understanding, and the manner of it was hard to be explained, and it was no easy matter to give an Account how it was. This, as I take it, your Lordship condemned in others, as a very unreasonable Principle, and such as would subvert all the Articles of the Christian Religion, that were mere Matters of Faith, as I think it will: And is it possible, that you should make use of it here yourself, against the Article of Life and Immortality, that Christ hath brought to light through the Gospel; and neither was, nor could be made out by natural Reason, without Revelation? But, you will say, you speak only of the Soul, and your Words are, That, it is no easy Matter to give an Account, how the Soul should be capable of Immortality, unless it be an immaterial Substance. I grant it; but crave leave to say, That there is not any one of those Difficulties, that are, or can be raised, about the manner how a material Soul can be immortal, which do not as well reach the Immortality of the Body.

But if it were not so, I am sure this Principle of your Lordship's would reach other Articles of Faith, wherein our natural Reason finds it not so easy to give an Account, how those Mysteries are: And which, therefore, according to your Principles, must be less credible, than other Articles that create less Difficulty to the Understanding. For your Lordship says, † That P. 28. you appeal to any Man of Sense, whether to a Man, who thought by his Principles, he could, from natural Grounds, demonstrate the Immortality of the Soul, the finding the Uncertainty of those Principles he went upon, in point of Reason, i. e. the finding he could not certainly prove it, by natural Reason, doth not weaken the Credibility of that Fundamental Article, when it is considered purely as a Matter of Faith. Which, in effect, I humbly conceive, amounts to this; That a Proposition divinely revealed, that cannot be proved by natural Reason, is less credible than one that can: Which seems to me to come very little short of this, with due Reverence be it spoken, That God is less to be believed, when He affirms a Proposition, that cannot be proved by natural Reason, than when He proposes what can be proved by it. The direct contrary to which is my Opinion; tho' you endeavour to make it good by these following Words: † If the Evidence of P. 29. Faith fails so much short of that of Reason, it must needs have less effect upon Mens Minds, when the Subserviency of Reason is taken away; as it must be, when the Grounds of Certainty, by Reason, are vanished. Is it at all probable, that he, who finds his Reason deceive him, in such Fundamental Points, should have his Faith stand firm and unmoveable, on the Account of Revelation? Than which, I think, there are hardly plainer Words to be found out, to declare, that the Credibility of God's
God's Testimony depends on the natural Evidence, or Probability of the Things we receive from Revelation, and rises and falls with it; and that the Truths of God, or the Articles of mere Faith, lose so much of their Credibility, as they want Proof from Reason; which, if true, Revelation may come to have no Credibility at all. For if, in this present Case, the Credibility of this Proposition, The Souls of Men shall live for ever, revealed in the Scripture, be lessened by confessing it cannot be demonstratively proved from Reason, tho' it be asserted to be most highly probable; must not, by the same Rule, its Credibility dwindle away to nothing, if natural Reason should not be able to make it out, to be so much as probable, or should place the Probability, from natural Principles, on the other side? For if mere Want of Demonstration lessens the Credibility of any Proposition, divinely revealed, must not Want of Probability, or contrary Probability from natural Reason, quite take away its Credibility? Here at last it must end, if, in any one Case, the Veracity of God, and the Credibility of the Truths we receive from Him, by Revelation, be subjected to the Verdigris of Human Reason, and be allowed to receive any Acception, or Diminution, from other Proofs, or want of other Proofs of its Certainty, or Probability.

If this be your Lordship's way to promote Religion, or defend its Articles, I know not what Argument the greatest Enemies of it could use, more effectual for the Subversion of those you have undertaken to defend; this being to resolve all Revelation, perfectly and purely, into natural Reason, to bound its Credibility by that, and leave no room for Faith, in other Things, than what can be accounted for, by natural Reason, without Revelation.

* Your Lordship * inflicts much upon it, as if I had contradicted what I had said in my Essay, by saying, * 1 Anf. P. 42—54.  
† That, upon my Principles, it cannot be demonstratively proved, that it is an immaterial Substance in us that thinks, however probable it be. He that will be at the Pains to read that Chapter of mine, and consider it, will find, that my Business there was to shew, that it was no harder to conceive an immaterial, than a material Substance; and that, from the Ideas of Thought, and the Power of moving of Matter, which we experienced in ourselves, (Ideas originally not belonging to Matter, as Matter) there was no more Difficulty to conclude there was an immaterial Substance in us, than that we had material Parts. These Ideas of Thinking, and Power of moving of Matter, I, in another place, shewed, did demonstratively lead us to the certain Knowledge of the Existence of an immaterial, thinking Being, in whom we have the Idea of Spirit, in the strictest Sense; in which Sense I also applied it to the Soul; in that 22d Ch. of my Essay; the easily conceivable Possibility, may great Probability, that That thinking Substance in us is immaterial, giving me sufficient Ground for it. In which Sense, I shall think, I may safely attribute it to the thinking Substance in us, until your Lordship shall have better proved, from my Words, That it is impossible it should be immaterial. For I only
I only say, That it is possible, i.e. involves no Contradiction, that God, the Omnipotent, Immortal Spirit, should, if He pleases, give to some Parcels of Matter, disposed as He thinks fit, a Power of Thinking and Moving: Which Parcels of Matter, so endued with a Power of Thinking and Motion, might properly be called Spirits, in Contra-distinction to unthinking Matter. In all which, I presume, there is no manner of Contradiction.

I justified my use of the Word Spirit, in that Sense, from the Authorities of Cicero and Virgil, applying the Latin Word Spiritus, from whence Spirit is derived, to a Soul, as a thinking Thing, without excluding Materiality out of it. To which

*1 Anf.
your Lordship replies, *That Cicero, in his Tusculan Questions, supposes the Soul not to be a finer sort of Body, but of a different Nature from the Body,—That he calls the Body the Prison of the Soul.—And says, That a wise Man's Business is to draw off his Soul from his Body. And then your Lordship concludes, as is usual, with a Question, Is it possible, now, to think so great a Man looked on the Soul, but as a Modification of the Body, which must be at an end with Life? Anf. No, it is impossible that a Man of so good Sense, as Tully, when he uses the Word Corpus, or Body, for the gross and visible Parts of a Man, which he acknowledges to be mortal; should look on the Soul, to be a Modification of that Body, in a Discourse, wherein he was endeavouring to persuade another, that it was immortal. It is to be acknowledged, that truly great Men, such as he was, are not wont so manifestly to contradict themselves. He had, therefore, no Thought, concerning the Modification of the Body of a Man, in the Case; he was not such a Trifler, as to examine, whether the Modification of the Body of a Man was immortal, when that Body itself was mortal: And, therefore, that which he reports, as Diocarbus's Opinion, he dismits in the beginning, without any more ado, C. 11. But Cicero's was a direct, plain, and sensible Enquiry, viz. What the Soul was? To see whether, from thence, he could difcover its Immortality. But, in all that Discourse, in his first Book of Tusculan Questions, where he lays out so much of his Reading and Reason, there is not one Sylable, shewing the least Thought that the Soul was an immaterial Substance; but many Things directly to the contrary.

Indeed (1.) he shuts out the Body, taken in the

† Ch. 19. 22: Sense he uses Corpus all along, for the sensible, 30, 31, &c. organical Parts of a Man; and is positive that is not the Soul: And Body, in this Sense, taken for the Human Body, he calls the Prison of the Soul; and says a wise Man, inquiring in Socrates and Cato, is glad of a fair Opportunity to get out of it. But he no where says any such Thing of Matter: He calls not Matter, in general, the Prison of the Soul, nor talks a Word of being separate from it.

2. He concludes, that the Soul is not like other Things here below, made up of a Composition of the Elements, Ch. 27.
3. He excludes the two gross Elements, Earth and Water, from being the Soul, Ch. 26.

So far he is clear and positive: But, beyond this, he is uncertain; beyond this he could not get. For, in some Places, he speaks doubtfully, whether the Soul be not Air, or Fire: *Animis est animus, ignifcerus necio*, Ch. 25. And, therefore, he agrees with *Pausanias*, that, if it be at all Elementary, it is, as he calls it, *Inflammata Animus, inflammata Air*; and, for this, he gives several Reasons, C. 18, 19. And tho' he thinks it to be of a peculiar Nature of its own, yet he is so far from thinking it immaterial, that he says, C. 19. That the admitting it to be of an aerial, or igneous Nature, would not be inconsistent with any thing he had said.

That which he seems most to incline to, is, That the Soul was not at all Elementary, but was of the same Substance with the Heavens: Which *Aristoteles*, to distinguish from the four Elements, and the changeable Bodies here below, which he suppos'd made up of them, called *Quinta Essentia*. That this was *Tully's Opinion*, is plain from thele Words: *Ergo, Animus, qui, ut ego dico, divinus est, ut Euripides andet dicere Deus; et quidem, si Deus, aut anima, aut ignis est, idem est animus humanis*. Nam ut illa natura celestis & terrae vacat et humore, sic utriusque harum rerum humanus animus est express. Sin autem est quinta quaedam natura, ab Aristotelis inducta; primum hec et deorum est et animorum. Hanc nos sententiæ fecuti, his ipsis verbis in consolatione hec expressimus; Ch. 26. And then he goes on, Ch. 27, to repeat those his own Words, which your Lordship has quoted out of him, wherein he had affirmed, in his *Treatise de Consolationes*, the Soul not to have its Original from the Earth, or to be mixed, or made, of any Thing earthly; but had said, *Singularis est igitur quaedam natura et vis animi sejuncta ab his usitatissimis naturalibus*: Whereby, he tells us, he meant nothing but *Aristotle's Quinta Essentia*; which being unmixed, being that, of which the Gods and Souls confituted, he calls it *divinus, celeste*, and concludes it eternal; it being, as he speaks, Sejuncta ab omnibus mortalibus concectione. From which it is clear, That in all his Enquiry about the Substance of the Soul, his Thoughts went not beyond the four Elements, or *Aristoteles's Quinta Essentia*, to look for it. In all which there is nothing of Immateriality, but quite the contrary.

He was willing to believe (as good and wise Men have always been) that the Soul was immortal; but, for that, 'tis plain, he never thought of its Immateriality; but as the Eastern People do, who believe the Soul to be immortal, but have nevertheless no Thought, no Conception of its Immateriality. It is remarkable, what a very considerable and judicious Author says † in the *Cafe*:

No Opinion, says he, has been so universally receiv'd, as that of the Immortality of the Soul; but its Immateriality is a Truth, the Knowledge whereof has not spread so far. And, indeed, it is extremely difficult to let into the Mind of a Siamite, the Idea of a pure Spirit. This the Missionaries, who have been longest among them,
them, are positive in: All the Pagans of the East do truly believe, that there remains something of a Man after his Death, which subsists independently and separately from his Body. But they give Extension and Figure to that which remains, and attribute to it all the same Members, all the same Substances, both solid and liquid, which our Bodies are composed of. They only suppose, that the Souls are of a Matter, subtle enough to escape being seen, or handled—such were the Shades and the Manes of the Greeks and the Romans. And it is, by these Figures of the Souls, answerable to those of the Bodies, that Virgil supposed Aeneas knew Palinurus, Dido and Anchises, in the other World.

This Gentleman was not a Man that travelled into those Parts for his Pleasure, and to have the Opportunity to tell strange Stories, collected by Chance, when he returned; but one chosen on purpose (and he seems well chosen for the purpose) to inquire into the Singularities of Siam. And he has so well acquitted himself of the Commissions, which his Epistle Dedicatory tells us he had, to inform himself exactly of what was most remarkable there, that had we but such an Account of other Countries of the East, as he has given us of this Kingdom, which he was an Envoy to, we should be much better acquainted, than we are, with the Manners, Notions, and Religions, of that Part of the World, inhabited by civilized Nations, who want neither good Sense, nor Acuteness of Reason, tho' not cast into the Mould of the Logic and Philosophy of our Schools.

But, to return to Cicero: 'Tis plain, That, in his Enquiries about the Soul, his Thoughts went not at all beyond Matter. This the Expressions, that drop from him in several Places of this Book, evidently shew. For Example, That the Souls of excellent Men and Women ascended into Heaven; of others, that they remained here on Earth, C. 12. That the Soul is hot, and warms the Body: That, at its leaving the Body, it penetrates and divides, and breaks through our thick, cloudy, moist Air: That it stops in the Region of Fire, and ascends no farther, the Equality of Warmth and Weight making that its proper Place, where it is nourished and sustained with the same Things, wherewith the Stars are nourished and sustained; and that, by the Convenience of its Neighbourhood, it shall there have a clearer View and fuller Knowledge of the Heavenly Bodies, C. 19. That the Soul also, from this Height, shall have a pleasanter and fairer Prospect of the Globe of the Earth, the Disposition of whose Parts will then lie before it in one View, C. 20. That it is hard to determine what Conformation, Size, and Place, the Soul has in the Body: That it is too subtile to be seen: That it is in the Human Body, as in a House, or a Vessel, or a Receptacle, C. 22. All which are Expressions that sufficiently evidence, that he, who us'd 'em, had not, in his Mind, separated Materiality, from the Idea of the Soul.

It may, perhaps, be replied, That a great part of this, which we find in Chap. 19. is laid upon the Principles of those, who would have the Soul to be Animna inflammata, inflamed Air. I grant it: But it is also to be observed, That in this 19th, and the two following Chapters,
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Chapters, he does not only not deny, but even admits, That so material a Thing, as inflamed Air, may think.

The Truth of the Case, in short, is this: Cicero was willing to believe the Soul immortal, but, when he fought, in the Nature of the Soul itself, something to establish this his Belief, into a Certainty of it, he found himself at a Loss. He confessed, he knew not what the Soul was; but the not knowing what it was, he argues, C. 2. was no Reason to conclude it was not. And thereupon he proceeds to the Repetition of what he had said, in his 6th Book de Repub. concerning the Soul. The Argument which, borrowed from Plato, he there makes use of, if it have any Force in it, not only proves the Soul to be immortal, but more than, I think, your Lordship will allow to be true: For it proves it to be eternal, and without Beginning, as well as without End: Neque nata certe est, & eterna est, says he.

Indeed, from the Faculties of the Soul, he concludes right, That it is of Divine Original: But as to the Substance of the Soul, he, at the End of this Discourse concerning its Faculties, C. 25. as well as at the Beginning of it, C. 22. is not ashamed to own his Ignorance of what it is; Anima sit animus, ignifue, nefeio; nec me puder, ut iflos, fateri neferre quod nefciam. Ilud, fiulla alia de re obscuro affirmare possam, five anima, five ignis fit, animus, eum jurarem esse divinum, C. 25. So that all the Certainty he could attain to, about the Soul, was, That he was confident there was something Divine in it; i.e. there were Faculties in the Soul, that could not result from the Nature of Matter, but must have their Original from a Divine Power: But yet those Qualities, as Divine as they were, he acknowledged might be placed in Breath, or Fire, which, I think, your Lordship will not deny to be material Substances. So that all those Divine Qualities, which he so much, and so justly extols in the Soul, led him not, as appears, so much as to any the least Thought of Immateriality. This is Demonstration, That he built them not, upon an Exclusion of Materiality out of the Soul; for he avowedly professes, he does not know but Breath, or Fire, might be this thinking Thing in us: And in all his Considerations about the Substance of the Soul itself, he stuck in Air, or Fire, or Aristotle's Quinta Essentia; for by his, 'tis evident, he went not.

But, with all his Proofs out of Plato, to whose Authority he defers so much, with all the Arguments his vaft Reading and great Parts could furnish him with, for the Immortality of the Soul, he was so little satisfied, so far from being certain, so far from any Thought, that he had, or could prove it, that he, over and over again, professes his Ignorance and Doubt of it. In the beginning, he enumerates the several Opinions of the Philosophers, which he had well studied, about it; and then, full of Uncertainty, says, Harum sententiarum, que vera sit, Deus aliquis viderit, que verifimilima magna questio, C. 11. And towards the latter end, having gone them all over again, and, one after another, examined them, he professes himself still at a Loss, not knowing on which to pitch, nor what to determine: Mentis acies, says he, siipsum intuens, nonnumquam behesfit.
ob eamque caufam contemplandi diligentiam omittimus. Itaque du-
bitaus, circumjacentes, hesitas, multa adversa revertens, tanquam in
rate, in mari immenso, nostra vehetur oratio. C. 30. And, to conclude
this Argument, when the Person he introduces, as discoursing with
him, tells him, he is resolved to keep firm to the Belief of Immortal-
ity; Tully answers: C. 82. Laudo id quidem, & si nihil animis op-
portet considerare; movemur enim sape aliquo acute conclufo, lebas
mutuamque sententiam clarioribus etiam in rebus; in his eft enim a-
liqua obscuritas.

So unmoveable is that Truth, delivered by the Spirit of Truth,
That, tho’ the Light of Nature gave some obscure Glimmering, some
uncertain Hopes of a future State; yet human Reason could attain
to no Clearness, no Certainty about it, but that it was JESUS
CHRIST, alone, who had brought Life and Immortality to Light, thro’
the Gospel. Tho’ we are now told, That to own the Inability of natural
Reason, to bring Immortality to Light, or, which paffes for the fame,
to own Principles, upon which the Immateriality of the Soul, (and,
as ’tis urged, consequently its Immortality) cannot be demonstra-
tively proved, does lessen the Belief of this Article of Revelation,
which JESUS CHRIST alone has brought to Light, and which,
consequently, the Scripture assures us, is established and made certain,
only by Revelation. This would not, perhaps, have seemed strange
from thofe, who are justly complained of for flighting the Revelati-
on of the Gospel; and, therefore, would not be much regarded, if
they should contradict to plain a Text of Scripture, in favour of their
all-sufficient Reafon: But what Ufe the Promoters of Scepticism and
Infidelity, in an Age so much fungested by your Lordship, may
make, of what comes from one of your great Authority and Learning,
may deserve your Consideration.

And thus, my Lord, I hope, I have satisfied you concerning Cic-
ero’s Opinion about the Soul, in his first Book of Tusculan Questi-
ona; which, tho’ I easily believe, as your Lordship fays, you are no
Stranger to; yet I humbly conceive, you have not fhewn (and upon
a careful Perufal of that Treatife again, I think, I may boldly fay,
you cannot fhow) one Word in it, that expresses any thing like a
Notion in Tully, of the Soul’s Immateriality, or its being an imma-
terial Subftance.

From what you bring out of Virgil, your Lord-
ship concludes, † That he, no more than Cicero, does
me any Kindness in this Matter, being both Affert-
ers of the Soul’s Immortality. My Lord, were not
the Question of the Soul’s Immateriality, according to Custom, chan-
ged here into that of its Immortality, which I am no lefs an Affertor
of, than either of them, Cicero and Virgil do me all the Kindness I
defired of them in this Matter; and that was to fhow, that they attri-
buted the Word Spiritus to the Soul of Man, without any Thought of its Immateriality; and this the
Verfes, you yourself bring, out of Virgil ‡: Et,
Your Lordship's 

Your Lordship's + Answ der concerning what is said, Eccejfs. xiii. turns wholly upon Solomon's taking the Soul to be immortal, which was not what I questioned: All that I quoted that Place for, was to shew, that Spirit, in English, might properly be applied to the Soul, without any Notion of its Immateriality, as it was by Solomon; which, whether he thought the Souls of Men to be immaterial, does little appear, in that Pallage, where he speaks of the Souls of Men and Beasts together, as he does. But further, what I contended for, is evident from that Place, in that the Word Spirit is there applied, by our Translators, to the Souls of Beasts, which your Lordship, I think, does not rank amongst the immaterial, and, consequently, immortal Spirits, tho' they have Sence and spontaneous Motion.

But you say, + If the Soul be not of itself a free-thinking Substance, you do not see what Foundation there is in Nature, for a Day of Judgment. Anfw. P. 65.

Tho' the Heathen World did not of old, nor do to this Day, see a Foundation in Nature, for a Day of Judgment; yet in Revelation, if that will satisfy your Lordship, every one may see a Foundation for a Day of Judgment, because God has positively declared it; tho' God has not, by that Revelation, taught us, what the Substance of the Soul is; nor has any where said, That the Soul of itself is a free Agent. Whatsoever any created Substance is, it is not of itself, but is by the good Pleasure of its Creator. Whatever Degrees of Perfection it has, it has from the bountiful Hand of its Maker. For it is true, in a natural, as well as a Spiritual Sence, what St. Paul says, * Not that we are sufficient of ourselves, to think any thing, as of ourselves, but our Sufficiency is of God. 

But your Lordship, as I guess, by your following Words, would argue, That a material Substance cannot be a free Agent; whereby I suppose, you only mean, that you cannot see, or conceive, how a solid
solid Substance should begin, stop, or change its own Motion. To which give me leave to answer, That, when you can make it conceivable, how any created, finite, dependant Substance, can move itself, or alter, or stop its own Motion, which it must, to be a free Agent; I suppose you will find it no harder for God to bestow this Power on a solid, than an unsolid, created Substance. Tully, in the Place above quoted, * could not conceive this Power to be in any thing, but what was from Eternity; * Tusculan Quart. L. 1. Con pateat, igitur, aternum id esse quod seipsum moveat, quis est, qui hanc natural animis esse tributam neget? But tho' you cannot see how any created Substance, solid, or not solid, can be a free Agent, (Pardon me, my Lord, if I put in both, until your Lordship please to explain it of either, and shew the manner, how either of them can, of itself, move itself, or any thing else) yet I do not think, you will so far deny Men to be free Agents, from the Difficulty there is to see, how they are free Agents, as to doubt, whether there be Foundation enough for a Day of Judgment.

It is not for me to judge, how far your Lordship's Speculations reach; but finding in myself nothing to be true, than † Eccl. xi. 5. what the wife Solomon tells me; † As thou knowest not what is the way of the Spirit, nor how the Bones do grow in the Womb of her that is with Child; even so thou knowest not the Works of God, who maketh all Things: I gratefully receive, and rejoice in the Light of Revelation, which sets me at rest in many Things; the manner whereof my poor Reason can by no means make out to me: Omnipotency, I know, can do any thing, that contains in it no Contradiction; so that I readily believe whatever God has declared, tho' my Reason find Difficulties in it, which it cannot matter. As, in the present Case, God having revealed that there shall be a Day of Judgment, I think that Foundation enough, to conclude Men are free enough to be made answerable for their Actions, and to receive, according to what they have done; tho' how Man is a free Agent, surpaçs my Explication, or Comprehension.

In answer to the Place I brought out of St.Luke † C. xxiv. your Lordship asks, || Whether, from these Words of our Saviour, it follows, that a Spirit is only an Appearance? I answer, No; nor do I know who drew such an Inference from them: But it follows, that, in Apparitions, there is something that appears, and that That which appears is not wholly immaterial; and yet this was properly called πνεύμα, and was often looked upon, by those who called it πνεύμα in Greek, and now call it Spirit in English, to be the Ghost, or Soul of one departed; which, I humbly conceive, justifies my Use of the Word Spirit, for a thinking, voluntary Agent, whether material, or immaterial.

* r. Anl. P. 67.

Your Lordship says, * That I grant, that it cannot, upon these Principles, be demonstrated, that the spiritual Substance in us is immaterial: From whence you conclude, That then my Grounds of Certainty,
or no; it being impossible for us, by the Contemplation of our own Ideas, without Revelation, to discover, whether Omnipotency has not given to some Systems of Matter, fitly disposed, a Power to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to Matter so disposed, a thinking, immaterial Substance: It being, in respect of our Notions, not much more remote from our Comprehension to conceive, that God can, if He pleases, superadd to Matter a Faculty of Thinking, than that he should superadd to it another Substance, with a Faculty of Thinking; since we know not wherein Thinking consists, nor to what Sort of Substances the Almighty has been pleased to give that Power, which cannot be in any created Being, but merely by the good Pleasure and Bounty of the Creator. For I see no Contradiction in it, that the first, eternal, thinking Being should, if He pleased, give to certain Systems of created, senseless Matter, put together as He thinks fit, some Degrees of Sense, Perception, and Thought: Tho' as I think, I have proved, Lib. IV. Ch. x. §. 14, &c. it is no less than a Contradiction to suppose Matter (which is evidently, in its own Nature, void of Sense and Thought) should be that eternal, first thinking Being. What Certainty of Knowledge can any one have, that some Perceptions, such as, v. g. Pleasure and Pain, should not be in some Bodies themselves, after a certain manner modified and moved, as well as that they should be in an immaterial Substance, upon the Motion of the parts of Body? Body, as far as we can conceive, being able only to strike and affect Body; and Motion, according to the utmost reach of our Ideas, being able to produce nothing but Motion: So that, when we allow it to produce Pleasure, or Pain, or the Idea of a Colour, or Sound, we are fain to quit our Reason, go beyond our Ideas, and attribute it wholly to the good Pleasure of our Maker. For since we must allow He

\[\text{from Ideas, are plainly given up. This being away of arguing, that you often make use of, I have often had occasion to consider it, and cannot, after all, see the Force of this Argument. I acknowledge, that this, or that Proposition cannot, upon my Principle: be demonstrated; Ergo, I grant this Proposition to be false, That Certainty consists in the Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of Ideas: For that is my Ground of Certainty, and, till that be given up, my Grounds of Certainty are not given up.}\]
He has annexed Effects to Motion, which we can no way conceive Motion able to produce, what reason have we to conclude, that He could not order them as well to be produced in a Subject, we cannot conceive capable of them, as well as in a Subject, we cannot conceive the Motion of Matter can any way operate upon? I say not this, that I would any way lessen the Belief of the Soul's Immateriality: I am not here speaking of Probability, but Knowledge; and I think not only, that it becomes the Modesty of Philosophy, not to pronounce magisterially, where we want that Evidence, that can produce Knowledge; but also, that it is of Use to us, to discern how far our Knowledge does reach: For the State we are at present in, not being that of Vision, we must, in many Things, content ourselves with Faith and Probability; and, in the present Question, about the Immateriality of the Soul, if our Faculties cannot arrive at demonstrative Certainty, we need not think it strange. All the great Ends of Morality and Religion, are well enough secured, without Philosophical Proofs of the Soul's Immateriality; since it is evident, that He, who made us at first begin to subsist here, sensible, intelligent Beings, and for several Years continued us in such a State, can, and will restore us to the like State of Sensibility, in another World, and make us capable, there, to receive the Retribution He has designed to Men, according to their Doings in this Life. And, therefore, it is not of such mighty Necessity to determine one way, or the other, as some, over zealous for, or against the Immateriality of the Soul, have been forward to make the World believe. Who either, on the one side, indulging too much their Thoughts, immered altogether in Matter, can allow no Existence to what is not material: Or who, on the other side, finding not Cognition within the natural Powers of Matter, examined over and over again, by the utmost Intention of Mind, have the Confidence to conclude, that Omnipotence Itself cannot give Perception and Thought to a Substance, which has the Modification of Solidity. He that considers how hardly Sensation is, in our Thoughts, reconcileable to extended Matter, or Existence to any Thing that hath no Extension at all, will confess, that
that he is very far from certainly knowing what his Soul is. It is a Point, which seems to me, to be put out of the reach of our Knowledge: And he, who will give himself leave to consider freely, and look into the dark and intricate Part of each Hypothetis, will scarce find his Reason able to determine him fixedly for, or against the Soul's Materiality. Since, on which side forever he views it, either as an unextended Substance, or as a thinking, extended Matter; the Difficulty to conceive either, will, whilst either alone is in his Thoughts, still drive him to the contrary side. An unfair way, which some Men take with themselves: Who, because of the Unconceivableness of something they find in one, throw themselves violently into the contrary Hypothetis, tho' altogether as unintelligible to an unbiassed Understanding. This serves not only to shew the Weakness and Scantiness of our Knowledge, but the insignificant Triumph of such sort of Arguments, which, drawn from our own Views, may satisfy us, that we can find no Certainty on one side of the Question; but do not at all thereby help us to Truth, by running into the opposite Opinion, which, on Examination, will be found clogged with equal Difficulties. For what Safety, what Advantage to any one is it, for the avoiding the seeming Absurdities, and, to him, unsurmountable Rubs he meets with, in one Opinion, to take refuge in the contrary, which is built on something altogether as inexplicable, and as far remote from his Comprehension? It is past Controversy, that we have in us something that thinks; our very Doubts, about what it is, confirm the Certainty of its Being, tho' we must content ourselves in the Ignorance of what kind of Being it is: And it is as vain to go about to be sceptical in this, as it is unreasonable in most other Cases to be positive against the Being of any Thing, because we cannot comprehend its Nature. For I would fain know what Substance exists, that has not something in it, which manifestly baffles our Understandings. Other Spirits, who see and know the Nature and inward Constitution of Things, how much must they exceed us in Knowledge? To which if we add larger Comprehension, which enables them at one Glance to see the Connexion and Agreement of very many Ideas, and readily
readily supplies to them the intermediate Proofs, which we, by single and slow Steps, and long poring in the Dark, hardly at last find out, and are often ready to forget one, before we have hunted out another; we may guess at some Part of the Happiness of superior Ranks of Spirits, who have a quicker and more penetrating Sight, as well as a larger Field of Knowledge. But to return to the Argument in hand; our Knowledge, I say, is not only limited to the Paukey and Imperfections of the Ideas we have, and which we employ it about, but even comes short of that too; but how far it reaches, let us now enquire.

How far our Knowledge reaches.

§. 7. The Affirmations, or Negations we make, concerning the Ideas we have, may, as I have before intimated in general, be reduced to these four Sorts, viz. Identity, Co-existence, Relation, and real Existence. I shall examine how far our Knowledge extends in each of these.

First, Our Knowledge of Identity and Diversity, as far as our Ideas.

§. 8. First, As to Identity and Diversity, in this way of the Agreement, or Disagreement of our Ideas, our intuitive Knowledge is as far extended as our Ideas themselves; and there can be no Idea in the Mind, which it does not presently, by an intuitive Knowledge, perceive to be what it is, and to be different from any other.

Secondly, Of Co-existence, a very little way.

§. 9. Secondly, As to the second Sort, which is the Agreement, or Disagreement of our Ideas in Co-existence; in this, our Knowledge is very short, tho' in this consists the greatest and most material Part of our Knowledge concerning Substances. For our Ideas of the Species of Substances, being, as I have shewed, nothing but certain Collections of simple Ideas, united in one Subject, and so co-existing together; v.g. our Idea of Flame is a Body hot, luminous, and moving upward; of Gold, a Body heavy to a certain Degree, yellow, malleable, and fusible: These, or some such complex Ideas as these in Mens Minds, do these two Names of the different Substances, Flame, and Gold, stand for. When we would know any thing farther concerning these, or any other Sort of Substances, what do we enquire, but what
what other Qualities, or Powers, these Substances have, or have not? Which is nothing else, but to know, what other simple Ideas do, or do not co-exist, with those that make up that complex Idea?

§ 10. This, how weighty and considerable a Part ever of Human Science, is yet very narrow, and scarce any at all. The Reason whereof is, that the simple Ideas, whereof our complex Ideas of Substances are made up, are, for the most part, such as carry with them, in their own Nature, no visible, necessary Connexion, or Inconsistency with any other simple Ideas, whose Co-existence with them we would inform ourselves about.

§ 11. The Ideas, that our complex ones of Substances are made up of, and about which our Knowledge concerning Substances, is most employed, are those of their secondary Qualities: Which depending all (as has been shewn) upon the primary Qualities of their minute and insensible Parts; or, if not upon them, upon something yet more remote from our Comprehension, it is impossible we should know which have a necessary Union, or Inconsistency one with another: For not knowing the Root they spring from, not knowing what Size, Figure, and Texture of Parts they are, on which depend, and from which result those Qualities, which make our complex Idea of Gold, it is impossible we should know what other Qualities result from, or are incompatible with the same Constitution of the insensible Parts of Gold; and so, consequently, must always co-exist with that complex Idea we have of it, or else are inconsistent with it.

§ 12. Besides this Ignorance of the primary Qualities of the insensible Parts of Bodies, on which depend all their secondary Qualities, there is yet another and more incurable Part of Ignorance, which sets us more remote from a certain Knowledge of the Co-existence, or Inco-existence (if I may so say) of different Ideas in the same Subject; and that is, that there is no discoverable
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Connexion between any secondary quality, and those primary qualities which it depends on.

§. 13. That the Size, Figure and Motion of one Body, should cause a Change in the Size, Figure and Motion of another Body, is not beyond our Conception: The Separation of the Parts of one Body, upon the Intrusion of another; and the Change from Rest to Motion, upon Impulse; these, and the like, seem to us to have some connexion one with another. And, if we knew these primary qualities of Bodies, we might have reason to hope, we might be able to know a great deal more of these Operations of them, one upon another: But, our Minds not being able to discover any connexion betwixt these primary qualities of Bodies, and the Sensations that are produced in us by them, we can never be able to establish certain and undoubted Rules of the Consequences, or co-existence of any secondary qualities, tho' we could discover the Size, Figure, or Motion of those invisible Parts, which immediately produce them. We are so far from knowing what Figure, Size, or Motion of Parts produce a yellow Colour, a sweet Taste, or a sharp Sound, that we can by no means conceive how any size, figure, or Motion of any particles, can possibly produce in us the idea of any Colour, Taste, or Sound whatsoever; there is no conceivable connexion betwixt the one and the other.

§. 14. In vain, therefore, shall we endeavour to discover by our ideas, (the only true way of certain and universal knowledge) what other ideas are to be found constantly joined with that of our complex idea of any substance: Since we neither know the real Constitution of the minute Parts, on which their qualities do depend; nor, did we know them, could we discover any necessary connexion between them, and any of the secondary qualities; which is necessary to be done, before we can certainly know their necessary co-existence. So that, let our complex idea of any species of substances be what it will, we can hardly, from the simple ideas contained in it, certainly determine the necessary co-existence of any other quality whatsoever. Our knowledge, in all these enquiries, reaches very little farther than our experience. Indeed some few of the primary qualities have a necessary
necessary Dependence, and visible Connexion one with another, as Figure necessarily supposes Extention; receiving, or communicat Yng Motion by Impulse, supposes Solidity. But tho' these, and, perhaps, some others of our Ideas, have, yet there are so few of them, that have a visible Connexion one with another, that we can, by Intuition, or Demonstration, discover the Co-existence of very few of the Qualities are to be found united in Substances; and we are left only to the Assistance of our Senses, to make known to us what Qualities they contain. For of all the Qualities that are co-existent in any Subject, without this Dependence, and evident Connexion of their Ideas one with another, we cannot know certainly any two to co-exist, any farther than Experience, by our Senses, informs us. Thus, tho' we see the yellow Colour, and upon trial find the Weight, Malleableness, Fusibility, and Fixedness, that are united in a Piece of Gold; yet, because no one of these Ideas has any evident Dependence, or necessary Connexion with the other, we cannot certainly know, that where any four of these are, the fifth will be there also, how highly probable it may be; because the highest Probability amounts not to Certainty, without which there can be no true Knowledge. For this Co-existence can be no farther known than it is perceived; and it cannot be perceived, but either in particular Subjects, by the Observation of our Senses, or in general, by the necessary Connexion of the Ideas themselves.

§. 15. As to Incompatibility, or Repugnancy to Co-existence, we may know, that any Subject can have, of each Sort of primary Qualities, but one particular at once; e.g. each particular Extension, Figure, Number of Parts, Motion, excludes all other of each kind. The like also is certain of all sensible Ideas, peculiar to each Sense; for whatever of each kind is present in any Subject, excludes all other of that Sort; e.g. no one Subject can have two Smells, or two Colours at the same time. To this, perhaps, will be said, has not an Opall, or an Infusion of Lignum Nepkriticum, two Colours at the same time? To which I answer, that these Bodies, to Eyes differently placed, may, at the same time, afford different Colours: But I take Liberty also to
to say, that to Eyes differently placed, it is different Parts of the Object that reflect the Particles of Light: And, therefore, it is not the same Part of the Object, and so not the very same Subject, which, at the same time, appears both yellow and azure. For it is as impossible that the very same Particle of any Body should, at the same time, differently modify, or reflect the Rays of Light, as that it should have two different Figures and Textures at the same time.

§. 16. But, as to the Powers of Substances, to change the sensible Qualities of other Bodies, which make a great Part of our Enquiries about them, and is no inconsiderable Branch of our Knowledge; I doubt, as to these, whether our Knowledge reaches much farther than our Experience; or whether we can come to the Discovery of most of these Powers, and be certain that they are in any Subject, by the Connexion with any of those Ideas, which to us make its Essence. Because the active and passive Powers of Bodies, and their ways of operating, consist in a Texture and Motion of Parts, which we cannot by any means come to discover; it is but in very few Cases, we can be able to perceive their Dependence on, or Repugnance to any of those Ideas, which make our complex one of that Sort of Things. I have here instanced in the Corpuscularian Hypothesis, as that which is thought to go farthest in an intelligible Explication of the Qualities of Bodies; and I fear the Weakness of Human Understanding is scarce able to substitute another, which will afford us a fuller and clearer Discovery of the necessary Connexion and Co-existence of the Powers, which are to be observed united in several Sorts of them. This, at least, is certain, that which ever Hypothesis be clearest and truest, (for of that it is not my Business to determine) our Knowledge, concerning corporal Substances, will be very little advanced by any of them, till we are made to see, what Qualities and Powers of Bodies have a necessary Connexion, or Repugnancy one with another; which, in the present State of Philosophy, I think we know but to a very small degree: And, I doubt, whether, with those Faculties we have, we shall ever be able to carry our general
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General Knowledge (I say not particular Experience) in this Part much farther. Experience is that which, in this Part, we must depend on. And it were to be wished, that it were more improved. We find the Advantages from Men's generous Pains, have this way brought to the Stock of natural Knowledge. And if others, especially the Philosophers by Fire, who pretend to it, had been so wary in their Observations, and sincere in their Reports, as those, who call themselves Philosophers, ought to have been; our Acquaintance with the Bodies here about us, and our Insight into their Powers and Operations, had been yet much greater.

§. 17. If we are at a loss, in respect of the Powers and Operations of Bodies, I think it is easy to conclude, we are much more in the Dark in reference to Spirits; whereof we naturally have no Ideas, but what we draw from that of our own, by reflecting on the Operations of our own Souls within us, as far as they can come within our Observation. But how inconsiderable a Rank, the Spirits that inhabit our Bodies hold, amongst those various, and, possibly, innumerable Kinds of nobler Beings; and how far short they come of the Endowments and Perfections of Cherubim and Seraphim, and infinite sorts of Spirits above us; is what, by a transient Hint, in another Place, I have offered to my Reader's Consideration.

§. 18. As to the third Sort of our Knowledge, viz. the Agreement, or Disagreement of any of our Ideas, in any other Relation: This, as it is the largest Field of our Knowledge, so it is hard to determine how far it may extend; because the Advances, that are made in this Part of Knowledge, depending on our Sagacity, in finding intermediate Ideas, that may shew the Relations and Habitudes of Ideas, whose Co-existence is not considered, it is a hard matter to tell when we are at an end of such Discoveries; and when Reason has all the Helps it is capable of; for the finding of Proofs, or examining the Agreement, or Disagreement of remote Ideas. They, that are ignorant of Algebra, cannot imagine the Wonders in this Kind are to be done by
by it: And what further Improvements and Helps, advantageous to other Parts of Knowledge, the sagacious Mind of Man may yet find out, it is not easy to determine. This at least I believe, that the Ideas of Quantity are not those alone that are capable of Demonstration and Knowledge; and that other, and, perhaps, more useful Parts of Contemplation, would afford us Certainty, if Vices, Passions, and domineering Interest did not oppose, or menace such Endeavours.

The Idea of a supreme Being, infinite in Power, Goodness and Wisdom, whose Workmanship we are, and on whom we depend; and the Idea of ourselves, as understanding, rational Beings, being such as are clear in us, would, I suppose, if duly considered and pursued, afford such Foundations of our Duty and Rules of Action, as might place Morality amongst the Sciences, capable of Demonstration; wherein I doubt not, but from self-evident Propositions, by necessary Consequences, as incontestible as those in Mathematics, the Measures of Right and Wrong might be made out, to any one that will apply himself with the same Indifference and Attention to the one, as he does to the other of these Sciences. The Relation of other Modes may certainly be perceived, as well as those of Number and Extension: And I cannot see, why they should not also be capable of Demonstration, if due Methods were thought on to examine, or pursue their Agreement, or Disagreement. Where there is no Property, there is no Injustice, is a Proposition as certain as any Demonstration in Euclid: For the Idea of Property, being a Right to any thing; and the Idea, to which the Name Injustice is given, being the Invasion, or Violation of that Right; it is evident, that these Ideas being thus established, and those Names annexed to them, I can as certainly know this Proposition to be true, as that a Triangle has three Angles equal to two right ones. Again, No Government allows absolute Liberty: The Idea of Government being the Establishment of Society upon certain Rules, or Laws, which require Conformity to them: And the Idea of absolute Liberty being for any one to do whatever he pleases; I am as capable
capable of being certain of the Truth of this Proposition, as of any in the Mathematics.

§. 19. That which, in this respect, has given the Advantage to the Ideas of Quantity, and made them thought more capable of Certainty and Demonstration, is, 

First, That they can be set down and represented by sensible Marks, which have a greater and nearer Correspondence with them than any Words, or Sounds whatsoever. Diagrams, drawn on Paper, are Copies of the Ideas in the Mind, and not liable to the Uncertainty that Words carry in their Signification. An Angle, Circle, or Square, drawn in Lines, lies open to the View, and cannot be mistaken: It remains unchangeable, and may, at leisure, be considered and examined, and the Demonstration be revised, and all the Parts of it may be gone over, more than once, without any Danger of the leaft Change in the Ideas. This cannot be thus done in moral Ideas, we have no sensible Marks that resemble them, whereby we can set them down; we have nothing but Words to express them by: Which tho', when written, they remain the same, yet the Ideas, they stand for, may change in the same Man; and it is very seldom that they are not different in different Persons.

Secondly, Another Thing, that makes the greater Difficulty in Ethics, is, That moral Ideas are commonly more complex, than those of the Figures ordinarily considered in Mathematics. From whence these two Inconveniences follow: First, That their Names are of more uncertain Signification, the precise Collection of simple Ideas, they stand for, not being so easily agreed on, and so the Sign that is used for them in Communication, always, and in Thinking often, does not steadily carry with it the same Idea. Upon which the same Disorder, Confusion and Error follows, as would, if a Man, going to demonstrate something of an Heptagon, should, in the Diagram he took to do it, leave out one of the Angles, or by Overlight make the Figure with one Angle more, than the Name ordinarily imported, or he intended it should, when at first he thought of his Demonstration. This often
often happens, and is hardly avoidable in very complex, moral

Ideas, where the same Name being retained, one Angle, i.e. one

simple Idea, is left out, or put in, in the complex one, (still call-
ed by the same Name) more at one Time than another. Second-

ly, From the Complexedness of these moral Ideas, there follows

another Inconvenience, viz. that the Mind cannot easily retain

those precise Combinations so exactly and perfectly, as is ne-

cessary in the Examination of the Habitues and Corresponden-
cies, Agreements, or Disagreements of several of them, one with

another; especially where it is to be judged of, by long Deduc-
tions, and the Intervention of several other complex Ideas, to

shew the Agreement, or Disagreement of two remote ones.

The great Help against this, which Mathematicians find in

Diagrams and Figures, which remain unalterable in their

Draughts, is very apparent, and the Memory would often have

great Difficulty otherwise to retain them so exactly, whilst the

Mind went over the Parts of them, Step by Step, to examine

their several Correspondencies. And th'o, in calling up a long

Sum, either in Addition, Multiplication, or Division, every Part

be only a Progression of the Mind, taking a View of its own

Ideas, and considering their Agreement, or Disagreement; and

the Resolution of the Question be nothing but the Result of the

whole, made up of such Particulars, whereof the Mind has a
clear Perception: Yet without setting down the several Parts

by Marks, whose precise Significations are known, and by

Marks, that left and remain in View, when the Memory had

let them go, it would be almost impossible to carry so many
different Ideas in Mind, without confounding, or letting slip

some Parts of the Reckoning, and thereby making all our Rea-
onings about it useless. In which Case, the Cyphers, or Marks,
help not the Mind at all to perceive the Agreement of any two,
or more Numbers, their Equalities, or Proportions: That the
Mind has only by Intuition of its own Ideas of the Numbers
themselves. But the numerical Characters are Helps to the
Memory, to record and retain the several Ideas, about which
the Demonstration is made, whereby a Man may know, how
far his intuitive Knowledge, in surveying several of the Particu-
culars,
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 particulars, has proceeded; that so he may, without Confusion, go on to what is yet unknown, and at last, have in one View before him the Result of all his Perceptions and Reasonings.

§ 20. One part of these Disadvantages in moral Ideas, which has made them be thought not capable of Demonstration, may in a good measure be remedied by Definitions, setting down that Collection of simple Ideas, which every Term shall stand for, and then using the Terms steadily and constantly for that precise Collection. And what Methods Algebra, or something of that kind, may hereafter suggest, to remove the other Difficulties, is not easy to foretell. Confident I am, that if Men would, in the same Method, and with the same Indifference, search after moral, as they do mathematical Truths, they would find them to have a stronger Connexion one with another, and a more necessary Consequence from our clear and distinct Ideas, and to come nearer perfect Demonstration than is commonly imagined. But much of this is not to be expected, whilst the Desire of Esteem, Riches, or Power, makes Men espouse the well endowed Opinions in Fashion, and then seek Arguments, either to make good their Beauty, or varnish over and cover their Deformity: Nothing being so beautiful to the Eye, as Truth is to the Mind: Nothing so deformed and irreconcileable to the Understanding, as a Lie. For tho' many a Man can with Satisfaction enough own a no very handsome Wife in his Bosom; yet who is bold enough openly to avow, that he has espoused a Fals-hood, and received into his Breast so ugly a Thing as a Lie? Whilst the Parties of Men cram their Tenets down all Men's Throats, whom they can get into their Power, without permitting them to examine their Truth, or Falshood, and will not let Truth have Fair-play in the World, nor Men the Liberty to search after it; What Improvements can be expected of this kind? What greater Light can be hoped for, in the moral Sciences? The subject part of Mankind in most Places might, instead thereof, with Egyptian Bondage, expect Egyptian Darkness, were not the Candle of the Lord set up by Himself in Mens Minds,
Minds, which it is impossible for the Breath, or Power of Man wholly to extinguish.

§. 21. As to the fourth sort of our Knowledge, viz. of the real actual Existence of Things, we have an intuitive Knowledge of our own Existence; a demonstrative Knowledge of the Existence of a God; of the Existence of any thing else, we have no other but a sensitive Knowledge, which extends not beyond the Objects present to our Senses.

§. 22. Our Knowledge being so narrow, as I have shewed, it will, perhaps, give us some Light into the present State of our Minds, if we look a little into the dark side, and take a view of our Ignorance: Which, being infinitely larger than our Knowledge, may serve much to the quieting of Disputes, and Improvement of useful Knowledge; if discovering how far we have clear and distinct Ideas, we confine our Thoughts within the Contemplation of those Things, that are within the Reach of our Understandings, and launch not out into that Abyss of Darkness (where we have not Eyes to see, nor Faculties to perceive any Thing) out of a Presumption, that nothing is beyond our Comprehension. But to be satisfied of the Folly of such a Conceit, we need not go far. He, that knows any thing, knows this in the first place, that he need not seek long for Instances of his Ignorance. The meanest and most obvious Things, that come in our way, have dark sides, that the quickest Sight cannot penetrate into. The clearest and most enlarged Understandings of thinking Men, find themselves puzzled, and at a loss, in every Particle of Matter. We shall the least wonder to find it so, when we consider the Causes of our Ignorance; which, from what has been said, I suppose, will be found to be chiefly these three:

First, Want of Ideas.
Secondly, Want of a discoverable Connexion between the Ideas we have.
Thirdly, Want of tracing and examining our Ideas.

§. 23. First,
First, there are some things, and those not a few, that we are ignorant of, for want of ideas.

First, all the simple ideas we have, are confined (as I have shewn) to those we receive from corporeal objects, by sensation, and from the operations of our own minds, as the objects of reflection. But how much these few and narrow inlets are disproportionate to the vast, whole extent of all beings, will not be hard to persuade those, who are not so foolish as to think their span the measure of all things. What other simple ideas it is possible the creatures in other parts of the universe may have, by the assistance of senses and faculties, more, or perfected than we have, or different from ours, it is not for us to determine. But to say, or think there are no such, because we conceive nothing of them, is no better an argument, than if a blind man should be positive in it, that there was no such thing as sight and colours, because he had no manner of idea of any such thing, nor could by any means frame to himself any notions about seeing. The ignorance and darkness that is in us, no more hinders, nor confines the knowledge that is in others, than the blindness of a mole is an argument against the quick-sight of an eagle. He, that will consider the infinite power, wisdom, and goodness of the creator of all things, will find reason to think, it was not all laid out upon so inconsiderable, mean, and impotent a creature, as he will find man to be; who, in all probability, is one of the lowest of all intellectual beings. What faculties, therefore, other species of creatures have to penetrate into the nature and inmost constitutions of things; what ideas they may receive of them, far different from ours, we know not. This we know, and certainly find, that we want several other views of them, besides those we have, to make discoveries of them more perfect. And we may be convinced, that the ideas we can attain to, by our faculties, are very disproportionate to things themselves, when a positive, clear, distinct one of substance itself, which is the foundation of all the rest, is concealed.
ed from us. But want of Ideas of this kind, being a Part, as well as Cause of our Ignorance, cannot be described. Only this, I think, I may confidently say of it, that the intellectual and sensible World, are in this perfectly alike; that That Part, which we see of either of them, holds no Proportion with what we see not: And whatsoever we can reach with our Eyes, or our Thoughts, of either of them, is but a Point, almost nothing in Comparison of the rest.

§. 24. Secondly, Another great Cause of Ignorance, is the want of Ideas we are capable of. Because of their Remoteness; or, As the want of Ideas, which our Faculties are not able to give us, shuts us wholly from those Views of Things, which it is reasonable to think other Beings, perfecfer than we, have, of which we know nothing; so the want of Ideas, I now speak of, keeps us in Ignorance of Things, we conceive capable of being known to us. Bulk, Figure, and Motion, we have Ideas of. But tho' we are not without Ideas of these primary Qualities of Bodies in general, yet not knowing what is the particular Bulk, Figure, and Motion, of the greatest Part of the Bodies of the Universe, we are ignorant of the several Powers, Efficacies, and ways of Operation, whereby the Effects, which we daily see, are produced. These are hid from us in some Things, by being too remote; and in others, by being too minute. When we consider the vast Distance of the known and visible Parts of the World, and the Reasons we have to think, that what lies within our Ken, is but a finall Part of the immense Universe, we shall then discover an huge Abyss of Ignorance. What are the particular Fabrics of the great Masses of Matter, which make up the whole stupendous Frame of Corporeal Beings, how far they are extended, what is their Motion, and how continued, or communicated, and what Influence they have one upon another, are Contemplations that, at first Glimpse, our Thoughts lose themselves in. If we narrow our Contemplation, and confine our Thoughts to this little Canton, I mean this System of our Sun, and the groffer Masses of Matter, that visibly move about it; what several Sorts of Vegetables, Animals, and intellectual, corporeal Beings, infinitely different from those
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those of our little Spot of Earth, may there probably be in the other Planets, to the Knowledge of which, even of their outward Figures and Parts, we can no way attain, whilst we are confined to this Earth; there being no natural Means, either by Sensation, or Reflection, to convey their certain Ideas into our Minds? They are out of the reach of those Inlets of all our Knowledge: And what Sorts of Furniture and Inhabitants those Mansions contain in them, we cannot so much as guess, much less have clear and distinct Ideas of them.

§. 25. If a great, nay, far the greatest Part of the several Ranks of Bodies in the Universe, escape our Notice by their Remoteness, there are others that are no less concealed from us by their Minuteness. These insensible Corpuscles, being the active Parts of Matter, and the great Instruments of Nature, on which depend not only all their secondary Qualities, but also most of their natural Operations, our want of precise, distinct Ideas of their primary Qualities, keeps us in an incurable Ignorance of what we desire to know about them. I doubt not, but if we could discover the Figure, Size, Texture, and Motion of the minute, constituent Parts of any two Bodies, we should know, without Trial, several of their Operations one upon another, as we do now the Properties of a Square, or a Triangle. Did we know the mechanical Affections of the Particles of Rhubarb, Hemlock, Opium, and a Man, as a Watchmaker does those of a Watch, whereby it performs its Operations, and of a File, which, by rubbing on them, will alter the Figure of any of the Wheels; we should be able to tell beforehand, that Rhubarb will purge, Hemlock kill, and Opium make a Man sleep, as well a Watchmaker can, that a little piece of Paper, laid on the Balance, will keep the Watch from going, till it be removed; or that some small Part of it, being rubbed by a File, the Machine would quite lose its Motion, and the Watch go no more. The dissolving of Silver in Aqua Fortis, and Gold in Aqua Regia, and not vice versa, would be then, perhaps, no more difficult to know, than it is to a Smith to understand, why the turning of one Key will open a Lock, and not the turning of another.
another. But whilst we are destitute of Senses, acute enough to discover the minute Particles of Bodies, and to give us Ideas of their mechanical Affections, we must be content to be ignorant of their Properties and Ways of Operation; nor can we be assured about them any farther, than some few Trials we make, are able to reach. But whether they will succeed again another time, we cannot be certain. This hinders our certain Knowledge of universal Truths, concerning natural Bodies: And our Reason carries us herein, very little beyond particular Matter of Fact.

§. 26. And, therefore, I am apt to doubt, that how far soever human Industry may advance useful and experimental Philosophy in physical Things, scientifical will still be out of our reach; because we want perfect and adequate Ideas of those very Bodies, which are nearest to us, and most under our command. Those, which we have ranked into Classes under Names, and we think ourselves best acquainted with, we have but very imperfect and incomplete Ideas of. Distinct Ideas of the several Sorts of Bodies, that fall under the Examination of our Senses, perhaps, we may have: But adequate Ideas, I suspect, we have not of any one amongst them. And tho' the former of these will serve us for common Use and Discourse, yet, whilst we want the latter, we are not capable of scientifical Knowledge; nor shall ever be able to discover general, instructive, unquestionable Truths concerning them. Certainty and Demonstration, are Things we must not, in these Matters, pretend to. By the Colour, Figure, Taste, and Smell, and other sensible Qualities, we have as clear and distinct Ideas of Sage and Hemloc, as we have of a Circle and a Triangle: But having no Ideas of the particular, primary Qualities of the minute Parts of either of these Plants, nor of other Bodies, which we would apply them to, we cannot tell what Effects they will produce; nor when we see those Effects, can we so much as guess, much less know, their manner of Production. Thus, having no Ideas of the particular, mechanical Affections of the minute Parts of Bodies, that are within our view and reach, we are ignorant of their Constitutions, Powers, and Operations:
rations: And of Bodies more remote, we are yet more ignorant, not knowing so much as their very outward Shapes, or the sensible and grosser Parts of their Constitutions.

§. 27. This, at first sight, will shew us how disproportionate our Knowledge is to the whole Extent even of material Beings; to which, if we add the Consideration of that infinite Number of Spirits, that may be, and probably are, which are yet more remote from our Knowledge, whereof we have no Cognizance, nor can frame to ourselves any distinct Ideas of their several Ranks and Sorts, we shall find this Cause of Ignorance conceal from us, in an impenetrable Obscurity, almost the whole intellectual World; a greater certainly, and more beautiful World than the material. For bating some very few, and those, if I may so call them, superficial Ideas of Spirit, which by Reflexion we get of our own, and from thence the best we can collect of the Father of all Spirits, the eternal, independent Author of them, and us, and all Things; we have no certain Information, so much as of the Existence of other Spirits, but by Revelation. Angels of all Sorts are naturally beyond our Discovery: And all those Intelligences, whereof it is likely there are more Orders than of corporeal Substances, are Things, whereof our natural Faculties give us no certain Account at all. That there are Minds, and thinking Beings in other Men, as well as himself, every Man has a Reason, from their Words and Actions, to be satisfied: And the Knowledge of his own Mind cannot suffer a Man, that considers, to be ignorant, that there is a God. But that there are Degrees of Spiritual Beings between us and the great God, who is there that, by his own Search and Ability, can come to know? Much less have we distinct Ideas of their different Natures, Conditions, States, Powers, and several Constitutions, wherein they agree, or differ from one another, and from us. And, therefore, in what concerns their different Species and Properties, we are under an absolute Ignorance.

§. 28. Secondly, What a small Part of the Substantial Beings, that are in the Universe, the
want of Ideas leave open to our Knowledge, we have seen. In the next place, another Cause of Ignorance, of no less Moment, is a want of a discoverable Connexion between those Ideas we have: For wherever we want that, we are utterly uncapable of universal and certain Knowledge; and are, as in the former Cafe, left only to Observation and Experiment: Which, how narrow and confined it is, how far from general Knowledge, we need not be told. I shall give some few Instances of this Cause of our Ignorance, and so leave it. It is evident that the Bulk, Figure, and Motion, of several Bodies about us, produce in us several Sensations, as of Colours, Sounds, Tastes, Smells, Pleasure and Pain, &c. These mechanical Affections of Bodies having no Affinity at all with those Ideas they produce in us, (there being no conceivable Connexion between any Impulse of any Sort of Body, and any Perception of a Colour, or Smell, which we find in our Minds) we can have no distinct Knowledge of such Operations beyond our Experience; and can reason no otherwise about them, than as Effects produced by the Appointment of an infinitely Wise Agent, which perfectly surpafs our Comprehensions. As the Ideas of sensible, secondary Qualities, which we have in our Minds, can by us be no way deduced from bodily Causes, nor any Correspondence, or Connexion, be found between them and those primary Qualities, which (Experience shews us) produce them in us: So, on the other side, the Operation of our Minds upon our Bodies is as unconceivable. How any Thought should produce a Motion in Body, is as remote from the Nature of our Ideas, as how any Body should produce any Thought in the Mind. That it is so, if Experience did not convince us, the Consideration of the Things themselves would never be able, in the leaft, to discover to us. These, and the like, tho’ they have a constant and regular Connexion, in the ordinary Course of Things; yet that Connexion being not discoverable in the Ideas themselves, which appearing to have no necessary Dependence one on another, we can attribute their Connexion to nothing else, but the arbitrary Determination of that all-wise Agent, who has made them to be,
and to operate as they do, in a way wholly above our weak Understandings to conceive.

§. 29. In some of our Ideas there are certain Instances. Relations, Habitudes, and Connexions, so visibly included in the Nature of the Ideas themselves, that we cannot conceive them separable from them, by any Power whatsoever. And in these only, we are capable of certain and universal Knowledge. Thus the Idea of a right lined Triangle necessarily carries with it an Equality of its Angles to two right ones. Nor can we conceive this Relation, this Connexion of these two Ideas, to be possibly mutable, or to depend on any arbitrary Power, which of choice made it thus, or could make it otherwise. But the Coherence and Continuity of the Parts of Matter; the Production of Sensation in us of Colours and Sounds, &c. by Impulse and Motion; nay, the original Rules and Communication of Motion being such, wherein we can discover no natural Connexion with any Ideas we have, we cannot but ascribe them to the arbitrary Will and good Pleasure of the wise Architect. I need not, I think, here mention the Resurrection of the Dead, the future State of this Globe of Earth, and such other Things, which are by every one acknowledged to depend wholly on the Determination of a free Agent. The Things that, as far as our Observation reaches, we constantly find to proceed regularly, we may conclude, do act by a Law set them; but yet by a Law that we know not: Whereby, tho' Causes work steadily, and Effects constantly flow from them, yet their Connexions and Dependences being not discoverable in our Ideas, we can have but an experimental Knowledge of them. From all which it is easy to perceive, what a Darkness we are involved in, how little it is of Being, and the Things that are, that we are capable to know. And, therefore, we shall do no Injury to our Knowledge, when we modestly think with ourselves, that we are so far from being able to comprehend the whole Nature of the Universe, and all the Things contained in it, that we are not capable of a Philosophical Knowledge of the Bodies that are about us, and make a part of us: Concerning their secondary Qualities, Powers, and Operations, we can have no universal
universal Certainty. Several Effects come every Day within the Notice of our Senses, of which we have so far sensitive Knowledge; but the Causes, Manner, and Certainty of their Production, for the two foregoing Reasons, we must be content to be ignorant of. In these we can go no farther than particular Experience informs us of matter of Fact, and, by Analogy, to guess what Effects the like Bodies are, upon other Trials, like to produce. But as to a perfect Science of natural Bodies, (not to mention Spiritual Beings) we are, I think, so far from being capable of any such thing, that I conclude it lost Labour to seek after it.

§. 30. Thirdly Where we have adequate Idées, and where there is a certain and discoverable Connexion between them, yet we are often ignorant, for want of tracing those Ideas, which we have, or may have; and for want of finding out those intermediate Ideas, which may shew us what Habitude of Agreement, or Disagreement they have one with another. And thus many are ignorant of mathematical Truths, not out of any Imperfection of their Faculties, or Uncertainty in the Things themselves, but for want of Application in acquiring, examining, and by due ways comparing those Ideas. That which has most contributed to hinder the due tracing of our Ideas, and finding out their Relations, and Agreements, or Disagreements one with another, has been, I suppose, the ill use of Words. It is impossible that Men should ever truly seek, or certainly discover the Agreement, or Disagreement of Ideas themselves, whilst their Thoughts flutter about, or flick only in Sounds of doubtful and uncertain Significations. Mathematicians, abstracting their Thoughts from Names, and accustoming themselves to set before their Minds the Ideas themselves that they would consider, and not Sounds instead of them, have avoided thereby a great part of that Perplexity, Puddering, and Confusion, which has so much hindered Mens Progress in other Parts of Knowledge. For whilst they flick in Words of undetermined and uncertain Signification, they are unable to distinguish True from False, Certain from Probable, Consistent from Inconsistent, in
their own Opinions. This having been the Fate, or Misfortune of a great part of the Men of Letters, the Increase, brought into the Stock of real Knowledge, has been very little, in Proportion to the Schools, Disputes, and Writings, the World has been filled with; whilst Students, being lost in the great Wood of Words, knew not whereabouts they were, how far their Discoveries were advanced, or what was wanting in their own, or the general Stock of Knowledge. Had Men, in the Discoveries of the material, done, as they have in those of the intellectual World, involved in all the Obscurity of uncertain and doubtful ways of talking, Volumes writ of Navigation and Voyages, Theories and Stories of Zones and Tides, multiplied and disputed; nay, Ships built, and Fleets set out, would never have taught us the way beyond the Line; and the Antipodes would be still as much unknown, as when it was declared Hereby to hold there were any. But, having spoken sufficiently of Words, and the ill, or careless Use that is commonly made of them, I shall not say anything more of it here.

§. 31. Hitherto we have examined the Extent of our Knowledge, in respect of the several Sorts of Beings that are. There is another Extent of it, in respect of Universality, which will also deserve to be considered; and in this regard, our Knowledge follows the Nature of our Ideas. If the Ideas are abstract, whose Agreement or Disagreement we perceive, our Knowledge is universal. For what is known of such general Ideas, will be true of every particular Thing, in whom that Essence, i.e. that abstract Idea is to be found; and what is once known of such Ideas, will be perpetually and for ever true. So that as to all general Knowledge, we must search and find it only in our Minds, and it is only the examining of our own Ideas, that furnisheth us with that. Truths belonging to Essences of Things, (that is, to abstract Ideas) are eternal, and are to be found out, by the Contemplation only of those Essences; as the Existences of Things is to be known only from Experience. But having more to say of this, in the Chapters, where I shall speak of general
general and real Knowledge, this may here suffice as to the Universality of our Knowledge in general.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Reality of Human Knowledge.

§ 1. I DOUBT not but my Reader, by this time, may be apt to think, that I have been, all this while, only building a Castle in the Air; and be ready to say to me, to what Purpose all this Stir? Knowledge, say you, is only the Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of our own Ideas: But who knows what those Ideas may be? Is there any thing so extravagant, as the Imaginations of Mens Brains? Where is the Head that has no Chimeras in it? Or, if there be a sober and a wise Man, what difference will there be, by your Rules, between his Knowledge, and that of the most extravagant Fancy in the World? They both have their Ideas, and perceive their Agreement and Disagreement one with another. If there be any difference between them, the Advantage will be on the warm-headed Man's side, as having the more Ideas, and the more lively: And so, by your Rules, he will be the more knowing. If it be true, that all Knowledge lies only in the Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of our own Ideas, the Visions of an Enthusiast, and the Reasonings of a sober Man, will be equally certain. It is no matter how Things are; so a Man observe but the Agreement of his own Imaginations, and talk conformably, it is all Truth, all Certainty. Such Castles in the Air will be as strong Holds of Truth, as the Demonstrations of Euclid. That an Harpy is not a Centaur, is by this way as certain Knowledge, and as much a Truth, as that a Square is not a Circle.

But of what Use is all this fine Knowledge of Mens own Imaginations, to a Man that enquires after the Reality of Things? It matters not what Mens Fancies are, it is the Knowledge of Things
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Things that is only to be prized; it is this alone gives a Value to our Reasonings, and Preference to one Man's Knowledge over another's, that it is of Things as they really are, and not of Dreams and Fancies.

§ 2. To which I answer, that if our Knowledge of our Ideas terminate in them, and reach no farther, where there is something farther intended, our most serious Thoughts will be of little more Use, than the Reveries of a crazy Brain; and the Truths built thereon of no more Weight than the Discourses of a Man, who sees Things clearly in a Dream, and with great Assurance utters them. But, I hope, before I have done, to make it evident, that this way of Certainty, by the Knowledge of our own Ideas, goes a little farther than bare Imagination: And, I believe it will appear, that all the Certainty of general Truths a Man has, lies in nothing else.

§ 3. It is evident, the Mind knows not Things immediately, but only by the Intervention of the Ideas it has of them. Our Knowledge, therefore, is real, only so far as there is a Conformity between our Ideas and the Reality of Things. But what shall be here the Criterion? How shall the Mind, when it perceives nothing but its own Ideas, know that they agree with Things themselves? This, tho' it seems not to want Difficulty, yet, I think, there be two Sorts of Ideas, that, we may be assured, agree with Things.

§ 4. First, The first are simple Ideas, which, since the Mind, as has been shewed, can by no means make to itself, must necessarily be the Product of Things, operating on the Mind in a natural way, and producing therein those Perceptions, which, by the Wisdom and Will of our Maker, they are ordained and adapted to. From whence it follows, that simple Ideas are not Fictions of our Fancies, but the natural and regular Productions of Things without us, really operating upon us, and so carry with them all the Conformity which is intended, or which our State requires: For they represent to us Things under those Appearances, which they are fitted to produce in us, whereby
we are enabled to distinguish the sorts of particular substances, to discern the states they are in, and so to take them for our necessities, and apply them to our uses. Thus the idea of whiteness, or bitterness, as it is in the mind, exactly answering that power, which is in any body to produce it there, has all the real conformity it can, or ought to have, with things without us. And this conformity between our simple ideas, and the existence of things, is sufficient for real knowledge.

§. 5. Secondly, all our complex ideas, except those of substances, being archetypes of the mind's own making, not intended to be the copies of any thing, nor referred to the existence of any thing, as to their originals, cannot want any conformity necessary to real knowledge. For that, which is not designed to represent any thing but itself, can never be capable of a wrong representation, nor mislead us from the true apprehension of any thing, by its dissimilitude to it; and such, excepting those of substances, are all our complex ideas: which, as I have shewed in another place, are combinations of ideas, which the mind, by its free choice, puts together, without considering any connexion they have in nature. And hence it is, that in all these sorts the ideas themselves are considered as the archetypes, and things no otherwise regarded, but as they are conformable to them. So that we cannot but be infallibly certain, that all the knowledge we attain, concerning these ideas, is real, and reaches things themselves; because in all our thoughts, reasonings, and discourses of this kind, we intend things no farther, than as they are conformable to our ideas. So that in these, we cannot miss of a certain and undoubted reality.

Hence the reality of mathematical knowledge; and not the bare, empty vision of vain, insignificant chimeras of the brain: and yet, if we will consider, we shall find that it is only of our own ideas. The mathematician considers the truth and properties belonging to a rectangle, or circle, only as they are in idea in his own mind. For
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For it is possible he never found either of them existing mathematically, i.e. precisely true, in this Life. But yet, the Knowledge he has of any Truths, or Properties belonging to a Circle, or any other mathematical Figure, are nevertheless true and certain, even of real Things existing; because real Things are no farther concerned, nor intended to be meant by any such Propositions, than as Things really agree to those Archetypes in his Mind. Is it true of the Idea of a Triangle, that its three Angles are equal to two right ones? It is true also of a Triangle, wherever it really exists. Whatever other Figure exists, that is not exactly answerable to that Idea of a Triangle in his Mind, is not at all concerned in that Proposition: And, therefore, he is certain all his Knowledge, concerning such Ideas, is real Knowledge; because intending Things no farther than they agree with those his Ideas, he is sure what he knows concerning those Figures, when they have barely an ideal Existence in his Mind, will hold true of them also, when they have real Existence in Matter; his Consideration being barely of those Figures, which are the same, wherever, or however they exist.

§ 7. And hence it follows, that moral Knowledge is as capable of real Certainty, as Mathematics. For Certainty being but the Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of our Ideas; and Demonstration nothing but the Perception of such Agreement, by the Intervention of other Ideas, or Mediums; our moral Ideas, as well as mathematical, being Archetypes themselves, and so adequate, and complete Ideas, all the Agreement, or Disagreement which we shall find in them, will produce real Knowledge, as well as in mathematical Figures.

§ 8. For the attaining of Knowledge and Certainty, it is requisite that we have determined Ideas; and to make our Knowledge real, it is requisite that the Ideas answer their Archetypes. Nor let it be wondered, that I place the Certainty of our Knowledge in the Consideration of our Ideas, with so little Care and Regard (as it may seem) to the real Existence of Things: Since most of those
Discourses, which take up the Thoughts, and engage the Dis-
putes of those who pretend to make it their Business to enquire
after Truth and Certainty, will, I presume, upon Examination,
be found to be general Propositions, and Notions, in which Ex-
istence is not at all concerned. All the Discourses of the Mathe-
maticians, about the squaring of a Circle, conic Sections, or
any other Part of Mathematics, concern not the Existence of
any of those Figures; but their Demonstrations, which depend on
their Ideas, are the same, whether there be any Square, or Circle,
existing in the World, or no. In the same manner, the Truth
and Certainty of moral Discourses abstracts from the Lives of
Men, and the Existence of those Virtues in the World, whereof
they treat. Nor are Tully's Offices less true, because there is no
body in the World that exactly practises his Rules, and lives up
to that Pattern of a virtuous Man, which he has given us, and
which existed no where, when he writ, but in Idea. If it be
true in Speculation, i.e. in Idea, that Murder deserves Death, it
will also be true in Reality of any Action, that exists conform-
able to that Idea of Murder. As for other Actions, the Truth
of that Proposition concerns them not. And thus it is of all o-
ther Species of Things, which have no other Essences but those
Ideas which are in the Minds of Men.

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lesf true, or cer-
tain, because mo-
ral Ideas are of
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and naming.

§. 9. But it will here be said, that if moral
Knowledge be placed in the Contemplation of
our own moral Ideas, and those, as other Modes,
be of our own making, What strange Notions
will there be of Justice and Temperance? What
Confusion of Virtues and Vices, if every one
may make what Ideas of them he pleases? No Confusion, nor
Disorder in the Things themselves, nor the Reasonings about
them; no more than (in Mathematics) there would be a Disturb-
ance in the Demonstration, or a Change in the Properties of Fi-
gures, and their Relations one to another, if a Man should make
a Triangle with four Corners, or a Trapezium with four right
Angles; that is, in plain English, change the Names of the Fi-
gures, and call that by one Name, which Mathematicians call
ordinarily by another. For let a Man make to himself the
Idéa
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Idea of a Figure with three Angles, whereof one is a right one, and call it, if he please, Equilaterum, or Trapezium, or any thing else, the Properties of, and Demonstrations about that Idea, will be the same, as if he called it a Rectangular Triangle. I confess the Change of the Name, by the Impropriety of Speech, will at first disturb him, who knows not what Idea it stands for; but as soon as the Figure is drawn, the Consequences and Demonstration are plain and clear. Just the same is it in moral Knowledge, let a Man have the Idea of taking from others, without their Consent, what their honest Industry has possessed them of, and call this Justice, if he please. He that takes the Name here, without the Idea put to it, will be mistaken, by joining another Idea of his own to that Name: But strip the Idea of that Name, or take it such as it is in the Speaker's Mind, and the same Things will agree to it, as if you called it Injustice. Indeed wrong Names in moral Discourses, breed usually more Disorder, because they are not so easily rectified as in Mathematics, where the Figure, once drawn and seen, makes the Name useless, and of no Force. For what need of a Sign, when the Thing signified is present and in view? But in moral Names, that cannot be so easily and shortly done, because of the many Decompositions that go to the making up the complex Ideas of those Modes. But yet for all this, miscalling of those Ideas, contrary to the usual Signification of the Words of that Language, hinders not, but that we may have certain and demonstrative Knowledge of their several Agreements and Disagreements, if we will carefully, as in Mathematics, keep to the same precise Ideas, and trace them in their several Relations one to another, without being led away by their Names. If we but separate the Idea, under Consideration, from the Sign that stands for it, our Knowledge goes equally on, in the Discovery of real Truth and Certainty, whatever Sounds we make use of.

§. 10. One thing more we are to take notice of, That where God, or any other Lawmaker, hath defined any moral Names, there they have made the Essence of that Species, to which that Name belongs; and there it is not
safe to apply, or use them otherwise: But in other cases, it is bare Impropriety of Speech to apply them contrary to the common Usage of the Country. But yet even this too disturbs not the Certainty of that Knowledge, which is still to be had by a due Contemplation, and comparing of those even nick-named Ideas.

§. 11. Thirdly, There is another Sort of complex Ideas, which being referred to Archetypes without us, may differ from them, and so our Knowledge about them may come short of being real. Such are our Ideas of Substances, which, consisting of a Collection of simple Ideas, supposed taken from the Works of Nature, may yet vary from them, by having more, or different Ideas united in them, than are to be found united in Things themselves. From whence it comes to pass, that they may, and often do fail of being exactly conformable to Things themselves.

§. 12. I say then, that to have Ideas of Substances, which by being conformable to Things, may afford us real Knowledge, it is not enough, as in Modes, to put together such Ideas, as have no Inconsistency, tho' they did never before so exist: V. g. The Ideas of Sacrilege, or Perjury, &c. were as real and true Ideas before, as after the Existence of any such Fact. But our Ideas of Substances, being supposed Copies, and referred to Archetypes without us, must still be taken from something, that does, or has existed; they must not consist of Ideas, put together at the pleasure of our Thoughts, without any real Pattern they were taken from, tho' we can perceive no Inconsistency in such a Combination. The Reason whereof is, because we not knowing what real Constitution it is of Substances, whereon our simple Ideas depend, and which really is the Cause of the strict Union of some of them one with another, and the Exclusion of others; there are very few of them, that we can be sure are, or are not inconsistent in Nature, any farther than Experience and sensible Observation reach. Herein, therefore, is founded the Reality of our Knowledge
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ledge concerning Substances, that all our complex Ideas of them must be such, and such only, as are made up of such simple ones, as have been discovered to co-exist in Nature. And our Ideas, being thus true, tho' not, perhaps, very exact Copies, are yet the Subjects of real (as far as we have any) Knowledge of them. Which (as has been already shewn) will not be found to reach very far: But so far as it does, it will still be real Knowledge. Whatever Ideas we have, the Agreement, we find they have with others, will still be Knowledge. If those Ideas be abstract, it will be general Knowledge. But to make it real concerning Substances, the Ideas must be taken from the real Existence of Things. Whatever simple Ideas have been found to co-exist in any Substance, these we may, with Confidence, join together again, and so make abstract Ideas of Substances. For whatever have once had an Union in Nature, may be united again.

§ 13. This, if we rightly consider, and confine not our Thoughts and abstract Ideas to Names, as if there were, or could be no other Sorts of Things, than what known Names had already determined, and as it were set out, we should think of Things with greater Freedom, and less Confusion, than perhaps we do. It would possibly be thought a bold Paradox, if not a very dangerous Falsity, if I should say, that some Changlings, who have lived forty Years together, without any Appearance of Reason, are something between a Man and a Beast: Which Prejudice is founded upon nothing else but a false Supposition, that these two Names, Man and Beast, stand for distinct Species, so set out by real Essences, that there can come no other Species between them. Whereas, if we will abstract from those Names, and the Supposition of such specific Essences made by Nature, wherein all Things of the same Denominations did exactly and equally partake; if we would not fancy that there were a certain number of these Essences, wherein all Things, as in Molds, were cast and formed, we should find that the Idea of the Shape, Motion, and Life of a Man, without Reason, is as much a distinct Idea, and makes as much a distinct Sort of Things.
Things from Man and Beast, as the Idea of the Shape of an Ass with Reason, would be different from either that of Man, or Beast, and be a Species of an Animal between, or distinct from both.

§. 14. Here every body will be ready to ask, if Changelings may be supposed something between Man and Beast, pray what are they? I answer, Changelings, which is as good a Word to signify something different from the Signification of MAN or BEAST, as the Names, Man and Beast, are to have Significations different one from the other. This, well considered, would resolve this Matter, and shew my Meaning, without any more ado. But I am not so unacquainted with the Zeal of some Men, which enables them to spin Consequences, and to see Religion threatened, whenever any one ventures to quit their Forms of Speaking, as not to foresee what Names such a Proposition as this is like to be charged with: And, without doubt it will be asked, if Changelings are something between Man and Beast, what will become of them in the other World? To which I answer, 1. It concerns me not to know, or enquire. To their own Matter they stand, or fall. It will make their State neither better, nor worse, whether we determine any thing of it, or no. They are in the Hands of a faithful Creator, and a bountiful Father, who disposeth not of His Creatures according to our narrow Thoughts, or Opinions, nor distinguishes them according to Names and Species of our Contrivance. And we, that know so little of this present World, we are in, may, I think, content ourselves without being peremptory in defining the different States, which Creatures shall come into, when they go off this Stage. It may suffice us, that he hath made known to all those, who are capable of Instruction, Discoursce and Reasoning, that they shall come to an Account, and receive according to what they have done in this Body.

§. 15. But, Secondly, I answer, The Force of these Mens Question, (viz. will you deprive Changelings of a future State?) is founded on one of these two Suppositions, which are both false.
The first is, that all Things, that have the outward Shape and Appearance of a Man, must necessarily be designed to an immortal, future Being, after this Life. Or, secondly, that whatever is of human Birth must be so. Take away these Imaginations, and such Questions will be groundless and ridiculous. I desire then those, who think there is no more but an accidental Difference between themselves and Changelings, the Essence in both being exactly the same, to consider, whether they can imagine Immortality annexed to any outward Shape of the Body; the very proposing it, is, I suppose, enough to make them disown it. No one yet, that ever I heard of, how much ever immersed in Matter, allowed that Excellency to any Figure of the gross, sensible, outward Parts, as to affirm eternal Life due to it, or a necessary Consequence of it; or that any Mafs of Matter should, after its Dissolution here, be again restored hereafter to an everlasting State of Sense, Perception, and Knowledge, only because it was moulded into this, or that Figure, and had such a particular Frame of its visible Parts. Such an Opinion as this, placing Immortality in a certain, superficial Figure, turns out of Doors all consideration of Soul, or Spirit, upon whose Account alone some corporeal Beings have hitherto been concluded immortal, and others not. This is to attribute more to the outside than inside of Things; to place the Excellency of a Man more in the external Shape of his Body, than internal Perfections of his Soul; which is but little better than to annex the great and inestimable Advantage of Immortality and Life Everlasting, which he has above other material Beings; to annex it, I say, to the Cut of his Beard, or the Fashion of his Coat. For this, or that outward Make of our Bodies, no more carries with it the Hopes of an eternal Duration, than the Fashion of a Man's Suit gives him reasonable Grounds to imagine it will never wear out, or that it will make him immortal. It will perhaps be said, that no body thinks that the Shape makes any thing immortal, but it is the Shape is the Sign of a rational Soul within, which is immortal. I wonder who made it the Sign of any such Thing: For barely saying it, will not make it so. It would require some Proofs to persuade one of it. No Figure, that I know, speaks any
any such Language. For it may as rationally be concluded, that the dead Body of a Man, wherein there is to be found no more Appearance, or Action of Life, than there is in a Statue, has yet nevertheless a living Soul in it, because of its Shape; as that there is a rational Soul in a Changeling, because he has the Outside of a rational Creature, when his Actions carry far less Marks of Reason with them, in the whole Course of his Life, than what are to be found in many a Beast.

§. 16. But it is the Issue of rational Parents, and must, therefore, be concluded to have a rational Soul. I know not by what Logic you must so conclude. I am sure this is a Conclusion, that Men no where allow of. For if they did, they would not make bold, as every where they do, to destroy ill-formed and mis-shaped Productions. Ay, but these are Monsters. Let them be so; what will your drivel, unintelligent, intractable Changeling be? Shall a Defect in the Body make a Monster: a Defect in the Mind, (the far more Noble, and, in the common Phrase, the far more Essential Part) not? Shall the Want of a Nose, or a Neck, make a Monster, and put such Issue out of the Rank of Men; the Want of Reason and Understanding, not? This is to bring all back again to what was exploded just now: This is to place all in the Shape, and to take the Measure of a Man, only by his Outside. To shew that, according to the ordinary Way of Reasoning in this Matter, People do lay the whole Stress on the Figure, and resolve the whole Essence of the Species of Man (as they make it) into the outward Shape, how unreasonable soever it be, and how much soever they disown it; we need but trace their Thoughts and Practice a little farther, and then it will plainly appear. The well-shaped Changeling is a Man, has a rational Soul, tho' it appear not; this is past doubt, say you. Make the Ears a little longer, and more pointed, and the Nose a little flatter than ordinary, and then you begin to boggle: Make the Face yet narrower, flatter, and longer, and then you are at a Stand: Add still more and more of the Likeness of a Brute to it, and let the Head be perfectly that of some other Animal, then presently it is a Monster; and it is Demonstration with you that it hath no
no rational Soul, and must be destroyed. Where now (I ask) shall be the just Measure of the utmost Bounds of that Shape, that carries with it a rational Soul? For since there have been human \textit{Foetus}'s produced, half Beast and half Man; and others three parts one, and one part the other; and so it is possible they may be in all the Variety of Approaches to the one, or the other Shape, and may have several Degrees of Mixture of the Likeness of a Man, or a Brute; I would gladly know what are those precise Lineaments, which, according to this Hypothesis, are, or are not capable of a rational Soul to be joined to them? What sort of Outside is the certain Sign that there is, or is not such an Inhabitant within? For, till that be done, we talk at random of Man: And shall always, I fear, do so, as long as we give ourselves up to certain Sounds, and the Imaginations of settled and fixed Species in Nature, we know not what. But, after all, I desire it may be considered, that those, who think they have answered the Difficulty, by telling us, that a mis-shaped \textit{Foetus} is a \textit{Monster}, run into the same Fault they are arguing against, by constituting a Species between Man and Beast. For what else, I pray, is their Monster in the Case, (if the Word \textit{Monster} signifies any thing at all) but something, neither Man nor Beast, but partaking somewhat of either? And just so is the \textit{Changeling} before mentioned. So necessary is it to quit the common Notion of Species and Essences, if we will truly look into the Nature of Things, and examine them, by what our Faculties can discover in them as they exist, and not by groundless Fancies, that have been taken up about them.

§. 17. I have mentioned this here, because, I think, we cannot be too cautious that \textit{Words} and \textit{Species}, in the ordinary Notions, which we have been used to of them, impose not upon us. For I am apt to think, therein lies one great Obstacle to our clear and distinct Knowledge, especially in reference to Substances; and from thence has rose a great part of the Difficulties about Truth and Certainty. Would we accustom ourselves to separate our Contemplations and Reasonings from \textit{Words}, we might, in a great Measure, remedy this Inconvenience within our own Thoughts: But
But yet it would still disturb us in our Discourse with others, as long as we retained the Opinion, that Species and their Essences were any thing else but our abstract Ideas, (such as they are) with Names annexed to them, to be the Signs of them.

Recapitulation.

§. 18. \textit{Wherever} we perceive the Agreement, or Disagreement of any of our Ideas, there is certain Knowledge: And wherever we are sure those Ideas agree with the Reality of Things, there is certain, real Knowledge. Of which Agreement of our Ideas, with the Reality of Things, having here given the Marks, I think I have shewn wherein it is, that \textit{Certainty, real Certainty,} consists: Which, whatever it was to others, was, I confess, to me heretofore, one of those \textit{Desiderata} which I found great want of.

\textbf{CHAP. V.}

\textbf{Of Truth in General.}

\textit{What Truth is.}

§. 1. \textit{What is Truth?} was an Enquiry many Ages since; and it being that, which all Mankind either do, or pretend to search after, it cannot but be worth our while carefully to examine wherein it consists, and so acquaint ourselves with the Nature of it, as to observe how the Mind distinguishes it from Falsity.

§. 2. Truth then seems to me, in the proper import of the Word, to signify nothing but the joining, and separating of Signs, as the Things signified by them, do agree, or disagree, one with another. The joining, or separating of Signs, here meant, is what, by another Name, we call Proposition. So that Truth properly belongs only to Propositions: Whereof there are two Sorts, \textit{viz.} Mental and Verbal; as there are two Sorts of Signs commonly made use of, \textit{viz.} Ideas and Words.

§. 3. Tho'
§. 3. To form a clear Notion of Truth, it is very necessary to consider Truth of Thought, and Truth of Words, distinctly one from another: But yet it is very difficult to treat of them asunder: Because it is unavoidable, in treating of mental Propositions, to make use of Words: And then the Instances given, of mental Propositions, cease immediately to be barely mental, and become verbal. For a mental Proposition being nothing but a bare Consideration of the Ideas, as they are in our Minds stripped of Names, they lose the Nature of purely mental Propositions, as soon as they are put into Words.

§. 4. And that, which makes it yet harder to treat of mental and verbal Propositions separately, is, That most Men, if not all, in their Thinking and Reasonings within themselves, make use of Words, instead of Ideas; at least when the Subject of their Meditation contains in it complex Ideas. Which is a great Evidence of the Imperfection and Uncertainty of our Ideas of that kind, and may, I suppose, attentively made use of, serve for a Mark to shew us, what are those Things we have clear and perfect, established Ideas of, and what not. For if we will curiously observe the Way our Mind takes in Thinking and Reasoning, we shall find, I suppose, that, when we make any Propositions within our own Thoughts about White, or Black; Sweet, or Bitter; a Triangle, or a Circle; we can, and often do frame in our Minds, the Ideas themselves, without reflecting on the Names. But, when we would consider, or make Propositions about the more complex Ideas, as of a Man, Vitriol, Fortitude, Glory, we usually put the Name for the Idea: Because the Ideas, these Names stand for, being for the most part imperfect, confused, and undetermined, we reflect on the Names themselves, because they are more clear, certain, and distinct, and readier occur to our Thoughts than the pure Ideas: And so we make use of these Words, instead of the Ideas themselves, even when we would meditate and reason within ourselves, and make tacit, mental Propositions. In Substances, as has been already noted, this is occasioned by the Imperfection.
Imperfection of our Ideas: We making the Name stand for the real Essence, of which we have no Idea at all. In Modes, it is occasioned by the great Number of simple Ideas, that go to the making them up. For many of them being compounded, the Name occurs much easier than the complex Idea itself, which requires Time and Attention to be recollected, and exactly represented to the Mind, even in those Men who have formerly been at the Pains to do it; and is utterly impossible to be done by those, who, tho' they have ready in their Memory the greatest part of the common Words of their Language, yet, perhaps, never troubled themselves in all their Lives to consider what precise Ideas the most of them stood for. Some confused, or obscure Notions, have served their Turns; and many who talk very much of Religion and Conscience, of Church and Faith, of Power and Right, of Obstructions and Humours, Melancholy and Choler, would, perhaps, have little left in their Thoughts and Meditations, if one should desire them to think only of the Things themselves, and lay by those Words, with which they so often confound others, and not seldom themselves also.

§. 5. But to return to the Consideration of Truth: We must, I say, observe two Sorts of Propositions, that we are capable of making.

First, Mental, wherein the Ideas in our Understandings are without the use of Words put together, or separated by the Mind, perceiving, or judging, of their Agreement, or Disagreement.

Secondly, Verbal Propositions, which are Words, the Signs of our Ideas, put together, or separated in Affirmative, or Negative Sentences. By which way of affirming, or denying, these Signs, made by Sounds, are, as it were, put together, or separated one from another. So that Proposition consists in joining, or separating Signs; and Truth consists in the putting together, or separating those Signs, according as the Things, which they stand for, agree, or disagree.

§. 6. Every one's Experience will satisfy him, that the Mind, either by perceiving, or supposing the Agreement, or Disagreement of any of its
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its Ideas, does tacitly within itself put them into a kind of Proposition, affirmative, or negative, which I have endeavoured to express by the Terms, Putting together and Separating. But this Action of the Mind, which is so familiar to every Thinking and Reasoning Man, is easier to be conceived by reflecting on what passes in us, when we affirm, or deny, than to be explained by Words. When a Man has in his Mind the Idea of two Lines, viz. the Side and Diagonal of a Square, whereof the Diagonal is an Inch long, he may have the Idea also of the Division of that Line, into a certain Number of equal Parts; viz. into Five, Ten, an Hundred, a Thousand, or any other Number, and may have the Idea of that Inch Line, being divisible, or not divisible, into such equal Parts, as a certain Number of them will be equal to the Side-line. Now whenever he perceives, believes, or supposes such a kind of Divisibility to agree, or disagree, to his Idea of that Line, he, as it were, joins, or separates those two Ideas, viz. the Idea of that Line, and the Idea of that kind of Divisibility; and so makes a mental Proposition, which is true, or false, according as such a kind of Divisibility, a Divisibility into such aliquot Parts, does really agree to that Line, or no. When Ideas are so put together, or separated in the Mind, as they, or the Things they stand for, do agree, or not, that is, as I may call it, mental Truth. But Truth of Words is something more; and that is, the affirming, or denying of Words one of another, as the Ideas, they stand for, agree, or disagree: And this again is twofold; either purely Verbal and trifling, which I shall speak of, Chap. viii. or Real and instructive; which is the Object of that real Knowledge, which we have spoken of already.

§ 7. But here again will be apt to occur the same Doubt about Truth, that did about Knowledge: And it will be objected, that, if Truth be nothing but the joining, or separating of Words in Propositions, as the Ideas they stand for, agree, or disagree in Mens Minds, the Knowledge of Truth is not so valuable a Thing as it is taken to be, nor worth the Pains and Time Men employ to the Search of it; Line, by this Account,
Account, it amounts to no more than the Conformity of Words to the Chimeras of Mens Brains. Who knows not what odd Notions many Mens Heads are filled with, and what strange Ideas all Mens Brains are capable of? But if we rest here, we know the Truth of nothing by this Rule, but of the visionary World in our own Imaginations; nor have other Truth, but what as much concerns Harpies and Centaurs, as Men and Horses. For those, and the like, may be Ideas in our Heads, and have their Agreement and Disagreement there, as well as the Ideas of real Beings, and so have as true Propositions made about them. And it will be altogether as true a Proposition, to say all Centaurs are Animals, as that all Men are Animals; and the Certainty of one as great as the other. For in both the Propositions, the Words are put together, according to the Agreement of the Ideas in our Minds: And the Agreement of the Idea of Animal with that of Centaur, is as clear and visible to the Mind, as the Agreement of the Idea of Animal with that of Man; and if these two Propositions are equally true, equally certain. But of what use is all such Truth to us?

§. 8. Tho' what has been said in the foregoing Chapter, to distinguish real from imaginary Knowledge, might suffice here, in answer to this Doubt, to distinguish real Truth from chim-merical, or (if you please) barely nominal, they depending both on the same Foundation; yet it may be not amiss here again to consider, that tho' our Words signify nothing but our Ideas, yet being designed by them to signify Things, the Truth they contain, when put into Propositions, will be only Verbal, when they stand for Ideas in the Mind, that have not an Agreement with the Reality of Things. And, therefore, Truth, as well as Knowledge, may well come under the Distinction of Verbal and Real; that being only verbal Truth, wherein Terms are joined, according to the Agreement, or Disagreement of the Ideas they stand for, without regarding whether our Ideas are such, as really have, or are capable of having an Existence in Nature. But then it is they contain real Truth, when these Signs are joined, as our Ideas agree; and when our Ideas are such, as
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we know are capable of having an Existence in Nature: Which in Substances we cannot know, but by knowing that such have existed.

§. 9. Truth is the marking down in Words the Agreement, or Disagreement of Ideas, as it is. Falshood is the marking down in Words the Agreement, or Disagreement of Ideas, otherwise than it is. And so far as these Ideas, thus marked by Sounds, agree to their Archetypes, so far only is the Truth real. The Knowledge of this Truth consists in knowing what Ideas the Words stand for, and the Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement, of those Ideas, according as it is marked by those Words.

§. 10. But, because Words are looked on as the great Conduits of Truth and Knowledge, and that in conveying and receiving of Truth, and commonly in Reasoning about it, we make use of Words and Propositions, I shall more at large enquire, wherein the Certainty of real Truths, contained in Propositions, consists, and where it is to be had; and endeavour to shew, in what sort of universal Propositions we are capable of being certain of their real Truth, or Falshood.

I shall begin with general Propositions, as those which most employ our Thoughts, and exercise our Contemplation. General Truths are most looked after by the Mind, as those that most enlarge our Knowledge; and by their Comprehensiveness, satisfying us at once of many Particulars, enlarge our View, and shorten our Way to Knowledge.

§. 11. Besides Truth, taken in the strict Sense before mentioned, there are other Sorts of Truth; as, 1. Moral Truth, which is speaking of Things according to the Persuasion of our own Minds, tho' the Proposition, we speak, agree not to the Reality of Things. 2. Metaphysical Truth, which is nothing but the real Existence of Things, conformable to the Ideas to which we have annexed their Names. This, tho' it seems to consist in the very Beings of Things, yet, when considered a little near-
ly, will appear to include a tacit Proposition, whereby the Mind joins that particular Thing to the Idea it had before settled with a Name to it. But these Considerations of Truth, either having been before taken notice of, or not being so much to our present Purpose, it may suffice here only to have menti-

CHAP. VI.

Of Universal Propositions, their Truth and Certainty.

§ 1. THO' the examining and judging of Ideas by themselves, their Names being quite laid aside, be the best and surest Way to clear and distinct Knowledge; yet, thro' the prevailing Custom of using Sounds for Ideas, I think it is very seldom practised. Every one may observe how common it is for Names to be made use of, instead of the Ideas themselves, even when Men think and reason within their own Breasts; especially if the Ideas be very com-

§ 2. All the Knowledge we have, being only of particular, or general Truths, it is evident, that, whatever may be done in the former of these, the latter, which is that which with Rea-

§ 3. But that we may not be misled in this Case, by that which is the Danger every where, I mean
I mean by the doubtfulness of Terms, it is fit to observe, that Certainty is two-fold; Certainty of Truth, and Certainty of Knowledge. Certainty of Truth is, when Words are so put together in Propositions, as exactly to express the Agreement, or Disagreement of the Ideas they stand for, as really it is. Certainty of Knowledge is, to perceive the Agreement, or Disagreement of Ideas, as expressed in any Proposition. This we usually call Knowing, or being certain of the Truth of any Proposition.

§ 4. Now because we cannot be certain of the Truth of any general Proposition, unless we know the precise Bounds and Extent of the Species its Terms stand for, it is necessary we should know the Essence of each Species, which is that which constitutes and bounds it. This, in all simple Ideas and Modes, is not hard to do. For in these, the real and nominal Essence being the same; or, which is all one, the Abstract Ideas, which the general Term stands for, being the sole Essence and Boundary, that is, or can be supposed, of the Species, there can be no doubt, how far the Species extends, or what Things are comprehended under each Term: Which, it is evident, are all that have any exact Conformity with the Idea it stands for, and no other. But in Substances, wherein a real Essence, distinct from the nominal, is supposed to constitute, determine, and bound the Species, the Extent of the general Word is very uncertain: Because, not knowing this real Essence, we cannot know what is, or what is not of that Species; and, consequently, what may, or may not with Certainty be affirmed of it. And thus, speaking of a Man, or Gold, or any other Species of natural Substances, as supposed constituted by a precise, real Essence, which Nature regularly imparts to every Individual of that Kind, whereby it is made to be of that Species, we cannot be certain of the Truth of any Affirmation, or Negation made of it. For Man, or Gold, taken in this Sense, and used for Species of Things, constituted by real Essences, different from the complex Idea in the Mind of the Speaker, stand for we know not what: And the Extent of these Species, with such Boundaries,
Boundaries, are so unknown and undetermined, that it is impos-
sible, with any Certainty, to affirm, that all Men are rational, or
that all Gold is yellow. But where the nominal Essence is kept
to, as the Boundary of each Species, and Men extend the Ap-
application of any general Term no farther than to the particular
Things, in which the complex Idea, it stands for, is to be found,
there they are in no Danger to mistake the Bounds of each Spe-
cies, nor can be in doubt, on this Account, whether any Pro-
positions be true, or no. I have chose to explain this Uncertain-
ty of Propositions in this scholastic way, and have made use of
the Terms of Essences and Species, on purpose to shew the Ab-
furdity and Inconvenience there is to think of them, as of any
other Sort of Realities, than barely abstract Ideas, with Names to
them. To suppose, that the Species of Things are any thing
but the sorting of them under general Names, according as they
agree to several abstract Ideas, of which we make those Names
the Signs, is to confound Truth, and introduce Uncertainty in-
to all general Propositions, that can be made about them. Tho',
therefore, these Things might, to People not possesed with schol-
astic Learning, be perhaps treated of in a better and clearer way;
yet these wrong Notions of Essences, or Species, having got Root
in most People's Minds, who have received any Tinctorie from
the Learning which has prevailed in this part of the World, are
to be discovered and removed, to make way for that use of
Words, which should convey Certainty with it.

§ 5. The Names of Substances, then, when-
ever made to stand for Species, which are suppos-
ed to be constituted by real Essences, which we
know not, are not capable to convey Certainty
to the Understanding, of the Truth of general Propositions made
up of such Terms, we cannot be sure. The Reason whereof is
plain: For how can we be sure that this, or that Quality is in
Gold, when we know not what is, or is not Gold? Since, in this
way of speaking, nothing is Gold, but what partakes of an Es-
fence, which we not knowing, cannot know where it is, or is
not, and so cannot be sure that any Parcel of Matter in the
World is, or is not, in this Sense, Gold; being incurably igno-
rant,
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rant, whether it has, or has not that which makes any thing to be called Gold, i. e. that real Essence of Gold, whereof we have no Idea at all. This being as impossible for us to know, as it is for a blind Man to tell in what Flower the Colour of a Panfie is, or is not to be found, whilst he has no Idea of the Colour of a Panfie at all. Or if he could (which is impossible) certainly know where a real Essence, which we know not, is; v. g. in what Parcels of Matter the real Essence of Gold is; yet could we not be sure, that this, or that Quality, could with Truth be affirmed of Gold: Since it is impossible for us to know, that this, or that Quality, or Idea, has a necessary Connexion with a real Essence, of which we have no Idea at all, whatever Species that supposed, real Essence, may be imagined to constitute.

§. 6. On the other side, the Names of Substances, when made use of, as they should be, for the Ideas Men have in their Minds, tho' they carry a clear and determinate Signification with them, will not yet serve us to make many universal Propositions, of whose Truth we can be certain. Not because in this use of them we are uncertain what Things are signified by them, but because the complex Ideas, they stand for, are such Combinations of simple ones, as carry not with them any discoverable Connexion, or Repugnancy, but with a very few other Ideas.

§. 7. The complex Ideas, that our Names of the Species of Substances properly stand for, are Collections of such Qualities, as have been observed to co-exist in an unknown Substratum, which we call Substance: But what other Qualities necessarily co-exist with such Combinations, we cannot certainly know, unless we can discover their natural Dependence; which, in their primary Qualities, we can go but a very little way in; and in all their secondary Qualities, we can discover no Connexion at all, for the Reasons mentioned, Chap. iii. §. 11, &c. viz. 1. Because we know not the real Constitutions of Substances, on which each secondary Quality particularly depends. 2. Did we know that, it would serve us only for experimental (not universal) Knowledge; and

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reach with Certainty no farther than that bare Instance: Because our Understandings can discover no conceivable Connexion between any secondary Quality, and any Modification whatsoever, of any of the primary ones. And, therefore, there are very few general Propositions to be made concerning Substances, which can carry with them undoubted Certainty.

§. 8. *All Gold is fixed,* is a Proposition, whose Truth we cannot be certain of; how universally soever it be believed. For if, according to the useless Imagination of the Schools, any one supposes the Term *Gold* to stand for a Species of Things, set out by Nature, by a real Essence belonging to it, it is evident he knows not what particular Substances are of that Species; and so cannot, with Certainty, affirm any thing universally of *Gold.* But if he makes *Gold* stand for a Species, determined by its nominal Essence, let the nominal Essence, for Example, be the complex *Idea* of a *Body,* of a certain *yellow* Colour, *malleable,* * fusible,* and *heavier* than any other known; in this proper Use of the Word *Gold,* there is no Difficulty to know, what is, or is not *Gold.* But yet no other Quality can with Certainty be universally affirmed, or denied, of *Gold,* but what hath a discoverable Connexion, or Inconsistency, with that nominal Essence. *Fixedness,* for Example, having no necessary Connexion, that we can discover, with the Colour, Weight, or any other simple *Idea* of our complex one, or with the whole Combination together; it is impossible that we should certainly know the Truth of this Proposition, That *all Gold is fixed.*

§. 9. As there is no discoverable Connexion between *Fixedness,* and the Colour, Weight, and other simple *Ideas* of that nominal Essence of *Gold,* so if we make our complex *Idea* of *Gold,* a *Body* yellow, * fusible,* *ductile,* *weighty,* and *fixed,* we shall be at the same Uncertainty concerning *Solubility* in *Ag. Regia,* and for the same Reason: Since we can never, from Consideration of the *Ideas* themselves, with Certainty affirm, or deny of a Body, whose complex *Idea* is made up of yellow, very weighty, *ductile,* * fusible,* and fixed, that it is soluble in *Ag. Regia,* and so on, of the rest of its Qualities. I would gladly meet
meet with one General Affirmation, concerning any Quality of Gold, that any one can certainly know is true. It will, no doubt, be presently objected, Is not this an universal certain Proposition, All Gold is malleable? To which I answer, It is a very certain Proposition, if Malleableness be a Part of the complex Idea, the Word Gold stands for. But then, here is nothing affirmed of Gold, but that That Sound stands for an Idea, in which Malleableness is contained: And such a Sort of Truth and Certainty as this, it is, to say, a Centaur is four-footed: But if Malleableness makes not a Part of the specific Essence, the Name Gold stands for, it is plain, all Gold is malleable, is not a certain Proposition. Because, let the complex Idea of Gold, be made up of which soever of its other Qualities you please, Malleableness will not appear to depend on that complex Idea, nor follow from any simple one contained in it: The Connexion that Malleableness has (if it has any) with those other Qualities, being only by the Intervention of the real Constitution of its insensible Parts; which, since we know not, it is impossible we should perceive that Connexion, unless we could discover that which ties them together.

§. 10. The more, indeed, of these co-existing Qualities we unite into one complex Idea, under one Name, the more precise and determinate we make the Signification of that Word; but yet never make it thereby more capable of universal Certainty, in respect of other Qualities, not contained in our complex Idea; since we perceive not their Connexion, or Dependence one on another, being ignorant both of that real Constitution, in which they are all founded, and also how they flow from it. For the chief Part of our Knowledge, concerning Substances, is not, as in other Things, barely of the Relation of two Ideas, that may exist separately; but is of the necessary Connexion and Co-existence of several distinct Ideas in the same Subject, or of their Repugnancy so to co-exist. Could we begin at the other end, and discover what it was, wherein that Colour consisted, what made a Body lighter, or heavier, what Texture
ture of Parts made it malleable, fusible, and fixed, and fit to be
dissolved in this Sort of Liquor, and not in another; if (I say)
we had such an Idea as this of Bodies, and could perceive where-
in all sensible Qualities originally consist, and how they are pro-
duced; we might frame such abstract Ideas of them, as would
furnish us with Matter of more general Knowledge, and enable
us to make universal Propositions, that should carry general
Truth and Certainty with them. But whilst our complex Ideas,
of the Sorts of Substances, are so remote from that internal,
real Constitution, on which their sensible Qualities depend, and
are made up of nothing but an imperfect Collection of those
apparent Qualities our Senses can discover, there can be very
few general Propositions concerning Substances, of whose real
Truth we can be certainly assured: Since there are but few
simple Ideas, of whose Connexion and necessary Co-existence we
can have certain and undoubted Knowledge. I imagine, amongst
all the secondary Qualities of Substances, and the Powers relat-
ing to them, there cannot any two be named, whose necessary
Co-existence, or Repugnance to co-exist, can certainly be known,
unless in those of the same Sense, which necessarily exclude one
another, as I have elsewhere shewed. No one, I think, by the
Colour that is in any Body, can certainly know what Smell,
Taste, Sound, or tangible Qualities it has, nor what Alterations
it is capable to make, or receive on, or from other Bodies.
The same may be said of the Sound, or Taste, &c. Our specific
Names of Substances standing for any Collections of such Ideas,
it is not to be wondered, that we can, with them, make very few
general Propositions of undoubted, real Certainty. But yet so
far as any complex Idea, of any sort of Substances, contains in
it any simple Idea, whose necessary Co-existence with any other
may be discovered, so far Universal Propositions may with Cer-
tainty be made concerning it: V. g. Could any one discover a
necessary Connexion between Malleableness, and the Colour, or
Weight of Gold, or any other Part of the complex Idea, signifi-
ced by that Name, he might make a certain, universal Propositi-
on, concerning Gold, in this respect; and the real Truth of this
Proposition, That all Gold is Malleable, would be as certain as
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of this, The three Angles of all right-lined Triangles are equal to two right ones.

§. 11. Had we such Ideas of Substances, as to know what real Constitutions produce those sensible Qualities, we find in them, and how those Qualities flowed from thence, we could, by the Specific Ideas of their real Essences in our own Minds, more certainly find out their Properties, and discover what Qualities they had, or had not, than we can now by our Senses: And to know the Properties of Gold, it would be no more necessary that Gold should exist, and that we should make Experiments upon it, than it is necessary for the knowing the Properties of a Triangle, that a Triangle should exist in any Matter; the Idea in our Minds would serve for the one, as well as the other. But we are so far from being admitted into the Secrets of Nature, that we scarce so much as ever approach the first Entrance towards them. For we are wont to consider the Substances we meet with, each of them as an entire Thing by itself, having all its Qualities in itself, and independent of other Things; overlooking, for the most part, the Operations of those invisible Fluids they are encompassed with, and upon whose Motions and Operations depend the greatest part of those Qualities which are taken notice of in them, and are made by us the inherent Marks of Distinction, whereby we know and denominate them. Put a Piece of Gold any where by itself, separate from the Reach and Influence of all other Bodies, it will immediately lose all its Colour and Weight, and, perhaps, Malleableness too; which, for ought I know, would be changed into a perfect Friability. Water, in which to us Fluidity is an essential Quality, left to itself, would cease to be fluid. But if inanimate Bodies owe so much of their present State to other Bodies without them, that they would not be what they appear to us, were those Bodies, that inviron them, removed, it is yet more so in Vegetables, which are nourished, grow, and produce Leaves, Flowers, and Seeds, in a constant Succession. And, if we look a little nearer into the State of Animals, we shall find, that their Dependence,
Dependence, as to Life, Motion, and the most considerable Qualities to be observed in them, is so wholly on extrinsical Causes and Qualities of other Bodies, that make no part of them, that they cannot subsist a Moment without them: Tho' yet those Bodies, on which they depend, are little taken Notice of, and make no Part of the complex Ideas we frame of those Animals. Take the Air but a Minute from the greatest Part of Living Creatures, and they presently lose Sense, Life, and Motion. This the Necessity of Breathing has forced into our Knowledge. But how many other extrinsical, and, possibly, very remote Bodies, do the Springs of those admirable Machines depend on, which are not vulgarly observed, or so much as thought on; and how many are there, which the severest Enquiry can never discover? The Inhabitants of this Spot of the Universe, tho' removed so many Millions of Miles from the Sun, yet depend so much on the duly tempered Motion of Particles coming from, or agitated by it, that were this Earth removed, but a small Part of that Distance, out of its present Situation, and placed a little farther, or nearer, that Source of Heat, it is more than probable, that the greatest Part of the Animals in it would immediately perish: Since we find them so often destroyed by an Excess, or Defect, of the Sun's Warmth, which an accidental Position, in some Parts of this our little Globe, exposes them to. The Qualities observed in a Loadstone must needs have their Source far beyond the Confines of that Body; and the Ravage made often on several Sorts of Animals, by invisible Causes, the certain Death (as we are told) of some of them, by barely passing the Line, or, as it is certain of others, by being removed into a neighbouring Country, evidently shew, that the Concurrence and Operation of several Bodies, with which they are seldom thought to have any thing to do, is absolutely necessary to make them be what they appear to us, and to preserve those Qualities, by which we know and distinguish them. We are then quite out of the way, when we think that Things contain within themselves the Qualities that appear to us in them: And we in vain search for that Constitution within the Body of a Fly, or an Elephant, upon which depend those Qualities and Powers we observe
observe in them. For which, perhaps, to understand them right, we ought to look, not only beyond this our Earth, and Atmosphere, but even beyond the Sun, or remotest Star, our Eyes have yet discovered. For how much the Being and Operation of particular Substances, in this our Globe, depend on Causes utterly beyond our view, is impossible for us to determine. We see and perceive some of the Motions, and groser Operations of Things here about us; but whence the Streams come, that keep all these curious Machines in Motion and Repair, how conveyed and modified, is beyond our Notice and Apprehension: And the great Parts and Wheels, as I may so say, of this stupendous Structure of the Universe, may, for ought we know, have such a Connexion and Dependence, in their Influences and Operations one upon another, that, perhaps, Things in this our Mansion would put on quite another Face, and cease to be what they are, if some one of the Stars, or great Bodies, incomprehensibly remote from us, should cease to be, or move as it does. This is certain, Things, however absolute and entire they seem in themselves, are but Retainers to other Parts of Nature, for that which they are most taken notice of by us. Their observable Qualities, Actions, and Powers, are owing to something without them; and there is not so complete and perfect a Part, that we know, of Nature, which does not owe the Being it has, and the Excellencies of it, to its Neighbours; and we must not confine our Thoughts within the Surface of any Body, but look a great deal farther, to comprehend perfectly those Qualities that are in it.

§. 12. If this be so, 'tis not to be wondered, that we have very imperfect Ideas of Substances; and that the Real Essences, on which depend their Properties and Operations, are unknown to us. We cannot discover so much as that Size, Figure, and Texture, of their minute and active Parts, which is really in them; much less the different Motions and Impulses made in, and upon them, by Bodies from without, upon which depends, and by which is formed, the greatest and most remarkable Part of those Qualities we observe in them, and of which our complex Ideas of them are made up. This Consideration alone is enough to put
put an end to all our Hopes of ever having the Ideas of their real Effences; which, whilst we want the nominal Effences, we make use of, instead of them, will be able to furnish us but very sparingly with any general Knowledge, or universal Propositions, capable of real Certainty.

§. 13. We are not, therefore, to wonder, if Judgment may reach farther, but that is not Knowledge. Certainty be to be found in very few general Propositions, made concerning Substances: Our Knowledge of their Qualities and Properties go very seldom farther than our Senses reach and inform us. Possibly inquisitive and observing Men may, by Strength of Judgment, penetrate farther, and on Probabilities taken from wary Observation, and Hints well laid together, often guess right, at what Experience has not yet discovered to them. But this is but guessing still; it amounts only to Opinion, and has not that Certainty, which is requisite to Knowledge. For all general Knowledge lies only in our own Thoughts, and consists barely in the Contemplation of our own abstract Ideas. Wherever we perceive any Agreement, or Disagreement amongst them, there we have general Knowledge; and, by putting the Names of those Ideas together accordingly in Propositions, can with Certainty pronounce general Truths. But because the abstract Ideas of Substances, for which their specific Names stand, whenever they have any distinct and determinate Signification, have a discoverable Connexion, or Inconsistency with but a very few other Ideas; the Certainty of universal Propositions, concerning Substances, is very narrow and scanty in that Part, which is our principal Enquiry concerning them: And there are scarce any of the Names of Substances, let the Idea, it is applied to, be what it will, of which we can generally, and with Certainty pronounce, that it has, or has not, this, or that other Quality belonging to it, and constantly co-existing, or inconsistent with that Idea, wherever it is to be found.

§. 14. Before we can have any tolerable Knowledge of this Kind, we must first know what Changes the primary Qualities of one Body do regularly produce in the primary Qualities

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Lities of another, and how. Secondly, We must know what primary Qualities of any Body produce certain Sensations, or Ideas in us. This is in truth no less than to know all the Effects of Matter, under its diverse Modifications of Bulk, Figure, Cohesion of Parts, Motion and Rest. Which, I think, every body will allow, is utterly impossible to be known by us, without Revelation. Nor if it were revealed to us, what sort of Figure, Bulk, or Motion of Corpuscles, would produce in us the Sensation of a yellow Colour, and what sort of Figure, Bulk and Texture of Parts, in the Superficies of any Body were fit to give such Corpuscles their due Motion to produce that Colour; would that be enough to make universal Propositions with Certainty, concerning the several Sorts of them, unless we had Faculties acute enough to perceive the precise Bulk, Figure, Texture and Motion of Bodies in those minute Parts, by which they operate on our Senses, that so we might by those frame our abstract Ideas of them? I have mentioned here only corporeal Substances, whose Operations seem to lie more level to our Understandings: For, as to the Operations of Spirits, both their thinking and moving of Bodies, we at first Sight find ourselves at a loss; tho' perhaps, when we have applied our Thoughts a little nearer to the Consideration of Bodies, and their Operations, and examined how far our Notions, even in these, reach, with any Clearness, beyond sensible Matter of Fact, we shall be bound to confess, that even in these too, our Discoveries amount to very little, beyond perfect Ignorance and Incapacity.

§. 15. This is evident, the abstract, complex Ideas of Substances, for which their general Names stand, not comprehending their real Constitutions, can afford us but very little universal Certainty. Because our Ideas of them are not made up of that, on which those Qualities we observe in them, and would inform ourselves about, do depend, or with which they have any certain Connexion: V. g. Let the Idea, to which we give the Name Man, be, as it commonly is, a Body of the ordinary Shape, with Sense, voluntary Motion, and Reason join-
ed to it: This being the abstract Idea, and consequently the Essence of our Species Man, we can make but very few general, certain Propositions concerning Man, standing for such an Idea. Because, not knowing the real Constitution on which Sensation, Power of Motion, and Reasoning, with that peculiar Shape, depend, and whereby they are united together in the same Subject, there are very few other Qualities, with which we can perceive them to have a necessary Connexion, and, therefore, we cannot with Certainty affirm, That all Men sleep by Intervals; that no Man can be nourish'd by Wood, or Stones; that all Men will be poison'd by Hemlock: Because these Ideas have no Connexion, nor Repugnancy with this our nominal Efficiency of Man, with this abstract Idea that Name stands for. We must in these, and the like, appeal to Trial in particular Subjects, which can reach but a little way. We must content ourselves with Probability in the rest; but can have no general Certainty, whilst our specific Idea of Man contains not that real Constitution, which is the Root, wherein all his inseparable Qualities are united, and from whence they flow. Whilst our Idea, the Word Man stands for, is only an imperfect Collection of some sensible Qualities and Powers in him, there is no discernable Connexion, or Repugnance, between our specific Idea, and the Operation of either the Parts of Hemlock, or Stones, upon his Constitution. There are Animals that safely eat Hemlock, and others, that are nourish'd by Wood and Stones: But, as long as we want Ideas of those real Constitutions of different Sorts of Animals, whereon these, and the like Qualities and Powers depend, we must not hope to reach Certainty in universal Propositions concerning them. Those few Ideas only, which have a discernable Connexion with our nominal Essence, or any part of it, can afford us such Propositions. But these are so few, and of so little Moment, that we may justly look on our certain, general Knowledge of Substances, as almost none at all.

§ 16. To conclude, General Propositions, of what kind soever, are then only capable of Certainty, when the Terms, used in them, stand for such Ideas whose Agreement, or Disagreement,
as there expressed, is capable to be discovered by us. And we are then certain of their Truth, or Falsity, when we perceive the Ideas, the Terms stand for, to agree, or not agree, according as they are affirmed, or denied one of another. Whence we may take notice, that general Certainty is never to be found, but in our Ideas. Whenever we go to seek it elsewhere, in Experiment, or Observations without us, our Knowledge goes not beyond Particulars. It is the Contemplation of our own abstract Ideas, that alone is able to afford us general Knowledge.

**CHAP. VII.**

**Of Maxims.**

§. 1. There are a sort of Propositions, which, under the Name of Maxims and Axioms, have passed for Principles of Science; and because they are self-evident, have been supposed innate, altho' no body (that I know) ever went about to chew the Reason and Foundation of their Clearness, or Cogency. It may however be worth while to enquire into the Reason of their Evidence, and see whether it be peculiar to them alone, and also examine how far they influence and govern our other Knowledge.

§. 2. Knowledge, as has been shewn, consists in the Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of Ideas: Now, where that Agreement, or Disagreement is perceived immediately by itself, without the Intervention, or Help of any other, there our Knowledge is self-evident. This will appear to be so to any one, who will but consider any of those Propositions, which, without any Proof, he assents to at first Sight: For in all of them he will find, that the Reason of his Assent, is from that Agreement, or Disagreement, which the Mind, by an immediate comparing them, finds in those Ideas answering the Affirmation, or Negation in the Proposition.

§. 3. This
§ 3. This being so, in the next Place let us consider, whether this Self-evidence be peculiar only to those Propositions, which commonly pass under the Name of Maxims, and have the Dignity of Axioms allowed them. And here it is plain, that several other Truths, not allowed to be Axioms, partake equally with them in this Self-evidence. This we shall see, if we go over these several Sorts of Agreement, or Disagreement of Ideas, which I have above mentioned, viz. Identity, Relation, Co-existence, and real Existence; which will discover to us, that not only those few Propositions, which have had the Credit of Maxims, are self-evident, but a great many, even almost an infinite Number of other Propositions are such.

§ 4. For, First, the immediate Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of Identity, being founded in the Mind's having distinct Ideas, this affords us as many self-evident Propositions, as we have distinct Ideas. Every one that has any Knowledge at all, has, as the Foundation of it, various and distinct Ideas: And it is the first Act of the Mind, (without which it can never be capable of any Knowledge) to know every one of its Ideas by itself, and distinguish it from others. Every one finds in himself, that he knows the Ideas he has; that he knows also, when any one is in his Understanding, and what it is; and that, when more than one are there, he knows them distinctly and unconfusedly one from another. Which always being so, (it being impossible but that he should perceive what he perceives) he can never be in doubt when any Idea is in his Mind, that it is there, and is that Idea it is, and that two distinct Ideas, when they are in his Mind, are there, and are not one and the same Idea. So that all such Affirmations and Negations are made, without any Possibility of Doubt, Uncertainty, or Hesitation, and must necessarily be assented to, as soon as understood; that is, as soon as we have in our Minds determined Ideas, which the Terms in the Proposition stand for. And, therefore, wherever the Mind with Attention considers any Proposition, so as to perceive the
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two Ideas, signified by the Terms, and affirmed, or denied one of the other, to be the same, or different; it is presently and infalli-
bly certain of the Truth of such a Proposition, and this equally,
whether these Propositions be in Terms standing for more gene-
ral Ideas, or such as are less so, v. g. whether the general Idea of
Being be affirmed of itself, as in this Proposition, Whatev're is, is;
or a more particular Idea be affirmed of itself, as a Man is a
Man, or whatsoever is White, is White; or whether the Idea of
Being in general be denied of not Being, or, which is the only (if
I may so call it) Idea different from it, as in this other Propositi-
on, it is impossible for the same Thing to be, and not to be; or any
Idea of any particular Being be denied of another different from
it, as a Man is not a Horse; Red is not Blue. The Difference of
the Ideas, as soon as the Terms are understood, makes the Truth
of the Proposition presently visible, and that with an equal Cer-
tainty and Easiness in the less, as well as the more general Pro-
positions, and all for the same Reason, viz. because the Mind per-
ceives in any Ideas, that it has, the same Idea to be the same with
itself; and two different Ideas to be different, and not the same.
And this it is equally certain of, whether these Ideas be more, or
less general, abstract and comprehensive. It is not, therefore, a-
lone to these two general Propositions, Whatev're is, is; and, it
is impossible for the same Thing to be, and not to be; that this Self-
evidence belongs, by any peculiar Right. The Perception of be-
ing, or not being, belongs no more to these vague Ideas, signified
by the Terms, Whatev're and Thing, than it does to any other
Ideas. These two general Maxims amounting to no more, in short,
but this, that the same is the same, and same is not different,
are Truths known in more particular Instances, as well as in
these general Maxims, and known also in particular Instances,
before these general Maxims are ever thought on, and draw all
their Force from the Discernment of the Mind, employed about
particular Ideas. There is nothing more visible, than that the
Mind, without the help of any Proof, or Reflection on either of
these general Propositions, perceives so clearly, and knows so
certainly, that the Idea of White, is the Idea of White, and not
the Idea of Blue; and that the Idea of White, when it is in the
Mind,
Mind, is there, and is not absent; that the Consideration of these Axioms can add nothing to the Evidence, or Certainty of its Knowledge. Just so it is (as every one may experiment in himself) in all the Ideas a Man has in his Mind: He knows each to be itself, and not to be another; and to be in his Mind, and not away, when it is there, with a Certainty that cannot be greater; and, therefore, the Truth of no general Proposition can be known with a greater Certainty, nor add any thing to this. So that in respect of Identity, our intuitive Knowledge reaches as far as our Ideas. And we are capable of making as many self-evident Propositions, as we have Names for distinct Ideas. And I appeal to every one's own Mind, whether this Proposition, a Circle is a Circle, be not as self-evident a Proposition, as that consisting of more general Terms, Whatsoever is, is: And again, Whether this Proposition, Blue is not Red, be not a Proposition, that a Mind can no more doubt of, as soon as it understands the Words, than it does of that Axiom, it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be; and so of all the like.

§. 5. Secondly, As to Co-existence, or such necessary Connexion between two Ideas, that in the Subject, where one of them is supposed, there the other must necessarily be also; of such Agreement, or Disagreement, as this, the Mind has an immediate Perception, but in very few of them; and, therefore, in this Sort we have but very little intuitive Knowledge; nor are there to be found very many Propositions that are self-evident, tho' some there are; e. g. the Idea of filling a Place equal to the Contents of its Superficies, being annexed to our Idea of Body, I think it is a self-evident Proposition, That two Bodies cannot be in the same Place.

§. 6. Thirdly, As to the Relations of Modes, Mathematicians have framed many Axioms concerning that one Relation of Equality. As Equals taken from Equals, the Remainder will be Equals; which, with the rest of that Kind, however they are received for Maxims by the Mathematicians, and are unquestionable Truths; yet, I think, that any one who considers them, will not
not find that they have a clearer Self-evidence than these, That
One and One are equal to Two; that if you take from the five Fingers of one Hand two, and from the five Fingers of the other Hand two, the remaining Numbers will be equal. These and a Thousand other such Propositions, may be found in Numbers, which, at the very first Hearing, force the Assent, and carry with them an equal, if not greater Clearness, than those mathematical Axioms.

§. 7. Fourthly, As to real Existence, since that has no Connexion with any other of our Ideas, but that of ourselves, and of a first Being, we have in that, concerning the real Existence of all other Beings, not so much as demonstrative, much less a self-evident Knowledge; and, therefore, concerning those there are no Maxims.

§. 8. In the next Place let us consider, what Influence these received Maxims have upon the other Parts of our Knowledge. The Rules established in the Schools, that all Reasonings are ex precognitis & praeconcessis, seem to lay the Foundation of all other Knowledge in these Maxims, and to suppose them to be precognita; whereby, I think, are meant these two Things: First, That these Axioms are those Truths that are first known to the Mind. And, secondly, that upon them the other Parts of Knowledge depend.

§. 9. First, That they are not the Truths first known to the Mind, is evident to Experience, as we have shewn in another Place, B. I. Ch. ii. Who perceives not that a Child certainly knows that a Stranger is not its Mother; that its Sucking-Bottle is not the Rod, long before he knows that it is impossible for the same Thing to be, and not to be? And how many Truths are there about Numbers, which it is obvious to observe that the Mind is perfectly acquainted with, and fully convinced of, before it ever thought on these general Maxims, to which Mathematicians, in their Arguings, do sometimes refer them? Whereof the Reason is very plain: For that which makes the Mind
Mind assent to such Propositions, being nothing else but the Perception it has of the Agreement, or Disagreement of its Ideas, according as it finds them affirmed, or denied one of another, in Words it understands, and every Idea being known to be what it is, and every two distinct Ideas being known not to be the same; it must necessarily follow, that such self-evident Truths must be first known, which consist of Ideas, that are first in the Mind: And the Ideas first in the Mind, it is evident, are those of particular Things, from whence, by slow Degrees, the Understanding proceeds to some few general ones; which being taken from the ordinary and familiar Objects of Sense, are settled in the Mind, with general Names to them. Thus particular Ideas are first received and distinguished, and so Knowledge got about them; and next to them, the less general, or specific, which are next to particular: For abstract Ideas are not so obvious, or easy to Children, or the yet unexercised Mind, as particular ones. If they seem so to grown Men, it is only because by constant and familiar Use they are made so. For when we nicely reflect upon them, we shall find, that general Ideas are Fictions and Contrivances of the Mind, that carry Difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves, as we are apt to imagine. For Example, Does it not require some Pains and Skill to form the general Idea of a Triangle? (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult) for it must be neither Oblique, nor Rectangle, neither Equilateral, Equicrural, nor Scalene; but all and none of these at once. In effect, it is something imperfect, that cannot exist; an Idea, wherein some Parts of several different and inconsistent Ideas are put together. It is true, the Mind, in this imperfect State, has need of such Ideas, and makes all the Haste to them it can, for the Conveniency of Communication, and Enlargement of Knowledge; to both which it is naturally very much inclined. But yet one has Reason to suspect such Ideas are Marks of our Imperfection; at least this is enough to shew, that the most abstract and general Ideas are not those, that the Mind is first and most easily acquainted with, nor such as its earliest Knowledge is conversant about.

§. 10. Secondly,
§. 16. Secondly, from what has been said, it plainly follows, that these magnified Maxims are not the Principles and Foundations of all our other Knowledge. For, if there be a great many other Truths, which have as much Self-evidence as they, and a great many that we know before them, it is impossible they should be the Principles, from which we deduce all other Truths. Is it impossible to know that one and two are equal to three, but by Virtue of this, or some such Axiom, viz. The Whole is equal to all its Parts taken together? Many a one knows, that one and two are equal to three, without having heard, or thought on that, or any other Axiom, by which it might be proved; and knows it as certainly, as any other Man knows, that the Whole is equal to all its Parts, or any other Maxim, and all from the same Reason of Self-evidence; the Equality of those Ideas being as visible and certain to him without that, or any other Axiom, as with it, it needing no Proof to make it perceived. Nor after the Knowledge, That the Whole is equal to all its Parts, does he know that one and two are equal to three, better, or more certainly, than he did before. For if there be any Odds in those Ideas, the Whole and Parts are more obscure, or, at least, more difficult to be settled in the Mind, than those of one, two, and three. And indeed, I think, I may ask these Men, who will needs have all Knowledge besides those general Principles themselves, to depend on general, innate, and self-evident Principles, What Principle is requisite to prove, that one and one are two; that two and two are four; that three times two are six? Which being known without any Proof, do evince, that either all Knowledge does not depend on certain Precognita, or general Maxims, called Principles, or else that these are Principles; and if these are to be counted Principles, a great Part of Numeration will be so. To which, if we add all the self-evident Propositions, which may be made about all our distinct Ideas, Principles will be almost infinite, at least, innumerable, which Men arrive to the Knowledge of at different Ages; and a great many of these innate Principles, they never come to know all their Lives. But, whether they come in View.
of the Mind earlier, or later, this is true of them, that they are all known by their native Evidence, are wholly independent, receive no Light, nor are capable of any Proof one from another; much less the more particular, from the more general; or the more simple, from the more compounded: The more simple, and less abstract, being the most familiar, and the easier and earlier apprehended. But which ever be the clearest Ideas, the Evidence and Certainty of all such Propositions is in this, that a Man sees the same Idea to be the same Idea, and infallibly perceives two different Ideas to be different Ideas. For, when a Man has in his Understanding the Ideas of one and of two, the Idea of Yellow, and the Idea of Blue, he cannot but certainly know, that the Idea of one is the Idea of one, and not the Idea of two; and that the Idea of Yellow is the Idea of Yellow, and not the Idea of Blue. For a Man cannot confound the Ideas in his Mind, which he has distinct: That would be to have them confused and distinct at the same time, which is a Contradiction: And to have none distinct, is to have no Use of our Faculties, to have no Knowledge at all. And, therefore, what Idea soever it affirmed of itself, or whatsoever two entire, distinct Ideas are denied one of another, the Mind cannot but assent to such a Proposition, as infallibly true, as soon as it understands the Terms, without Hesitation, or need of Proof, or regarding those made in more general Terms, and called Maxims.

§. II. What shall we then say? Are these general Maxims of no Use? By no Means; tho’ perhaps their Use is not that, which it is commonly taken to be. But since doubting in the least, of what hath been by some Men ascribed to these Maxims, may be apt to be cried out against, as overturning the Foundations of all the Sciences; it may be worth while to consider them, with respect to other Parts of our Knowledge, and examine more particularly, to what Purposes they serve, and to what not.

1. It is evident from what has been already said, that they are of no use to prove, or confirm, less general, self-evident Propositions.
2. It is as plain that they are not, nor have been the Foundations whereon any Science hath been built. There is, I know, a great deal of Talk, propagated from Scholastic Men, of Sciences, and the Maxims on which they are built: But it has been my ill Luck never to meet with any such Sciences; much less any one, built upon these two Maxims, What is, is; and It is impossible for the same Thing to be, and not to be. And I would be glad to be shewn, where any such Science, erected upon these, or any other general Axioms, is to be found: And should be obliged to any one, who would lay before me the Frame, and System of any Science so built on these, or any such like Maxims, that could not be shewn to stand as firm, without any Consideration of them. I ask, Whether these general Maxims have not the same Use in the Study of Divinity, and in Theological Questions, that they have in the other Sciences? They serve here too, to silence Wranglers, and put an end to dispute. But I think that no body will therefore say, that the Christian Religion is built upon these Maxims, or that the Knowledge, we have of it, is derived from these Principles. It is from Revelation we have received it, and without Revelation, these Maxims had never been able to help us to it. When we find out an Idea, by whose Intervention we discover the Connexion of two others, this is a Revelation from God to us, by the Voice of Reason. For we then come to know a Truth, that we did not know before. When God declares any Truth to us, this is a Revelation to us by the Voice of His Spirit, and we are advanced in our Knowledge. But in neither of these do we receive our Light, or Knowledge from Maxims. But in the one, the Things themselves afford it, and we see the Truth in them, by perceiving their Agreement, or Disagreement. In the other, God Himself affords it immediately to us, and we see the Truth of what He says in His unerring Veracity.

3. They are not of use to help Men forward in the Advance- ment of Sciences, or new Discoveries of yet unknown Truths. Mr. Newton, in his never enough to be admired Book, has demonstrated several Propositions, which are so many new Truths, before unknown to the World, and are farther Advances in Ma-
Maxims.  

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thematical Knowledge: But, for the Discovery of these, it was not the general Maxims, What is, is; or, the Whole is bigger than a Part, or the like, that helped him. These were not the Clues, that led him into the Discovery of the Truth, and Certainty of those Propositions. Nor was it by them that he got the Knowledge of those Demonstrations; but by finding out intermediate Ideas, that shewed the Agreement, or Disagreement of the Ideas, as expressed in the Propositions he demonstrated. This is the great Exercise and Improvement of Human Understanding, in the enlarging of Knowledge, and advancing the Sciences, where-in they are far enough from receiving any Help from the Contemplation of these, or the like magnified Maxims. Would those who have this traditional Admiration of these Propositions, that they think no Step can be made in Knowledge, without the Support of an Axiom, no Stone laid in the building of the Sciences, without a general Maxim, but distinguishing between the Method of acquiring Knowledge, and of communicating; between the Method of raising any Science, and that of teaching it to others, as far as it is advanced; they would see that those general Maxims were not the Foundations, on which the first Discoverers raised their admirable Structures, nor the Keys, that unlocked and opened those Secrets of Knowledge. Tho' afterwards, when Schools were erected, and Sciences had their Professors to teach what others had found out, they often made use of Maxims, i. e. laid down certain Propositions, which were self-evident, or to be received for true; which being settled in the Minds of their Scholars, as unquestionable Verities, they on occasion made use of, to convince them of Truths, in particular Instances, that were not so familiar to their Minds, as those general Axioms, which had before been inculcated to them, and carefully settled in their Minds. Tho' these particular Instances, when well reflected on, are no less self-evident to the Understanding, than the general Maxims brought to confirm them: And it was in these particular Instances, that the first Discoverer found the Truth, without the Help of the general Maxims: And so may any one else do, who with Attention considers them.

To come, therefore, to the use that is made of Maxims.

1. They
1. They are of use, as has been observed, in the ordinary Methods of teaching Sciences, as far as they are advanced; but of little, or none, in advancing them farther.

2. They are of use in Disputes, for the silencing of obstinate Wranglers, and bringing those Contests to some Conclusion. Whether a need of them to that End, came not in, in the Manner following, I crave leave to enquire. The Schools, having made Disputation the Touchstone of Mens Abilities, and the Criterion of Knowledge, adjudged Victory to him that kept the Field; and he that had the last Word, was concluded to have the better of the Argument, if not of the Cause. But, because by this means there was like to be no Decision between Skilful Combatants, whilst one never failed of a medium terminus to prove any Proposition; and the other could as constantly, without, or with a Disjunction, deny the Major, or Minor. To prevent, as much as could be, the running out of Disputes, into an endless Train of Syllogisms, certain general Propositions, most of them indeed self-evident, were introduced into the Schools; which, being such as all Men allowed and agreed in, were looked on as general Measures of Truth, and served instead of Principles, (where the Disputants had not laid down any other between them) beyond which there was no going, and which must not be receded from, by either Side. And thus these Maxims, getting the Name of Principles, beyond which Men in Dispute could not retreat, were, by Mistake, taken to be Originals and Sources, from whence all Knowledge began, and the Foundations whereon the Sciences were built. Because, when in their Disputes they came to any of these, they flopped there, and went no farther, the Matter was determined. But how much this is a Mistake hath been already shewn.

This Method of the Schools, which have been thought the Fountains of Knowledge, introduced, as I suppose, the like Use of these Maxims, into a great Part of Conversation out of the Schools, to flop the Mouths of Cavillers, whom any one is excused from arguing any longer with, when they deny these general self-evident Principles received by all reasonable Men, who have once thought of them: But yet their Use herein is but
to put an end to Wrangling. They, in truth, when urged in such Cases, teach nothing: That is already done by the intermediate Ideas, made use of in the Debate, whose Connexion may be seen without the help of those Maxims, and so the Truth known before the Maxim is produced, and the Argument brought to a first Principle. Men would give off a wrong Argument, before it come to that, if in their Disputes they proposed to themselves the finding and embracing of Truth, and not a Contest for Victory. And thus Maxims have their Use to put a Stop to their Perverseness, whose Ingenuity should have yielded sooner. But the Method of the Schools have allowed and encouraged Men to oppose and resist evident Truth, till they are baffled, i.e. till they are reduced to contradict themselves, or some established Principle; it is no Wonder that they should not, in civil Conversation, be ashamed of that, which in the Schools is counted a Virtue and a Glory; viz. obstinately to maintain that Side of the Question they have chosen, whether true, or false, to the last Extremity; even after Conviction. A strange way to attain Truth and Knowledge; and that, which I think the rational Part of Mankind, not corrupted by Education, could scarce believe should ever be admitted amongst the Lovers of Truth, and Students of Religion, or Nature; or introduced into the Seminaries of those, who are to propagate the Truths of Religion, or Philosophy, amongst the Ignorant and Unconvinced. How much such a Way of Learning is like to turn young Mens Minds from the sincere Search and Love of Truth; nay, and to make them doubt whether there is any such Thing, or, at least, worth the adhering to, I shall not now enquire. This I think, that, bating those Places which brought the Peripatetic Philosophy into their Schools, where it continued many Ages, without teaching the World any thing but the Art of Wrangling; these Maxims were no where thought the Foundations, on which the Sciences were built, nor the great Helps to the Advancement of Knowledge.

As to these general Maxims, therefore, they are, as I have said, of great Use in Disputes, to stop the Mouths of Wranglers; but not of such
much use to the Discovery of unknown Truths, or to help the Mind forwards in its Search after Knowledge. For whoever began to build his Knowledge on this general Proposition, What is, is; or, it is impossible for the same Thing to be, and not to be: And from either of these, as from a Principle of Science, deduced a System of useful Knowledge? Wrong Opinions often involving Contradictions, one of these Maxims, as a Touchstone, may serve well to shew whither they lead. But yet, however fit to lay open the Absurdity, or Mistake of a Man’s Reasoning, or Opinion, they are of very little use for enlightening the Understanding: And it will not be found, that the Mind receives much Help from them, in its Progress in Knowledge; which would be neither less, nor less certain, were these two general Propositions never thought on. It is true, as I have said, they sometimes serve in Argumentation, to stop a Wrangler’s Mouth, by shewing the Absurdity of what he faith, and by exposing him to the Shame of contradicting what all the World knows, and he himself cannot but own to be true. But it is one Thing to shew a Man that he is in an Error; and another to put him in Possession of Truth: And I would fain know, what Truths these two Propositions are able to teach, and by their Influence make us know, which we did not know before, or could not know without them. Let us reason from them, as well as we can, they are only about identical Predications, and influence, if any at all, none but such. Each particular Proposition, concerning Identity, or Diversity, is as clearly and certainly known in itself, if attended to, as either of these general ones: Only these general ones, as serving in all Cases, are, therefore, more inculcated and insisted on. As to other, less general Maxims, many of them are no more than bare verbal Propositions, and teach us nothing but the Respect and Import of Names one to another. The Whole is equal to all its Parts; what real Truth, I beseech you, does it teach us? What more is contained in that Maxim, than what the Signification of the Word Totum, or the Whole, does of itself import? And he, that knows that the Word Whole stands for what is made up of all its Parts, knows very little less, than that the Whole is equal to
all its Parts. And upon the same Ground, I think that this Proposition, *A Hill is higher than a Valley*, and several the like, may also pass for Maxims. But yet Masters of Mathematics, when they would, as Teachers of what they know, initiate others in that Science, do, not without Reason, place this, and some other such Maxims, at the Entrance of their Systems; that their Scholars, having in the Beginning perfectly acquainted their Thoughts with these Propositions, made in such general Terms, may be used to make such Reflexions, and have these more general Propositions, as formed Rules and Sayings, ready to apply to all particular Cases. Not that, if they be equally weighed, they are more clear and evident than the particular Instances they are brought to confirm; but that, being more familiar to the Mind, the very naming them is enough to satisfy the Understanding. But this, I say, is more from our Custom of using them, and the Establishment they have got in our Minds, by our often thinking of them, than from the different Evidence of the Things. But before Custom has settled Methods of Thinking and Reasoning in our Minds, I am apt to imagine it is quite otherwise; and that the Child, when a part of his Apple is taken away, knows it better in that particular Instance, than by this general Proposition, *The Whole is equal to all its Parts*; and that if one of these have need to be confirmed to him, by the other, the general has more need to be let into his Mind by the particular, than the particular by the general. For in Particulars our Knowledge begins, and so spreads itself by Degrees to Generals. Tho' afterwards the Mind takes the quite contrary Course, and having drawn its Knowledge into as general Propositions as it can, makes those familiar to its Thoughts, and accustoms itself to have recourse to them, as to the Standards of Truth and Falsity. By which familiar Use of them, as Rules to measure the Truth of other Propositions, it comes in time to be thought, that more particular Propositions have their Truth and Evidence from their Conformity to these more general ones, which, in Discourse and Argumentation, are so frequently urged, and constantly admitted. And this I think to be the reason why, among
Maxims, if
Care be not tak-
en in the Use of
Words, may
prove Contra-
dictions.

§. 12. One thing farther, I think, it may not
be amiss to observe, concerning these general
Maxims, that they are so far from improving,
or establishing our Minds in true Knowledge,
that if our Notions be wrong, loose, or unstea-
dy, and we resign up our Thoughts to the
Sound of Words, rather than fix them on settled, determined
Ideas of Things: I say, these general Maxims will serve to con-
firm us in Mistakes; and in such a Way of Use of Words,
which is most common, will serve to prove Contradictions:
V. g. He that, with Des Cartes, shall frame in his Mind an Idea,
of what he calls Body, to be nothing but Extension, may easily
demonstrate, that there is no Vacuum, i. e. no Space void of
Body, by this Maxim, What is, is. For the Idea, to which
he annexes the Name Body, being bare Extension, his Know-
ledge, that Space cannot be without Body, is certain. For he
knows his own Idea of Extension clearly and distinctly, and
knows that it is what it is, and not another Idea, tho’ it be call-
ed by these three Names, Extension, Body, Space. Which three
Words, standing for one and the same Idea, may, no doubt,
with the same Evidence and Certainty, be affirmed one of an-
other, as each of itself: And it is as certain, that, whilst I use
them all to stand for one and the same Idea, this Predication is
as true and identical in its Signification, That Space is Body, as
this Predication is true and identical, that Body is Body, both in
Signification and Sound.

§. 13. But if another shall come, and make
to himself another Idea, different from Des Car-
tes’s, of the Thing, which yet, with Des Cartes,
he calls by the same Name Body; and make his Idea, which he
expresses by the Word Body, to be of a Thing that hath both
Extension and Solidity together; he will as easily demonstrate,
that there may be a Vacuum, or Space without a Body, as Des
Cartes demonstrated the contrary. Because the Idea, to which
he gives the Name Space, being barely the simple one of Exten-

Vacuum.
Maxims.

§ 14. But yet, tho' both these Propositions (as you see) may be equally demonstrated, viz. that there may be a Vacuum, and that there cannot be a Vacuum, by these two certain Principles (viz.) What is, is; and the same Thing cannot be, and not be: Yet neither of these Principles will serve to prove to us, that any, or what, Bodies do exist: For that we are left to our Senses, to discover to us, as far as they can. Those universal and self-evident Principles, being only our constant, clear, and distinct Knowledge of our own Ideas, more general, or comprehensive, can assure us of nothing that passes without the Mind, their Certainty is founded only upon the Knowledge we have of each Idea by itself, and of its Distinction from others; about which we cannot be mistaken, whilst they are in our Minds, tho' we may, and often are mistaken, when we retain the Names without the Ideas, or use them confusedly, sometimes for one, and sometimes for another Idea. In which Cases, the Force of these Axioms, reaching only to the Sound, and not the Signification of the Words, serves only to lead us into Confusion, Mistake, and Error. It is to shew Men, that these Maxims, however cried up for the great Guards of Truth, will not secure them from Error, in a careless, loose Use of their Words, that I have made this Remark. In all that is here suggested, concerning the little Use for the Improvement of Knowledge, or dangerous Use in undetermined Ideas, I have been far enough from saying, or intending they should be laid aside, as some have been too
too forward to charge me. I affirm them to be Truths, self-evident Truths; and so cannot be laid aside. As far as their Influence will reach, it is in vain to endeavour, nor would I attempt to abridge it. But yet without any Injury to Truth, or Knowledge, I may have Reason to think their Use is not answerable to the great Stress which seems to be laid on them; and I may warn Men not to make an ill Use of them, for the confirming themselves in Errors.

§. 15. But let them be of what Use they will in verbal Propositions, they cannot discovery, or prove to us the least Knowledge of the Nature of Substances, as they are found and exist without us, any farther than grounded on Experience. And tho' the Consequence of these two Propositions, called Principles, be very clear, and their Use not dangerous, or hurtful, in the Probation of such Things, wherein there is no need at all of them for Proof, but such as are clear by themselves without them, viz. where our Ideas are determined, and known by the Names that stand for them: Yet when these Principles, viz. What is, is; and, It is impossible for the same Thing to be, and not to be, are made use of in the Probation of Propositions, wherein are Words, standing for complex Ideas, viz. Man, Horse, Gold, Virtue; there they are of infinite Danger, and most commonly make Men receive and retain Falshood for manifest Truth, and Uncertainty for Demonstration: Upon which follow Error, Obstlnacy, and all the Mischiefs that can happen from wrong Reasoning. The Reason whereof is not, that these Principles are less true, or of less Force in proving Propositions, made of Terms standing for complex Ideas, than where the Propositions are about simple Ideas: But, because Men mistake generally, thinking that where the same Terms are preserved, the Propositions are about the same Things, tho' the Ideas, they stand for, are in Truth different; therefore these Maxims are made use of to support thofe, which in Sound and Appearance are contradictory Propositions; as is clear in the Demonstrations above mentioned, about a Vacuum. So that, whilst Men take Words for Things, as usually they do, these Maxims may, and
and do commonly serve to prove contradictory Propositions: As shall yet be farther made manifest.

§. 16. For Instance; Let Man be that, concerning which you would, by these first Principles, demonstrate any Thing, and we shall see, that, so far as Demonstration is by these Principles, it is only verbal, and gives us no certain, universal, true Proposition, or Knowledge of any Being existing without us. First, A Child having framed the Idea of a Man, it is probable, that his Idea is just like that Picture, which the Painter makes of the visible Appearances joined together; and such a Complication of Ideas together in his Understanding, makes up the single, complex Idea, which he calls Man, whereof White, or Flesh-Colour in England being one, the Child can demonstrate to you, that a Negro is not a Man, because white Colour was one of the constant, simple Ideas of the complex Idea he calls Man: And, therefore, he can demonstrate, by the Principle, It is impossible for the same Thing to be, and not to be, that a Negro is not a Man; the Foundation of his Certainty being not that universal Proposition, which, perhaps, he never heard, nor thought of, but the clear, distinct Perception he hath of his own simple Ideas of Black and White, which he cannot be persuaded to take, nor can ever mistake one for another, whether he knows that Maxim, or no: And to this Child, or any one who hath such an Idea, which he calls Man, can you never demonstrate that a Man hath a Soul, because his Idea of Man includes no such Notion, or Idea in it. And, therefore, to him, the Principle of What is, is, proves not this Matter; but it depends upon Collection and Observation, by which he is to make his complex Idea called Man.

§. 17. Secondly, Another, that hath gone farther in framing and collecting the Idea he calls Man, and to the outward Shape adds Laughter and rational Discourse, may demonstrate that Infants and Changelings are no Men, by this Maxim, It is impossible for the same Thing to be, and not to be: And I have discoursed with very rational Men, who have actually denied that they are Men.

§. 18. Thirdly,
§ 18. Thirdly, perhaps another makes up the complex idea, which he calls Man, only out of the ideas of body in general, and the powers of language and reason, and leaves out the shape wholly: This man is able to demonstrate, that a man may have no hands, but be quadrupes, neither of those being included in his idea of man; and in whatever body, or shape he found speech and reason joined, that was a man: Because having a clear knowledge of such a complex idea, it is certain that what is, is.

§ 19. So that, if rightly considered, I think we may say, that where our ideas are determined in our minds, and have annexed to them by us known and steady names under those settled determinations, there is little need, or no use at all, of these maxims, to prove the agreement, or disagreement of any of them. He that cannot discern the truth; or falsehood of such propositions, without the help of these and the like maxims, will not be helped by these maxims to do it: Since he cannot be supposed to know the truth of these maxims themselves without proof, if he cannot know the truth of others without proof, which are as self-evident as these. Upon this ground it is, that intuitive knowledge neither requires, nor admits any proof, one part of it more than another. He that will suppose it does, takes away the foundation of all knowledge and certainty: And he that needs any proof to make him certain, and give his assent to this proposition, that two are equal to two, will also have need of a proof to make him admit, that what is, is. He that needs a probation to convince him, that two are not three, that white is not black, that a triangle is not a circle, &c. or any other two determined, distinct ideas are not one and the same, will need also a demonstration to convince him, that it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be.

§ 20. And, as these maxims are of little use, where we have determined ideas; so they are, as I have shewed, of dangerous use, where our ideas are not determined; and where we use their use dangerous, where our ideas are confused.

Words,
Words, that are not annexed to determined ideas, but such as are of a loose and wandering Signification, sometimes standing for one, and sometimes for another idea: From which follows Mistake and Error, which these Maxims (brought as Proofs to establish Propositions, wherein the Terms stand for undetermined ideas) do, by their Authority, confirm and rivet.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Trifling Propositions.

§ 1. Whether the Maxims, treated of in the foregoing Chapter, be of that use to real knowledge, as is generally supposed, I leave to be considered. This, I think, may confidently be affirmed, that there are universal Propositions, which, tho' they be certainly true, yet they add no light to our understandings, bring no increase to our knowledge. Such are,

§ 2. First, All purely identical Propositions. These obviously, and at first blush, appear to contain no instruction in them. For, when we affirm the said term of itself, whether it be barely verbal, or whether it contains any clear and real idea, it shews us nothing, but what we must certainly know before, whether such a proposition be either made by, or proposed to us. Indeed that most general one, what is, is, may serve sometimes to shew a man the absurdity he is guilty of, when, by circumlocution, or equivocal terms, he would, in particular instances, deny the same thing of itself; because no body will so openly bid defiance to common sense, as to affirm visible and direct contradictions in plain words: or, if he does, a man is excused, if he breaks off any farther discourse with him. But yet, I think I may say, that neither that received maxim, nor any other identical proposition teaches us any thing: And tho', in such kind of Propositions, this great and magnified maxim, boasted to be the
Chap. VIII. *Tripling Propositions.*

the Foundation of Demonstration, may be, and often is made use of to confirm them; yet all it proves amounts to no more than this, That the same Word may, with great Certainty, be affirmed of itself, without any doubt of the Truth of any such Proposition, and let me add also, without any real Knowledge.

§. 3. For at this Rate, any very ignorant Person, who can but make a Proposition, and knows not what he means when he says, *Ay,* or *No,* may make a Million of Propositions, of whose Truths he may be infallibly certain, and yet not know one Thing in the World thereby; *v. g.* what is a Soul, is a Soul; or a Soul is a Soul; a Spirit is a Spirit; a Fetiche is a Fetiche, &c. These being all equivalent to this Proposition, *viz.* What is, is, *i. e.* what hath Existence, hath Existence; or, *Who hath a Soul, hath a Soul.* What is this more than trifling with Words? It is but like a Monkey shifting his Oyster from one Hand to the other, and had he had but Words, might, no doubt, have said, Oyster in right Hand is Subject, and Oyster in left Hand is Predicate: And so might have made a self-evident Proposition of Oyster, *i. e.* Oyster is Oyster; and yet, with all this, not have been one Whit the wiser, or more knowing: And that Way of handling the Matter, would much at one have satisfied the Monkey's Hunger, or a Man's Understanding; and they two would have improved in Knowledge and Bulk together.

I know there are some, who, because identical Propositions are self-evident, shew a great Concern for them, and think they do great Service to Philosophy, by crying them up, as if in them was contained all Knowledge, and the Understanding were led into all Truth, by them only. I grant, as forwardly as any one, that they are all true and self-evident. I grant farther, that the Foundation of all our Knowledge lies in the Faculty we have of perceiving the same Idea to be the same, and of discerning it from those that are different, as I have shewn in the foregoing Chapter. But how that vindicates the making use of identical Propositions, for the Improvement of Knowledge, from the Imputation of trifling, I do not see. Let any one repeat, as often as he pleases, that the *Will is the Will,* or lay what Stress on it he thinks fit; of what Use is this, and an infinite the like
like Propositions, for the enlarging our Knowledge? Let a Man abound as much as the Plenty of Words, which he has, will permit him, in such Propositions as these; A Law is a Law, and Obligation is Obligation; Right is Right, and Wrong is Wrong; will these and the like ever help him to an Acquaintance with Ethics? Or instruct him, or others, in the Knowledge of Morality? Thoso, who know not, nor perhaps ever will know, what is Right, and what is Wrong, nor the Measures of them, can with as much Assurance make, and infallibly know the Truth of these and all such Propositions, as he that is best instructed in Morality can do. But what Advance do such Propositions give in the Knowledge of any Thing necessary, or useful for their Conduct?

He would be thought to do little less than trifle, who, for the enlightning the Understanding, in any Part of Knowledge, should be busy with identical Propositions, and insist on such Maxims as those: Substance is Substance, and Body is Body; a Vacuum is a Vacuum, and a Vortex is a Vortex; a Centaur is a Centaur, and a Chimera is a Chimera, &c. For these, and all such are equally true, equally certain, and equally self-evident. But yet they cannot but be counted trifling, when made use of as Principles of Instruction, and Stress laid on them, as Helps to Knowledge: Since they teach nothing, but what every one, who is capable of Discourse, knows without being told, viz. That the same Term is the same Term, and the same Idea the same Idea. And upon this Account it was that I formerly did, and do still think, the offering and inculcating such Propositions, in order to give the Understanding any new Light, or Inlet, into the Knowledge of Things, no better than trifling.

Instruction lies in something very different; and he, that would enlarge his own, or another's Mind, to Truths he does not yet know, must find out intermediate Ideas, and then lay them in such Order, one by another, that the Understanding may see the Agreement, or Disagreement of those in Question. Propositions, that do this, are instructive; but they are far from such as affirm the same Term of itself: Which is no way to advance one's self, or others, in any sort of Knowledge. It no more
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more helps to that, than it would help any one in his learning to read, to have such Propositions as these inculcated to him; an \(A\) is an \(A\), and a \(B\) is a \(B\); which a Man may know, as well as any School-Master; and yet never be able to read a Word, as long as he lives. Nor do these, or any such identical Propositions, help him one jot forward in the Skill of Reading, let him make what use of them he can.

If those, who blame my calling them trifling Propositions, had but read, and been at the Pains to understand what I had above writ, in very plain English, they could not but have seen that, by identical Propositions, I mean only such, wherein the same Term, importing the same Idea, is affirmed of itself: Which I take to be the proper Signification of identical Propositions; and, concerning all such, I think I may continue safely to say, That to propose them as instructive, is no better than trifling. For no one, who has the Use of Reason, can miss them, where it is necessary they should be taken notice of; nor doubt of their Truth, when he does take notice of them.

But if Men will call Propositions identical, wherein the same Term is not affirmed of itself, whether they speak more properly than I, others must judge. This is certain, all that they say of Propositions, that are not identical in my Sense, concerns not me, nor what I have said; all that I have said, relating to those Propositions, wherein the same Term is affirmed of itself. And I would fain see an Instance, wherein any such can be made use of, to the Advantage and Improvement of any one's Knowledge. Instances of other kinds, whatever use may be made of them, concern not me, as not being such as I call Identical.

§ 4. Secondly, Another sort of trifling Propositions is, when a part of the complex Idea is predicated of the Name of the whole; a part of the Definition of the Word defined. Such are all Propositions, wherein the Genus is predicated of the Species, or more comprehensive, of less comprehensive Terms: For what Information, what Knowledge carries this Proposition in it, viz. Lead is a Metal, to a Man, who knows the complex Idea the Name Lead stands for? All the

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simple Ideas, that go to the complex one signified by the Term, Metal, being nothing, but what he before comprehended, and signified by the Name, Lead. Indeed, to a Man, that knows the Signification of the Word, Metal, and not of the Word, Lead, it is a shorter way to explain the Signification of the Word, Lead, by saying it is a Metal, which at once expresses several of its simple Ideas, than to enumerate them one by one, telling him it is a Body very heavy, fusible and malleable.

§. 5. Alike trifling it is, to predicate any other Part of the Definition of the Term defined, or to affirm any one of the simple Ideas of a complex one, of the Name of the whole complex Idea; as, All Gold is fusible. For Fusibility being one of the simple Ideas that goes to the making up the complex one the Sound, Gold, stands for, What can it be but playing with Sounds, to affirm that of the Name, Gold, which is comprehended in its received Signification? It would be thought little better than ridiculous, to affirm gravely, as a Truth of Moment, that Gold is yellow; and I see not how it is any jot more material to say, it is fusible, unless that Quality be left out of the complex Idea, of which the Sound, Gold, is the Mark in ordinary Speech. What Instruction can it carry with it, to tell one, that which he hath been told already, or he is supposed to know before? For I am supposed to know the Signification of the Word another uses to me, or else he is to tell to me. And If I know that the Name Gold stands for this complex Idea of Body, yellow, heavy, fusible, malleable, it will not much instruct me, to put it solemnly afterwards in a Proposition, and gravely say, All Gold is fusible. Such Propositions can only serve to shew the Distinguinity of one, who will go from the Definition of his own Terms, by reminding him sometimes of it; but carry no Knowledge with them, but of the Signification of Words, however certain they be.

§. 6. Every Man is an Animal, or living Body, is as certain a Proposition as can be; but no more conducing to the Knowledge of Things, than to say, A Palfry is an ambling Horsc, or a neighing, ambling Animal.
Animal, both being only about the Signification of Words, and make me know but this. That Body, Sense, and Motion, or Power of Sensation and Moving, are Three of those Ideas, that I always comprehend and signify by the Word, Man; and where they are not to be found together, the Name Man belongs not to that Thing; and so of the other, that Body, Sense, and a certain way of going, with a certain kind of Voice, are some of those Ideas, which I always comprehend, and signify by the Word Palfry; and when they are not to be found together, the Name Palfry belongs not to that Thing. It is just the same, and to the same Purpose, when any Term standing for any one, or more of the simple Ideas, that all together make up that complex Idea, which is called a Man, is affirmed of the Term Man: V.g. Suppose a Roman, signified by the Word Homo; all these distinct Ideas, united in one Subject, Corporietas, Sensibilitas, Potentia se movendi, Rationalitas, Risibilitas; he might, no doubt, with great Certainty, universally affirm one, more, or all of these together of the Word Homo, but did no more than say, that the Word Homo, in his Country, comprehended in its Signification all these Ideas. Much like a Romance-Knight, who by the Word Palfry signified these Ideas; Body, of a certain Figure, Four-legged, with Sense, Motion, Ambling, Neighing, White, used to have a Woman on his Back; might with the same Certainty universally affirm also any, or all of these of the Word Palfry: But did thereby teach no more, but that the Word Palfry, in his, or Romance Language, stood for all these, and was not to be applied to any thing, where any of these was wanting. But he that shall tell me, that in whatever Thing Sense, Motion, Reason and Laughter, were united, that Thing had actually a Notion of God, or would be cast into a Sleep by Opium, made indeed an instructive Proposition: Because neither having the Notion of God, nor being cast into Sleep by Opium, being contained in the Idea signified by the Word, Man, we are, by such Propositions, taught something more than barely what the Word, Man, stands for; and, therefore, the Knowledge contained in it, is more than verbal.
For this teaches but the Signification of Words; he is supposed to understand the Terms he uses in it, or else he talks like a Parrot, only making a Noise by Imitation, and framing certain Sounds, which he has learnt of others; but not, as a rational Creature, using them for Signs of Ideas, which he has in his Mind. The Hearer also is supposed to understand the Terms as the Speaker uses them, or else he talks Jargon, and makes an unintelligible Noise. And, therefore, he trifles with Words, who makes such a Proposition, which, when it is made, contains no more than one of the Terms does, and which a Man was supposed to know before; e.g. a Triangle hath three Sides, or Saffron is yellow. And this is no farther tolerable, than where a Man goes to explain his Terms, to one who is supposed, or declares himself not to understand him: And then it teaches only the Signification of that Word, and the Use of that Sign.

§. 8. We can know, then, the Truth of two Sorts of Propositions, with perfect Certainty; the one is, of those trifling Propositions, which have a Certainty in them, but it is only a verbal Certainty, but not instructive. And, Secondly, we can know the Truth, and so may be certain in Propositions, which affirm something of another, which is a necessary Consequence of its precise, complex Idea, but not contained in it: As that the external Angle of all Triangles, is bigger than either of the opposite internal Angles; which Relation of the outward Angle, to either of the opposite, internal Angles, making no part of the complex Idea, signified by the Name Triangle; this is a real Truth, and conveys with it instructive, real Knowledge.

§. 9. We have little, or no Knowledge of what Combinations there be of simple Ideas, existing together in Substances, but by our Senses, we cannot make any universal, certain Propositions concerning them, any farther than our nominal Essences lead us; which being to a very few and inconsiderable Truths, in respect of those which depend on their real Constitutions, the general Propositions, that are made about

Silb.
Substances, if they are certain, are for the most part but trifling; and if they are instructive, are uncertain, and are such as we can have no Knowledge of their real Truth, how much soever constant Observation and Analogy may assist our Judgments in guessing. Hence it comes to pass, that one may often meet with very clear and coherent Discourses, that amount yet to nothing. For it is plain, that Names of substantial Beings, as well as others, as far as they have relative Significations affixed to them, may, with great Truth, be joined negatively and affirmatively in Propositions, as their relative Definitions make them fit to be so joined; and Propositions, consisting of such Terms, may, with the same Clearness, be deduced one from another, as those that convey the most real Truths: And all this, without any Knowledge of the Nature, or Reality of Things existing without us. By this Method, one may make Demonstrations and undoubted Propositions in Words, and yet thereby advance not one jot in the Knowledge of the Truth of Things; v. g. he that having learned these following Words, with their ordinary, mutually relative Acceptations annexed to them; v. g. Substance, Man, Animal, Form, Soul, Vegetative, Sensitive, Rational, may make several undoubted Propositions about the Soul, without knowing at all what the Soul really is: And of this Sort, a Man may find an infinite Number of Propositions, Reasonings, and Conclusions, in Books of Metaphysics, School-Divinity, and some Sort of natural Philosophy, and, after all, know as little of God, Spirits, or Bodies, as he did before he set out.

§. 10. He that hath Liberty to define, i. e. determine the Signification of his Names of Substances, (as certainly every one does in effect, who makes them stand for his own Ideas) and makes their Significations at a Venture, taking them from his own, or other Mens Fancies, and not from an Examination, or Enquiry into the Nature of Things themselves, may, with little Trouble, demonstrate them one of another, according to those several Respects and mutual Relations he has given them one to another; wherein, however Things agree, or disagree, in their own Nature, he needs mind nothing but his own Notions, with the Names he hath bestowed upon them;
them: But thereby no more increases his own Knowledge, than
he does his Riches, who taking a Bag of Counters, calls one
in a certain Place a Pound, another in another Place a Shilling,
and a third in a third Place a Penny; and so proceeding, may un-
doubtedly reckon right, and cast up a great Sum, according to his
Counters so placed, and standing for more, or less, as he pleases,
without being one jot the richer, or without even knowing how
much a Pound, Shilling, or Penny is, but only that one is con-
tained in the other twenty Times, and contains the other
twelve; which a Man may also do in the Signification of Words,
by making them, in respect of one another, more, or less, or
equally comprehensive.

§ 11. Tho' yet concerning most Words, us-
ed in Discourses, especially argumentative and
controversial, there is this more to be complain-
ed of, which is the worst Sort of Trifling, and
which lets us yet farther from the Certainty of Knowledge we
hope to attain by them, or find in them, viz. that most Writers
are so far from instructing us in the Nature and Knowledge of
Things, that they use their Words loosely and uncertainly, and do
not, by using them constantly and steadily in the same Significa-
tions, make plain and clear Deductions of Words one from
another, and make their Discourses coherent and clear, (how
little soever it were instructive) which were not difficult to do,
did they not find it convenient to shelter their Ignorance, or
Obstinacy, under the Obscurity and Perplexedness of their
Terms: To which, perhaps, Inadvertency and ill Custom do
in many Men much contribute.

Marks of verbal Propositions may be known by these following Marks:

First, Predication in abstract.

Terms are affirmed one of another, are barely
about the Signification of Sounds. For since
no abstract Idea can be the same with any other
but itself, when its abstract Name is affirmed of any other
Term, it can signify no more but this, that it may, or ought
to be called by that Name, or that these two Names signify the
same
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fame Idea. Thus, should any one say, that Parsimony is Frugality, that Gratitude is Justice, that this, or that Action is, or is not Temperance; however specious these and the like Propositions may at first sight seem, yet when we come to press them, and examine nicely what they contain, we shall find, that it all amounts to nothing, but the Signification of those Terms.

§ 13. Secondly, All Propositions, wherein a Part of the complex Idea, which any Term stands for, is predicated of that Term, are only verbal; v. g. to say, that Cold is a Metal, or heavy. And thus all Propositions, wherein more comprehensive Words, called Genera, are affirmed of subordinate, or less comprehensive, called Species, or Individuals, are barely verbal.

When, by these two Rules, we have examined the Propositions, that make up the Discourses we ordinarily meet with, both in and out of Books, we shall, perhaps, find that a greater Part of them, than is usually suspected, are purely about the Signification of Words, and contain nothing in them, but the Use and Application of these Signs.

This, I think, I may lay down for an infallible Rule, that wherever the distinct Idea any Word stands for, is not known and considered, and something not contained in the Idea is not affirmed, or denied of it; there our Thoughts stick wholly in Sounds, and are able to attain no real Truth, or Falsity. This, perhaps, if well heeded, might save us a great deal of useless Amusement and Dispute, and very much shorten our Trouble and Wandering, in the Search of real and true Knowledge.
Of our Knowledge of Existence.

§ 1. Hitherto we have only considered the Essences of Things, which being only abstract Ideas, and thereby removed in our Thoughts from particular Existence, (that being the proper Operation of the Mind, in Abstraction, to consider an Idea under no other Existence, but what it has in the Understanding) gives us no Knowledge of real Existence at all. Where, by the way, we may take notice, that universal Propositions, of whose Truth, or Falsity, we can have certain Knowledge, concern not Existence; and farther, that all particular Affirmations, or Negations, that would not be certain, if they were made general, are only concerning Existence; they declaring only the accidental Union, or Separation of Ideas in Things existing, which, in their abstract Natures, have no known, necessary Union, or Separation of Ideas in Things existing, which, in their abstract Natures, have no known, necessary Union, or Repugnancy.

§ 2. But, leaving the Nature of Propositions, and different Ways of Predication, to be considered more at large in another Place, let us proceed now to enquire, concerning our Knowledge of the Existence of Things, and how we come by it. I say then, that we have the Knowledge of our own Existence by Intuition; of the Existence of God by Demonstration; and of other Things by Sensation.

§ 3. As for our own Existence, we perceive it so plainly, and so certainly, that it neither needs, nor is capable of any Proof. For nothing can be more evident to us, than our own Existence; I think, I reason, I feel Pleasure and Pain; Can any of these be more evident to me, than my own Existence? If I doubt of all other Things, that very Doubt makes me perceive
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receive my own Existence, and will not suffer me to doubt of that. For if I know I feel Pain, it is evident I have as certain Perception of my own Existence, as of the Existence of the Pain I feel: Or if I know I doubt, I have as certain Perception of the Existence of the Thing doubting, as of that Thought which I call Doubt. Experience then convinces us, that we have an intuitive Knowledge of our own Existence, and an internal, infallible Perception that we are. In every Act of Sensation, Reasoning, or Thinking, we are conscious to ourselves of our own Being; and, in this Matter, come not short of the highest Degree of Certainty.

C H A P. X.

Of our Knowledge of the Existence of a God.

§. 1. THO' God has given us no innate Ideas of Himself; tho' He has stamped no original Characters on our Minds, wherein we may read His Being; yet having furnished us with those Faculties our Minds are endowed with, He hath not left Himself without Witness: Since we have Sense, Perception, and Reason, and cannot want a clear Proof of Him, as long as we carry ourselves about us. Nor can we justly complain of our Ignorance in this great Point, since He has so plentifully provided us with the Means to discover, and know Him, so far as is necessary to the End of our Being, and the great Concernment of our Happiness. But tho' this be the most obvious Truth that Reason discovers; and tho' its Evidence be (if I mistake not) equal to mathematical Certainty; yet it requires Thought and Attention, and the Mind must apply itself to a regular Deduction of it from some part of our intuitive Knowledge, or else we shall be as uncertain and ignorant of this, as of other Propositions, which are in themselves capable of clear Demonstration. To shew, therefore, that we are capable of knowing, i.e. being certain that there is a God, and how we may come

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by this Certainty, I think we need go no farther than ourselves, and that undoubted Knowledge we have of our own Existence.

§. 2. I think it is beyond Question, that

Man has a clear Perception of his own Being; he knows certainly, that he exists, and that he is something. He that can doubt, whether he be any thing, or no, I speak not to, no more than I would argue with pure Nothing, or endeavour to convince Non-entity, that it were Something. If any one pretends to be so sceptical, as to deny his own Existence, (for really to doubt of it, is manifestly impossible) let him for me enjoy his beloved Happiness of being Nothing, until Hunger, or some other Pain convince him of the contrary. This, then, I think, I may take for a Truth, which every one's certain Knowledge assures him of, beyond the Liberty of doubting, viz. that he is something that actually exists.

§. 3. In the next Place, Man knows, by an intuitive Certainty, that bare Nothing can no more produce any real Being, than it can be equal to two right Angles. If a Man knows not that Non-entity, or the Absence of all Being, cannot be equal to two right Angles, it is impossible he should know any Demonstration in Euclid. If, therefore, we know there is some real Being, and that Non-entity cannot produce any real Being, it is an evident Demonstration, that from Eternity there has been something; since what was not from Eternity had a Beginning; and what had a Beginning, must be produced by something else.

§. 4. Next it is evident, that what had its Being and Beginning from another, must also have all that which is in, and belongs to its Being from another too. All the Powers it has must be owing to, and received from the same Source. This eternal Source then of all Being, must also be the Source and Original of all Power; and so this eternal Being must also be the most powerful.

§. 5. Again,
§. 5. Again, A Man finds in himself Perception and Knowledge. We have then got one Step farther; and we are certain now, that there is not only some Being, but some knowing, intelligent Being in the World.

There was a Time then, when there was no knowing Being, and when Knowledge began to be; or else there has been also a knowing Being from Eternity. If it be said, there was a Time when no Being had any Knowledge, when that eternal Being was void of all Understanding: I reply, that then it was impossible there should ever have been any Knowledge; it being as impossible that Things wholly void of Knowledge, and operating blindly, and without any Perception, should produce a knowing Being, as it is impossible that a Triangle should make itself Three Angles bigger than two right ones. For it is as repugnant to the Idea of senseless Matter, that it should put into itself Sense, Perception, and Knowledge, as it is repugnant to the Idea of a Triangle, that it should put into itself greater Angles than two right ones.

§. 6. Thus from the Consideration of ourselves, and what we infallibly find in our own Constitutions, our Reason leads us to the Knowledge of this certain and evident Truth, That there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing Being: which whether any one will please to call God, it matters not. The Thing is evident, and, from this Idea, duly considered, will easily be deduced all those other Attributes, which we ought to ascribe to this eternal Being. If, nevertheless, any one should be found so senselessly arrogant, as to suppose Man alone, knowing and wise, but yet the Product of mere Ignorance and Chance; and that all the rest of the Universe acted only by that blind Hap Hazard: I shall leave with him that very rational and emphatical Rebuke of Tully, L. ii. de Leg. to be considered at his Leisure. 'What can 'be more sillily arrogant and misbecoming, than for a Man to 'think that he has a Mind and Understanding in him, but yet in 'all the Universe besides, there is no such Thing? Or that those 'Things, which, with the utmost stretch of his Reason, he can 'scarc
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's scarce comprehend, should be moved and managed without
'any Reason at all?' *Quid est enim verius, quam neminem esse
exportet tam sulte arrogantem, ut in se mentem & rationem putet
inesse, in calo mundoque non putet? Aut ea, quae vix summa in-
genii ratione comprehendat, nulla ratione moveri putet?

From what has been said, it is plain to me, we have a more
certain Knowledge of the Existence of a God, than of any
thing our Senses have not immediately discovered to us. Nay,
I presume I may say, that we more certainly know that there
is a God, than that there is any thing else without us. When
I say we know, I mean there is such a Knowledge within our
reach, which we cannot miss, if we will but apply our Minds
to that, as we do to several other Enquiries.

Our Idea of a most perfect Be-
ing, which a Man may frame in his Mind,
does, or does not prove the Existence of a God,
I will not here examine. For, in the different
Make of Mens Tempers, and Application of their Thoughts,
some Arguments prevail more on one, and some on another,
for the Confirmation of the same Truth. But yet, I think, this
I may say, That it is an ill Way of establishing this Truth,
and silencing Atheists, to lay the whole Stress of so important
a Point as this, upon that sole Foundation; and take some
Mens having that Idea of God in their Minds (for it is evident
some Men have none, and some worse than none, and the most
very different) for the only Proof of a Deity; and, out of an
Over-fondness of that darling Invention, cashier, or, at least,
endeavour to invalidate all other Arguments, and forbid us to
hearken to those Proofs, as being weak, or fallacious, which
our own Existence, and the sensible Parts of the Universe offer
to clearly and cogently to our Thoughts, that I deem it impos-
fible for a considering Man to withfand them. For I judge it
is as certain and clear a Truth, as can any where be delivered,
That the invisible Things of God are clearly seen, from the Creation
of the World, being understood by the Things that are made, even
His eternal Power and Godhead. Tho' our own Being furnishes
us, as I have shewn, with an evident and incontestable Proof of
a Deity.
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and, I believe, no body can avoid the Cogency of it, who will but as carefully attend to it, as to any other Demonstration of so many Parts: Yet this being so fundamental a Truth, and of that Consequence, that all Religion and genuine Morality depend thereon, I doubt not but I shall be forgiven by my Reader, if I go over some Parts of this Argument again, and enlarge a little more upon them.

§. 8. There is no Truth more evident, than that something must be from Eternity. I never yet heard of any one so unreasonable, or that could suppose so manifest a Contradiction, as a Time, wherein there was perfectly nothing. This being of all Absurdities the greatest, to imagine that pure nothing, the perfect Negation and Absence of all Beings, should ever produce any real Existence.

It being then unavoidable for all rational Creatures to conclude, that something has existed from Eternity; let us next see what kind of Thing that must be.

§. 9. There are but two Sorts of Beings in the World, that Man knows, or conceives.

First, Such as are purely material, without Sense, Perception, or Thought, as the Clippings of our Beards, and the Parings of our Nails.

Secondly, Sensible, thinking, perceiving Beings, such as we find ourselves to be; which, if you please, we will hereafter call Cogitative and Incogitative Beings: Which, to our present Purpose, if for nothing else, are, perhaps, better Terms, than material and immaterial.

§. 10. If then, there must be something eternal, let us see what sort of Being it must be. And to that, it is very obvious to Reason, that it must necessarily be a cogitative Being. For it is as impossible to conceive, that ever bare incogitative Matter should produce a thinking, intelligent Being, as that nothing should of itself produce Matter. Let us suppose any Parcel of Matter eternal, great, or small, we shall find it, in itself, able to produce nothing. For Example;
Let us suppose the Matter of the next Pebble we meet with, eternal, closely united, and the Parts firmly at Rest together, if there were no other Being in the World, must it not eternally remain so, a dead, inactive Lump? Is it possible to conceive it can add Motion to itself, being purely Matter, or produce any Thing? Matter then, by its own Strength, cannot produce in itself so much as Motion: The Motion it has must also be from Eternity, or else be produced, and added to Matter, by some other Being more powerful than Matter; Matter, as is evident, having not Power to produce Motion in itself. But let us suppose Motion eternal too; yet Matter, 

incogitative Matter and Motion, whatever Changes it might produce of Figure and Bulk, could never produce Thought: Knowledge will still be as far beyond the Power of Motion and Matter to produce, as Matter is beyond the Power of Nothing, or Non-entity to produce. And I appeal to every one's own Thoughts, whether he cannot as easily conceive Matter produced by Nothing, as Thought to be produced by pure Matter, when before there was no such Thing as Thought, or an intelligent Being existing. Divide Matter into as minute Parts as you will, (which we are apt to imagine a Sort of Spiritualizing, or making a thinking Thing of it) vary the Figure and Motion of it, as much as you please, a Globe, Cube, Cone, Prism, Cylinder, &c. whose Diameters are but 1,000,000th Part of a Gey (a), will operate no otherwise upon other Bodies of Proportionable Bulk, than those of an Inch, or Foot Diameter; and you may as rationally expect to produce Sense, Thought, and Knowledge, by putting together, in a certain Figure and Motion, gross Particles of Matter, as by those that are the very minutest, that do any where exist. They knock, impel, and resist one another, just as the

(a) A Gey is \( \frac{1}{3} \) of a Line, a Line \( \frac{1}{10} \) of an Inch, an Inch \( \frac{1}{10} \) of a Philosophical Foot, a Philosophical Foot \( \frac{1}{4} \) of a Pendulum, whose Diadromus, in the Latitude of 45 Degrees, are each equal to one second of Time, or \( \frac{1}{60} \) of a Minute. I have affectedly made use of this Measure here, and the Parts of it, under a decimal Division, with Names to them; because, I think, it would be of general Convenience, that this should be the common Measure, in the Commonwealth of Letters.
the greater do, and that is all they can do. So that, if we will suppose nothing first, or eternal; Matter can never begin to be: If we suppose bare Matter, without Motion, eternal; Motion can never begin to be: If we suppose only Matter and Motion first, or eternal; Thought can never begin to be. For it is impossible to conceive, that Matter, either with, or without Motion, could have originally in, and from itself, Sense, Perception and Knowledge, as is evident from hence, that then Sense, Perception and Knowledge must be a Property eternally inseparable from Matter, and every Particle of it. Not to add, that tho' our general, or specific Conception of Matter makes us speak of it as one Thing, yet really all Matter is not one individual Thing, neither is there any such thing existing, as one material Being, or one single Body, that we know, or can conceive. And, therefore, if Matter were the eternal, first, cogitative Being, there would not be one eternal, infinite, cogitative Being, but an infinite Number of eternal, finite, cogitative Beings, independent one of another, of limited Force, and distinct Thoughts, which could never produce that Order, Harmony and Beauty, which is to be found in Nature. Since, therefore, whatsoever is the first eternal Being must necessarily be cogitative; and whatsoever is first of all Things, must necessarily contain in it, and actually have, at least, all the Perfections that can ever after exist; nor can it ever give to another any perfection that it hath not, either actually in itself, or, at least, in a higher Degree; it necessarily follows, that the first, eternal Being cannot be Matter.

§. 11. If therefore, it be evident, that Something necessarily must exist from Eternity, it is also as evident; that That Something must necessarily be a cogitative Being: For it is as impossible, that incogitative Matter should produce a cogitative Being, as that Nothing, or the Negation of all Being, should produce a positive Being, or Matter.

§. 12. Tho' this Discovery of the necessary Existence of an eternal Mind, does sufficiently lead us into the Knowledge of God; since it will hence follow, that all other knowing Beings, that
that have a Beginning, must depend on Him, and have no other Ways of Knowledge, or Extent of Power, than what He gives them; and, therefore, if He made those, He made also the less excellent Pieces of this Universe, all inanimate Beings, whereby his Omniscience, Power, and Providence will be established, and all his other Attributes necessarily follow: Yet, to clear up this a little farther, we will see what Doubts can be raised against it.

Whether material, or no.

§ 13. First, Perhaps it will be said, that tho' it be as clear, as Demonstration can make it, that there must be an eternal Being, and that Being must also be knowing; yet it does not follow, but that thinking Being may also be material. Let it be so; it equally still follows, that there is a God. For if there be an Eternal, Omniscient, Omnipotent Being, it is certain, that there is a God, whether you imagine that Being to be material, or no. But herein, I suppose, lies the Danger and Deceit of that Supposition: There being no Way to avoid the Demonstration, that there is an eternal, knowing Being, Men, devoted to Matter, would willingly have it granted, that this knowing Being is material; and then letting slide out of their Minds, or the Discourse, the Demonstration, whereby an eternal, knowing Being was proved necessarily to exist, would argue all to be Matter, and so deny a God, that is, an eternal, cogitative Being; whereby they are so far from establishing, that they destroy their own Hypothesis. For, if there can be, in their Opinion, eternal Matter, without any eternal, cogitative Being, they manifestly separate Matter and Thinking, and suppose no necessary Connection of the one with the other, and so establish the Necessity of an eternal Spirit, but not of Matter; since it has been proved already, that an eternal, cogitative Being is unavoidably to be granted. Now, if Thinking and Matter may be separated, the eternal Existence of Matter will not follow from the eternal Existence of a cogitative Being, and they suppose it to no Purpose.

Not Material; first, because every Particle of thinking Being is material.

§ 14. But now let us see how they can satisfy themselves, or others, that this eternal,
First, I would ask them, whether they imagine, that all Matter, every Particle of Matter, thinks? This, I suppose, they will scarce say; since then there would be as many eternal, thinking Beings, as there are Particles of Matter, and so an Infinity of Gods. And yet, if they will not allow Matter, as Matter, that is, every Particle of Matter to be as well cogitative, as extended, they will have as hard a Task to make out to their own Reasons, a cogitative Being, out of incogitative Particles, as an extended Being, out of unextended Parts, if I may so speak.

§. 15. Secondly, If all Matter does not think, I next ask, whether it be only one Atom that does so? This has as many Absurdities as the other; for then this Atom of Matter must be alone eternal, or not. If this alone be eternal, then this alone, by its powerful Thought, or Will, made all the rest of Matter. And so we have the Creation of Matter by a powerful Thought, which is that the Materialists fllick at. For if they suppose one single, thinking Atom, to have produced all the rest of Matter, they cannot ascribe that Pre-eminency to it, upon any other Account, than that of its Thinking, the only supposed Difference. But allow it to be, by some other Way, which is above our Conception, it must be still Creation, and these Men must give up their great Maxim, Ex nihilo nil fit. If it be said, that all the rest of Matter is equally eternal, as that thinking Atom, it will be to say any Thing at Pleasure, tho' never so absurd: For to suppose all Matter eternal, and yet one small Particle in Knowledge and Power, infinitely above all the rest, is, without any the least Appearance of Reason, to frame any Hypothesis. Every Particle of Matter, as Matter, is capable of all the same Figures and Motions of any other; and I challenge any one, in his Thoughts, to add any Thing else to one above another.

§. 16. Thirdly, If, then, neither one peculiar Atom alone can be this eternal, thinking Being; nor all Matter, as Matter, i. e. every Particle of Matter, can be it; it only remains, that
that it is some certain System of Matter, duly put together, that is this thinking, eternal Being. This is that which I imagine, is that Notion, which Men are aptest to have of God; who would have him a material Being, as most readily suggested to them, by the ordinary Conceit they have of themselves, and other Men, which they take to be material, thinking Beings. But this Imagination, however more natural, is no less absurd than the other: For, to suppose the eternal, thinking Being, to be nothing else, but a Composition of Particles of Matter, each whereof is incogitative, is to ascribe all the Wisdom and Knowledge of that eternal Being, only to the Juxta-position of Parts; than which nothing can be more absurd. For unthinking Particles of Matter, however put together, can have nothing thereby added to them, but a new Relation of Position, which it is impossible should give Thought and Knowledge to them.

§. 17. But farther, this corporeal System either has all its Parts at Rest, or it is a certain Motion of the Parts, wherein its Thinking consists. If it be perfectly at Rest, it is but one Lump, and so can have no Privileges above one Atom.

If it be the Motion of its Parts, on which its Thinking depends, all the Thoughts there must be unavoidably accidental and limited; since all the Particles, that by Motion cause Thought, being each of them in itself without any Thought, cannot regulate its own Motions, much less be regulated by the Thought of the whole; since that Thought is not the Cause of Motion, (for then it must be antecedent to it, and so without it) but the Consequence of it, whereby Freedom, Power, Choice, and all rational and wise Thinking, or Acting, will be quite taken away: So that such a thinking Being will be no better, nor wiser, than pure, blind Matter; since to resolve all into the accidental, unguided Motions of blind Matter, or into Thought, depending on unguided Motions of blind Matter, is the same Thing; not to mention the Narrowness of such Thoughts and Knowledge, that must depend on the Motion of such Parts. But there needs no Enumeration of any more Absurdities and Impossibilities in this Hypothesis, (however full of them it be).
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than that before mentioned; since, let this thinking System be all, or a Part of the Matter of the Universe, it is impossible that any one Particle should either know its own, or the Motion of any other Particle, or the whole know the Motion of every Particular; and so regulate its own Thoughts, or Motions, or indeed have any Thought resulting from such Motion.

§. 18. Others would have Matter to be eternal, notwithstanding that they allow an eternal, cogitative, immaterial Being. This, though it take not away the Being of a God, yet since it denies one, and the First great Piece of his Workmanship, the Creation, let us consider it a little. Matter must be allowed eternal; Why? Because you cannot conceive how it can be made out of Nothing; why do you not also think yourself eternal? You will answer, perhaps, because about Twenty, or Forty Years since, you began to be. But if I ask you what that You is, which began then to be, you can scarce tell me. The Matter, whereof you are made, began not then to be; for if it did, then it is not eternal: But it began to be put together in such a Fashion and Frame as makes up your Body; but yet that Frame of Particles is not you, it makes not that thinking Thing you are; (for I have now to do with one, who allows an eternal, immaterial, thinking Being, but would have unthinking Matter eternal too) therefore, when did that thinking Thing begin to be? If it did never begin to be, then have you always been a thinking Thing from Eternity; the Absurdity whereof I need not confute, till I meet with one, who is so void of Understanding as to own it. If, therefore, you can allow a thinking Thing to be made out of nothing, (as all Things that are not eternal must be) why also can you not allow it possible for a material Being to be made out of Nothing, by an equal Power, but that you have the Experience of the one in View, and not of the other? Tho', when well considered, Creation of a Spirit will be found to require no less Power, than the Creation of Matter. Nay, possibly, if we would emancipate ourselves from vulgar Notions, and raise our Thoughts, as far as they would reach, to a closer Contemplation of Things, we might be able
to aim at some dim and seeming Conception, how Matter might at first be made, and begin to exist, by the Power of that eternal first Being: But to give Beginning and Being to a Spirit, would be found a more inconceivable Effect of Omnipotent Power. But this being what would perhaps lead us too far from the Notions, on which the Philosophy now in the World is built, it would not be pardonable to deviate so far from them; or to enquire so far as Grammar itself would authorize, if the common, settled Opinion, opposes it: Especially in this Place, where the received Doctrine serves well enough to our present Purpose, and leaves this past Doubt, that the Creation, or Beginning of any one SUBSTANCE, out of Nothing, being once admitted, the Creation of all other, but the CREATOR himself, may, with the same Ease, be supposed.

§ 19. But you will say, Is it not impossible to admit of the making any Thing out of Nothing, since we cannot possibly conceive it? I answer, No: 1. Because it is not reasonable to deny the Power of an infinite Being, because we cannot comprehend its Operations. We do not deny other Effects upon this Ground, because we cannot possibly conceive the Manner of their Production. We cannot conceive how any thing, but Impulse of Body, can move Body; and yet that is not a Reason sufficient to make us deny it possible, against the constant Experience we have of it in ourselves, in all our voluntary Motions, which are produced in us only by the free Action, or Thought of our own Minds; and are not, nor can be the Effects of the Impulse, or Determination of the Motion of blind Matter in, or upon our Bodies; for then it could not be in our Power, or Choice to alter it. For Example: My right Hand writes, whilst my left Hand is still; what causes Rest in one, and Motion in the other? Nothing but my Will, a Thought of my Mind; my Thought only changing, the right Hand rests, and the left Hand moves. This is Matter of Fact, which cannot be denied: Explain this, and make it intelligible, and then the next Step will be to understand Creation. For the giving a new Determination to the Motion of the animal Spirits, (which some make use of to explain voluntary Motion) clears
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clears not the Difficulty one jot: To alter the Determination of Motion, being in this Case no easier, nor less, than to give Motion itself; since the new Determination, given to the Animal Spirits, must be either immediately by Thought; or by some other Body put in their way by Thought; which was not in their Way before, and so must owe its Motion to Thought; either of which leaves voluntary Motion as unintelligible as it was before. In the mean time, it is an over-valuing ourselves, to reduce all to the narrow Measure of our Capacities; and to conclude all Things impossible to be done, whose Manner of doing exceeds our Comprehension. This is to make our Comprehension infinite, or God finite, when what He can do, is limited to what we can conceive of it. If you do not understand the Operations of your own finite Mind, that thinking Thing within you, do not deem it strange, that you cannot comprehend the Operations of that eternal, infinite Mind, who made and governs all Things, and whom the Heaven of Heavens cannot contain.

CHAP. XI.

Of our Knowledge of the Existence of other Things.

§ 1. The Knowledge of our own Being, we have by Intuition. The Existence of a God, Reason clearly makes known to us, as has been shewn.

The Knowledge of the Existence of any other Thing, we can have only by Sensation: For there being no necessary Connexion of real Existence, with any Idea a Man hath in his Memory, nor of any other Existence, but that of God, with the Existence of any particular Man; no particular Man can know the Existence of any other Being, but only when, by actual operating upon him, it makes itself perceived by him. For the having the Idea of any thing in our Mind, no more proves the Existence of that Thing, than the Picture of a Man evidences his being in
in the World, or the Visions of a Dream make thereby a true History.

§. 2. It is, therefore, the actual receiving of Ideas from without, that gives us notice of the Existence of other Things, and makes us know, that something doth exist, at that Time, without us, which causes that Idea in us, tho', perhaps, we neither know, nor consider how it does it: For it takes not from the Certainty of our Senses, and the Ideas we receive by them, that we know not the Manner wherein they are produced: V. g. Whilst I write this, I have, by the Paper affecting my Eyes, that Idea produced in my Mind, which, whatever Object causes, I call White; by which I know, that That Quality, or Accident, (i. e. whose Appearance before my Eyes always causes that Idea) doth really exist, and hath a Being without me. And of this, the greatest Assurance I can possibly have, and to which my Faculties can attain, is the Testimony of my Eyes, which are the proper and sole Judges of this Thing, whose Testimony I have reason to rely on, as so certain, that I can no more doubt, whilst I write this, that I see White and Black, and that something really exists, that causes that Sensation in me, than that I write, or move my Hand; which is a Certainty, as great as human Nature is capable of, concerning the Existence of any Thing, but a Man's self alone, and of God.

§. 3. The Notice we have by our Senses, of the existing of Things without us, tho' it be not altogether so certain, as our intuitive Knowledge, or the Deductions of our Reason, employed about the clear, abstract Ideas of our own Minds; yet it is an Assurance, that deserves the Name of Knowledge. If we persuade ourselves, that our Faculties act and inform us right, concerning the Existence of those Objects that affect them, it cannot pass for an ill grounded Confidence: For I think no body can, in earnest, be so sceptical, as to be uncertain of the Existence of those Things, which he sees and feels. At least, he that can doubt so far, (whatever he may have with his own Thoughts) will never have any
any Controversy with me; since he can never be sure I say any
thing contrary to his Opinion. As to myself, I think God has
given me Assurance enough of the Existence of Things without
me; since, by their different Application, I can produce in my-
self both Pleasure and Pain, which is one great Concernment of
my present State. This is certain, the Confidence, that our Facul-
ties do not herein deceive us, is the greatest Assurance we are ca-
ple of, concerning the Existence of material Beings. For we
cannot act any Thing, but by our Faculties; nor talk of Know-
ledge itself, but by the Help of those Faculties, which are fitted
to apprehend even what Knowledge is. But besides the Assurance
we have, from our Senses themselves, that they do not err in the
Information they give us, of the Existence of Things without
us, when they are affected by them, we are farther confirmed
in this Assurance by other concurrent Reasons.

§. 4. First, It is plain, those Perceptions are
produced in us by exterior Causes affecting our
Senses; because these, that want the Organs of
any Sense, never can have the Ideas belonging to
that Sense, produced in their Minds. This is
is too evident to be doubted; and, therefore, we cannot but be
assured, that they come in by the Organs of that Sense, and no
other Way. The Organs themselves, it is plain, do not produce
them; for then the Eyes of a Man in the Dark would produce
Colours, and his Nose smell Roses in the Winter: But we see no
body gets the Relish of a Pine Apple, till he goes to the Indies
where it is, and tastes it.

§. 5. Secondly, Because sometimes I find, that
I cannot avoid the having those Ideas produced
in my Mind. For tho', when my Eyes are shut,
or Windows fast, I can, at Pleasure, recall to my
Mind the Ideas of Light, or the Sun, which for-
mer Sensations had lodged in my Memory; so
I can at Pleasure lay by that Idea, and take into my View that
of the Smell of a Rose, or Taste of Sugar. But if I turn my Eyes
at Noon towards the Sun, I cannot avoid the Ideas which the
Light, or Sun, then produces in me. So that there is a manifes-
Difference between the Ideas, laid up in my Memory, (over which, if they were there only, I should have constantly the same Power to dispose of them, and lay them by at Pleasure) and those, which force themselves upon me, and I cannot avoid having. And, therefore, it must needs be some exterior Caufe, and the brisk acting of some Objects without me, whose Efficacy I cannot resist, that produces those Ideas in my Mind, whether I will, or no. Besides, there is no body, who doth not perceive the Difference in himself, between contemplating the Sun, as he hath the Idea of it in his Memory, and actually looking upon it: Of which two, his Perception is so distinct, that few of his Ideas are more distinguishable, one from another. And, therefore, he hath certain Knowledge, that they are not both Memory, or the Actions of his Mind, and Fancies only within him; but that actual Seeing hath a Cause without.

§. 6. Thirdly, Add to this, that many of those Ideas are produced in us with Pain, which afterwards we remember without the least Offence. Thus the Pain of Heat, or Cold, when the Idea of it is revived in our Minds, gives us no Disturbance; which, when felt, was very troublesome, and is again, when actually repeated; which is occasioned by the Disorder the external Object causes in our Bodies, when applied to it. And we remember the Pain of Hunger, Thirst, or the Head-ach, without any Pain at all; which would either never disturb us, or else constantly do it, as often as we thought of it, were there nothing more but Ideas floating in our Minds, and Appearances entertaining our Fancies, without the real Existence of Things affecting us from Abroad. The same may be said of Pleasure, accompanying several actual Sensations: And tho' mathematical Demonstration depends not upon Sense, yet the examining them by Diagrams gives great Credit to the Evidence of our Sight, and seems to give it a Certainty approaching to that of Demonstration itself. For it would be very strange, that a Man should allow it for an undeniable Truth, that two Angles of a Figure, which he measures by Lines and Angles of a Diagram, should be bigger one than the
the other; and yet doubt of the Existence of those Lines and Angles, which, by looking on, he makes use of to measure that by.

§ 7. Fourthly, Our Senses, in many Cases, bear witness to the Truth of each other's Report, concerning the Existence of sensible Things without us. He that sees a Fire, may, if he doubt whether it be any thing more than a bare Fancy, feel it too; and be convinced, by putting his Hand in it. Which certainly could never be put into such exquisite Pain, by a bare Idea, or Phantom, unless that the Pain be a Fancy too: Which yet he cannot, when the Burn is well, by raising the Idea of it, bring upon himself again.

Thus I see, whilst I write this, I can change the Appearance of the Paper; and by designing the Letters, tell before-hand what new Idea it shall exhibit the very next Moment, barely by drawing my Pen over it: Which will neither appear (let me fancy as much as I will) if my Hand stand still; or tho' I move my Pen, if my Eyes be shut: Nor when those Characters are once made on the Paper, can I chuse afterwards but see them as they are; that is, have the Ideas of such Letters as I have made. Whence it is manifest, that they are not barely the Sport and Play of my own Imagination, when I find that the Characters, that were made at the Pleasure of my own Thoughts, do not obey them; nor yet cease to be, whenever I shall fancy it, but continue to affect my Senses constantly, and regularly, according to the Figures I made them. To which, if we will add, that the Sight of those shall, from another Man, draw such Sounds as I beforehand design they shall stand for; there will be little Reason left to doubt, that those Words I write, do really exist without me, when they cause a long Series of regular Sounds to affect my Ears, which could not be the Effect of my Imagination, nor could my Memory retain them in that Order.

§ 8. But yet, if after all this, any one will be so sceptical, as to distrust his Senses, and to affirm that all we see and hear, feel and taste, think and do, during our whole Being, is but the Se-

This Certainty is as great as our Condition needs.
ries and deluding Appearances of a long Dream, whereof there is no Reality; and therefore will question the Existence of all Things, or our Knowledge of any Thing: I must desire him to consider, that if all be a dream, then he doth but dream that he makes the Question; and so it is not much matter, that a waking Man should answer him. But yet, if he pleases, he may dream that I make him this Answer, That the Certainty of Things existing in Rerum Natura, when we have the Testimony of our Senses for it, is not only as great as our Frame can attain to, but as our Condition needs. For our Faculties being suited not to the full Extent of Being, nor to a perfect, clear, comprehensive Knowledge of Things, free from all Doubt and Scruple; but to the Preservation of us, in whom they are; and accommodated to the Use of Life; they serve to our Purpose well enough, if they will but give us certain notice of those Things, which are convenient, or inconvenient to us. For he that sees a Candle burning, and hath experimented the Force of its Flame, by putting his Finger in it, will little doubt that this is something existing without him, which does him harm, and puts him to great Pain: Which is Assurance enough, when no Man requires greater Certainty, to govern his Actions by, than what is as certain as his Actions themselves. And if our Dreamer pleases to try, whether the glowing Heat of a Glass Furnace, be barely a wandering Imagination in a drowsy Man's Fancy; by putting his Hand into it, he may perhaps be wakened into a Certainty, greater than he could wish, that it is something more than bare Imagination. So that this Evidence is as great, as we can desire, being as certain to us as our Pleasure, or Pain, i.e. Happines, or Misery; beyond which we have no Concernment, either of Knowledge, or Being. Such an Assurance of the Existence of Things without us, is sufficient to direct us in the attaining the Good, and avoiding the Evil, which is caused by them, which is the important Concernment we have of being made acquainted with them.

§ 9. In fine then, when our Senses do actually convey into our Understandings any Idea, we cannot but be satisfied, that there doth something at that Time really exist without us, which doth
Chap. XI.  **Existence of other Things.**

doth affect our Senses, and by them give notice of itself to our apprehensive Faculties, and actually produce that *idea*, which we then perceive: And we cannot so far distrust their Testimony, as to doubt, that such Collections of simple *ideas*, as we have observed by our Senses to be united together, do really exist together. But *this knowledge* extends as far as the present *Testimony of our Senses*, employed about particular Objects, that do then affect them, and no farther. For if I saw such a Collection of simple *ideas*, as is wont to be called *Man*, existing together one Minute since, and am now alone; I cannot be certain that the same *Man* exists now, since there is no necessary Connexion of his Existence a Minute since, with his Existence now: By a thousand Ways he may cease to be, since I had the Testimony of my Senses for his Existence. And if I cannot be certain, that the *Man* I saw last *To-day* is now in being, I can less be certain that he is so, who hath been longer removed from my Senses, and I have not seen since *Yesterday*, or since the last *Year*: And much less can I be certain of the Existence of *Men* that I never saw. And, therefore, tho' it be highly probable, that Millions of Men do now exist, yet whilst I am alone writing this, I have not that *Certainty* of it, which we strictly call Knowledge; tho' the great *Likelihood* of it puts me past doubt, and it be reasonable for me to do several Things, upon the Confidence that there are *Men* (and Men also of my Acquaintance, with whom I have to do) now in the World: But this is but *Probability*, not Knowledge.

§. 10. Whereby yet we may observe, how foolish and vain a Thing it is, for a Man of a narrow Knowledge, who having Reason given him, to judge of the different Evidence and *Probability* of Things, and to be swayed accordingly; how *vain*, I say, is it to *expect Demonstration* and *Certainty*, in *Things not capable* of it; and refuse *Assent* to very rational Propositions, and act contrary to very plain and clear *Truths*, because they cannot be made out so evident, as to surmount every the least (I will not say Reason, but) *Pretence* of doubting? He that, in the ordinary Affairs of *Life*, would admit of nothing, but direct, plain *Demonstration*,
Knowledge of the

Book IV.

tion, would be sure of nothing in this World, but of perishing quickly. The Wholesomeness of his Meat, or Drink, would not give him reason to venture on it: And I would fain know, what it is he could do upon such Grounds, as are capable of no Doubt, no Objection.

§ 11. As when our Senses are actually employed about any Object, we do know that it does exist; so by our Memory we may be assured, that, heretofore, Things that affected our Senses have existed. And thus we have knowledge of the past Existence of several Things, whereof our Senses having informed us, our Memories still retain the Ideas; and of this we are past all Doubt, so long as we remember well. But this Knowledge also reaches no farther than our Senses have formerly assured us. Thus seeing Water at this instant, is an unquestionable Truth to me, that Water doth exist: And remembering that I saw it Yesterday, it will also be always true; and as long as my Memory retains it, always an undoubted Proposition to me, that Water did exist the 10th of July, 1688. as it will also be equally true, that a certain Number of very fine Colours did exist, which, at the same time I saw upon a Bubble of that Water: But being now quite out of the Sight both of the Water and Bubbles too, it is no more certainly known to me that the Water doth now exist, than that the Bubbles, or Colours therein do so; it being no more necessary that Water should exist To-day, because it existed Yesterday, than that the Colours, or Bubbles, exist To-day, because they existed Yesterday; tho' it be exceedingly much more probable; because Water hath been observed to continue long in Existence, but Bubbles, and the Colours on them, quickly cease to be.

The Existence of Spirits is not knowable. § 12. What Ideas we have of Spirits, and how we come by them, I have already shewn. But, tho' we have those Ideas in our Minds, and know we have them there, the having the Ideas of Spirits does not make us know, that any such Things do exist without us, or that there are any finite Spirits, or any other spiritual Beings, but the eternal God. We have Ground from Revelation,
Chap. XI. Existence of other Things.

velation, and several other Reasons, to believe with Assurance, that there are such Creatures: But, our Senses not being able to discover them, we want the Means of knowing their particular Existences. For we can no more know, that there are finite Spirits really existing, by the idea we have of such Beings in our Minds, than by the Ideas any one has of Fairies, or Centaurs, he can come to know that Things, answering those Ideas, do really exist.

And, therefore, concerning the Existence of finite Spirits, as well as several other Things, we must content ourselves with the Evidence of Faith; but universal, certain Propositions, concerning this Matter, are beyond our Reach. For however true it may be, e.g. that all the intelligent Spirits, that God ever created, do still exist; yet it can never make a Part of our certain Knowledge. These, and the like Propositions, we may assent to, as highly probable, but are not, I fear, in this State, capable of knowing. We are not then to put others upon demonstrating, nor ourselves upon search of universal Certainty in all those Matters, wherein we are not capable of any other Knowledge, but what our Senses give us in this, or that Particular.

§ 13. By which it appears, that there are two Sorts of Propositions. 1. There is one Sort of Propositions concerning the Existence of any Thing answerable to such an Idea: As having the Idea of an Elephant, Phoenix, Motion, or an Angle, in my Mind, the first and natural Enquiry is, Whether such a Thing does any where exist? And this Knowledge is only of Particulars. No Existence of any Thing without us, but only of God, can certainly be known, farther than our Senses inform us. 2. There is another Sort of Propositions, wherein is expressed the Agreement, or Disagreement of our abstract Ideas, and their Dependence one on another. Such Propositions may be universal and certain. So, having the Idea of God and myself, of Fear and Obedience, I cannot but be sure that God is to be feared and obeyed by me: And this Proposition will be certain, concerning Man in general, if I have made an abstract
abstræt Idea of such a Species, whereof I am one particular. But yet this Proposition, how certain so ever, That Men ought to fear and obey God, proves not to me the Exisitence of Men in the World, but will be true of all such Creatures, whenever they do exist: Which Certainty of such general Propositions, depends on the Agreement, or Disagreement, is to be discovered in those abstract Ideas.

§. 14. In the former Case, our Knowledge is the Consequence of the Exisitence of Things, producing Ideas in our Minds by our Senses: In the latter, Knowledge is the Consequence of the Ideas, (be they what they will) that are in our Minds producing their general, certain Propositions. Many of these are called Eterna Veritates, and all of them indeed are so; not from being written all, or any of them, in the Minds of all Men, or that they were any of them Propositions in any one's Mind, till he, having got the abstract Ideas, joined, or separated them by Affirmation, or Negation. But, wheresoever we can suppose such a Creature as Man is, endowed with such Faculties, and thereby furnished with such Ideas as we have, we must conclude, he must needs, when he applies his Thoughts to the Consideration of his Ideas, know the Truth of certain Propositions, that will arise from the Agreement, or Disagreement, which he will perceive in his own Ideas. Such Propositions are therefore called Eternal Truths, not because they are eternal Propositions actually formed, and antecedent to the Understanding, that at any time makes them; nor because they are imprinted on the Mind from any Patterns, that are any where of them out of the Mind, and existeth before; but because being once made about abstract Ideas, so as to be true, they will, whenever they can be supposed to be made again, at any time past, or to come, by a Mind having those Ideas, always actually be true. For Names being supposed to stand perpetually for the same Ideas, and the same Ideas having immutably the same Habitudes one to another; Propositions concerning any abstract Ideas, that are once true, must needs be eternal Verities.
CHAP. XII.

Of the Improvement of our Knowledge.

§. 1. It having been the common received Opinion, amongst Men of Letters, that Maxims were the Foundation of all Knowledge; and that the Sciences were, each of them, built upon certain Præcognita, from whence the Understanding was to take its Rise, and by which it was to conduct itself, in its Enquiries into the Matters belonging to that Science; the beaten Road of the Schools has been, to lay down, in the Beginning, one, or more, general Propositions, as Foundations, whereon to build the Knowledge that was to be had of that Subject. These Doctrines thus laid down, for Foundations of any Science, were called Principles, as the Beginnings, from which we must set out, and look no farther backwards in our Enquiries, as we have already observed.

§. 2. One Thing, which might probably give an Occasion to this Way of proceeding in other Sciences, was (as I suppose) the good Success it seemed to have in Mathematics, wherein Men, being observed to attain a great Certainty of Knowledge, these Sciences came, by Pre-eminence, to be called Μάθηματα, and Μαθηματικα, Learning, or Things learned, thoroughly learned, as having, of all others, the greatest Certainty, Clearness and Evidence in them.

§. 3. But if any one will consider, he will (I guess) find that the great Advancement and Certainty of real Knowledge, which Men arrived to in these Sciences, was not owing to the Influence of these Principles, nor derived from any peculiar Advantage they received, from two, or three general Maxims, laid down in the Beginning; but from the clear, distinct, complete Ideas their Thoughts were employed about, and
and the Relation of Equality and Excess so clear between some of them, that they had an intuitive Knowledge, and by that a Way to discover in others, and this without the Help of those Maxims. For I ask, Is it not possible for a young Lad to know, that his whole Body is bigger than his little Finger, but by Virtue of this Axiom, That the Whole is bigger than a Part; nor be assured of it, till he has learned that Maxim? Or cannot a Country Wench know, that having received a Shilling from one that owes her three, and a Shilling also from another, that owes her three, that the remaining Debts, in each of their Hands, are equal? Cannot she know this, I say, without she fetch the Certainty from this Maxim, That if you take Equals from Equals, the Remainders will be Equal, a Maxim which, possibly, she never heard, or thought of? I desire any one to consider, from what has been elsewhere said, which is known first and clearest by most People, the particular Instance, or the general Rule; and which it is that gives Life and Birth to the other. These general Rules are but the comparing our more general and abstractive Ideas, which are the Workmanship of the Mind made, and Names given to them, for the easier Dispatch in its Reasonings, and drawing into comprehensive Terms, and short Rules, its various and multiplied Observations. But Knowledge began in the Mind, and was founded on Particulars; tho' afterwards, perhaps, no notice be taken thereof: It being natural for the Mind (forward still to enlarge its Knowledge) most attentively to lay up those general Notions, and make the proper Use of them, which is to disburden the Memory of the cumbersome Load of Particulars. For I desire it may be considered, what more Certainty there is to a Child, or any one, that his Body, little Finger and all, is bigger than his little Finger alone, after you have given to his Body the Name Whole, and to his little Finger the Name Part, than he could have had before? or what new Knowledge concerning his Body, can these two relative Terms give him, which he could not have without them? Could he not know that his Body was bigger than his little Finger, if his Language were yet so imperfect, that he had no such relative Terms as Whole and Part? I ask farther, When he has
Ch. XII. Improvement of our Knowledge.

has got these Names, how is he more certain that his Body is a Whole, and his little Finger a Part, than he was, or might be certain, before he learned those Terms, that his Body was bigger than his little Finger? Any one may as reasonably doubt, or deny that his little Finger is a Part of his Body, as that it is less than his Body. And he that can doubt whether it be less, will as certainly doubt whether it be a Part. So that the Maxim, The Whole is bigger than a Part, can never be made use of, to prove the little Finger less than the Body, but when it is useless, by being brought to convince one of a Truth which he knows already. For he that does not certainly know that any Parcel of Matter, with another Parcel of Matter joined to it, is bigger than either of them alone, will never be able to know it, by the help of these two relative Terms, Whole and Part, make of them what Maxim you please.

§. 4. But, be it in the Mathematics as it will, whether it be clearer, that, taking an Inch from a black Line of two Inches, and an Inch from a red Line of two Inches, the remaining Parts of the two Lines will be equal; or that, if you take Equals from Equals, the Remainders will be equal: Which, I say, of these two is the clearer and first known, I leave to any one to determine, it not being material to my present Occasion. That which I have here to do, is to enquire, whether, if it be the readiest way to Knowledge to begin with general Maxims, and build upon them, if it be yet a safe way to take the Principles, which are laid down in any other Science, as unquestionable Truths; and so receive them without Examination, and adhere to them, without suffering to be doubted of, because Mathematicians have been so happy, or so fair, to ufe none but self-evident and undeniable. If this be so, I know not what may not pass for Truth in Morality, what may not be introduced and proved in natural Philosophy.

Let that Principle of some of the Philosophers, that all is Matter, and that there is nothing else, be received for certain and undubitable, and it will be easy to be seen, by the Writings of some that have revived it again in our Days, what Consequences.
sequences it will lead us into. Let any one, with Polemo, take the World; or, with the Stoics, the Ether, or the Sun; or, with Anaximenes, the Air, to be God; and what a Divinity, Religion, and Worship, must we needs have! Nothing can be so dangerous as Principles, thus taken up without Questioning, or Examination; especially if they be such as concern Morality, which influence Mens Lives, and give a Bias to all their Actions. Who might not justly expect another Kind of Life in Aristippus, who placed Happiness in bodily Pleasure; and in Antisthenes, who made Virtue sufficient to Felicity? And he who, with Plato, shall place Beatitude in the Knowledge of God, will have his Thoughts raised to other Contemplations than those who looked not beyond this Spot of Earth, and those perishing Things, which are to be had in it. He that, with Archelaus, shall lay it down as a Principle, That Right and Wrong, Honest and Dishonest, are defined only by Laws, and not by Nature, will have other Measures of moral Rectitude and Pravity, than those, who take it for granted, that we are under Obligations, antecedent to all human Constitutions.

§ 5. Ir, therefore, those that pass for Principles, are not certain, (which we must have some way to know, that we may be able to distinguish them from those that are doubtful) but are only made so to us, by our blind Assent, we are liable to be misled by them; and instead of being guided into Truth, we shall, by Principles, be only confirmed in Mistake and Error.

§ 6. But, since the Knowledge of the Certainty of Principles, as well as of all other Truths, depends only upon the Perception we have of the Agreement, or Disagreement of our Ideas, the Way to improve our Knowledge, is not, I am sure, blindly and with an implicit Faith, to receive and swallow Principles; but is, I think, to get and fix in our Minds clear, distinct, and complete Ideas, as far as they are to be had, and annex to them proper and constant Names. And thus, perhaps, without any other Principles,
Principles, but barely considering those Ideas, and by comparing them one with another, finding their Agreement, or Disagreement, and their several Relations and Habitudes; we shall get more true and clear Knowledge, by the Conduft of this one Rule, than by taking up Principles, and thereby putting our Minds into the Disposal of others.

§ 7. We must therefore, if we will proceed, as Reason advices, adapt our Methods of Enquiry to the Nature of the Ideas we examine, and the Truth we search after. General and certain Truths are only founded in the Habitudes and Relations of abstract Ideas. A sagacious and methodical Application of our Thoughts, for the finding out these Relations, is the only Way to discover all that can be put, with Truth and Certainty concerning them, into general Propositions. By what Steps we are to proceed in these, is to be learned in the Schools of the Mathematicians, who, from very plain and easy Beginnings, by gentle Degrees, and a continued Chain of Reasonings, proceed to the Discovery and Demonstration of Truths, that appear at first Sight beyond human Capacity. The Art of finding Proofs, and the admirable Methods they have invented, for the singling out, and laying in Order those intermediate Ideas, that demonstratively shew the Equality, or Inequality of unapplicable Quantities, is that which has carried them so far, and produced such wonderful and unexpected Discoveries: But whether something like this, in respect of other Ideas, as well as those of Magnitude, may not in time be found out, I will not determine. This, I think, I may say, that if other Ideas, that are the real, as well as nominal Essences of their Species, were pursued in the Way familiar to Mathematicians, they would carry our Thoughts farther, and with greater Evidence and Clearness, than possibly we are apt to imagine.

§ 8. This gave me the Confidence to advance that Conjecture, which I suggest, Chap. iii. § 18. viz. That Morality is capable of Demonstration, as well as Mathematics. For the Ideas, that Ethics are conversant about, being all real Essences, and such
such as I imagine have a discoverable Connexion and Agreement one with another; so far as we can find their Habitues and Relations, so far we shall be possessed of certain, real, and general Truths: And I doubt not, but if a right Method were taken, a great Part of Morality might be made out with that Clearnes, that could leave, to a considering Man, no more reason to doubt, than he could have to doubt of the Truth of Propositions in Mathematics, which have been demonstrated to him.

§ 9. In our Search after the Knowledge of Substances, our Want of Ideas, that are suitable to such a Way of Proceeding, obliges us to a quite different Method. We advance not here, as in the other, (where our abstract Ideas are real, as well as nominal Essences) by contemplating our Ideas, and considering their Relations and Correspondencies; that helps us very little, for the Reasons that, in another Place, we have at large set down. By which, I think, it is evident, that Substances afford Matter of very little general Knowledge; and the bare Contemplation of their abstract Ideas, will carry us but a very little Way in the Search of Truth and Certainty. What then are we to do for the Improvement of our Knowledge in substantial Beings? Here we are to take a quite contrary Course; the Want of Ideas of their real Essences, sends us from our own Thoughts, to the Things themselves, as they exist. Experience here must teach me, what Reason cannot; and it is by trying alone, that I can certainly know, what other Qualities co-exist with those of my complex Idea, v. g. whether that yellow, heavy, fusible Body, I call Gold, be malleable, or no; which Experience (which Way ever it prove, in that particular Body I examine) makes me not certain, that it is so in all, or any other yellow, heavy, fusible Bodies, but that which I have tried. Because it is no Consequence, one Way, or the other, from my complex Idea; the Necessity, or Inconsistency of Malleability, hath no visible Connexion with the Combination of that Colour, Weight, and Fusibility in any Body. What I have said here, of the nominal Essence of Gold, supposed to consist of a Body of
such a determinate Colour, Weight, and Fusibility, will hold true, if Malleableness, Fixedness, and Solubility in Aqua Regia, be added to it. Our Reasonings from these Ideas will carry us but a little Way, in the certain Discovery of the other Properties, in those Masses of Matter, wherein all these are to be found. Because the other Properties of such Bodies, depending not on these, but on that unknown, real Essence, on which these also depend, we cannot by them discover the rest; we can go no farther than the simple Ideas of our nominal Essence will carry us, which is very little beyond themselves; and so afford us but very sparingly any certain, universal, and useful Truths. For, upon Trial, having found that particular Piece, (and all others of that Colour, Weight, and Fusibility, that I ever tried) Malleable, that also makes now, perhaps, a Part of my complex Idea, Part of my nominal Essence of Gold: Whereby, tho' I make my complex Idea, to which I affix the Name Gold, to consist of more simple Ideas than before; yet still, it not containing the real Essence of any Species of Bodies, it helps me not certainly to know (I say to know, perhaps it may to conjecture) the other remaining Properties of that Body, farther than they have a visible Connexion with some, or all of the simple Ideas, that make up my nominal Essence. For Example, I cannot be certain, from this complex Idea, whether Gold be fixed, or no; because, as before, there is no necessary Connexion, or Inconsistence to be discovered betwixt a complex Idea of a Body, yellow, heavy, fusible, malleable; betwixt these, I say, and Fixedness: So that I may certainly know, that in whatsoever Body these are found, there Fixedness is sure to be. Here again, for Assurance, I must apply myself to Experience, as far as that reaches, I may have certain Knowledge, but no farther.

§. 10. I deny not, but a Man, accustom ked to rational and regular Experiments, shall be able to see farther into the Nature of Bodies, and guess righter at their yet unknown Properties, than one that is a Stranger to them: But yet, as I have said, this is but Judgment and Opinion, not Knowledge and Certainty. This Way of getting, and improving our Knowledge in Substances, only
Improvement of our Knowledge. B. IV.

only by Experience and History, which is all that the Weaknesses of our Faculties, in this State of Mediocrity, which we are in in this World, can attain to, makes me suspect, that natural Philosophy is not capable of being made a Science. We are able, I imagine, to reach very little general Knowledge, concerning the Species of Bodies, and their several Properties. Experiments and Historical Observations we may have, from which we may draw Advantages of Ease and Health, and thereby increase our Stock of Conveniencies for this Life; but beyond this I fear our Talents reach not, nor are our Faculties, as I guess, able to advance.

§. 11. From whence it is obvious to conclude, that since our Faculties are not fitted to penetrate into the internal Fabric, and real Essences of Bodies; but yet plainly discover to us the Being of a God, and the Knowledge of ourselves, enough to lead us into a full and clear Discovery of our Duty, and great Concernment; it will become us, as rational Creatures, to employ those Faculties we have, about what they are most adapted to, and follow the Direction of Nature, where it seems to point us out the Way. For it is rational to conclude, that our proper Employment lies in those Enquiries, and in that sort of Knowledge which is most suited to our natural Capacities, and carries in it our greatest Interest, i.e. the Condition of our eternal Estate. Hence I think I may conclude, that Morality is the proper Science, and Business of Mankind in general; (who are both concerned, and fitted to search out their Summum Bonum) as several Arts, conversant about several Parts of Nature, are the Lot and private Talent of particular Men, for the common Use of human Life, and their own particular Subsistence in this World. Of what Consequence the Discovery of one natural Body, and its Properties may be to human Life, the whole great Continent of America is a convincing Instance: Whose Ignorance in useful Arts, and Want of the greatest Part of the Conveniencies of Life, in a Country that abounded with all Sorts of natural Plenty, I think, may be attributed to their Ignorance of what was to be found in a very ordinary, despicable Stone,
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Stone, I mean the Mineral of Iron. And whatever we think of our Parts, or Improvements, in this Part of the World, where Knowledge and Plenty seem to vie with each other; yet, to any one, that will seriously reflect on it, I suppose it will appear past doubt, that, were the Use of Iron lost among us, we should in a few Ages be unavoidably reduced to the Wants and Ignorance of the ancient savage Americans, whose natural Endowments and Provisions came no way short of those of the most flourishing and polite Nations; so that he, who first made known the Use of that one contemptible Mineral, may be truly stiled the Father of Arts, and Author of Plenty.

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Improvement of our Knowledge. B. IV.

The Knowledge of Bodies we must get by our Senses, warily employed in taking notice of their Qualities and Operations on one another: And what we hope to know of separate Spirits in this World, we must, I think, expect only from Revelation. He that shall consider how little general Maxims, precarious Principles, and Hypotheses laid down at Pleasure, have promoted true Knowledge, or helped to satisfy the Enquiries of rational Men after real Improvements; how little, I say, the setting out at that End has, for many Ages together, advanced Mens Progress towards the Knowledge of natural Philosophy, will think we have reason to thank those, who in this latter Age have taken another Course, and have trod out to us, tho' not an easier Way to learned Ignorance, yet a surer Way to profitable Knowledge.

§. 13. Not that we may not, to explain any Phenomena of Nature, make use of any probable Hypotheses whatsover: Hypotheses, if they are well made, are, at least, great Helps to the Memory, and often direct us to new Discoveries. But my Meaning is, that we should not take up any one too hastily, (which the Mind, that would always penetrate into the Causes of Things, and have Principles to rest on, is very apt to do) till we have very well examined Particulars, and made several Experiments, in that Thing which we would explain by our Hypothesis, and see whether it will agree to them all; whether our Principles will carry us quite through, and not be as inconsistent with one Phenomenon of Nature, as they seem to accommodate and explain another. And at least that we take care, that the Name of Principles deceive us not, nor impose on us, by making us receive that for an unquestionable Truth, which is really, at best, but a very doubtful Conjecture, such as are most (I had almost said all) of the Hypothesis in natural Philosophy.

§. 14. But whether natural Philosophy be capable of Certainty, or no, the Ways to enlarge our Knowledge, as far as we are capable, seem to me, in short, to be these two:

First, The first is, to get and settle in our Minds determined Ideas of those Things, where-
of we have general, or specific Names; at least of so many of them, as we would consider and improve our Knowledge in, or Reason about. And, if they be specific Ideas of Substances, we should endeavour also to make them as complete as we can; whereby I mean, that we should put together as many simple Ideas, as being constantly observed to co-exist, may perfectly determine the Species: And each of those simple Ideas, which are the Ingredients of our complex one, should be clear and distinct in our Minds. For it being evident, that our Knowledge cannot exceed our Ideas; as far as they are either imperfect, confused, or obscure, we cannot expect to have certain, perfect, or clear Knowledge.

Secondly, The other is the Art of finding out those intermediate Ideas, which may shew us the Agreement, or Repugnancy of other Ideas; which cannot be immediately compared.

§. 15. That these two (and not the relying on Maxims, and drawing Consequences from some general Propositions) are the right Method of improving our Knowledge, in the Ideas of other Modes besides those of Quantity, the Consideration of mathematical Knowledge will easily inform us. Where first we shall find, that he, that has not a perfect and clear Idea of those Angles, or Figures, of which he desires to know any thing, is utterly thereby incapable of any Knowledge about them. Suppose but a Man not to have a perfect, exact Idea of a right Angle, a Scalenum, or Trapezium; and there is nothing more certain, than that he will in vain seek any Demonstration about them. Farther, it is evident, that it was not the Influence of those Maxims, which are taken for Principles in Mathematics, that hath led the Masters of that Science into those wonderful Discoveries they have made. Let a Man of good Parts know all the Maxims, generally made use of in Mathematics, never so perfectly; and contemplate their Extent and Consequences, as much as he pleases, he will, by their Assistance, I suppose, scarce ever come to know, that the Square of the Hypothemse, in a right angled Triangle, is equal to the Squares of the two other Sides. The Knowledge, that the Whole...
Whole is equal to all its Parts, and if you take Equals from Equals, the Remainder will be equal, &c. helped him not, I presume, to this Demonstration: And a Man may, I think, pore long enough on those Axioms, without ever seeing one jot the more of Mathematical Truths. They have been discovered by the Thoughts otherwise applied: The Mind had other Objects, other Views before it, far different from those Maxims, when it first got the Knowledge of such kind of Truths in Mathematics, which Men, well enough acquainted with those received Axioms, but ignorant of their Method, who first made these Demonstrations, can never sufficiently admire. And who knows what Methods, to enlarge our Knowledge in other Parts of Science, may hereafter be invented, answering that of Algebra in Mathematics, which so readily finds out Ideas of Quantities, to measure others by; whose Equality, or Proportion, we could otherwise very hardly, or, perhaps, never come to know?

CHAP. XIII.

Some further Considerations concerning our Knowledge.

§.1. Our Knowledge, as in other Things, so in this, has a great Conformity with our Sight, that it is neither wholly necessary, nor wholly voluntary. If our Knowledge were altogether necessary, all Mens Knowledge would not only be alike, but every Man would know all that is knowable: And, if it were wholly voluntary, some Men so little regard, or value it, that they would have extreme little, or none at all. Men, that have Senses, cannot choose but receive some Ideas by them; and, if they have Memory, they cannot but retain some of them; and if they have any distinguishing Faculty, cannot but perceive the Agreement, or Disagreement of some of them, one with another: As he, that has Eyes, if he will open them by Day, cannot but see some Objects, and perceive a Difference in them. But
Considerations concerning our Knowledge.

But tho' a Man, with his Eyes open in the Light, cannot but see; yet there be certain Objects, which he may chuse whether he will turn his Eyes to: There may be in his reach a Book containing Pictures and Discourses, capable to delight, and instruct him, which yet he may never have the Will to open, never take the Pains to look into.

§. 2. There is also another Thing in a Man's Power, and that is, tho' he turns his Eyes sometimes towards an Object, yet he may chuse, whether he will curiously survey it, and, with an intent Application, endeavour to observe accurately all that is visible in it. But yet, what he does see, he cannot see otherwise than he does. It depends not on his Will to see that Black, which appears Yellow; nor to persuade himself, that what actually scalps him, feels cold. The Earth will not appear painted with Flowers, nor the Fields covered with Verdure, whenever he has a mind to it: In the cold Winter, he cannot help seeing it white and hoary, if he will look abroad. Just thus is it with our Understanding; all that is voluntary in our Knowledge, is the employing, or with-holding any of our Faculties, from this, or that sort of Objects, and a more, or less accurate Survey of them; but they being employed, our Will hath no Power to determine the Knowledge of the Mind one way, or other; that is done only by the Objects themselves, as far as they are clearly discovered. And, therefore, as far as Mens Senses are conversant about external Objects, the Mind cannot but receive those Ideas, which are presented by them, and be informed of the Existence of Things without: And so far as Mens Thoughts converse with their own determined Ideas, they cannot but, in some measure, observe the Agreement, and Disagreement, that is to be found amongst some of them, which is so far Knowledge: And, if they have Names for those Ideas, which they have thus considered, they must needs be asurced of the Truth of those Propositions, which express that Agreement, or Disagreement, they perceive in them, and be undoubtedly convinced of those Truths. For what a Man sees, he cannot but see; and what he perceives, he cannot but know that he perceives.

§. 3. Thus,
§ 3. Thus, he that has got the Ideas of Numbers, and hath taken the Pains to compare one, two, and three, to six, cannot chuse but know that they are equal: He that hath got the Idea of a Triangle, and found the Ways to measure its Angles, and their Magnitudes, is certain that its three Angles are equal to two right ones; and can as little doubt of that, as of this Truth, that it is impossible for the same Thing to be, and not to be.

He also that hath the Idea of an intelligent, but frail and weak Being, made by, and depending on another, who is eternal, omnipotent, perfectly wise and good, will as certainly know, that Man is to Honour, Fear, and Obey God, as that the Sun shines, when he sees it. For if he hath but the Ideas of two such Beings in his Mind, and will turn his Thoughts that way, and consider them, he will as certainly find, that the inferior, finite, and dependent, is under an Obligation to obey the supreme and infinite, as he is certain to find, that three, four, and seven, are less than fifteen, if he will consider and compute those Numbers; nor can he be surer, in a clear Morning, that the Sun is risen, if he will but open his Eyes, and turn them that way. But yet these Truths, being never so certain, never so clear, he may be ignorant of either, or all of them, who will never take the Pains to employ his Faculties, as he should, to inform himself about them.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Judgment.

§ 1. The understanding Faculties being given to Man, not barely for Speculation, but also for the Conduct of his Life, Man would be at a great Loss, if he had nothing to direct him, but what has the Certainty of true Knowledge. For that being very short and scanty, as we have seen, he would be
be often utterly in the dark, and, in most of the Actions of his Life, perfectly at a stand, had he nothing to guide him in the Absence of clear and certain Knowledge. He that will not eat, till he has Demonstration that it will nourish him; he that will not stir, till he infallibly knows the Business he goes about will succeed, will have little else to do, but sit still and perish.

§. 2. Therefore, as God has set some Things in broad Day-light; as He has given us some certain Knowledge, tho' limited to a few Things in comparison, probably as a Taste of what intellectual Creatures are capable of, to excite in us a Desire and Endeavour after a better State: So, in the greatest Part of our Concernment, He has afforded us only the Twilight, as I may so say, of Probability, suitable, I presume, to that State of Mediocrity and Probationership, He has been pleased to place us in here; wherein, to check our Over-confidence, and Presumption, we might, by every Day's Experience, be made sensible of our Short-sightedness, and Liability to Error; the Sense whereof might be a constant Admonition to us, to spend the Days of this our Pilgrimage with Industry and Care, in the Search, and following of that Way, which might lead us to a State of greater Perfection: It being highly rational to think, even were Revelation silent in the Case, that as Men employ those Talents God has given them here, they shall accordingly receive their Rewards, at the Close of the Day, when their Sun shall set, and Night shall put an End to their Labours.

§. 3. The Faculty, which God has given Man to supply the Want of clear and certain Knowledge, in Cases where that cannot be had, is Judgment, whereby the Mind takes its Ideas to agree, or disagree; or, which is the same, any Proposition to be true, or false, without perceiving a demonstrative Evidence in the Proofs. The Mind sometimes exercises this Judgment out of Necessity, where demonstrative Proofs, and certain Knowledge are not to be had; and sometimes out of Laziness, Unskilfulness, or Haste, even where demonstrative and certain Proofs are to be had. Men often stay not warily to examine the
the Agreement, or Disagreement of two Ideas, which they are desirous, or concerned to know; but either incapable of such Attention, as is requisite in a long Train of Gradations, or impatient of Delay, lightly cast their Eyes on, or wholly pass by the Proofs; and so, without making out the Demonstration, determine of the Agreement, or Disagreement of two Ideas, as it were by a View of them, as they are at a Distance, and take it to be the one, or the other, as seems most likely to them upon such a loose Survey. This Faculty of the Mind, when it is exercised immediately about Things, is called Judgment; when about Truths delivered in Words, is most commonly called Assent, or Disent: Which being the most usual Way, wherein the Mind has occasion to employ this Faculty, I shall, under these Terms, treat of it, as least liable in our Language to Equivocation.

§. 4. Thus the Mind has two Faculties, conversant about Truth and Falhood.

First, Knowledge, whereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly satisfied of the Agreement, or Disagreement, of any Ideas.

Secondly, Judgment, which is the putting Ideas together, or separating them from one another in the Mind, when their certain Agreement, or Disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so; which is, as the Word imports, taken to be so, before it certainly appears. And if it so unites, or separates them, as in reality Things are, it is right Judgment.

CHAP. XV.

Of Probability.

Probability is the Appearance of Agreement upon fallible Proofs.

§. 1. As Demonstration is the shewing the Agreement, or Disagreement of two Ideas, by the Intervention of one, or more Proofs, which have a constant, immutable, and visible Connexion one with another; so Probability is nothing but the Appearance of such an
an Agreement, or Disagreement, by the Intervention of Proofs, whose Connexion is not constant and immutable, or at least is not perceived to be so, but is, as appears for the most part to be so, and is enough to induce the Mind to judge the Proposition to be true, or false, rather than the contrary. For Example: In the Demonstration of it, a Man perceives the certain, immutable Connexion there is of Equality between the three Angles of a Triangle, and those intermediate ones, which are made use of, to shew their Equality to two right ones; and so, by an intuitive Knowledge of the Agreement, or Disagreement of the intermediate Ideas, in each Step of the Progress, the whole Series is continued with an Evidence, which clearly shews the Agreement, or Disagreement of those three Angles, in the Equality to two right ones: And thus he has certain Knowledge that it is so. But another Man, who never took the Pains to observe the Demonstration, hearing a Mathematician, a Man of Credit, affirm the three Angles of a Triangle to be equal to two right ones, assents to it, i.e. receives it for true. In which Case, the Foundation of his Assent is the Probability of the Thing, the Proof being such as for the most part carries Truth with it: The Man, on whose Testimony he receives it, not being wont to affirm any Thing contrary to, or besides his Knowledge, especially in Matters of this kind. So that That which causes his Assent to this Proposition, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones, that which makes him take these Ideas to agree, without knowing them to do so, is the wonted Veracity of the Speaker in other Cases, or his supposed Veracity in this.

§ 2. Our Knowledge, as has been shewn, being very narrow, and we not happy enough to find certain Truth, in every thing which we have occasion to consider; most of the Propositions we think, reason, discourse, nay act upon, are such, as we cannot have undoubted Knowledge of their Truth: Yet some of them border so near upon Certainty, that we make no doubt at all about them, but assent to them as firmly, and act, according to that Assent, as resolutely, as if they were infallibly demon-
Probability. Book IV.

demonstrated, and that our Knowledge of them was perfect and certain. But there being Degrees herein, from the very Neigh-
bourhood of Certainty and Demonstration, quite down to Im-
probability and Unlikelihood, even to the Confines of Impossibi-
liity; and also Degrees of Assent from full Assurance and Confi-
dence, quite down to Conjecture, Doubt and Difficult; I shall
come now, (having, as I think, found out the Bounds of human
Knowledge and Certainty) in the next Place, to consider the se-
veral Degrees and Grounds of Probability, and Assent, or Faith.

§ 3. Probability is Likeliness to be true; the
very Notation of the Word signifying such a
Proposition, for which there be Arguments, or
Proofs, to make it pass, or be received for true.
The Entertainment the Mind gives this Sort of
Propositions, is called Belief, Assent, or Opinion,
which is the admitting, or receiving any Proposition for true,
upon Arguments, or Proofs that are found to persuade us to re-
ceive it as true, without certain Knowledge that it is so. And
herein lies the Difference between Probability and Certainty,
Faith and Knowledge, that in all the Parts of Knowledge, there
is Intuition; each immediate Idea, each Step has it visible and
certain Connexion; in Belief, not so. That, which makes me
believe, is something extraneous to the Thing I believe; some-
ting not evidently joined on both Sides to, and so not mani-
festly shewing the Agreement, or Disagreement of those Ideas,
that are under Consideration.

§ 4. Probability, then, being to supply the
Defect of our Knowledge, and to guide us,
where that fails, is always conversant about
Propositions, whereof we have no Certainty,
but only some Inducements to receive them for
ture. The Grounds of it are, in short, these two
following.

First, The Conformity of any Thing with
our own Knowledge, Observation, and Experience.
Secondly, The Testimony of others, vouching their Obser-
vation and Experience. In the Testimony of others, is to be
considered,
in this, all the agreements, pro and con, ought to be examined, before we come to a judgment.

§. 5. Probability wanting that intuitive Evidence, which infallibly determines the Understanding, and produces certain Knowledge, the Mind, if it would proceed rationally, ought to examine all the Grounds of Probability, and see how they make more, or less, for, or against any Proposition, before it assents to, or dissents from it; and upon a due ballancing the Whole, reject, or receive it, with a more, or less firm Assent, proportionably to the Preponderancy of the greater Grounds of Probability, on one Side, or the other. For Example:

If I myself see a Man walk on the Ice; it is past Probability it is Knowledge; but if another tells me he saw a Man in England, in the Midst of a sharp Winter, walk upon Water hardened with Cold; this has so great Conformity with what is usually observed to happen, that I am disposed, by the Nature of the Thing itself, to assent to it, unless some manifest Suspicion attend the Relation of that Matter of Fact. But, if the same Thing be told to one born between the Tropics, who never saw, nor heard of any such Thing before, there the whole Probability relies on Testimony: And, as the Relators are more in Number, and of more Credit, and have no Interest to speak contrary to the Truth; so that Matter of Fact is like to find more, or less Belief. Tho' to a Man, whose Experience has been always quite contrary, and has never heard of any Thing like it, the most untainted Credit of a Witness will scarce be able to find Belief. As it happened to a Dutch Ambassador, who entertaining the King of Siam with the Particularities of Holland, which he was inquisitive after, amongst other Things told him, that the Water in his Country would sometimes, in cold Weather, be so hard, that Men walked upon it, and that it would bear an Elephant, if he were there. To which the King replied,
Hitherto I have believed the strange Things you have told me, because I look upon you as a sober, fair Man; but now I am sure you lie.

They being capable of great Variety.

§. 6. Upon these Grounds depends the Probability of any Proposition: And as the Conformity of our Knowledge, as the Certainty of Observations, as the Frequency and Constancy of Experience, and the Number and Credibility of Testimonies do more, or less agree, or disagree with it, so is any Proposition, in itself, more, or less probable. There is another, I confess, which, tho' by itself it be no true Ground of Probability, yet is often made use of for one, by which Men most commonly regulate their Assent, and upon which they pin their Faith, more than any Thing else, and that is the Opinion of others: Tho' there cannot be a more dangerous Thing to rely on, nor more likely to mislead one; since there is much more Falseness and Error among Men, than Truth and Knowledge. And, if the Opinions and Persuasions of others, whom we know and think well of, be a Ground of Assent, Men have Reason to be Heathens in Japan, Mahometans in Turky, Papists in Spain, Protestants in England, and Lutherans in Sweden. But of this wrong Ground of Assent, I shall have occasion to speak more at large in another Place.

CHAP. XVI.
Of the Degrees of Assent.

§. 1. The Grounds of Probability we have laid down, in the foregoing Chapter; as they are the Foundations, on which our Assent is built, so are they also the Measure, whereby its several Degrees are, or ought to be regulated; only we are to take notice, that whatever Grounds of Probability there may be, yet they operate no farther on the Mind, which searches after Truth, and endeavours
endeavours to judge right, than they appear, at least in the first Judgment, or Search, that the Mind makes. I confess, in the Opinions Men have, and firmly stick to, in the World, their Assent is not always from an actual View of the Reasons, that at first prevailed with them: It being in many Cases almost impossible, and in most very hard, even for those who have very admirable Memories, to retain all the Proofs which, upon a due Examination, made them embrace that side of the Question. It suffices that they have once, with Care and Fairness, sifted the Matter, as far as they could; and that they have searched into all the Particulars, that they could imagine, to give any Light to the Question, and, with the best of their Skill, cast up the Account upon the whole Evidence: And thus, having once found on which Side the Probability appeared to them, after as full and exact an Enquiry as they can make, they lay up the Conclusion in their Memories, as a Truth they have discovered; and for the future they remain satisfied with the Testimony of their Memories, that this is the Opinion, that, by the Proofs they have once seen of it, deserves such a Degree of their Assent, as they afford it.

§ 2. This is all that the greatest Part of Men are capable of doing, in regulating their Opinions and Judgments; unless a Man will exact of them, either to retain, distinctly, in their Memories, all the Proofs concerning any probable Truth, and that too in the same Order, and regular Deduction of Consequences, in which they have formerly placed, or seen them; which sometimes is enough to fill a large Volume, upon one single Question: Or else they must require a Man, for every Opinion that he embraces, every Day to examine the Proofs: Both which are impossible. It is unavoidable, therefore, that the Memory be relied on, in the Case, and that Men be persuaded of several Opinions, whereof the Proofs are not actually in their Thoughts; nay, which perhaps they are not able actually to recal. Without this, the greatest Part of Men must be either very Sceptics, or change every Moment, and yield themselves
themselves up to whoever, having lately studied the Question, offers them Arguments; which, for Want of Memory, they are not able presently to answer.

§. 3. I cannot but own, that Mens slipping to their past Judgment, and adhering firmly to Conclusions formerly made, is often the Cause of great Obstination in Error and Mistake. But the Fault is not, that they rely on their Memo-

ries, for what they have before well judged, but because they judged before they had well examined. May we not find a great Number (not to say the greatest Part) of Men, that think they have formed right Judgments of several Matters, and that for no other reason, but because they never thought otherwise? Who imagine themselves to have judged right, only because they never questioned, never examined their own Opinions? Which is, indeed, to think they judged right, because they never judged at all: And yet these of all Men hold their Opinions with the greatest Stifhness; those being generally the most fierce and firm in their Tenets, who have least examined them. What we once know, we are certain is so; and we may be secure, that there are no latent Proofs undiscovered, which may overturn our Knowledge, or bring it in doubt. But in Matters of Probability, it is not in every Case we can be sure that we have all the Particulars before us, that any way concern the Question; and that there is no Evidence behind, and yet unseen, which may cast the Probability on the other Side, and outweigh all that at present seems to preponderate with us. Who almost is there that hath the Leisure, Patience, and Means, to collect together all the Proofs, concerning most of the Opinions he has, so as safely to conclude, that he hath a clear and full View, and that there is no more to be alleged for his better Information? And yet we are forced to determine ourselves on the one Side, or other. The Conduct of our Lives, and the Management of our great Concerns, will not bear delay; for these depend, for the most part, on the Determination of our Judgment, in Points wherein we are not capable of certain and demonstrative
Chap. XVI. Degrees of Assent.

demonstrative Knowledge, and wherein it is necessary for us to embrace the one Side, or the other.

§. 4. Since, therefore, it is unavoidable to the greatest part of Men, if not all, to have several Opinions, without certain and indubitable Proofs of their Truths; and it carries too great an Imputation of Ignorance, Lightness, or Folly, for Men to quit and renounce their former Tenets presently, upon the offer of an Argument, which they cannot immediately answer, and shew the Insufficiency of: It would, methinks, become all Men to maintain Peace, and the common Offices of Humanity and Friendship, in the Diversity of Opinions; since we cannot reasonably expect, that any one should readily and obsequiously quit his own Opinion, and embrace ours, with a blind Resignation to an Authority, which the Understanding of Man acknowledges not. For, however it may often mistake, it can own no other Guide but Reason, nor blindly submit to the Will and Dictates of another. If he, you would bring over to your Sentiments, be one that examines before he assents, you must give him Leave, at his Leisure, to go over the Account again, and, recalling what is out of his Mind, examine all the Particulars, to see on which Side the Advantage lies: And if he will not think our Arguments of weight enough to engage him anew in so much Pains, it is but what we do often ourselves in the like case; and we should take it amiss, if others should prescribe to us what Points we should study. And, if he be one who takes his Opinions upon Trust, how can we imagine that he should renounce those Tenets, which Time and Custom have so settled in his Mind, that he thinks them self-evident, and of an unquestionable Certainty; or which he takes to be Impressions he has received from God Himself, or from Men sent by Him? How can we expect, I say, that Opinions, thus settled, should be given up to the Arguments, or Authority of a Stranger, or Adversary; especially if there be any Suspicions of Interest, or Design, as there never fails to be, where Men find themselves ill treated? We should do well to commiserate our mutual Ignorance, and endeavour to remove it, in all the gentle and fair
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fair Ways of Information; and not instantly treat others ill, as obdinate and perverse, because they will not renounce their own, and receive our Opinions, or, at least, those we would force upon them, when it is more than probable, that we are no less obdinate in not embracing some of theirs. For where is the Man that has uncontestible Evidence of the Truth of all that he holds, or of the Falshood of all he condemns; or can say, that he has examined to the Bottom all his own, or other Mens Opinions? The necessity of believing, without Knowledge, nay, often upon very slight Grounds, in this fleeting State of Action and Blindness we are in, should make us more busy and careful to inform ourselves, than constrain others. At least, those who have not thoroughly examined to the Bottom all their own Tenets, must confess they are unfit to prescribe to others; and are unreasonable in imposing that as Truth, on other Mens Belief, which they themselves have not searched into, nor weighed the Arguments of Probability, on which they should receive, or reject it. Those, who have fairly and truly examined, and are thereby got past Doubt, in all the Doctrines they profess, and govern themselves by, would have a juster Pretence to require others to follow them: But these are so few in Number, and find so little reason to be magisterial in their Opinions, that nothing insolent and imperious is to be expected from them: And there is reason to think, that if Men were better instructed themselves, they would be less imposing on others.

§. 5. BUT, to return to the Grounds of Assent, and the several Degrees of it: We are to take notice, that the Propositions we receive, upon Inducements of Probability, are of two Sorts; either concerning some particular Existence, or, as it is usually termed, Matter of Fact, which, falling under Observation, is capable of human Testimony; or else concerning Things, which, being beyond the Discovery of our Senses, are not capable of any such Testimony.

The concurrent Experience of particular Matter of Fact;

§. 6. Concerning the first of these, viz. particular Matter of Fact:
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First, Where any particular Thing, concomitant to the constant Observation of ourselves, and others, in the like Case, comes attested, by the concurrent Reports of all that mention it, we receive it as easily, and build as firmly upon it, as if it were certain Knowledge; and we reason and act thereupon, with as little doubt, as if it were perfect Demonstration. Thus, if all English Men, who have occasion to mention it, should affirm that it froze in England the last Winter, or that there were Swallows seen there in the Summer; I think a Man could almost as little doubt of it, as that seven and four are eleven. The first, therefore, and highest Degree of Probability, is, when the general Consent of all Men, in all Ages, as far as it can be known, concurs with a Man’s constant and never-failing Experience in like Cases, to confirm the Truth of any particular Matter of Fact, attested by fair Witnesses: Such are all the stated Constitutions and Properties of Bodies, and the regular Proceedings of Causes and Effects in the ordinary Course of Nature. This we call an Argument from the Nature of Things themselves. For what our own and other Men’s constant Observation has found always to be after the same Manner, that we, with Reason, conclude to be the Effects of steady and regular Causes, tho’ they come not within the Reach of our Knowledge. Thus, that Fire warmed a Man, made Lead fluid, and changed the Colour, or Consistency in Wood, or Charcoal; that Iron sunk in Water, and swam in Quick-silver: These, and the like Propositions about particular Facts, being agreeable to our constant Experience, as often as we have to do with these Matters; and being generally spoke of, (when mentioned by others) as Things found constantly to be so, and, therefore, not so much as controverted by any body; we are put past doubt, that a Relation, affirming any such Thing to have been true, or any Predication, that it will happen again in the same Manner, is very true. These Probabilities rise so near to Certainty, that they govern our Thoughts as absolutely, and influence all our Actions as fully, as the most evident Demonstration; and in what concerns us, we make little, or no Difference between all other Men with ours, produces Assurance, approaching to Knowledge.
between them and certain Knowledge. Our Belief thus grounded, rises to Assurance.

§ 7. Secondly, The next Degree of Probability is, when I find by my own Experience, and the Agreement of all others that mention it, a Thing to be, for the most part so; and that the particular Influence of it is attested by many and undisputed Witnesses, e. g. History giving us such an Account of Men in all Ages; and my own Experience, as far as I had an Opportunity to observe, confirming it, that most Men prefer their private Advantage to the public: If all Historians that write of Tiberius, say that Tiberius did so, it is extremely probable. And, in this Case, our Assent has a sufficient Foundation to raise itself to a Degree, which we may call Confidence.

§ 8. Thirdly, In Things that happen indifferently, as that a Bird should fly this, or that way; that it should thunder on a Man's right, or left Hand, & c. when any particular Matter of Fact is vouched, by the concurrent Testimony of unsuspected Witnesses, there our Assent is also unavoidable. Thus, that there is such a City in Italy as Rome; that about 1700 Years ago, there lived in it a Man, called Julius Caesar; that he was General; and that he won a Battle against another, called Pompey: This, tho' in the Nature of the Thing there be nothing for, nor against it, yet being related by Historians of Credit, and contradicted by no one Writer, a Man cannot avoid believing it, and can as little doubt of it, as he does of the Being and Actions of his own Acquaintance, whereof he himself is a Witness.

§ 9. Thus far the Matter goes easy enough. Probability upon such Grounds carries so much Evidence with it, that it naturally determines the Judgment, and leaves us as little Liberty to believe, or disbelieve, as a Demonstration does, whether we will know, or be ignorant. The Difficulty is, when Testimonies contradict common Experience, and
and the Reports of History and Witnesses clash with the ordinary Course of Nature, or with one another; there it is, where Diligence, Attention, and Exactness is required, to form a right judgment, and to proportion the Assent to the different Evidence and Probability of the Thing; which rises and falls, according as those two Foundations of Credibility, viz. Common Observation in like Cases, and particular Testimonies in that particular Instance, favour, or contradict it. These are liable to so great Variety of contrary Observations, Circumstances, Reports, different Qualifications, Tempers, Designs, Oversights, &c. of the Reporters, that it is impossible to reduce, to precise Rules, the various Degrees wherein Men give their Assent. This only may be said in general, that as the Arguments and Proofs, pro and con, upon due Examination, nicely weighing every particular Circumstance, shall to any one appear, upon the whole Matter, in a greater, or less Degree, to preponderate on either Side; so they are fitted to produce in the Mind such different Entertainment, as we call Belief, Conjecture, Guess, Doubt, Wavering, Distrust, Disbelief, &c.

§ 10. This is what concerns Assent, in Matters wherein Testimony is made use of: Concerning which, I think, it may not be amiss to take notice of a Rule, observed in the Law of England; which is, that tho' the attested Copy of a Record be good Proof, yet the Copy of a Copy, never so well attested, and by never so credible Witnesses, will not be admitted as a Proof in Judicature. This is so generally approved as reasonable, and suited to the Wisdom and Caution to be used in our Enquiry after material Truths, that I never yet heard of any one that blamed it. This Practice, if it be allowable in the Decisions of Right and Wrong, carries this Observation along with it, viz. That any Testimony, the farther off it is from the Original Truth, the less Force and Proof it has. The Being and Existence of the Thing itself, is what I call the original Truth. A credible Man vouching his Knowledge of it, is a good Proof: But if another, equally credible, do witness it from his Report, the Testimony is weaker; and a third that attests the...
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Hear-say of an Hear-say, is yet less considerable. So that, in traditional Truths, each Remove weakens the Force of the Proof: And the more Hands the Tradition has successively passed thro', the less Strength and Evidence does it receive from them. This I thought necessary to be taken notice of, because I find, amongst some Men, the quite contrary commonly practised, who look on Opinions to gain Force by growing older; and what a Thousand Years since would not, to a rational Man, cotemporry with the first Voucher, have appeared at all probable, is now urged as certain, beyond all Question, only because several have since, from him, said it one after another. Upon this Ground, Propositions, evidently false, or doubtful enough in their first Beginning, come, by an inverted Rule of Probability, to pass for authentic Truths; and those which found, or deserved little Credit from the Mouths of their first Authors, are thought to grow venerable by Age, and are urged as undeniable.

Yet History is of great Use.

§. 11. I would not be thought here to lessen the Credit and Use of History: It is all the Light we have in many Cases, and we receive from it a great Part of the useful Truths we have, with a convincing Evidence. I think nothing more valuable than the Records of Antiquity: I wish we had more of them, and more uncorrupted. But this Truth itself forces me to say, That no Probability can arise higher than its first Original. What has no other Evidence than the single Testimony of one only Witness, must stand, or fall, by his only Testimony, whether good, bad, or indifferent; and tho' cited afterwards by Hundreds of others, one after another, is so far from receiving any Strength thereby, that it is only the weaker. Passion, Interest, Inadvertency, Mistake of his Meaning, and a Thousand odd Reasons, or Capricio's, Mens Minds are acted by, (impossible to be discovered) may make one Man quote another Man's Words, or Meaning, wrong. He that has but ever so little examined the Citations of Writers, cannot doubt how little Credit the Quotations deserve, where the Originals are wanting; and, consequently, how much less Quotations of Quotations can be relied on. This is certain, that what in one Age was affirmed upon slight Grounds, can never
never after come to be more valid in future Ages, by being often repeated. But the farther still it is from the Original, the less valid it is, and has always less Force in the Mouth, or Writing of him that last made use of it, than in his, from whom he received it.

§ 12. The Probabilities, we have hitherto mentioned, are only such as concern Matter of Fact, and such Things as are capable of Observation and Testimony. There remains that other Sort, concerning which Men entertain Opinions with Variety of Assent, tho' the Things be such, that falling not under the Reach of our Senses, they are not capable of Testimony. Such are, 1. The Existence, Nature, and Operations of finite, immaterial Beings without us; as Spirits, Angels, Devils, &c. or the Existence of material Beings; which, either for their Smallness in themselves, or Remoteness from us, our Senses cannot take notice of: As whether there be any Plants, Animals, and intelligent Inhabitants in the Planets, and other Mansions of the vast Universe. 2. Concerning the Manner of Operation in most Parts of the Works of Nature: Wherein, tho' we see the sensible Effects, yet their Causes are unknown, and we perceive not the Ways and Manner how they are produced. We see Animals are generated, nourished, and move; the Loadstone draws Iron; and the Parts of a Candle, successively melting, turn into flame, and give us both Light and Heat. These, and the like Effects, we see and know: But the Causes that operate, and the Manner they are produced in, we can only guess, and probably conjecture. For these, and the like, coming not within the Scrutiny of Human Senses, cannot be examined by them, or be attested by any body; and, therefore, can appear more, or less probable, only as they more, or less agree to Truths, that are established in our Minds, and as they hold Proportion to other Parts of our Knowledge and Observation. Analogy in these Matters is the only Help we have, and it is from that alone we draw all our Grounds of Probability. Thus observing that the bare rubbing of two Bodies violently one upon another, produces Heat, and very often Fire itself,
self, we have reason to think, that what we call Heat and Fire, consists in a violent Agitation of the imperceptible, minute Parts of the burning Matter: Observing likewise, that the different Refractions of pellucid Bodies produce in our Eyes the different Appearances of several Colours; and also, that the different ranging and laying the superficial Parts of several Bodies, as of Velvet, watered Silk, &c. does the like, we think it probable, that the Colour and shining of Bodies, is in them nothing but the different Arrangement and Refraction of their minute and insensible Parts. Thus finding in all Parts of the Creation, that fall under human Observation, that there is a gradual Connexion of one with another, without any great, or discernible Gaps between, in all that great Variety of Things we see in the World, which are so closely linked together, that, in the several Ranks of Beings, it is not easy to discover the Bounds betwixt them; we have reason to be persuaded, that, by such gentle Steps, Things ascend upwards in Degrees of Perfection. It is a hard Matter to say, where Sensible and Rational begin, and where Insensible and Irrational end: And who is there quick-sighted enough to determine precisely, which is the lowest Species of living Things, and which the first of those, which have no Life? Things, as far as we can observe, lessen and augment, as the Quantity does in a regular Cone; where, tho' there be a manifest Odds betwixt the Bigness of the Diameter at a remote Distance, yet the Difference between the upper and under, where they touch one another, is hardly discernible. The Difference is exceeding great between some Men, and some Animals: But if we will compare the Understanding and Abilities of some Men, and some Brutes, we shall find so little Difference, that it will be hard to say, that That of the Man is either clearer, or larger. Observing, I say, such gradual and gentle Descents downwards, in those Parts of the Creation that are beneath Men, the Rule of Analogy may make it probable, that it is so also in Things above us, and our Observation; and that there are several Ranks of intelligent Beings, excelling us in several Degrees of Perfection, ascending upwards towards the infinite Perfection of the Creator, by gentle Steps and Differences, that are every one at no great Distance from the next to it. This Sort
Sort of Probability, which is the best Conduit of rational Experiments; and the Rise of Hypothesis, has also its Use and Influence; and a wary Reasoning from Analogy leads us often into the Discovery of Truths, and useful Productions, which would otherwise lie concealed.

§. 13. Tho' the common Experience, and the ordinary Course of Things, have justly a mighty Influence on the Minds of Men, to make them give, or refuse Credit to any Thing proposed to their Belief; yet there is one Case, wherein the Strangeness of the Fact lessens not the Assent to a fair Testimony given of it. For where such supernatural Events are suitable to Ends aimed at by Him, who has the Power to change the Course of Nature, there, under such Circumstances, they may be the fitter to procure Belief, by how much the more they are beyond, or contrary to ordinary Observation. This is the proper Case of Miracles, which, well attested, do not only find Credit themselves, but give it also to other Truths, which need such Confirmation.

§. 14. Besides those, we have hitherto mentioned, there is one Sort of Propositions, that challenge the highest Degree of our Assent, upon bare Testimony, whether the Thing proposed agree, or disagree, with common Experience, and the ordinary Course of Things, or no.
The Reason whereof is, because the Testimony is of such an one, as cannot deceive, nor be deceived, and that is of God Himself. This carries with it Assurance beyond Doubt, Evidence beyond Exception. This is called by a peculiar Name, Revelation; and our Assent to it, Faith: Which as absolutely determines our Minds, and as perfectly excludes all wavering, as our Knowledge itself; and we may as well doubt of our own Being, as we can, whether any Revelation from God be true. So that Faith is a settled and sure Principle of Assent and Assurance, and leaves no manner of room for Doubt, or Hesitation. Only we must be sure, that it be a divine Revelation, and that we understand it right: Else we shall expose ourselves to all the Extravagancy.
Extravagancy of Enthusiasm, and all the Error of wrong Principles, if we have Faith and Assurance in what is not divine Revelation. And, therefore, in those Cases, our Assent can be, rationally, no higher than the Evidence of its being a Revelation, and that this is the Meaning of the Expressions it is delivered in. If the Evidence of its being a Revelation, or that this is its true Sense, be only on probable Proofs, our Assent can reach no higher than an Assurance, or Diffidence, arising for the more, or less apparent Probability of the Proofs. But of Faith, and the Precedency it ought to have before other Arguments of Persuasion, I shall speak more hereafter, where I treat of it, as it is ordinarily placed, in Contradistinction to Reason; tho' in Truth, it be nothing else but an Assent founded on the highest Reason.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Reason.

§. 1. THE Word Reason, in the English Language, has different Significations: Sometimes it is taken for true and clear Principles; sometimes for clear and fair Deductions from those Principles; and sometimes for the Cause, and particularly the final Cause. But the Consideration, I shall have of it here, is in a Signification, different from all these; and that is, as it stands for a Faculty in Man, that Faculty, whereby Man is supposed to be distinguished from Beasts, and wherein it is evident he much surpasses them.

§. 2. If general Knowledge, as has been shewn, consists in a Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of our own Ideas; and the Knowledge of the Existence of all Things without us, (except only of a God, whose Existence every Man may certainly know, and demonstrate to himself, from
his own Existence) be had only by our Senses; what room then is there for the Exercise of any other Faculty, but outward Sense, and inward Perception? What need is there of Reason? Very much; both for the Enlargement of our Knowledge, and regulating our Assent: For it hath to do both in Knowledge and Opinion, and is necessary and assisting to all our other intellectual Faculties, and, indeed, contains two of them, \textit{viz.} Sagacity and Ilation. By the one, it finds out; and by the other, it so orders the intermediate Ideas, as to discover what Connexion there is in each Link of the Chain, whereby the Extremes are held together; and thereby, as it were, to draw into View the Truth sought for, which is that we call \textit{Ilation}, or \textit{Inference}, and consists in nothing but the Perception of the Connexion there is between the Ideas, in each Step of the Deduction, whereby the Mind comes to see either the certain Agreement, or Disagreement of any two Ideas, as in Demonstration, in which it arrives at Knowledge; or their probable Connexion, 'on which it gives, or with-holds its Assent, as in Opinion. Sense and Intuition reach but a very little Way. The greatest Part of our Knowledge depends upon Deductions and intermediate Ideas: And in those Cases, where we are fain to substitute Assent instead of Knowledge, and take Propositions for true, without being certain they are so, we have need to find out, examine, and compare the Grounds of their Probability. In both these Cases, the Faculty, which finds out the Means, and rightly applies them to discover Certainty in the one, and Probability in the other, is that which we call Reason. For as Reason perceives the necessary and indubitable Connexion of all the Ideas, or Proofs, one to another, in each Step of any Demonstration, that produces Knowledge; so it likewise perceives the probable Connexion of all the Ideas, or Proofs, one to another, in every Step of a Discourse, to which it will think Assent due. This is the lowest Degree of that, which can be truly called Reason. For, where the Mind does not perceive this probable Connexion, where it does not discern whether there be any such Connexion, or no; there Mens Opinions are not the Product of Judgment, or the Consequence of
of Reason, but the Effects of Chance and Hazard, of a Mind floating at all Adventures, without Choice, and without Direction.

Its four Parts. § 3. So that we may, in Reason, consider these four Degrees: The first and highest, is the discovering and finding out of Proofs; the second, the regular and methodical Disposition of them, and laying them in a clear and fit Order, to make their Connexion and Force be plainly and easily perceived; the third is the perceiving their Connection; and the fourth, a making a right Conclusion. These several Degrees may be observed in any mathematical Demonstration; it being one Thing to perceive the Connexion of each Part, as the Demonstration is made by another; another, to perceive the Dependence of the Conclusion on all the Parts; a third, to make out a Demonstration clearly and neatly one's self; and something different from all these, to have first found out those intermediate Ideas, or Proofs, by which it is made.

§ 4. There is one Thing more, which I shall desire to be considered concerning Reason; and that is, whether Syllogism, as is generally thought, be the proper Instrument of it, and the usefulest Way of exercising this Faculty. The Causes I have to doubt, are these:

First, Because Syllogism serves our Reason but in one only of the fore-mentioned Parts of it; and that is, to shew the Connexion of the Proofs in any one Instance, and no more: But in this it is of no great Use, since the Mind can perceive such Connexion where it really is, as easily, nay, perhaps, better without it.

If we will observe the Actings of our own Minds, we shall find that we reason best and clearest, when we only observe the Connexion of the Proof, without reducing our Thoughts to any Rule of Syllogism. And, therefore, we may take notice, that there are many Men, that reason exceeding clear and rightly, who know not how to make a Syllogism. He, that will look into many Parts of Asia and America, will find Men reason there, perhaps, as acutely as himself, who yet never
never heard of a Syllogism, nor can reduce any one Argument to those Forms: And, I believe, scarce any one ever makes Syllogisms in Reasoning within himself. Indeed Syllogism is made use of on Occasion, to discover a Fallacy, hid in a rhetorical Flourish, or cunningly wrapped up in a smooth Period; and, stripping an Absurdity of the Cover of Wit and good Language, shew it in its naked Deformity. But the Weakness, or Fallacy of such a loose Discourse, it shews, by the artificial Form it is put into, only to those who have thoroughly studied Mode and Figure, and have so examined the many Ways, that three Propositions may be put together, as to know which of them does certainly conclude right, and which not, and upon what Grounds it is that they do so. All who have so far considered Syllogism, as to see the Reason why, in three Propositions laid together in one Form, the Conclusion will be certainly right, but in another, not certainly so, I grant are certain of the Conclusions, they draw from the Premisses in the allowed Modes and Figures. But they, who have not so far looked into those Forms, are not sure, by Virtue of Syllogism, that the Conclusion certainly follows from the Premisses; they only take it to be so, by an implicit Faith in their Teachers, and a Confidence in those Forms of Argumentation; but this is still but believing, not being certain. Now if, of all Mankind, those, who can make Syllogisms, are extremely few, in Comparison of those who cannot; and if of those few, who have been taught Logic, there is but a very small Number, who do any more than believe that Syllogisms, in the allowed Modes and Figures, do conclude right, without knowing certainly that they do so; if Syllogisms must be taken for the only proper Instrument of Reason and Means of Knowledge, it will follow, that, before Aristotle, there was not one Man that did, or could know any Thing by Reason; and that, since the Invention of Syllogisms, there is not one of Ten Thousand that doth.

But God has not been so sparing to Men to make them barely two-legged Creatures, and left it to Aristotle to make them rational, i.e. those few of them, that he could get so to examine the Grounds of Syllogisms, as to see, that in above three score Vol. II. T't Ways,
Ways, that three Propositions may be laid together, there are but about fourteen, wherein one may be sure that the Conclusion is right, and upon what Ground it is, that in these few the Conclusion is certain, and in the other not. God has been more bountiful to Mankind than so: He has given them a Mind that can reason, without being instructed in Methods of Syllogizing: The Understanding is not taught to reason by these Rules; it has a native Faculty to perceive the Coherence, or Incoherence of its Ideas, and can range them right, without any such perplexing Repetitions. I say not this any way to lessen Aristotle, whom I look on as one of the greatest Men amongst the Ancients; whose large Views, Acuteness, and Penetration of Thought, and Strength of Judgment, few have equalled: And who, in this very Invention of Forms of Argumentation, wherein the Conclusion may be shewn to be rightly inferred, did great Service, against those who were not ashamed to deny any Thing. And I readily own, that all right Reasoning may be reduced to his Forms of Syllogism. But yet I think, without any Diminution to him, I may truly say, that they are not the only, nor the best Way of Reasoning, for the leading of those into Truth, who are willing to find it, and desire to make the best Use they may of their Reason, for the Attainment of Knowledge. And he himself, it is plain, found out some Forms to be conclusive, and others not; not by the Forms themselves, but by the original Way of Knowledge, i.e. by the visible Agreement of Ideas. Tell a Country Gentlewoman, that the Wind is South-West, and the Weather lowring, and like to rain, and she will easily understand, that it is not safe for her to go Abroad thin clad, in such a Day, after a Fever: She clearly sees the probable Connexion of all these, viz. South-West Wind, and Clouds, Rain, Wetting, taking Cold, Relapse, and Danger of Death, without tying them together, in those artificial and cumbrous Fetters of several Syllogisms, that clog and hinder the Mind, which proceeds from one Part to another, quicker and clearer without them; and the Probability, which she easily perceives in Things, thus in their native State, would be quite loft, if this Argument were managed learnedly, and proposed
proposed in Mode and Figure. For it very often confounds the Connexion: And, I think, every one will perceive, in Mathematical Demonstrations, that the Knowledge gained thereby comes shortest and clearest without Syllogisms.

**Inference** is looked on as the great Act of the rational Faculty, and so it is, when it is rightly made: But the Mind, either very desirous to enlarge its Knowledge, or very apt to favour the Sentiments it has once imbibed, is very forward to make Inferences, and, therefore, often makes too much Haste, before it perceives the Connexion of the Ideas that must hold the Extremes together.

To infer, is nothing but, by Virtue of one Proposition laid down as true, to draw in another as true, i. e. to see, or suppose such a Connexion of the two Ideas of the inferred Proposition, v. g. Let this be the Proposition laid down, _Men shall be punished in another World_, and from thence be inferred this other, _Then Men can determine themselves_. The Question now is to know, whether the Mind has made this Inference right, or no; if it has made it, by finding out the intermediate Ideas, and taking a View of the Connexion of them, placed in a due Order, it has proceeded rationally, and made a right Inference. If it has done it, without such a View, it has not so much made an Inference, that will hold, or an Inference of right Reason, as shewn a Willingness to have it be, or be taken for such. But in either Case is it Syllogism, that discovered those Ideas, or shewed the Connexion of them? for they must be both found out, and the Connexion every where perceived, before they can rationally be made use of in Syllogism: Unless it can be said, that any Idea, without considering what Connexion it hath with the two other, whose Agreement should be shewn by it, will do well enough in a Syllogism, and may be taken at a venture for the Medius Terminus, to prove any Conclusion. But this no body will say, because it is, by Virtue of the perceived Agreement of the intermediate Idea with the Extremes, that the Extremes are concluded to agree; and, therefore, each intermediate Idea must be such, as in the whole Chain hath a visible Connexion with those two, it is placed between, or else thereby the Conclusion cannot
cannot be inferred, or drawn in: For wherever any Link of the
Chain is loose, and without Connexion, there the whole Strength
of it is lost, and it hath no Force to infer, or draw in any Thing.
In the Instance above mentioned, what is it shews the Force of
the Inference, and consequently the Reasonableness of it, but a
View of the Connexion of all the intermediate Ideas that draw
in the Conclusion, or Proposition inferred? v. g. Men shall be
punished,———-God the Punisher,———-just
Punishment,———-the Punished guilty,———
could have done otherwise ——— Freedom,
Self-determination: By which Chain of Ideas thus visibly link-
ed together in Train, i. e. each intermediate Idea agreeing on
each Side with those two, it is immediately placed between, the
Ideas of Men and Self-determination appear to be connected,
i. e. this Proposition, Men can determine themselves is drawn in,
or inferred from this, that they shall be punished in the other
World. For here the Mind, seeing the Connexion there is be-
tween the Idea, of Mens Punishment in the other World, and the
Idea of God punishing; between God punishing, and the Justice of
the Punishment; between the Justice of the Punishment and Guilt;
between Guilt and a Power to do otherwise; between a Power to
do otherwise and Freedom, and between Freedom and Self-deter-
mination, sees the Connexion between Men and Self-determi-
nation.

Now, I ask, whether the Connexion of the Extremes be not
more clearly seen, in this simple and natural Disposition, than in
the perplexed Repetitions, and Jumble of five, or six Syllogisms?
I must beg Pardon for calling it Jumble, till somebody shall put
these Ideas into so many Syllogisms, and then say, that they are
less jumbled, and their Connexion more visible, when they are
transposed and repeated, and spun out to a greater Length, in ar-
tificial Forms; than in that short, natural, plain Order, they are
laid down in here, wherein every one may see it; and wherein
they must be seen, before they can be put into a Train of Sylo-
logisms. For the natural Order of the connecting Ideas, must di-
rect the Order of the Syllogisms, and a Man must see the Con-
nexion of each intermediate Idea, with those that it connects,
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before he can with Reason make use of it in a Syllogism. And when all those Syllogisms are made, neither those that are, nor those that are not Logicians, will see the Force of the Argumentation, i.e. the Connexion of theExtremes, one Jot the better. [For those that are not Men of Art, not knowing the true Forms of Syllogism, nor the Reasons of them, cannot know, whether they are made in right and conclusive Modes and Figures, or no, and so are not at all helped by the Forms they are put into; tho' by them the natural Order, wherein the Mind could judge of their respective Connexion, being disturbed, renders the Inference much more uncertain, than without them.] And as for Logicians themselves, they see the Connexion of each intermediate Idea, with those it stands between, (on which the Force of the Inference depends) as well before as after the Syllogism is made, or else they do not see it at all. For a Syllogism neither shews, nor strengthens the Connexion of any two Ideas, immediately put together, but only, by the Connexion seen in them, shews what Connexion the Extremes have one with another. But what Connexion the intermediate has, with either of the Extremes in that Syllogism, that no Syllogism does, or can shew. That the Mind only doth, or can perceive, as they stand there, in that Juxta-position, only by its own View, to which the Syllogistical Form, it happens to be in, gives no Help, or Light at all; it only shews, that if the intermediate Idea agrees with those it is on both Sides immediately applied to, then those two remote ones, or, as they are called Extremes, do certainly agree; and, therefore, the immediate Connexion of each Idea, to that which it is applied to, on each Side, on which the Force of the Reasoning depends, is as well seen before, as after the Syllogism is made, or else he that makes the Syllogism could never see it at all. This, as has been already observed, is seen only by the Eye, or the perceptive Faculty of the Mind, taking a View of them laid together, in a Juxta-position; which View of any two it has equally, whenever they are laid together in any Proposition, whether that Proposition be placed as a Major, or a Minor in a Syllogism, or no.
Of what Use then are *Syllogisms*? I answer, Their chief and main Use is in the Schools, where Men are allowed, without Shame, to deny the Agreement of *Ideas*, that do manifestly agree; or out of the Schools, to those; who from thence have learned, without Shame, to deny the Connexion of *Ideas*, which even to themselves is visible. But, to an ingenious Seacher after Truth, who has no other Aim but to find it, there is no Need of any such Form, to force the allowing of the Inference: The Truth and Reasonableness of it is better seen in ranging of the *Ideas*, in a simple and plain Order: And hence it is, that Men, in their own Enquiries after Truth, never use *Syllogisms* to convince themselves, [or, in teaching others, to instruct willing Learners.] Because, before they can put them into a *Syllogism*, they must see the Connexion that is between the intermediate *Idea*, and the two other *Ideas*, it is set between, and applied to, to shew their Agreement; and when they see that, they see whether the Inference be good, or no, and so *Syllogism* comes too late to settle it. For to make use again of the former Instance; I ask, whether the Mind, considering the *Idea* of Justice, placed as an intermediate *Idea* between the *Punishment* of Men, and the *Guilt* of the punished, (and, till it does so consider it, the Mind cannot make use of it, as a *medius terminus*) does not as plainly see the Force and Strength of the Inference, as when it is formed into *Syllogism*? To shew it in a very plain and easy Example; let *Animal* be the intermediate *Idea*, or *medius terminus*, that the Mind makes use of, to shew the Connexion of *Homo* and *Vivens*: I ask, whether the Mind does not more readily and plainly see that Connexion, in the simple and proper Position of the connecting *Idea* in the Middle; thus,

\[ \text{Homo} \rightarrow \text{Animal} \rightarrow \text{Vivens} ; \]

Than in this perplexed one,

\[ \text{Animal} \rightarrow \text{Vivens} \rightarrow \text{Homo} \rightarrow \text{Animal} ; \]

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Which is the Position these Ideas have in a Syllogism, to shew the Connexion between Homo and Vivens, by the Intervention of Animal.

Indeed Syllogism is thought to be of necessary Use, even to the Lovers of Truth, to shew them the Fallacies, that are often concealed in florid, witty, or involved Discourses. But that this is a Mistake, will appear, if we consider that the Reason, why sometimes Men, who sincerely aim at Truth, are imposed upon, by such loose, and, as they are called, Rhetorical Discourses, is, that their Fancies being struck with some lively, metaphorical Representations, they neglect to observe, or do not easily perceive, what are the true Ideas upon which the Inference depends. Now, to shew such Men the Weakness of such an Argumentation, there needs no more, but to strip it of the superfluous Ideas, which, blended and confounded with those on which the Inference depends, seem to shew a Connexion where there is none; or, at least, do hinder the Discovery of the Want of it; and then to lay the naked Ideas, on which the Force of the Argumentation depends, in their due Order, in which Position the Mind, taking a View of them, sees what Connexion they have, and so is able to judge of the Inference, without any need of a Syllogism at all.

I grant, that Mode and Figure are commonly made use of, in such Cases, as if the Detection of the Incoherence of such loose Discourses were wholly owing to the Syllogistical Form; and so I myself formerly thought, till upon a stricter Examination, I now find, that laying the intermediate Ideas naked, in their due Order, shews the Incoherence of the Argumentation better than Syllogism; not only as subjecting each Link of the Chain to the immediate View of the Mind, in its proper Place, whereby its Connexion is best observed; but also, because Syllogism shews the Incoherence only to those (who are not one of ten thousand) who perfectly understand Mode and Figure, and the Reason upon which those Forms are established: Whereas a due and orderly placing of the Ideas, upon which the Inference is made, makes every one, whether Logician, or not Logician, who understands the Terms, and hath the Faculty
to perceive the Agreement, or Disagreement of such Ideas, (without which, in, or out of Syllogism, he cannot perceive the Strength, or Weakness, Coherence, or Incoherence of the Discourse) see the Want of Connexion in the Argumentation, and the Absurdity of the Inference.

And thus I have known a Man, unskilful in Syllogism, who at first Hearing could perceive the Weakness and Inconclusiveness of a long, artificial and plausible Discourse, wherewith others, better skilled in Syllogism, have been mislead. And, I believe, there are few of my Readers, who do not know such. And, indeed, if it were not so, the Debates of most Princes Councils, and the Business of Assemblies, would be in Danger to be mismanaged, since those, who are relied upon, and have usually a great Stroke in them, are not always such, who have the good Luck to be perfectly knowing in the Forms of Syllogism, or expert in Mode and Figure. And, if Syllogism were the only, or so much as the surest way to detect the Fallacies of artificial Discourses; I do not think that all Mankind, even Princes, in Matters that concern their Crowns and Dignities, are so much in Love with Falshood and Mistake, that they would every where have neglected to bring Syllogism into the Debates of Moment; or thought it ridiculous so much as to offer them in Affairs of Consequence: A plain Evidence to me, that Men of Parts and Penetration, who were not idly to dispute at their Ease, but were to act, according to the Result of their Debates, and often pay for their Mistakes with their Heads, or Fortunes, found those Scholastic Forms were of little use, to discover Truth, or Fallacy, whilst both the one and the other might be shewn, and better shewn, without them, to those, who would not refuse to see what was visibly shewn them.

Secondly, Another Reason that makes me doubt, whether Syllogism be the only proper Instrument of Reason in the Discovery of Truth, is, that of whatever use Mode and Figure is pretended to be, in the laying open of Fallacy, (which has been above considered) those Scholastic Forms of Discourse are not less liable to Fallacies than the plainer Ways of Argumentation: And for this I appeal to common Observation, which has
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has always found these artificial Methods of Reasoning more adapted to catch and entangle the Mind, than to instruct and inform the Understanding. And hence it is, that Men, even when they are baffled and silenced in this Scholastic Way, are seldom, or never convinced, and so brought over to the conquering Side: They, perhaps, acknowledge their Adversary to be the more skilful Disputant; but rest, nevertheless, persuaded of the Truth on their Side; and go away, worsted as they are, with the same Opinion they brought with them: Which they could not do, if this Way of Argumentation carried Light and Conviction with it, and made Men see where the Truth lay.

And, therefore, Syllogism has been thought more proper for the attaining Victory in Dispute, than for the Discovery, or Confirmation of Truth, in fair Enquiries: And, if it be certain, that Fallacy can be couched in Syllogism, as it cannot be denied, it must be something else, and not Syllogism, that must discover them.

I have had Experience how ready some Men are, when all the Use, which they have been wont to ascribe to any Thing, is not allowed, to cry out, that I am for laying it wholly aside. But to prevent such unjust and groundless Imputations, I tell them, that I am not for taking away any Helps to the Understanding, in the Attainment of Knowledge. And if Men skilled in, and used to Syllogisms, find them assist to their Reason, in the Discovery of Truth, I think they ought to make use of them. All that I aim at is, that they should not ascribe more to these Forms, than belongs to them; and think, that Men have no use, or not so full a Use, of their Reasoning Faculty, without them. Some Eyes want Spectacles, to see Things clearly and distinctly; but let not those that use them, therefore say, nobody can see clearly without them: Those who do so will be thought in Favour of Art, (which, perhaps, they are beholden to) a little too much to depress and disredit Nature. Reason, by its own Penetration, where it is strong and exercised, usually sees quicker and clearer without Syllogism. If use of those Spectacles has so dimmed its Sight, that it cannot, without them, see Consequences, or Inconsequences in Argumentation, I am not
not so unreasonable as to be against the using them. Every one
knows what best fits his own Sight: But let him not thence
conclude all in the dark, who use not just the same Helps that he
finds a need of.

§ 5. But, however it be in Knowledge, I
think I may truly say, it is of far less, or no
Use at all, in Probabilities. For the Assent there,
being to be determined by the Preponderancy,
after a due Weighing of all the Proofs, with all Circumstances,
on both Sides, nothing is so unfit to assist the Mind in that, as
Syllogism: Which running away with one assumed Probability,
or one topical Argument, pursues that, till it has led the Mind
quite out of Sight of the Thing under Consideration: And for-
cing it upon some remote Difficulty, holds it fast there, intangl-
ed, perhaps, and as it were manacled in the Chain of Syllogisms,
without allowing it the Liberty, much less affording it the Helps,
requisite to shew on which Side, all Things considered, is the
greater Probability.

§ 6. But let it help us, (as perhaps may be
said) in convincing Men of their Errors and
Mistakes: (And yet I would fain see the Man,
that was forced out of his Opinion by Dint of
Syllogism) yet still it fails our Reason in that Part, which, if not
its highest Perfection, is yet certainly its hardest Task, and that,
which we most need its Help in; and that is, the finding of
Proofs, and making new Discoveries. The Rules of Syllogism
serve not to furnish the Mind with those intermediate Ideas, that
may shew the Connexion of remote ones. This Way of Rea-
soning discovers no new Proofs, but is the Art of marshalling
and ranging the old ones we have already. The 47th Propo-
sition of the first Book of Euclid is very true; but the Disco-
very of it, I think, not owing to any Rules of common Logic.
A Man knows first, and then he is able to prove syllogistically:
So that Syllogism comes after Knowledge, and then a Man has
little, or no need of it. But it is chiefly by the finding out
those Ideas, that shew the Connexion of distant ones, that our
Stock of Knowledge is increased, and that useful Arts and Sci-
ences
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ences are advanced. *Syllogism*, at best, is but the Art of Fencing, with the little Knowledge we have, without making any Addition to it. And if a Man should employ his Reason all this Way, he will not do much otherwise than he, who, having got some Iron out of the Bowels of the Earth, should have it beaten up all into Swords, and put it into his Servants Hands to fence with, and bang one another. Had the King of *Spain* employed the Hands of his People, and his *Spanish* Iron so, he had brought to Light but little of that Treasure, that lay so long hid in the dark Entrails of *America*. And I am apt to think, that he, who shall employ all the Force of his Reason, only in brandishing of *Syllogisms*, will discover very little of that *Mass* of Knowledge, which lies yet concealed in the secret Recesses of Nature; and which, I am apt to think, native, rural Reason (as it formerly has done) is likelier to open a Way to, and add to the common Stock of Mankind, rather than any Scholastic Proceeding, by the strict Rules of Mode and Figure.

§. 7. I doubt not, nevertheless, but there are Ways to be found, to assist our Reason in this most useful Part; and this the judicious *Hooker* encourages me to say, who in his *Eccl. Pol.*

i. 1. §. 6. speaks thus: If there might be added the right Helps of true Art and Learning, (which Helps I must plainly confess, this Age of the World, carrying the Name of a learned Age, doth neither much know, nor generally regard) there would undoubtedly be almost as much Difference, in Maturity of Judgment, between Men therewith inured, and that which now Men are, as between Men that are now, and Innocents. I do not pretend to have found, or discovered here any of those *right Helps of Art*, this great Man of deep Thought mentions; but this is plain, that *Syllogism*, and the *Logic* now in Use, which were as well known in his Days, can be none of those he means. It is sufficient for me, if, by a Discourse, perhaps something out of the Way, I am sure, as to me, wholly new and unborrowed, I shall have given occasion to others to cast about for new Discoveries, and to seek in their own Thoughts, for those *right Helps of Art*, which will scarce be found, I fear, by those who servilely confine
confine themselves to the Rules and Dictates of others. For beaten Tracts lead these sort of Cattle (as an observing Roman calls them) whose Thoughts reach only to Imitation, non quo eundem eft, sed quo iter. But I can be bold to say, that this Age is adorned with some Men of that Strength of Judgment, and Largeness of Comprehension, that, if they would employ their Thoughts on this Subject, could open new and undiscovered Ways to the Advancement of Knowledge.

§. 8. Having here had an Occasion to speak of Syllogism in general, and the Use of it in Reasoning, and the Improvement of our Knowledge; it is fit, before I leave this Subject, to take notice of one manifest Mistake in the Rules of Syllogism, viz. That no Syllogistical Reasoning can be right and conclusive, but what has, at least, one general Proposition in it. As if we could not reason, and have Knowledge about Particulars: Whereas, in Truth, the Matter rightly considered, the immediate Object of all our Reasoning and Knowledge, is nothing but Particulars. Every Man's Reasoning and Knowledge is only about the Ideas, existing in his own Mind, which are truly, every one of them, particular Existences, and our Knowledge and Reasoning about other Things, is only as they correspond with those our particular Ideas. So that the Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of our particular Ideas, is the whole and utmost of all our Knowledge. Universality is but accidental to it, and consists only in this, That the particular Ideas, about which it is, are such, as more than one particular Thing can correspond with, and be represented by. But the Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of any two Ideas, and, consequently, our Knowledge, is equally clear and certain, whether either, or both, or neither of those Ideas, be capable of representing more real Beings than one, or no. One Thing more I crave leave to offer about Syllogism, before I leave it, viz. May one not upon just Ground enquire, whether the Form Syllogism now has, is that which in Reason it ought to have? For the Medius Terminus being to join the Extremes, i. e. the intermediate Ideas, by its Intervention, to shew the Agreement, or Disagreement
ment of the two in question, would not the Position of the *Medius Terminus* be more natural, and shew the Agreement, or Dis-agreement of the Extremes clearer and better, if it were placed in the Middle between them? which might be easily done, by transposing the Propositions, and making the *Medius Terminus* the Predicate of the First, and the Subject of the Second. As thus,

*Omnis Homo est Animal,*

*Omne Animal est vivens,*

*Ergo omnis Homo est vivens.*

*Omne Corpus est extensum et solidum,*

*Nullum extensum et solidum est pura extensio,*

*Ergo Corpus non est pura extensio.*

I need not trouble my Reader with Instances in Syllogisms, whose Conclusions are particular. The same Reason holds for the same Form in them, as well as in the general.

§. 9. **Reason,** tho' it penetrates into the Depths of the Sea and Earth, elevates our Thoughts as high as the Stars, and leads us through the vast Spaces and large Rooms of this mighty Fabrick, yet it comes far short of the real Extent of even corporeal Being; and there are many Instances wherein it fails us: As,

*First,* it perfectly fails us, where our Ideas fail. It neither does, nor can extend itself farther than they do. And, therefore, where-ever we have no Ideas, our Reasoning stops, and we are at an End of our Reckoning: And if at any Time we reason about Words, which do not stand for any Ideas, it is only about those Sounds, and nothing else.

§. 10. **Secondly,** Our Reason is often puzzled, and at a loss, because of the Obscurity, Confusion, or Imperfection of the Ideas, it is employed about; and there we are involved in Difficulties and Contradictions. Thus, not having any perfect...
Idea of the least Extension of Matter, nor of Infinity, we are at a loss about the Divisibility of Matter; but having perfect, clear, and distinct Ideas of Number, our Reason meets with none of those inextricable Difficulties in Numbers, nor finds itself involved in any Contradictions about them. Thus, we having but imperfect Ideas of the Operations of our Minds, and of the Beginning of Motion, or Thought, how the Mind produces either of them in us, and much imperfecter yet, of the Operation of God, run into great Difficulties about free created Agents, which Reason cannot well extricate itself out of.

§ 11. Thirdly, Our Reason is often at a stand, because it perceives not those Ideas, which could serve to shew the certain, or probable Agreement, or Disagreement of any two other Ideas: And in this some Mens Faculties far outgo others. Till Algebra, that great Instrument and Instance of human Sagacity, was discovered, Men, with Amazement, looked on several of the Demonstrations of ancient Mathematicians, and could scarce forbear to think the finding several of those Proofs to be something more than human.

§ 12. Fourthly, The Mind, by proceeding upon false Principles, is often engaged in Absurdities and Difficulties, brought into Straits and Contradictions, without knowing how to free itself: And, in that Case, it is in vain to implore the Help of Reason, unless it be to discover the Fallhood, and reject the Influence of those wrong Principles. Reason is so far from clearing the Difficulties, which the building upon false Foundations brings a Man into, that, if he will pursue it, it entangles him the more, and engages him deeper in Perplexities.

§ 13. Fifthly, As obscure and imperfect Ideas often involve our Reason; so, upon the same Ground, do dubious Words, and uncertain Signs often, in Discourses and Arguings, when not warily attended to, puzzle Mens Reason, and bring them to a Nonplus. But these two latter are our Fault, and not the Fault of Reason. But yet the Consequences of them are nevertheless obvious:
obvious: And the Perplexities, or Errors, they fill Mens Minds with, are every where observable.

§. 14. Some of the Ideas, that are in the Mind, are so there, that they can be, by themselves, immediately compared one with another; and in these the Mind is able to perceive, that they agree, or disagree, as clearly as that it has them. Thus the Mind perceives, that an Arch of a Circle is less than the whole Circle, as clearly as it does the Idea of a Circle: And this, therefore, as has been said, I call intuitive Knowledge; which is certain, beyond all doubt, and needs no Probation, nor can have any; this being the highest of all human Certainty. In this consists the Evidence of all those Maxims, which no body has any doubt about, but every Man (does not, as is said, only to assent to, but) knows to be true, as soon as ever they are proposed to his Understanding. In the Discovery of, and Assent to these Truths, there is no use of the discursive Faculty, no need of Reasoning, but they are known by a superior, and higher Degree of Evidence. And such, if I may guess at Things unknown, I am apt to think, that Angels have now, and the Spirits of just Men made perfect shall have, in a future State, of thousands of Things, which now either wholly escape our Apprehensions, or which, our short-sighted Reafon having got some faint Glimpse of, we, in the dark, grope after.

§. 15. But tho' we have, here and there, a little of this clear Light, some Sparks of bright Knowledge; yet the greatest Part of our Ideas are such, that we cannot discern their Agreement, or Disagreement, by an immediate comparing them. And in all these we have need of Reasoning, and must, by Discourse and Inference, make our Discoveries. Now of these there are two Sorts, which I shall take the liberty to mention here again.

First, those whole Agreement, or Disagreement, tho' it cannot be seen by an immediate putting them together, yet may be examined by the Intervention of other Ideas, which can be compared with them. In this Case, when the Agreement, or Disagreement of the intermediate Idea on both Sides, with those which
we would compare, is plainly discerned, there it amounts to a Demonstration, whereby Knowledge is produced; which, tho' it be certain, yet it is not so easy, nor altogether so clear as intuitive Knowledge. Because in that there is barely one simple Intuition, wherein there is no room for any the least Mistake, or Doubt; the Truth is seen all perfectly at once. In Demonstration, it is true, there is Intuition too, but not altogether at once; for there must be a Remembrance of the Intuition of the Agreement of the Medium, or intermediate Idea, with that we compared it with before, when we compare it with the other; and where there be many Mediums, there the Danger of the Mistake is the greater. For each Agreement, or Disagreement of the Ideas must be observed, and seen in each Step of the whole Train, and retained in the Memory, just as it is; and the Mind must be sure, that no Part of what is necessary to make up the Demonstration is omitted, or overlooked. This makes some Demonstrations long and perplexed, and too hard for those, who have not Strength of Parts distinctly to perceive, and exactly carry so many Particulars orderly in their Heads. And even those, who are able to master such intricate Speculations, are fain sometimes to go over them again, and there is need of more than one Review, before they can arrive at Certainty. But yet, where the Mind clearly retains the Intuition it had of the Agreement of any Idea with another, and that with a third, and that with a fourth, &c. there the Agreement of the first, and the fourth, is a Demonstration, and produces certain Knowledge, which may be called rational Knowledge, as the other is Intuitive.

§. 16. Secondly, There are other Ideas, whose Agreement, or Disagreement, can no otherwise be judged of, but by the Intervention of others, which have not a certain Agreement with the Extremes, but an usual, or likely one: And in these it is that the Judgment is properly exercised, which is the acquiescing of the Mind, that any Ideas do agree, by comparing them with such probable Mediums. This, tho' it never amounts to Knowledge, no, not to that which is the lowest Degree of it; yet sometimes the intermediate

To supply the Narrowsom of this, we have nothing but Judgment upon probable Reasoning.
mediate Ideas, the extremes so firmly together, and the probability is so clear and strong, that assent as necessarily follows it, as knowledge does demonstration. The great excellency and use of the judgment is to observe right, and take a true estimate of the force and weight of each probability; and then, casting them up all right together, choose that side which has the over balance.

§. 17. Intuitive knowledge is the perception of the certain agreement, or disagreement of two ideas, immediately compared together.

Rational knowledge is the perception of the certain agreement, or disagreement of any two ideas, by the intervention of one, or more other ideas.

Judgment is the thinking, or taking two ideas to agree, or disagree, by the intervention of one, or more ideas, whose certain agreement, or disagreement with them, it does not perceive, but hath observed to be frequent and usual.

§. 18. The deducing one proposition from another, or making inferences in words, be a great part of reason, and that which it is usually employed about; yet the principal act of ratiocitation, is the finding the agreement, or disagreement of two ideas, one with another, by the intervention of a third. As a man, by a yard, finds two houses to be the same length, which could not be brought together, to measure their equality by juxtaposition. Words have their consequences, as the signs of such ideas: and things agree, or disagree, as really they are; but we observe it only by our ideas.

§. 19. Before we quit this subject, it may be worth our while a little to reflect on four sorts of arguments. Four sorts of arguments, that men, in their reasonings with others, do ordinarily make use of, to prevail on their assent; or, at least, to awe them as to silence their opposition.

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First, The first is, to allledge the Opinions of Men, whose Parts, Learning, Eminency, Power, or some other Cause, has gained a Name, and settled their Reputation, in the common Esteem, with some kind of Authority. When Men are established in any kind of Dignity, it is thought a Breach of Modesty for others to derogate any way from it, and question the Authority of Men, who are in Possession of it. This is apt to be cenured, as carrying with it too much of Pride, when a Man does not readily yield to the Determination of approved Authors, which is wont to be received with Respect and Submission by others; and it is looked upon as Insolence for a Man to set up, and adhere to his own Opinion, against the current Stream of Antiquity; or to put it in the Balance against that of some learned Doctor, or otherwise approved Writer. Whoever backs his Tenets with such Authorities, thinks he ought thereby to carry the Cause, and is ready to stile it Impudence in any one, who shall stand out against them. This, I think, may be called *Argumentum ad Verecundiam*.

Secondly, Ad Ignorantiam. § 20. Secondly, Another way that Men ordinarily use to drive others, and force them to submit their Judgments, and receive the Opinion in Debate, is to require the Adversary to admit what they allledge as a Proof, or to assign a better. And this I call *Argumentum ad Ignorantiam*.

Thirdly, Ad Hominem. § 21. Thirdly, A third way is, to press a Man with Consequences drawn from his own Principles, or Concessions. This is already known under the Name of *Argumentum ad Hominem*.

Fourthly, Ad Judicium. § 22. Fourthly, The fourth is, the using of Proofs drawn from any of the Foundations of Knowledge, or Probability. This I call *Argumentum ad Judicium*. This alone, of all the four, brings true Instruction with it, and advances us in our Way to Knowledge. For, 1. It argues not another Man's Opinion to be right, because I, out of respect, or any other Consideration but that of Conviction, will not contradict him. 2. It proves not another Man to
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to be in the right way, nor that I ought to take the same with him, because I know not a better. 3. Nor does it follow, that another Man is in the right way, because he has shewn me that I am in the wrong. I may be modest, and, therefore, not oppose another Man's Persuasion: I may be ignorant, and not be able to produce a better: I may be in an Error, and another may shew me that I am so. This may dispose me, perhaps, for the Reception of Truth, but helps me not to it; that must come from Proofs and Arguments, and Light arising from the Nature of Things themselves, and not from my Shamefacedness, Ignorance, or Error.

§. 23. By what has been before said of Reason, we may be able to make some Guess at the Distinction of Things, into those that are according to, above, and contrary to Reason. 1. According to Reason are such Propositions, whose Truth we can discover, by examining, and tracing those Ideas we have from Sensation and Reflexion; and by natural Deduction find to be true, or probable. 2. Above Reason are such Propositions, whose Truth, or Probability, we cannot, by Reason, derive from those Principles. 3. Contrary to Reason are such Propositions, as are inconsistent with, or irreconcileable to our clear and distinct Ideas. Thus the Existence of one God, is according to Reason; the Existence of more than one God, contrary to Reason; the Resurrection of the Dead, above Reason. Farther, as above Reason may be taken in a double Sense, viz. either as signifying above Probability, or above Certainty; so in that large Sense also, contrary to Reason, is, I suppose, sometimes taken.

§. 24. There is another Use of the Word Reason, wherein it is opposed to Faith; which, tho' it be in itself a very improper Way of speaking, yet common Use has so authorized it, that it would be Folly either to oppose, or hope to remedy it: Only, I think, it may not be amiss to take notice, that however Faith be opposed to Reason, Faith is nothing but a firm Assent of the Mind: Which, if it be regulated, as is our Duty, cannot be afforded to any Thing, but upon good Reason, and so cannot be opposite to it. He that
that believes, without having any Reason for believing, may be in love with his own Fancies; but neither seeks Truth, as he ought, nor pays the Obedience due to his Maker, who would have him use those discerning Faculties He has given him, to keep him out of Mistake and Error. He that does not this to the best of his Power, however he sometimes lights on Truth, is in the Right but by Chance; and I know not whether the Luckiness of the Accident will excuse the Irregularity of his Proceeding. This, at least, is certain, that he must be accountable for whatever Mistakes he runs into: Whereas he, that makes use of the Light and Faculties God has given him, and seeks sincerely to discover Truth by those Helps and Abilities he has, may have this Satisfaction in doing his Duty, as a rational Creature, that, tho' he should miss Truth, he will not miss the Reward of it. For he governs his Assent right, and places it as he should, who, in any Cause, or Matter, whatsoever, believes, or disbelieves, according as Reason directs him. He, that does otherwise, transgresses against his own Light, and misuses those Faculties, which were given him to no other End, but to search and follow the clearer Evidence, and greater Probability. But since Reason and Faith are by some Men opposed, we will so consider them in the following Chapter.

C H A P. XVIII.

Of Faith and Reason, and their distinct Provinces.

§ 1. It has been above shewn, 1. That we are of Necessity ignorant, and want Knowledge of all Sorts, where we want Ideas. 2. That we are ignorant, and want rational Knowledge, where we want Proofs. 3. That we want general Knowledge and Certainty, as far we want clear and determined, specific Ideas. 4. That we want Probability to direct our Assent, in Matters, where we have neither Knowledge of our own, nor Testimony of other Men, to bottom our Reason upon.

From
From these Things thus premised, I think we may come to lay down the Measures and Boundaries between Faith and Reason; the Want whereof, may, possibly, have been the Cause, if not of great Disorders, yet at least of great Disputes, and, perhaps, Mistakes in the World: For till it be resolved how far we are to be guided by Reason, and how far by Faith, we shall in vain dispute, and endeavour to convince one another in Matters of Religion.

§. 2. I find every Sect, as far as Reason will help them, make use of it gladly: And where it fails them, they cry out, It is Matter of Faith, and above Reason. And I do not see how they can argue with any one, or ever convince a Gainsayer, who makes use of the same Plea, without setting down strict Boundaries between Faith and Reason; which ought to be the first Point, established in all Questions, where Faith has any Thing to do.

Reason, therefore, here, as contradistinguished to Faith, I take to be the Discovery of the Certainty, or Probability, of such Propositions, or Truths, which the Mind arrives at, by Deduction made from such Ideas, which it has got by the Use of its natural Faculties, viz. by Sensation, or Reflexion.

Faith, on the other Side, is the Assent to any Proposition, not thus made out by the Deduction of Reason; but upon the Credit of the Proposer, as coming from God, in some extraordinary Way of Communication. This Way of discovering Truths to Men, we call Revelation.

§. 3. First, Then, I say, that no Man inspired by God, can, by any Revelation, communicate to others any new simple Ideas, which they had not before from Sensation, or Reflexion. For, whatsoever Impressions he himself may have from the immediate Hand of God, this Revelation, if it be of new simple Ideas, cannot be conveyed to another, either by Words, or any other Signs. Because Words, by their immediate Operation on us, cause no other Ideas, but of their natural Sounds: And it is by the Custom of using them for Signs, that they excite and revive in our Minds latent Ideas; but yet on-
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ly such Ideas, as were there before. For Words seen, or heard, recal to our Thoughts those Ideas only, which to us they have been wont to be Signs of; but cannot introduce any perfectly new; and formerly unknown, simple Ideas. The same holds in all other Signs, which cannot signify to us Things, of which we have before never had any Idea at all.

Thus, whatever Things were discovered to St. Paul, when he was wrapped up in the Third Heaven, whatever new Ideas, his Mind there received, all the Description he can make to others of that Place, is only this, that there are such Things, as Eye hath not seen, nor Ear heard, nor hath it entered into the Heart of Man to conceive. And supposing God should discover to any one, supernaturally, a Species of Creatures inhabiting, for Example Jupiter, or Saturn, (for that it is possible there may be such, no body can deny) which had six Senses; and imprint on his Mind the Ideas, conveyed to theirs, by that sixth Sense; he could no more, by Words, produce, in the Minds of other Men those Ideas, imprinted by that sixth Sense, than one of us could convey the Ideas of any Colour, by the Sounds of Words, into a Man, who having the other four Senses perfect, had always totally wanted the fifth of Seeing. For our simple Ideas then, which are the Foundation and sole Matter of all our Notions and Knowledge, we must depend wholly on our Reason, I mean, our natural Faculties; and can by no means receive them, or any of them, from traditional Revelation; I say, traditional Revelation, in Distinction to original Revelation. By the one, I mean that first Impression, which is made immediately by God, on the Mind of any Man, to which we cannot set any Bounds; and by the other, those Impressions, delivered over to others in Words, and the ordinary Ways of conveying our Conceptions one to another.

§ 4. Secondly, I say, that the same Truths may be discovered, and conveyed down from Revelation, which are discoverable to us by Reason, and by those Ideas we naturally may have. So God might, by Revelation, discover the Truth of any Proposition in Euclid; as well as Men,
by the natural Use of their Faculties, come to make the Discovery themselves. In all Things of this Kind, there is little Need, or Use of Revelation, God having furnished us with natural, and surer Means to arrive at the Knowledge of them. For whatsoever Truth we come to the clear Discovery of, from the Knowledge and Contemplation of our own Ideas, will always be certainer to us, than those which are conveyed to us by traditional Revelation. For the Knowledge we have, that this Revelation came at first from God, can never be so sure, as the Knowledge we have, from the clear and distinct Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of our own Ideas. V. g. If it were revealed some Ages since, that the three Angles of a Triangle were equal to two right ones, I might assent to the Truth of that Proposition, upon the Credit of the Tradition, that it was revealed: But that would never amount to so great a Certainty as the Knowledge of it, upon the Comparing and Measuring my own Ideas of two right Angles, and the three Angles of a Triangle. The like holds in Matter of Fact, knowable by our Senses, v. g. the History of the Deluge is conveyed to us by Writings, which had their Original from Revelation: And yet no body, I think, will say, he has as certain and clear a Knowledge of the Flood, as Noah that saw it; or that he himself would have had, had he then been alive, and seen it. For he has no greater an Assurance than that of his Senses, that it is writ in the Book, suppos’d writ by Moses inspired: But he has not so great an Assurance, that Moses writ that Book, as if he had seen Moses write it. So that the Assurance of its being a Revelation, is less still than the Assurance of his Senses.

§ 5. In Propositions then, whose Certainty is built upon the clear Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of our Ideas, attained either by immediate Intuition, as in self-evident Propositions, or by evident Deductions of Reason in Demonstrations, we need not the Assistance of Revelation, as necessary to gain our Assent, and introduce them into our Minds. Because the natural Ways of Knowledge
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Knowledge could settle them there, or had done it already; which is the greatest Assurance we can possibly have of any thing, unless where God immediately reveals it to us: And there too, our Assurance can be no greater, than our Knowledge is, that it is a Revelation from God. But yet nothing, I think, can, under that Title, shake, or over-rule plain Knowledge, or rationally prevail with any Man to admit it for true, in a direct Contradiction to the clear Evidence of his own Understanding. For since no Evidence of our Faculties, by which we receive such Revelations, can exceed, if equal, the Certainty of our intuitive Knowledge, we can never receive for a Truth, any thing, that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct Knowledge; v.g. the Ideas of one Body, and one Place, do so clearly agree, and the Mind has so evident a Perception of their Agreement, that we can never assent to a Proposition, that affirms the same Body to be in two distant Places at once, however it should pretend to the Authority of a divine Revelation: Since the Evidence, First, That we deceive not ourselves, in ascribing it to God; Secondly, That we understand it right; can never be so great, as the Evidence of our own intuitive Knowledge, whereby we discern it impossible for the same Body to be in two Places at once. And, therefore, no Proposition can be received for divine Revelation, or obtain the assent due to all such, if it be contradictory to our clear, intuitive Knowledge. Because this would be to subvert the Principles and Foundations of all Knowledge, Evidence, and Assent whatsoever: And there would be left no Difference between Truth and Falsity, no Measures of Credible and Incredible, in the World, if doubtful Propositions shall take Place before self-evident; and what we certainly know, give Way to what we may possibly be mistaken in. In Propositions, therefore, contrary to the clear Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of any of our Ideas, it will be in vain to urge them as Matters of Faith. They cannot move our Assent, under that, or any other Title whatsoever. For Faith can never convince us of any Thing, that contradicts our Knowledge. Because, tho' Faith be founded on the Testimony of God, (who cannot lie) revealing
ing any Proposition to us; yet we cannot have an Assurance of the Truth of its being a divine Revelation, greater than our own Knowledge: Since the whole Strength of the Certainty depends upon our Knowledge, that God revealed it; which in this Case, where the Proposition, supposed to be revealed, contradicts our Knowledge, or Reason, will always have this Objection hanging to it, (viz.) that we cannot tell how to conceive that to come from God, the bountiful Author of our Being, which, if received for true, must overturn all the Principles and Foundations of Knowledge He has given us; render all our Faculties useless, wholly destroy the most excellent Part of His Workmanship, our Understandings; and put a Man in a Condition, wherein he will have less Light, less Conduct, than the Beast that perisheth. For if the Mind of Man can never have a clearer (and, perhaps, not so clear) Evidence of any Thing, to be a divine Revelation, as it has of the Principles of its own Reason, it can never have a Ground to quit the clear Evidence of its Reason, to give place to a Proposition, whose Revelation has not a greater Evidence, than those Principles have.

§. 6. Thus far a Man has Use of Reason, and ought to hearken to it, even in immediate and original Revelation, where it is supposed to be made to himself: But to all those, who pretend not to immediate Revelation, but are required to pay Obedience, and to receive the Truths revealed to others, which, by the Traditions of Writings, or Word of Mouth, are conveyed down to them; Reason has a great deal more to do, and is that only, which can induce us to receive them. For, Matter of Faith being only divine Revelation, and nothing else; Faith, as we use the Word, (called commonly divine Faith) has to do with no Propositions, but those which are supposed to be divinely revealed. So that I do not see how those, who make Revelation alone the sole Object of Faith, can say, that it is a Matter of Faith, and not of Reason, to believe, that such, or such a Proposition, to be found in such, or such a Book, is of Divine Inspiration; unless it be revealed, that That Proposition, or all in that Book,
was communicated by Divine Inspiration. Without such a Revelation, the believing, or not believing that Proposition, or Book, to be of Divine Authority, can never be Matter of Faith, but Matter of Reason; and such, as I must come to an Assent to, only by the Use of my Reason, which can never require, or enable me to believe that, which is contrary to itself: It being impossible for Reason ever to procure any Assent to that, which to itself appears unreasonable.

In all Things, therefore, where we have clear Evidence from our Ideas, and those Principles of Knowledge I have above-mentioned, Reason is the proper Judge; and Revelation, tho' it may, in conflenting with it, confirm its Dictates, yet cannot in such Cases invalidate its Decrees: Nor can we be obliged, where we have the clear and evident Sentence of Reason, to quit it for the contrary Opinion, under a Pretence, that it is Matter of Faith; which can have no Authority against the plain and clear Dictates of Reason.

§. 7. But, Thirdly, there being many Things, wherein we have very imperfect Notions, or none at all; and other Things, of whose past, present, or future Existence, by the natural Use of our Faculties, we can have no Knowledge at all; these, as being beyond the Discovery of our natural Faculties, and above Reason, are, when revealed, the proper Matter of Faith. Thus, that Part of the Angels rebelled against God, and thereby lost their first happy State; and that the Dead shall rise, and live again: These, and the like, being beyond the Discovery of Reason, are purely Matters of Faith; with which Reason has directly nothing to do.

§. 8. But since God, in giving us the Light of Reason, has not thereby tied up His own Hands from affording us, when He thinks fit, the Light of Revelation, in any of those Matters, wherein our natural Faculties are able to give a probable Determination; Revelation, where God has been pleased to give it, must carry it, against the probable Conjectures of Reason. Because the Mind, not being certain of the Truth
Truth of that it does not evidently know, but only yielding to the Probability that appears in it, is bound to give up its Assent to such a Testimony; which, it is satisfied, comes from One who cannot err, and will not deceive. But yet it still belongs to Reason, to judge of the Truth of its being a Revelation, and of the Signification of the Words wherein it is delivered. Indeed, if any thing shall be thought Revelation, which is contrary to the plain Principles of Reason, and the evident Knowledge the Mind has of its own clear and distinct Ideas; there Reason must be hearkened to, as to a Matter within its Province. Since a Man can never have so certain a Knowledge, that a Proposition, which contradicts the clear Principles and Evidences of his own Knowledge, was divinely revealed, or that he understands the Words rightly, wherein it is delivered; as he has, that the contrary is true: And so is bound to consider and judge of it, as a Matter of Reason, and not to swallow it, without Examination, as a Matter of Faith.

§. 9. First, Whatever Proposition is revealed, of whose Truth our Mind, by its natural Faculties and Notions, cannot judge; that is purely Matter of Faith, and above Reason.

Secondly, All Propositions, whereof the Mind, by the Use of its natural Faculties, can come to determine and judge, from naturally acquired Ideas, are Matter of Reason; with this Difference still, that in those, concerning which it has but an uncertain Evidence, and so is persuaded of their Truth, only upon probable Grounds, which still admit a Possibility of the contrary to be true, without doing Violence to the certain Evidence of its own Knowledge, and overturning the Principles of all Reason; in such probable Propositions, I say, an evident Revelation ought to determine our Assent, even against Probability. For, where the Principles of Reason have not evidenced a Proposition to be certainly true, or false, there clear Revelation, as another Principle of Truth, and Ground of Assent, may determine; and so it may be Matter of Faith, and be also above Reason. Because Reason, in that particular Matter, being able to reach no higher than Probability
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§. 10. Thus far the Dominion of Faith reaches, and that without any Violence, or Hindrance to Reason; which is not injured, or disturbed, but assisted and improved, by new Discoveries of Truth, coming from the eternal Fountain of all Knowledge. Whatever God hath revealed, is certainly true; no Doubt can be made of it. This is the proper Object of Faith: But, whether it be a divine Revelation, or no, Reason must judge; which can never permit the Mind to reject a greater Evidence, to embrace what is less evident, nor allow it to entertain Probability, in Opposition to Knowledge and Certainty. There can be no Evidence, that any traditional Revelation is of divine Original, in the Words we receive it, and in the Sense we understand it, so clear, and so certain, as that of the Principles of Reason; and, therefore, nothing that is contrary to, and inconsistent with the clear and self-evident Dictates of Reason, has a right to be urged, or assented to, as a Matter of Faith, wherein Reason hath nothing to do. Whatsoever is divine Revelation, ought to overrule all our Opinions, Prejudices, and Interests, and hath a Right to be received with full Assent. Such a Submission as this, of our Reason to Faith, takes not away the Land-marks of Knowledge: This shakes not the Foundations of Reason, but leaves us that Use of our Faculties, for which they were given us.

§. 11. If the Provinces of Faith and Reason are not kept distinct, by these Boundaries, there will, in Matters of Religion, be no Room for Reason at all; and those extravagant Opinions and Ceremonies, that are to be found in the several Religions of the World, will not deserve to be blamed. For, to this crying up of Faith, in Opposition to Reason, we may, I think, in a good Measure, ascribe those Aburdities, that fill almost all the Religions, which poffef and divide Mankind. For Men, having been principled with an Opinion, that they must not consult Reason...
Reason in the Things of Religion, however apparently contradictory to common Sense, and the very Principles of all their Knowledge, have let loose their Fancies, and natural Superstition; and have been, by them, led into so strange Opinions, and extravagant Practices, in Religion, that a considerate Man cannot but stand amazed at their Follies, and judge them so far from being acceptable to the great and wise God, that he cannot avoid thinking them ridiculous, and offensive to a sober good Man. So that, in effect, Religion, which should most distinguish us from Beasts, and ought most peculiarly to elevate us, as rational Creatures, above Brutes, is that wherein Men often appear most irrational, and more senseless than Beasts themselves. Credo, quia impossibile est; I believe, because it is impossible, might, in a good Man, pass for a Sally of Zeal; but would prove a very ill Rule for Men to chuse their Opinions, or Religion by.

CHAP. XIX.

Of Enthusiasm.

§ 1. He, that would seriously set upon the Search of Truth, ought, in the first Place, to prepare his Mind, with a Love of it. For he, that loves it not, will not take much Pains to get it, nor be much concerned, when he misses it. There is no body, in the Commonwealth of Learning, who does not profess himself a Lover of Truth; and there is not a rational Creature, that would not take it amiss, to be thought otherwise of. And yet, for all this, one may truly say, there are very few Lovers of Truth, for Truth’s Sake, even amongst those who persuade themselves that they are so. How a Man may know, whether he be so, in earnest, is worth Enquiry: And, I think, there is this one unerring Mark of it, viz. The not entertaining any Proposition, with greater Assurance, than the Proofs,
Proofs, it is built upon, will warrant. Whoever goes beyond this Measure of Assent, it is plain, receives not Truth, in the Love of it; loves not Truth for Truth's Sake, but for some other By-end. For the Evidence, that any Proposition is true, (except such as are self-evident) lying only in the Proofs, a Man has of it, whatsoever Degrees of Assent he affords it, beyond the Degrees of that Evidence, it is plain, all that Surplussage of Assurance is owing to some other Affection, and not to the Love of Truth: It being as impossible, that the Love of Truth should carry my Assent, above the Evidence, there is to me, that it is true, as that the Love of Truth should make me assent to any Proposition, for the Sake of that Evidence, which it has not, that it is true; which is, in Effect, to love it as a Truth, because it is possible, or probable, that it may not be true. In any Truth, that gets not Possession of our Minds, by the irresistible Light of Self-evidence, or by the Force of Demonstration, the Arguments, that gain it Assent, are the Vouchers and Gage of its Probability to us; and we can receive it for no other, than such, as they deliver it to our Understandings. Whatever Credit, or Authority, we give to any Proposition, more than it receives from the Principles and Proofs, it supports itself upon, is owing to our Inclinations that Way, and is so far a Derogation from the Love of Truth, as such: Which, as it can receive no Evidence from our Passions, or Interests, so it should receive no Tincture from them.

§ 2. The assuming an Authority, of dictating to others, and a Forwardness to prescribe to their Opinions, is a constant Concomitant of this Bias and Corruption of our Judgments:

For how, almost, can it be otherwise, but that he should be ready to impose on others Belief, who has already imposed on his own? Who can reasonably expect Arguments and Conviction from him, in dealing with others, whose Understanding is not accustomed to them, in his Dealing with himself? Who does Violence to his own Faculties, tyrannizes over his own Mind, and usurps the Prerogative, that belongs
belongs to Truth alone, which is to command Assent, by only its own Authority, i.e. by and in Proportion to that Evidence, which it carries with it.

§. 3. Upon this Occasion, I shall take the Liberty to consider a third Ground of Assent, which, with some Men, has the same Authority, and is as confidently relied on, as either Faith, or Reason; I mean Enthusiasm. Which, laying by Reason, would set up Revelation without it. Whereby, in Effect, it takes away both Reason and Revelation, and substitutes, in the room of it, the ungrounded Fancies of a Man's own Brain, and assumes them for a Foundation, both of Opinion and Conduct.

§. 4. Reason is natural Revelation, whereby the eternal Father of Light, and Fountain of all Knowledge, communicates to Mankind, that Portion of Truth, which He has laid within the Reach of their natural Faculties. Revelation is natural Reason, enlarged by a New set of Discoveries, communicated by God, immediately, which Reason vouches the Truth of, by the Testimony and Proofs it gives, that they come from God. So that he, that takes away Reason, to make way for Revelation, puts out the Light of both, and does much what the same, as if he would persuade a Man to put out his Eyes, the better to receive the remote Light of an invisible Star, by a Telescope.

§. 5. Immediate Revelation, being a much easier Way for Men, to establish their Opinions, and regulate their Conduct, than the tedious and not always successful Labour of strict Reasoning, it is no Wonder, that some have been very apt to pretend to Revelation, and to persuade themselves, that they are under the peculiar Guidance of Heaven, in their Actions and Opinions, especially in those of them, which they cannot account for, by the ordinary Methods of Knowledge, and Principles of Reason. Hence we see, that in all Ages, Men, in whom Melancholy has mixed with Devotion, or whose Conceit of themselves has raised them into an Opinion of a greater Familiarity with God, and a nearer Admittance to His Favour, than is afforded to others, have often
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ten flattered themselves with a Persuasion of an immediate Intercourse with the Deity, and frequent Communications from the Divine Spirit. God, I own, cannot be denied to be able to enlighten the Understanding, by a Ray darted into the Mind, immediately from the Fountain of Light: This they understand, He has promised to do, and who then has so good a Title to expect it, as those, who are His peculiar People, chosen by Him, and depending on him?

§. 6. Their Minds being thus prepared, whatsoever groundless Opinion comes to settle itself strongly upon their Fancies, is an Illumination from the Spirit of God, and presently of divine Authority: And, whatsoever odd Action they find in themselves a strong Inclination to do, that Impulse is concluded to be a Call, or Direction, from Heaven, and must be obeyed; it is a Commission from Above, and they cannot err, in executing it.

§. 7. This I take to be properly Enthusiasm, which, tho' founded neither on Reason, nor divine Revelation, but rising from the Conceits of a warmed, or over-weening Brain, works yet, where it once gets Footing, more powerfully on the Persuasions and Actions of Men, than either of those two, or both together: Men being most forwardly obedient to the Impulses they receive, from themselves; and the whole Man is sure to act more vigorously, where the whole Man is carried by a natural Motion. For strong Conceit, like a new Principle, carries all easily with it, when got above common Sense, and freed from all Restraint of Reason, and Check of Reflexion, it is heightened into a divine Authority, in Concurrence with our own Temper and Inclination.

§. 8. Tho' the odd Opinions, and extravagant Actions, Enthusiasm has run Men into, were enough to warn them, against this wrong Principle, so apt to misguide them, both in their Belief and Conduct; yet the Love of something extraordinary, the Ease and Glory it is to be inspired, and be above the common and natural Ways of Knowledge, so flatters many Mens Lazines, Ignorance, and Vanity, that, when once
once they are got into this Way, of immediate Revelation, of Illumination without Search, and of Certainty without Proof, and without Examination, 'tis a hard Matter to get them out of it. Reason is lost upon them, they are above it: They see the Light infused into their Understandings, and cannot be mistaken; 'tis clear and visible there, like the Light of bright Sunshine: Shews itself, and needs no other Proof, but its own Evidence: They feel the Hand of God, moving them within, and and the Impulses of the Spirit, and cannot be mistaken, in what they feel. Thus they support themselves, and are sure, Reason, hath nothing to do with what they see and feel in themselves: What they have a sensible Experience of, admits no Doubt, needs no Probation. Would he not be ridiculous, who should require to have it proved to him, that the Light shines, and that he sees it? It is its own Proof, and can have no other. When the Spirit brings Light into our Minds, it dispels Darkness. We see it, as we do that of the Sun, at Noon, and need not the Twilight of Reason, to shew it us. This Light from Heaven is strong, clear, and pure, carries its own Demonstration with it: And we may, as rationally, take a Glow-worm to assist us to discover the Sun, as to examine the celestial Ray, by our dim Candle, Reason.

§. 9. This is the Way of talking of these Men; they are sure, because they are sure: And their Persuasions are right, only because they are strong in them. For, when what they say is stripped of the Metaphor of Seeing and Feeling, this is all it amounts to: And yet these Similes so impose on them, that they serve them, for Certainty in themselves, and Demonstration to others.

§. 10. But to examine, a little soberly, this internal Light, and this Feeling, on which they build so much. These Men have, they say, clear Light, and they see; they have awakened Sense, and they feel: This cannot, they are sure, be disputed them. For, when a Man says he sees, or he feels, no body can deny it him, that he does so. But here, let me ask: This seeing, is it the Perception of the Truth of the Proposition, or of this, that it...
is a Revelation from God? This Feeling, is it a Perception of an Inclination, or Fancy, to do Something, or of the Spirit of God, moving that Inclination? These are two very different Perceptions, and must be carefully distinguished, if we would not impose upon ourselves. I may perceive the Truth of a Proposition, and yet not perceive, that it is an immediate Revelation from God. I may perceive the Truth of a Proposition in Euclid, without its being, or my perceiving it to be, a Revelation: Nay, I may perceive I came not by this Knowledge in a natural Way, and so may conclude it revealed, without perceiving that it is a Revelation from God; because there be Spirits, which, without being divinely commissioned, may excite those Ideas in me, and lay them in such Order, before my Mind, that I may perceive their Connexion. So that the Knowledge of any Proposition, coming into my Mind I know not how, is not a Perception that it is from God. Much less is a strong Persuasion, that it is true, a Perception that it is from God, or so much as true. But, however it be called Light and Seeing, I suppose, it is at most, but Belief and Assurance: And the Proposition, taken for a Revelation, is not such as they know to be true but take to be true. For, where a Proposition is known to be true, Revelation is needless; and it is hard to conceive, how there can be a Revelation, to any one, of what he knows already. If, therefore, it be a Proposition, which they are persuaded, but do not know to be true, whatever they may call it, it is not Seeing, but Believing. For these are two Ways, whereby Truth comes into the Mind, wholly distinct, so that one is not the other. What I see, I know to be so, by the Evidence of the Thing itself: What I believe, I take to be so upon the Testimony of another: But this Testimony, I must know to be given, or else what Ground have I of Believing? I must see that it is God, that reveals this to me, or else I see nothing. The Question then here is, How do I know, that God is the Revealer of this to me; that this Impression is made upon my Mind, by His Holy Spirit, and that, therefore, I ought to obey it? If I know not this, how great soever the Assurance is, that I am possessed with, it is groundless; whatever Light I pretend to, it is but Enthusiasm.
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Enthusiasm.

For, whether the Proposition, supposed to be revealed, be in itself evidently true, or visibly probable, or by the natural Ways of Knowledge, uncertain, the Proposition, that must be well grounded, and manifested to be true, is this, that God is the Revealer of it, and that, what I take to be a Revelation, is certainly put into my Mind by Him, and is not an Illusion, dropped in by some other Spirit, or raised by my own Fancy. For, if I mistake not, these Men receive it for true, because they presume God revealed it. Does it not then stand them upon, to examine, upon what Grounds they presume it to be a Revelation from God? Or else, all their Confidence is mere Presumption: And this Light, they are so dazzled with, is nothing but an ignis fatuus, that leads them continually round in this Circle; it is a Revelation, because they firmly believe it; and they believe it, because it is a Revelation.

§. 11. In all that is of divine Revelation, there is need of no other Proof, but that it is an Inspiration from God: For he can neither deceive, nor be deceived. But how shall it be known, that any Proposition, in our Minds, is a Truth, infused by God; a Truth, that is revealed to us by Him, which He declares to us, and, therefore, we ought to believe? Here it is, that Enthusiasm fails of the Evidence it pretends to. For Men, thus possessed, boast of a Light, whereby, they say, they are enlightened, and brought into the Knowledge of this, or that Truth. But, if they know it to be a Truth, they must know it to be so, either by its own Self-evidence to natural Reason, or by the rational Proofs, that make it out to be so. If they see and know it to be a Truth either of these two Ways, they in vain suppose it to be a Revelation. For they know it to be true, by the same Way, that any other Man naturally may know that it is so, without the Help of Revelation. For thus all the Truths, of what Kind soever, that Men, uninspired, are enlightened with, came into their Minds, and are established there. If they say, they know it to be true, because it is a Revelation from God; the Reason is good: But then, it will be demanded, How they know it to be a Revelation from God?
God? If they say, by the Light it brings with it, which shines bright in their Minds, and they cannot resist: I beseech them to consider, whether this be any more, than what we have taken Notice of already, viz. that it is a Revelation, because they strongly believe it to be true. For all the Light, they speak of, is but a strong, tho' ungrounded Persuasion of their own Minds, that it is a Truth. For rational Grounds from Proofs, that it is a Truth, they must acknowledge to have none; for then, it is not received as a Revelation, but upon the ordinary Grounds, that other Truths are received: And if they believe it to be true, because it is a Revelation, and have no other Reason for its being a Revelation, but because they are fully persuaded, without any other Reason, that it is true, they believe it to be a Revelation, only because they strongly believe it to be a Revelation; which is a very unsafe Ground to proceed on, either in our Tenets, or Actions. And what readier Way can there be, to run ourselves into the most extravagant Errors and Miscarriages, than thus to set up Fancy for our supreme and sole Guide, and to believe any Proposition to be true, any Action to be right, only because we believe it to be so? The Strength of our Persuasions is no Evidence at all, of their own Rectitude: Crooked Things may be as stiff and unflexible, as freight: And Men may be as positive and peremptory in Error, as in Truth, How come else the untractable Zealots, in different and opposite Parties? For, if the Light, which every one thinks he has in his Mind, which in this Case is nothing but the Strength of his own Persuasion, be an Evidence that it is from God, contrary Opinions may have the same Title to be Inspirations; and God will be not only the Father of Lights, but of opposite and contradictory Lights leading Men contrary Ways; and contradictory Propositions will be divine Truths, if an ungrounded Strength of Assurance be an Evidence, that any Proposition is a divine Revelation.

§ 12. This cannot be otherwise, whilst Firmness of Persuasion is made the Cause of Believing, and Confidence, of being in the Right, is made an Argument of Truth. St. Paul himself
Chap. XIX. Enthusiasm.

self believed he did well, and that he had a Call to it, when he persecuted the Christians, whom he confidently thought in the Wrong: But yet it was he, and not they, who were mistaken. Good Men are Men still, liable to mistakes; and are sometimes warmly engaged in Errors, which they take for divine Truths, shining in their Minds with the clearest Light.

§. 13. Light, true Light in the Mind is, or can be nothing else, but the Evidence of the Truth of any Proposition; and, if it be not a self-evident Proposition, all the Light it has, or can have, is from the Clearness and Validity of those Proofs, upon which it is received. To talk of any other Light in the Understanding, is to put ourselves in the Dark, or in the Power of the Prince of Darkness; and, by our own Consent, to give ourselves up to Delusion, to believe a Lie. For, if Strength of Persuasion be the Light, which must guide us; I ask, how shall any one distinguish between the Delusions of Satan, and the Inspirations of the Holy Ghost? He can transform himself into an Angel of Light. And they, who are led by this Son of the Morning, are as fully satisfied of the Illumination, i. e. are as strongly persuaded, that they are enlightened, by the Spirit of God, as any one, who is so: They acquiesce and rejoice in it, are acted by it: And no body can be more sure, nor more in the Right, (if their own strong Belief may be Judge) than they.

§. 14. He, therefore, that will not give himself up to all the Extravagancies of Delusion and Error, must bring this Guide, of his Light within, to the Trial. God, when He makes the Prophet, does not unmake the Man. He leaves all his Faculties in their natural State, to enable him to judge of his Inspirations, whether they be of divine Original, or no. When He illuminates the Mind with supernatural Light, He does not extinguish that which is natural. If He would have us assent to the Truth of any Proposition, He either evidences that Truth, by the usual Methods of natural Reason, or else makes it known to be a Truth, which He would have us assent to, by His Authority; and convinces us, that it is from Him, by some Marks, which Reason
Reason cannot be mistaken in. Reason must be our last Judge and Guide, in every Thing. I do not mean, that we must consult Reason, and examine whether a Proposition, revealed from God, can be made out, by natural Principles, and if it cannot, that then we may reject it: But consult it we must, and by it examine, whether it be a Revelation from God, or no. And, if Reason finds it to be revealed from God, Reason then declares for it, as much as for any other Truth, and makes it one of her Dictates. Every Conceit, that thoroughly warms our Fancies, must pass for an Inspiration, if there be nothing but the Strength of our Persuasions, whereby to judge of our Persuasions: If Reason must not examine their Truth, by something extrinsical to the Persuasions themselves, Inspirations and Delusions, Truth and Falsity, will have the same Measure, and will not be possible to be distinguished.

§. 15. If this internal Light, or any Proposition which, under that Title, we take for inspired, be conformable to the Principles of Reason, or to the Word of God, which is attested Revelation, Reason warrants it, and we may safely receive it for true, and be guided by it, in our Belief and Actions: If it receive no Testimony, nor Evidence, from either of these Rules, we cannot take it for a Revelation, or so much as for true, till we have some other Mark, that it is a Revelation, besides our believing that it is so. Thus we see the holy Men of Old, who had Revelations from God, had something else, besides that internal Light, of Assurance in their own Minds, to testify to them that it was from God. They were not left to their own Persuasions alone, that those Persuasions were from God; but had outward Signs to convince them of the Author of those Revelations. And, when they were to convince others, they had a Power given them, to justify the Truth of their Commission from Heaven: And, by visible Signs, to assert the divine Authority of a Message they were sent with. Moses saw the Bush burn, without being consumed, and heard a Voice out of it. This was something, besides finding an Impulse upon his Mind, to go to Pharaoh, that he might bring his Brethren out of Egypt: And yet he thought not this enough,
enough, to authorize him to go with that Message, till God, by another Miracle, of his Rod turned into a Serpent, had assured him of a Power to testify his Mission, by the same Miracle repeated before them, whom he was sent to. Gideon was sent by an Angel, to deliver Israel from the Midianites, and yet he desired a Sign to convince him, that this Commission was from God. These, and several the like Instances to be found among the Prophets of Old, are enough to shew, that they thought not an inward Seeing, or Persuasion of their own Minds, without any other Proof, a sufficient Evidence that it was from God, tho' the Scripture does not every where mention their demanding, or having such Proofs.

§ 16. In what I have said, I am far from denying, that God can, or doth sometimes, enlighten Mens Minds, in the apprehending of certain Truths, or excite them to good Actions, by the immediate Influence and Assistance of the Holy Spirit, without any extraordinary Signs accompanying it. But, in such Cases too, we have Reason and Scripture, unerring Rules, to know whether it be from God, or no. Where the Truth, embraced, is consonant to the Revelation in the written Word of God, or the Action conformable to the Dictates of right Reason, or holy Writ, we may be assured that we run no risk, in entertaining it as such; because, tho' perhaps it be not an immediate Revelation from God, extraordinarily operating on our Minds, yet we are sure it is warranted by that Revelation, which he has given us of Truth. But it is not the Strength of our private Persuasion, within ourselves, that can warrant it to be a Light, or Motion from Heaven: Nothing can do that, but the written Word of God without us, or that Standard of Reason, which is common to us with all Men. Where Reason, or Scripture, is express for any Opinion, or Action, we may receive it, as of Divine Authority: But it is not the Strength of our own Persuasions, which can, by itself, give it that Stamp. The Bent of our own Minds may favour it, as much as we please; that may shew it to be a Fondling of our own, but will, by no Means, prove it to be an Offspring of Heaven, and of Divine Original.

C H A P.
§ 1. KNOWLEDGE being to be had, only of visible certain Truth, Error is not a Fault of our Knowledge, but a Mistake of our Judgment, giving Assent to that which is not true.

But, if Assent be grounded on Likelihood, if the proper Object and Motive of our Assent be Probability, and that Probability consists in what is laid down, in the foregoing Chapters, it will be demanded, How Men come to give their Assents contrary to Probability? For there is nothing more common, than Contrariety of Opinions; nothing more obvious, than that one Man wholly disbelieves what another only doubts of, and a third steadfastly believes, and firmly adheres to. The Reasons whereof, tho' they may be very various, yet, I suppose, may be all reduced to these four.

1. Want of Proofs.
2. Want of Ability to use them.
3. Want of Will to use them.

§ 2. First, By Want of Proofs, I do not mean only the Want of those Proofs, which are nowhere extant, and so are no where to be had; but the Want even of those Proofs, which are in Being, or might be procured. And thus, Men want Proofs, who have not the Convenience, or Opportunity, to make Experiments and Observations themselves, tending to the Proof of any Proposition; nor likewise the Convenience to enquire into, and collect the Testimonies of others: And, in this State, are the greatest Part of Mankind, who are given up to Labour, and enslaved.
Chap. XX. *Wrong Assent, or Error.*

flaved to the Necessity of their mean Condition, whose Lives are worn out, only in the Provisions for Living. These Men’s Opportunity of Knowledge and Enquiry, are commonly as narrow as their Fortunes; and their Understandings are but little instructed, when all their whole Time and Pains is laid out to still the Croaking of their own Bellies, or the Cries of their Children. ’Tis not to be expected, that a Man, who drudges on, all his Life, in a laborious Trade, should be more knowing in the Variety of Things, done in the World, than a Pack-horse, who is driven constantly forwards and backwards, in a narrow Lane, and dirty Road, only to Market, should be skilled in the Geography of the Country. Nor is it at all more possible, that he, who wants Leisure, Books, and Languages, and the Opportunity of conversing with Variety of Men, should be in a Condition to collect those Testimonies and Observations, which are in Being, and are necessary to make out many, nay most of the Propositions, that, in the Societies of Men, are judged of the greatest Moment; or to find out Grounds of Assurance so great, as the Belief of the Points, he would build on them, is thought necessary. So that a great Part of Mankind are, by the natural and unalterable State of Things in this World, and the Constitution of human Affairs, unavoidably given over to invincible Ignorance of those Proofs, on which others build, and which are necessary to establish those Opinions: The greatest Part of Men, having much to do to get the Means of Living, are not in a Condition to look after those of learned and laborious Enquiries.

§. 3. What shall we say then? Are the greatest Part of Mankind, by the Necessity of their Condition, subjected to unavoidable Ignorance, in those Things, which are of greatest Importance to them? (for of these ’tis obvious to enquire.) Have the Bulk of Mankind no other Guide, but Accident, and blind Chance, to conduct them to their Happiness, or Misery? Are the current Opinions, and licensed Guides of every Country, sufficient Evidence and Security to every Man, to venture his greatest Concernments on; nay his everlasting Happiness?
Happiness, or Misery? Or, can those be the certain and infallible Oracles and Standards of Truth, which teach one Thing in Christendom, and another Turkey? Or shall a poor Countryman be eternally happy, for having the Chance to be born in Italy; or a Day-Labourer be unavoidably lost, because he had the ill Luck to be born in England? How ready some Men may be to say some of these Things, I will not here examine: But this I am sure, that Men must allow one, or other of these to be true, (let them chuse which they please) or else grant, that God has furnished Men with Faculties, sufficient to direct them in the Way they should take, if they will but seriously employ them that Way, when their ordinary Vocations allow them the Leisure. No Man is so wholly taken up with the Attendance on the Means of Living, as to have no spare Time at all, to think of his Soul, and inform himself in Matters of Religion. Were Men as intent upon this, as they are on Things of lower Concernment, there are none so enslaved to the Necessities of Life, who might not find many Vacancies, that might be husbanded to this Advantage of their Knowledge.

§ 4. Besides those, whose Improvements
and Informations are stinted by the Narrowness of their Fortunes, there are others, whose Largeness of Fortune would plentifully enough supply Books, and other Requisites, for clearing of Doubts, and discovering of Truth: But they are cooped in close by the Laws of their Countries, and the strict Guards of those, whose Interest it is to keep them ignorant, left, knowing more, they should believe the less in them. These are as far, nay, farther from the Liberty and Opportunities of a fair Enquiry, than those poor and wretched Labourers, we before spoke of. And, however, they may seem high and great, are confined to Narrowness of Thought, and enslaved in that, which should be the freest Part of Man, their Understandings. This is generally the Case of all those, who live in Places, where Care is taken to propagate Truth, without Knowledge; where Men are forced, at a Venture, to be of the Religion of the Country; and must, therefore, swallow down Opinions, as silly People do Empiricks Pills.
Pills, without knowing what they are made of, or how they will work, and have nothing to do, but believe that they will do the Cure: But, in this, are much more miserable than they, in that they are not at Liberty to refuse swallowing, what perhaps they had rather let alone; or to chuse the Physician, to whose Conduct they would trust themselves.

§ 5. Secondly, Those, who want Skill to use those Evidences they have, of Probabilities; who cannot carry a Train of Consequences in their Heads, nor weigh exactly the Preponderancy of contrary Proofs and Testimonies, making every Circumstance its due Allowance, may be easily misled to assent to Propositions, that are not probable. There are some Men of one, some but of two Syllogisms, and no more; and others that can but advance one Step farther. These cannot always discern that Side, on which the strongest Proofs lie; cannot constantly follow that, which in itself is the more probable Opinion. Now, that there is such a Difference between Men, in respect of their Understandings, I think no body, who has had any Conversation with his Neighbours, will question: Tho' he never was at Westminster-Hall, or the Exchange, on the one Hand; nor at Alms-Houses, or Bedlam, on the other. Which great Difference in Mens Intellectuals, whether it rises from any Defect in the Organs of the Body, particularly adapted to Thinking; or in the Dulness, or Untractableness of those Faculties, for Want of Use; or, as some think, in the natural Differences of Mens Souls themselves; or some, or all of these together; it matters not here to examine: Only this is evident, that there is a Difference of Degrees, in Mens Understandings, Apprehensions, and Reasonings, to so great a Latitude, that one may, without doing Injury to Mankind, affirm, that there is a greater Distance between some Men, and others, in this Respect, than between some Men, and some Beasts. But, how this comes about, is a Speculation, tho' of great Consequence, yet not necessary to our present Purpose.

§ 6. Thirdly,
Wrong Assent, or Error. Book IV.

§ 6. Thirdly, There are another Sort of People that want Proofs, not because they are out of their Reach, but because they will not use them; who, tho' they have Riches and Leisure enough, and want, neither Parts nor Helps, are yet never the better for them. Their hot Pursuit of Pleasure, or constant Drudgery in Business, engages some Men Thoughts elsewhere: Laziness and Obstancy in general, or a particular Aversion for Books, Study, and Meditation, keep others from any serious Thoughts at all; and some out of Fear, that an impartial Enquiry would not favour those Opinions, which best suit their Prejudices, Lives, and Designs, content themselves, without Examination, to take upon Truth, what they find convenient, and in Fashion. Thus most Men, even of those that might do otherwise, pass their Lives, without an Acquaintance with, much less a rational Assent to Probabilities, they are concerned to know, tho' they lie so much within their View, that to be convinced of them, they need but turn their Eyes that Way. But we know some Men will not read a Letter, which is supposed to bring ill News; and many Men forbear to call up their Accoupts, or so much as think upon their Estates, who have Reason to fear, their Affairs are in no very good Posture. How Men, whose plentiful Fortunes allow them Leisure to improve their Understandings, can satisfy themselves with a lazy Ignorance, I cannot tell: But methinks, they have a low Opinion of their Souls, who lay out all their Incomes in Provisions for the Body, and employ none of it to procure the Means and Helps of Knowledge; who take great care to appear always in a neat and splendid Outside, and would think themselves miserable in coarse Clothes, or a patched Coat, and yet contentedly suffer their Minds to appear abroad in a pie-bald Livery of coarse Patches, and borrowed Shreds, such as it has pleased Chance, or their Country Taylor, (I mean the common Opinion of those, they have conversed with) to clothe them in. I will not here mention, how unreasonable this is, for Men that ever think of a future State, and their Concernment in it, which no rational Man can avoid to do sometimes: Nor shall I take Notice what a Shame and Confusion it is, to the greatest:
greatest Contemners of Knowledge, to be found ignorant, in Things they are concerned to know. But this at least is worth the Consideration of those, who call themselves Gentlemen, That, however, they may think Credit, Respect, Power and Authority, the Concomitants of their Birth and Fortune; yet they will find all these still carried away from them, by Men of lower Condition, who surpass them in Knowledge. They, who are blind, will always be led by those that see, or else fall into the Ditch: And he is certainly the most subject, the most enslaved, who is so in his Understanding. In the foregoing Instances, some of the Causes have been shewn of wrong Assent, and how it comes to pass, that probable Doctrines, are not always received, with an Assent proportionable to the Reasons, which are to be had for their Probability; but hitherto, we have considered only such Probabilities, whose Proofs do exist, but do not appear to him who embraces the Error.

§. 7. Fourthly, There remains yet the last Sort, who, even where the real Probabilities appear, and are plainly laid before them, do not admit of the Conviction, nor yield unto manifest Reasons, but do either suspends their Assent, or give it to the less probable Opinion: And to this Danger are those exposed, who have taken up wrong Measures of Probability; which are,

1. Propositions, that are not in themselves, certain and evident, but doubtful and false, taken up for Principles.
2. Received Hypotheses.
3. Predominant Passions, or Inclinations.
4. Authority.

§. 8. First, The first and firmest Ground of Probability, is the Conformity any Thing has to our own Knowledge; especially that Part of our Knowledge, which we have embraced, and continue to look on, as Principles. These have so great an Influence upon our Opinions, that it is usually, by them, we judge of Truth, and measure Probability, to that Degree, that what is inconsistent
consistently with our Principles, is so far from passing for probable with us, that it will not be allowed possible. The Reverence, borne to these Principles, is so great, and their Authority so paramount to all other, that the Testimony, not only of other Men, but the Evidences of our own Senses, are often rejected, when they offer to vouch any Thing, contrary to those established Rules. How much the Doctrine of innate Principles, and that Principles are not to be proved, or questioned, has contributed to this, I will not here examine. This I readily grant, that one Truth cannot contradict another: But withal, I take leave also to say, that every one ought very carefully to beware what he admits for a Principle, to examine it strictly, and see whether he certainly knows it to be true of itself, by its own Evidence, or whether he does only, with Assurance, believe it to be so, upon the Authority of others. For he hath a strong Bias, put into his Understanding, which will unavoidably misguide his Assent, who hath imbibed wrong Principles, and has blindly given himself up to the Authority of any Opinion, in itself not evidently true.

§. 9. There is nothing more ordinary, than Childrens receiving into their Minds, Propositions, (especially about Matters of Religion) from their Parents, Nurses, or those about them: Which, being insinuated into their unwary, as well as unbiased Understandings, and fastened by Degrees, are at last (equally, whether true, or false) riveted there, by long Custom and Education, beyond all possibility of being pulled out again. For Men, when they are grown up, reflecting upon their Opinions, and finding those, of this Sort, to be as ancient in their Minds, as their very Memories, not having observed their early Insinuation, nor by what Means they got them, they are apt to reverence them, as sacred Things, and not to suffer them to be prophaned, touched, or questioned: They look on them as the Urim and Thummim, set up in their Minds, immediately by God Himself, to be the great and unerring Deciders of Truth and Falshood, and the Judges, to which they are to appeal, in all Manner of Controversies.

§. 10. This
§. 10. This Opinion of his Principles (let them be what they will) being once established in any one's Mind, it is easy to be imagined, what Reception any Proposition shall find, how clearly for ever proved, that shall invalidate their Authority, or at all thwart with these internal Oracles; whereas, the grossest Absurdities and Improbabilities, being but agreeable to such Principles, go down glibly, and are easily digested. The great Obstinacy, that is to be found in Men, firmly believing quite contrary Opinions, tho' many Times equally absurd, in the various Religions of Mankind, are as evident a Proof, as they are an unavoidable Consequence of this Way of Reasoning, from received, traditional Principles. So that Men will disbelief their own Eyes, renounce the Evidence of their Senses, and give their own Experience the Lye, rather than admit of anything disagreeing with these sacred Tenets. Take an intelligent Romanist, that, from the very first dawning of any Notions in his Understanding, hath had this Principle, constantly inculcated, viz. That he must believe as the Church (i.e. those of his Communion) believes, or that the Pope is infallible; and this he never so much as heard questioned, till at Forty, or Fifty Years old, he met with one of other Principles: How is he prepared easily to swallow, not only against all Probability, but even the clear Evidence of his Senses, the Doctrine of Transubstantiation? This Principle has such an Influence on his Mind, that he will believe that to be Flesh, which he sees to be Bread. And what way will you take to convince a Man, of any improbable Opinion he holds, who, with some Philosophers, hath laid down this as a Foundation of Reasoning, That he must believe his Reason (for so Men improperly call Arguments, drawn from their Principles) against his Senses? Let an Enthusiast be principled, that he, or his Teacher, is inspired, and act'd by an immediate Communication of the Divine Spirit, and you, in vain, bring the Evidence of clear Reasons against his Doctrine. Whoever, therefore, have imbibed wrong Principles, are not, in Things inconsistent with these Principles, to be moved, by the most apparent and convincing Probabilities, till they are so candid and ingenious to themselves, as to be persuaded to examine,
mine, even those very Principles, which many never suffer themselves to do.

Secondly, Received Hypotheses. §. 11. Secondly, Next to these, are Men, whose Understandings are cast into a Mold, and fashioned just to the Size of a received Hypothesis. The Difference between these and the former, is, that they will admit of Matter of Fact, and agree with Difenters in that; but differ only in assigning of Reasons, and explaining the Manner of Operation. These are not at that open Defiance with their Sensés, as the former: They can endure to hearken to their Information, a little more patiently; but will, by no means, admit of their Reports, in the Explanation of Things; nor be prevailed on, by Probabilities, which would convince them, that Things are not brought about, just after the same Manner, that they have decreed within themselves, that they are. Would it not be an insufferable Thing, for a learned Professor, and that which his Scarlet would blush at, to have his Authority, of Forty Years standing, wrought out of hard Rock Greek and Latin, with no small Expence of Time and Candle, and confirmed by general Tradition, and a reverend Beard, in an Instant, overturned by an upstart Novel? Can any one expect that he should be made to confess, That what he taught his Scholars, Thirty Years ago, was all Error and Mistake; and that he sold them hard Words and Ignorance, at a very dear Rate? What Probabilities, I say, are sufficient to prevail in such a Case? And whoever, by the most cogent Arguments, will be prevailed with, to difrobe himself, at once, of all his old Opinions, and Pretences to Knowledge and Learning, which, with hard Study, he hath all his Time been labouring for; and turn himself out stark naked, in Quest a-fresh of new Notions? All the Arguments can be used, will be as little able to prevail, as the Wind did with the Traveller, to part with his Cloak, which he held only the faster. To this of wrong Hypothesis, may be reduced the Errors, that may be occasioned by a true Hypothesis, or right Principles, but not rightly understood. There is nothing more familiar than this. The Instances of Men, contending for different Opinions, which they
they all derive from the infallible Truth of the Scripture, are
an undeniable Proof of it. All, that call themselves Christians,
allow the Text, that says, μετανοεῖτε, to carry in it the Obliga-
tion to a very weighty Duty. But yet, how very erroneous
will one of their Preachers be, who, understanding nothing but
the French, take this Rule, with one Translation, to be, repen-
tez vous, repent; or with the other, faitez Penitence, do Penance?

§. 12. Thirdly, Probabilities, which cross
Mens Appetites and prevailing Passions, run
the same Fate. Let never so much Probability
hang on one Side of a covetous Man's Reason-
ing, and Money on the other; it is easy to foresee, which will
outweigh. Earthly Minds, like Mud Walls, resist the strongesf
Batteries; and tho' perhaps, sometimes, the Force of a clear
Argument may make some Impression; yet they nevertheless
stand firm, keep out the Enemy, Truth, that would captivate,
or disturb them. Tell a Man, passionately in Love, that he is
jilted; bring a Score of Witnesses of the Falseness of his Mis-
tress, it is ten to one but three kind Words of her's shall inva-
idate all their Testimonies. *Quod volumus, facile credimus;* 
what suits our Wishes, is forwardly believed; is, I suppose, what
every one hath more than once experimented; and tho' Men can-
not always openly gainlay, or resist the Force of manifest Prob-abilities, that make against them, yet yield they not to the Argu-
ment. Not but that it is the Nature of the Understanding, con-
stantly to close with the more probable Side; but yet a Man hath
a Power to suspend and restrain its Enquiries, and not permit a
full and satisfactory Examination, as far as the Matter in Que-
station is capable, and will bear it to be made. Until that be done,
there will be always these two Ways left of evading the most ap-
parent Probabilities.

§. 13. First, That the Arguments being (as
for the most part they are) brought in Words,
there may be a Fallacy latent in them: And the
Consequences being, perhaps, many in Train,
they may be some of them incoherent. There
are very few Discourses so short, clear, and consistent, to which
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The Means of evading Probabilities; First, Supposed Fallacy.


most Men may not, with Satisfaction enough to themselves, raise this Doubt; and from whole Conviction they may not, without Reproach of Difingenious, or Unreafonableness, let themselves free with the old Reply, Non persuades, etiamsi persuaderis; tho' I cannot answer, I will not yield.

§. 14. Secondly, Manifet Probabilities may be evaded, and the Affent with-held, upon this Suggestion, That I know not, yet, all that may be said on the contrary Side: And, therefore, tho' I am beaten, it is not necessary I should yield, not knowing what Forces there are in Reserve behind. This is a Refuge against Conviction, so open and so wide, that it is hard to determine, when a Man is quite out of the Verge of it.

§. 15. But yet, there is some End of it: And a Man, having carefully enquired into all the Grounds of Probability and Unlikeliness, done his utmost to inform himself in all Particulars fairly, and cast up the Sum total on both Sides, may, in most Cases, come to acknowledge, upon the whole Matter, on which Side the Probability rests: Wherein some Proofs, in Matter of Reafon, being Suppositions upon universal Experience, are so cogent and clear; and some Testimonies, in Matter of Fact, so universal, that he cannot refuse his Affent. So that, I think, we may conclude, that in Propositions, where, tho' the Proofs in View are of most Moment, yet there are sufficient Grounds to suspect, that there is either Fallacy in Words, or certain Proofs as considerable to be produced, on the contrary Side, there Affent, Suspence, or Diflent are often voluntary Actions: But where the Proofs are such as make it highly probable, and there is not sufficient Ground to suspect, that there is either Fallacy of Words, (which sober and serious Consideration may discover) nor equally valid Proofs, yet undiscovered, latent on the other Side (which also the Nature of the Thing may, in some Cases, make plain to a considerate Man) there, I think, a Man, who has weighed them, can scarce refuse his Affent to the Side, on which the greater Probability appears. Whether it be probable, that a promiscuous Jumble of Print-
Chap. XX. Wrong Assent, or Error.

ing Letters should often fall into a Method and Order, which should stamp, on Paper, a coherent Discourse; or that a blind fortuitous Concourse of Atoms, not guided by an understanding Agent, should frequently constitute the Bodies of any Species of Animals: In these and the like Cases, I think, no body that considers them, can be one jot at a Stand, which Side to take, nor at all waver in his Assent. Lastly, When there can be no Supposition, (the Thing in its own Nature indifferent, and wholly depending upon the Testimony of Witnesses) that there is as fair Testimony against, as for the Matter of Fact attested; which, by Enquiry, is to be learned, v. g. whether there was 1700 Years ago, such a Man at Rome, as Julius Cæsar: In all such Cases, I say, I think it is not in any rational Man’s Power, to refuse his Assent; but that it necessarily follows, and closes with such Probabilities. In other less clear Cases, I think, it is in a Man’s Power to suspend his Assent; and, perhaps, content himself with the Proofs he has, if they favour the Opinion, that suits with his Inclination, or Interest, and so stop from farther Search. But that a Man should afford his Assent to that Side, on which the less Probability appears to him, seems to me utterly impracticable, and as impossible, as it is to believe the same Thing probable, and improbable, at the same Time.

§. 16. As Knowledge is no more arbitrary than Perception; so, I think, Assent is no more in our Power than Knowledge. When the Agreement of any two Ideas appears to our Minds, whether immediately, or by the Assistance of Reason, I can no more refuse to perceive, no more avoid knowing it, than I can avoid seeing those Objects, which I turn my Eyes to, and look on, in Day-light: And what, upon full Examination, I find the most probable, I cannot deny my Assent to. But, tho’ we cannot hinder our Knowledge, where the Agreement is once perceived; nor our Assent, where the Probability manifestly appears, upon due Consideration of all the Measures of it: Yet we can hinder both Knowledge and Assent, by stopping our Enquiry, and not employing our Faculties, in the Search of any Truth. If it were not so, Ignorance,
Wrong Assent, or Error. Book IV.

Ignorance, Error, or Infidelity could not in any Case be a Fault. Thus, in some Cases, we can prevent, or suspend, our Assent: But can a Man, versed in modern, or ancient History, doubt whether there be such a Place as Rome, or whether there was such a Man as Julius Caesar? Indeed, there are Millions of Truths, that a Man is not, or may not think himself concerned to know; as whether our King Richard the Third was Crook-backed, or no; or whether Roger Bacon was a Mathematician, or a Magician. In these, and such-like Cases, where the Assent, one Way, or other, is of no Importance, to the Interest of any one; no Action, no Concernment of his, following, or depending thereon; there it is not strange, that the Mind should give itself up to the common Opinion, or render itself to the first Comer. These, and the like Opinions, are of so little Weight and Moment, that, like Motes in the Sun, their Tendencies are very rarely taken Notice of. They are there, as it were, by Chance, and the Mind lets them float at Liberty. But, where the Mind judges, that the Proposition has Concernment in it; where the Assent, or not Assenting, is thought to draw Consequences of Moment after it, and Good, or Evil, to depend on chusing, or refusing, the right Side, and the Mind sets itself seriously to enquire and examine the Probability; there, I think, it is not in our Choice to take, which Side we please, if manifest Odds appear on either. The greater Probability, I think, in that Case, will determine the Assent: And a Man can no more avoid assenting, or taking it to be true, where he perceives the greater Probability, than he can avoid knowing it to be true, where he perceives the Agreement, or Disagreement of any two Ideas.

If this be so, the Foundation of Error will lie, in wrong Measures of Probability; as the Foundation of Vice, in wrong Measures of Good.

§ 17. Fourthly, The fourth and last wrong Measure of Probability, I shall take Notice of, and which keeps in Ignorance, or Error, more People than all the other together, is that, which I have mentioned in the foregoing Chapter; I mean, the giving up our Assent.
Chap. XX. *Wrong Assent, or Error.*

sent, to the common received Opinions, either of our Friends, or Party, Neighbourhood, or Country. How many Men have no other Ground for their Tenets, than the supposed Honesty, or Learning, or Number of those of the same Profession? As if honest, or bookish Men could not err, or Truth were to be established by the Vote of the Multitude; yet this with most Men serves the Turn. The Tenet has had the Attestation of reverend Antiquity, it comes to me with the Passport of former Ages, and, therefore, I am secure in the Reception I give it: Other Men have been, and are of the same Opinion, (for that is all is said) and, therefore, it is reasonable for me to embrace it. A Man may more justifiably throw up Cross and File for his Opinions, than take them up by such Measures. All Men are liable to Error, and most Men are, in many Points, by Passion, or Interest, under Temptation to it. If we could but see the secret Motives, that influenced the Men of Name and Learning in the World, and the Leaders of Parties, we should not always find, that it was the embracing of Truth, for its own Sake, that made them espouse the Doctrines they owned and maintained. This at least is certain, there is not an Opinion so absurd, which a Man may not receive upon this Ground: There is no Error to be named, which has not had its Professors: And a Man shall never want crooked Paths to walk in, if he thinks that he is in the right Way, and wherever he has the Footsteps of others to follow.

§. 18. But, notwithstanding the great Noise is made in the World about Errors and Opinions, I must do Mankind that Right, as to say, There are not so many Men in Errors, and wrong Opinions, as is commonly supposed. Not that I think they embrace the Truth: But, indeed, because concerning those Doctrines they keep such a flutter about, they have no Thought, no Opinion at all. For, if any one should a little catechize the greatest Part of the Partizans of most of the Sects in the World, he would not find, concerning those Matters they are so zealous for, that they have any Opinions of their own: Much less would he have Reason to think, that they took them upon the Examination of Arguments, and Appearance
Appearance of Probability. They are resolved to flock to a Party, that Education, or Interest has engaged them in; and there, like the common Soldiers of an Army, shew their Courage and Warmth, as their leaders direct, without ever examining, or so much as knowing, the Cause they contend for. If a Man's Life shews, that he has no serious Regard for Religion; for what Reason should we think, that he beats his Head about the Opinions of his Church, and troubles himself to examine the Grounds of this, or that Doctrine? It is enough for him to obey his Leaders, to have his Hand and his Tongue ready, for the Support of the common Cause, and thereby approve himself to those, who can give him Credit, Preferment, or Protection in that Society. Thus Men become Professors of, and Combatants for those Opinions, they never were convinced of, nor Proselytes to; no, nor ever had so much as floating in their Heads: And tho' one cannot say, there are fewer improbable, or erroneous Opinions in the World, than there are; yet this is certain, there are fewer, that actually assent to them, and mistake them for Truths, than is imagined.

CHAP. XXI.

Of the Division of the Sciences.

Three Sorts. § 1. All, that can fall within the Compass of Human Understanding, being either, First, The Nature of Things, as they are in themselves, their Relations, and their Manner of Operation: Or, Secondly, That, which Man himself ought to do, as a rational and voluntary Agent, for the Attainment of any End, especially Happiness: Or, Thirdly, The Ways and Means, whereby the Knowledge of both the one and the other of these is attained and communicated: I think, Science may be divided properly into these three Sorts.

First, Phusica. § 2. First, The Knowledge of Things, as they are in their own proper Beings, their Constitutions,
Division of the Sciences.

The first Branch, Conclusions, Properties, and Operations; whereby I mean not only Matter and Body, but Spirits also, which have their proper Natures, Constitutions, and Operations, as well as Bodies. This, in a little more enlarged Sense of the Word, I call Φιλοσοφία, or natural Philosophy. The End of this, is bare, speculative Truth; and whatsoever can afford the Mind of Man any such, falls under this Branch, whether it be God Himself, Angels, Spirits, Bodies, or any of their Affections, as Number, and Figure, &c.

§. 3. Secondly, Περιτονία, the Skill of right applying our own Powers and Actions, for the Attainment of Things good and useful. The most considerable, under this Head, is Ethics, which is the seeking out those Rules and Measures of human Actions, which lead to Happiness, and the Means to practice them. The End of this is not bare Speculation, and the Knowledge of Truth; but Right, and a Conduct suitable to it.

§ 4. Thirdly, Σημειωμα, or the Doctrine of Signs, the most usual whereof being Words, it is aptly enough termed also Λογία, Logic; the Business whereof is to consider the Nature of Signs, the Mind makes use of, for the Understanding of Things, or conveying its Knowledge to others. For since the Things, the Mind contemplates, are none of them, besides itself, present to the Understanding, it is necessary that something else, as a Sign, or Representation of the Thing it considers, should be present to it: And these are Ideas. And because the Scene of Ideas that makes one Man's Thoughts, cannot be laid open to the immediate View of another, nor laid up anywhere, but in the Memory, a no very sure Repository; therefore, to communicate our Thoughts to one another, as well as record them for our own Use, Signs of our Ideas are also necessary. Those, which Men have found most convenient, and, therefore, generally make Use of, are articulate Sounds. The Consideration, then, of Ideas and Words, as the great Instruments of Knowledge, makes no despicable Part of their Contemplation, who would take a View of Human Knowledge, in the whole Extent of it. And, perhaps, if they were distinctly
ly weighed, and duly considered, they would afford us another
Sort of Logic and Critic, than what we have been hitherto ac-
quainted with.

This is the first § 5. This seems to me the first and the most
Division of the general, as well as natural Division of the Ob-
Objeets of jects of our Understanding. For a Man can em-
Knowledge. ploy his Thoughts about nothing, but either
the Contemplation of Things themselves, for the Discovery of
Truth, or about the Things in his own Power, which are his
own Actions, for the Attainment of his own Ends; or the
Signs, the Mind makes Use of, both in the one and the other,
and the right Ordering of them, for its clearer Information.
All which three, viz. Things, as they are in themselves know-
able; Actions, as they depend on us, in order to Happiness; and
the right Use of Signs in order to Knowledge, being toto Caelo
different, they seem to me to be the three great Provinces of
the intellectual World, wholly separate and distinct one from
another.

FINIS.
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